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THE NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY BY THE UK COURTS TO 
ANSWER THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF CONVENTION 
RIGHTS INTERPRETATION 
 
BENEDICT DOUGLAS 
 
This thesis seeks to engage with and give answers to the fundamental question of rights 
interpretation confronting the British judiciary under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). As 
a premise, it recognises that the textual openness and consequential semantic uncertainty of 
the requirements of the Convention rights necessitates their interpretation. In determining the 
approach the courts should apply, this thesis takes as its structural foundation an analysis of 
the current approach of the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) to the five pivotal questions of interpretation: who has rights, the substantive nature 
of those rights, how rights are to be weighted and balanced in cases of conflict, whether they 
are rights under a will or an interest conception, and against whom the rights are held? 
 
From this basis, the thesis builds upon the existing knowledge to apply Alan Gewirth’s 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) to the current judicial position, to critique its 
compatibility with this principle’s requirements. Through analysis of core settled 
characteristics of the Convention rights, the substance of the courts’ judgements and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, and supported by both dialectically necessary and contingent 
arguments, it is ultimately argued that it is, theoretically and practically, both necessary and 
possible for the domestic courts to be guided by the PGC in their interpretive approach. 
 
Finally, an improved understanding of the principle of human dignity will be advocated as a 
means through which the domestic courts can apply the PGC’s requirements. By this means, 
this thesis ultimately proposes an interpretive approach to the Convention rights which gives 
compelling guidance in answering the fundamental questions of rights interpretation and, by 
encouraging direct principled engagement with these questions, increases the public 
understanding of the fundamental nature of rights and the acceptability of the HRA and 
judgments under it. 
 
 
 
  
   
 
2 
 
 
 
 
THE NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY BY THE UK COURTS TO 
ANSWER THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF CONVENTION 
RIGHTS INTERPRETATION 
 
 
 
In One Volume  
 
 
Benedict John Douglas 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The Law School 
 
 
St. John’s College 
 
 
Durham University 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged.” 
Benedict Douglas 25
 
September 2012 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. ii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER II: THE UNCERTAINTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................................... 17 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 17 
The Presence of Uncertainty .................................................................................................. 17 
Unavoidable Uncertainty in Human Rights .......................................................................... 19 
The Inherent Uncertainty of Language ................................................................................ 19 
The Uncertainty of Law ....................................................................................................... 22 
The Semantic Uncertainty of Human Rights ........................................................................ 23 
The Deliberate Uncertainty of Human Rights ....................................................................... 24 
The Need for Agreement ...................................................................................................... 25 
Substantive Constraints on Content ..................................................................................... 27 
The Avoidance of Legal Obligations.................................................................................... 29 
The Consequences of Uncertainty .......................................................................................... 31 
Desirable Consequences ...................................................................................................... 31 
Potentially Problematic Consequences ............................................................................... 33 
The Need for Interpretation .................................................................................................... 35 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 37 
CHAPTER III: THE PURPOSES UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HOW THESE AND THEIR USE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION 
RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTE TO THE INDETERMINACY OF MEANING OF THE CONVENTION 
RIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................... 38 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 38 
The General Purposes behind the Convention’s Creation .................................................... 38 
Principled Purposes ................................................................................................................ 40 
From Purposes to Principles ............................................................................................... 40 
The Convention Text ............................................................................................................ 41 
The Court’s Jurisprudence .................................................................................................. 43 
Uncertainty Surrounding the Interpretation of these Principles .......................................... 44 
Dignity.................................................................................................................................. 44 
Autonomy ............................................................................................................................. 48 
   
 
4 
 
Equality ................................................................................................................................ 50 
The Practical Implications of the Uncertainty of the Underlying Principles for the 
Interpretation of the Convention Rights ................................................................................ 52 
Who Has Rights.................................................................................................................... 52 
The Substantive Nature of the Convention Rights: Positive and Negative Obligations ...... 54 
The Weighing and Balancing of Convention Rights ............................................................ 56 
The Interest and the Will Conceptions of Rights ................................................................. 57 
Horizontal and Vertical Application .................................................................................... 59 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER IV: THE APPROACH OF THE ORGANS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE PIVOTAL QUESTIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONVENTION RIGHTS ............................................................................................................. 61 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 61 
Who Can Possess Convention Rights ..................................................................................... 61 
The Convention Text ............................................................................................................ 62 
The Judicial Organs of the Convention ............................................................................... 66 
The Substantive Nature of Rights as Imposing Positive and Negative Obligations ............. 69 
The Legal Source of the Obligations ................................................................................... 70 
The Particular Nature of the Obligations ............................................................................ 74 
Limits of Positive Obligations .............................................................................................. 77 
The Balancing of Rights ......................................................................................................... 78 
The Need to Balance ............................................................................................................ 78 
The Approach of the Convention’s Adjudicative Bodies ..................................................... 81 
Proportionality ..................................................................................................................... 81 
The Margin of Appreciation................................................................................................. 83 
Walking the Rope ................................................................................................................. 85 
Rights against Rights ........................................................................................................... 87 
Will and Interest Conceptions of Rights ................................................................................ 91 
The Will Conception ............................................................................................................ 91 
The Interest Conception ....................................................................................................... 94 
The Convention and ECtHR’s Approach to Waiving Rights ............................................... 97 
The Convention Text ....................................................................................................... 97 
The Approach of the Convention Organs ........................................................................ 98 
Horizontal and Vertical Rights ............................................................................................. 103 
   
 
5 
 
The Application of Rights................................................................................................... 104 
The Effect of Rights Against Individuals ............................................................................ 106 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 110 
CHAPTER V: THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE PIVOTAL 
QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION RAISED BY THE CONVENTION RIGHTS ........................ 112 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 112 
Who Can Possess Convention Rights ................................................................................... 112 
Who is a Human Being for the Purposes of Convention rights? ....................................... 112 
The Substantive Nature of Rights as Imposing Positive and Negative Obligations ........... 116 
The Reception of Positive and Negative Obligations ........................................................ 116 
The Foundations of the Existence of Positive Obligations ................................................ 118 
Determining the Extent of Positive Obligations ................................................................ 122 
The Balancing of Rights ....................................................................................................... 124 
Areas of Balancing ............................................................................................................. 125 
Proportionality ................................................................................................................... 126 
Practical Proportionality ................................................................................................... 132 
Balancing Rights Against Rights ....................................................................................... 133 
Balancing Rights Against General Interests ...................................................................... 137 
The Will and Interest Conceptions of Rights ....................................................................... 143 
The United Kingdom Courts Approach to Waiving Rights ................................................ 143 
Horizontal and Vertical Effect of Convention Rights ......................................................... 148 
Vertical Effect .................................................................................................................... 149 
Horizontal Effect ................................................................................................................ 153 
The Interpretive Obligation............................................................................................ 154 
The Courts as Public Authorities ................................................................................... 156 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 160 
CHAPTER VI: METHODOLOGY: FINDING ANSWERS TO THE OPEN TEXTURE OF RIGHTS IN 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................................................ 161 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 161 
The Question of the Interpretation of Convention Rights................................................... 161 
The Need to Find a Rational way of Resolving Disputes about the Interpretation the 
Convention Rights ................................................................................................................. 162 
Consistency with the Fundamental Features of the Convention’s Human Rights Protection
................................................................................................................................................ 164 
   
 
6 
 
Universality ........................................................................................................................ 164 
The Inherent and Inalienability Nature of Rights .............................................................. 168 
The Emphasis on Rights ..................................................................................................... 170 
The Principle of Generic Consistency as a Guide to the Interpretation of the Convention 
Rights ..................................................................................................................................... 175 
Moral Answers to Legal Questions .................................................................................... 175 
Alternate Arguments to the PGC ................................................................................... 192 
Compatibility with the Convention .................................................................................... 201 
Universality of Rights .................................................................................................... 202 
Inherently and Inalienably Deontological ...................................................................... 203 
Rights Rather than Duties .............................................................................................. 210 
The Mirror Principle and the Practical Application of the PGC ........................................ 218 
The Content and Consequences of the Mirror Principle ................................................... 218 
Exceptions to the Mirror Principle ................................................................................. 221 
Reflecting the PGC ............................................................................................................ 223 
Justification .................................................................................................................... 224 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 234 
CHAPTER VII: GEWIRTHIAN CONVENTION RIGHTS ............................................................ 235 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 235 
Who Has Human Rights ....................................................................................................... 235 
Introduction........................................................................................................................ 235 
Agency in Action ................................................................................................................ 235 
Rights in Agency ................................................................................................................ 236 
Generic Rights in Agency .............................................................................................. 236 
Generic Rights to Human Rights ................................................................................... 237 
Convention Rights through Generic Rights ....................................................................... 245 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 259 
The Substantive Nature of Convention Rights .................................................................... 260 
Foundations of Interpretation ............................................................................................ 260 
Convention Rights in the Light of Generic Rights ............................................................. 260 
Negative Obligations ..................................................................................................... 261 
Positive Obligations ....................................................................................................... 268 
The Limits of Positive Obligations ................................................................................ 274 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 281 
   
 
7 
 
The Balancing and Weighing of the Convention Rights .................................................... 281 
Conflicts Between Rights ................................................................................................... 281 
Weight and Balance ........................................................................................................... 283 
Gewirthian Weight ......................................................................................................... 284 
The Generic Weighting of Convention Rights .............................................................. 290 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 299 
Will Conception of Generic Rights ....................................................................................... 300 
The Nature of Gewirth’s Rights ......................................................................................... 300 
The Necessary Nature of the Generic Rights ..................................................................... 302 
Will Conception Convention Rights ................................................................................... 305 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 311 
Horizontal and Vertical Gewirthian Rights ......................................................................... 311 
Vertically Challenged ........................................................................................................ 312 
Horizontally Challenging................................................................................................... 314 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 321 
CHAPTER VIII: THE PRINCIPLE OF DIGNITY AS A MEANS FOR THE JUDICIARY TO HAVE 
REGARD TO GEWIRTHIAN IDEAS IN INTERPRETING THE CONVENTION RIGHTS ............. 322 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 322 
The Role of Dignity in Context of Human Rights ............................................................... 322 
Dignity as a Means of Regard to Morality ........................................................................... 327 
Gewirthian Dignity ............................................................................................................ 329 
The Susceptibility of British Law to a Dignity Basis for Rights Interpretation ................. 331 
Extra-national Support for the Increased Domestic Regard to Dignity ............................. 339 
Dignity in other States ....................................................................................................... 339 
Dignity above the National Level ...................................................................................... 341 
The Practicality of Dignity .................................................................................................... 346 
Potential Problems with the use of Dignity ....................................................................... 352 
From the Acceptance of Dignity to the Acceptance of Rights ............................................ 355 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 357 
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 358 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 368 
 
Benedict Douglas 25
 
September 2012 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To everyone I have had dinner with, 
for your thoughts that fed my own. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
Benedict Douglas 25
 
September 2012 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Without the help and encouragement of many people this thesis would not have been written 
and the process of writing it would not have been so enjoyable.  
 
My first and foremost thanks go to my supervisors Prof. Deryck Beyleveld and Dr Shaun 
Pattinson who, since our first meeting for lunch on a bright blue winters day, have 
encouraged and supported me to pursue this thesis. Deryck has remained both patient and 
interested as he helped me explore borderlands of philosophy and law, never ceasing to 
challenge me to think, and Shaun has provided much good humoured advice on my thesis and 
academia generally with his epidemically contagious enthusiasm for the subject. I could not 
have described better supervisors, or ones more patient with my more bizarre spelling 
mistakes. 
 
Keith and Maureen my parents, I would like to thank for their unending encouragement and 
belief through a decade of university education, and for the great value they give to learning, 
which has kept me going, for sharing with me the lows and highs, and for parcels of jam and 
cake. 
 
My friends in St. John’s College, Amanda and Gerry Taylor & Aiken, Dan Orton and Rich 
Wyld, as ready to laugh as to learn. Without them I would have spent more evenings in the 
library, learnt much less, and enjoyed the last four years nowhere near as much. Fr Tony 
Currer and Patricia & Liam Kelly I would like to thank for sharing their homes and culinary 
expertise with me, for their friendship and peaceful presence. 
 
Chris Castel, whose knowledge of the ancient art of commas is unparalleled, is deserving of 
particular thanks and possible beatification for proof reading my thesis and being a bountiful 
font of help and advice even with a sofa 300 miles away. I would also like to thank Gerry and 
Amanda who brought their own perspectives to my thesis by generously and gratuitously 
reading the most important parts of it, I am only sorry no phenomenology made it in.  
 
Dr Richard Burchill at the University of Hull and Colm O’Cinneide at UCL started and 
enhanced my fascination with human rights law, helping to craft the proposal that has since 
grown to this thesis. They have a lot to answer for, and I am very grateful for it.  
 
‘[T]hanks, and thanks, and ever thanks’ go ultimately to Mrs Smith & Mr Colley for their 
English Literature lessons, for filling me with a love of words, language and interpretation 
that is with me every day, and that I have been so lucky to find the chance to apply in writing 
this thesis. 
 
Substantive & grateful thanks are due to Durham Law School for the enjoyable Teaching 
Assistantship, to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for their thoughtful grant, and to 
St. John’s College for the joyful tutorship, that have made it possible and comfortable for me 
to conduct this research. 
 
 
 
 
ii 
Benedict Douglas 25
 
September 2012 
1 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
A direct engagement by the British judiciary with the key fundamental questions of the 
interpretation of the Convention rights incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), 
in the form of coherent principled approach to them, is both absent and necessary. In this 
thesis it will be argued that such a principled approach to the five fundamental questions of 
rights interpretation, which are at the root of all substantive judgements on the interpretation 
of the Convention’s scope and practical application, is both possible and desirable. 
 
A substantive moral principle which will argued to be capable of giving this interpretive 
guidance is Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) which requires moral 
agents to act in accordance with their own and other’s generic rights.1 This will be shown to 
be an internally coherent principle of action, with its acceptance both dialectically necessary 
by those who can be described as moral agents, and contingently necessary by all who accept 
as valid the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or rights 
documents based upon it. Its use as principle of interpretation will be argued to be a valid 
approach to their construction due to its consistency with the foundational principles whose 
protection has been stated to be the purpose of the Convention. Ultimately, it will be claimed 
that the interpretive use of the PGC is within the practical and constitutional abilities of the 
domestic courts, as consistent with Strasbourg’s jurisprudence, and with the means of 
implementation already present within the domestic case law.  
 
In chapter two it is shown, as a premise for the interpretative argument to follow, that the 
rights of the Convention are stated in textually open manner which facilitates semantic 
uncertainty as to their substantive requirements. Although to some extent an unavoidable 
                                                 
1
 A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1978), 135 
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characteristic of language and feature of laws, and particularly of the nature of rights, the 
openness of the provisions of the Convention to differing interpretations is also the product of 
a deliberate exploitation of this latent uncertainty. Phrased in this manner, to pragmatically 
facilitate the agreement of states with different ideas of rights protection to a single 
document, to be practically effective they require authoritative interpretation. More 
specifically, it will be argued that the open textured language and the deliberate avoidance of 
semantic specificity as to the nature of rights within the Convention, gives scope for a 
principle such as the PGC to be used in their interpretation to direct their application.  
 
The third chapter will acknowledge that three general principles are in fact apparent within 
the Convention itself and in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), existing as the motivating foundations underpinning the practical purposes of the 
Convention and the substantive rights. It will however be argued that these principles of 
dignity, autonomy and equality also lack clearly defined content and are the subject of 
differing interpretations and thus share in and, when applied as interpretive tools, contribute 
to the semantic uncertainty of the Convention generally.  
 
From this disputed nature of the underlying principles and the uncertainty of the requirements 
of the substantive Convention rights, it will be argued that five questions of interpretation 
emerge and must be engaged with to fully determine the rights’ scope and application. These 
questions ask: who has rights, what is the nature of the obligations they impose, how should 
the weighting and balancing of conflicting rights be conducted, whether they are rights under 
a will or interest conception and against whom are the rights held? These questions and the 
examination of judicial attempts to answer them, provide the analytical skeleton of the 
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argument presented in this thesis as how the PGC can be used to answer these questions, and 
thereby provide a coherent practical interpretive tool for the domestic judiciary. 
 
Chapters four and five respond to the uncertainty of the Convention’s requirements and the 
necessity of engaging with the five fundamental questions by identifying, through analysis of 
the Convention itself and case law, the current positions taken by the documents and judicial 
organs of the Council of Europe and the domestic courts in recognising and engaging with 
these pivotal questions. It is necessary to have regard to the ECtHR’s approach because of the 
hierarchical relationship between the domestic courts and Strasbourg,
2
 and the ancestral 
relationship between the HRA and the ECHR. This analysis will ultimately facilitate the 
construction of a compelling argument to be made in chapter seven, that it is in practice 
possible for the domestic courts, within this relationship, to adopt an interpretative approach 
to the Convention rights determined by the application of the PGC. 
 
On the question of who has rights, it will be submitted that Convention and its judicial bodies 
have deliberately taken pains to avoid ruling on the question of what characteristic entitles a 
human being to the protection of the Convention. The decision on this question has been left 
to each member state in their application of the ECHR, in recognition that there is scope for 
differences of opinion amongst them. The British courts will be argued to have exercised this 
discretion by applying in Convention context, their pre-HRA position on the nature of 
personhood for the purposes of the possession of legal rights generally. 
 
Almost all the Convention rights are expressed in terms of negative obligations prohibiting 
actions. The ECtHR has been prepared to rely on the more general Articles 1, 13 and 14, as 
                                                 
2
 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, [20] 
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well as a general principle of effectiveness, to interpret negatively phrased rights as also 
having a positive dimension, giving rise to a duty to act. However, no clear general theory on 
the recognition of positive obligations has been stated by the ECtHR, which advances on a 
case by case basis, leaving open the question of what obligations the Court will recognise. It 
will be shown that the HRA had a significant impact on the position of positive obligations 
generally within British law which previously gave little recognition to them. The 
development of the recognition of positive obligations will be argued to have relied heavily 
on Strasbourg jurisprudence in the absence of relevant domestic precedent. Consequently, the 
domestic courts have similarly not developed and applied a general theory of positive 
obligations. Instead, they have largely mirrored the ECtHR’s case law to ground the 
recognition positive obligations, tempering its implementation with a concern to act in 
accordance with the separation of powers.   
 
John Locke recognised that if all members of a community are deemed to have the same 
rights then those rights will come into conflict.
3
 The consequence of this is that the balancing 
of competing rights and interests is at the heart of the application of the Convention. It will be 
submitted that at a fundamental level both cases which explicitly raise questions of balancing 
the rights of one party against another, as well as those which substantively involve balancing 
rights against general interests, should be approached in the same way, as involving 
conflicting rights claims. The balancing tool of proportionality, and the Court’s margin of 
appreciation, will be shown to be sufficiently open in their application, to allow an approach 
to the balancing of the Convention rights at the domestic level which both reflects the 
reinterpretation of the conflict between rights and interests that will be argued for, and allows 
for the use of the PGC to resolve rights conflicts generally. The domestic courts will be 
                                                 
3
 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (J.M. Dent and Sons 1924), 118-120 
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shown to currently apply an approach to the weighting and balancing of rights and of 
competing interests, within a framework of proportionality and deference, which is capable of 
being guided by the PGC. 
 
The question of the position of the Convention rights within the dichotomy between will and 
interest conceptions of rights, is determined by whether and the grounds on which the 
benefits of the rights can be waived by their holders. This debate will be deliberately 
characterised in terms of whether the benefits of rights can be waived, rather than whether the 
rights themselves can be waived, in order to take account of the inalienability of rights which 
will be argued to be a fundamental feature of the Convention rights and international human 
rights norms generally.
4
 Although the text of the ECtHR is silent on this matter, the ECtHR 
has in some cases held that a Convention right’s benefit can be waived. However, it will be 
shown that the court has not set out a clear principled answer to this question, and thus it is 
not clear in those cases where the waiving of the benefit of a right has been explicitly 
permitted or rejected whether the decision was reached based on a will or interest conception 
of the rights. The domestic courts, similarly, have not adopted a settled approach to this 
question of rights interpretation. The case law which preceded and followed the enactment of 
the HRA contains judgements which can be interpreted as favouring each approach, or which 
are as ambiguous as to which they are applying. Thus, as in Strasbourg there is no 
authoritative statement as to which conception is to be applied in British law, creating a need 
for principled direction to be given to the law’s development. 
 
                                                 
4
 Below p.57-58 & 168 
   
 
6 
 
Although created with the intention of having the legal effect of protecting individuals from 
the actions of the state,
5
 it will be argued that the Convention’s rights protection should also 
be seen to be necessarily applicable to interactions between individuals. By virtue of this, the 
indirect legal effect given to them by Strasbourg’s jurisprudence, to require the protection of 
individuals from other actions, will be argued to be justified and required under the 
Convention even though direct enforcement between individuals is not legally possible at the 
supra-national level of the ECtHR. Compared to the other key questions of rights 
interpretation, as a result of the attempts of litigants to gain their protection in private law 
disputes, the domestic courts have engaged most directly with the question of against whom 
the incorporated rights can be enforced, recognising the question of the fundamental nature of 
rights it raises. In common with the Convention, there was a deliberate intention in the 
enactment of the HRA not to allow the rights to be directly horizontally enforceable between 
individuals.
6
 However, the arguments of fundamental horizontal applicability apply at the 
domestic level, and the domestic courts will be shown to have recognised this in giving effect 
to the Convention rights between individuals in an indirect manner, as foreseen in Parliament 
during the enactment of the Act. It will ultimately be argued that this ready recognition of 
horizontality is strengthened by a principled approach based in the PGC. 
 
From this premise of the open textured statements of the Convention rights, and the 
recognition of their semantic nature, together with approaches of the domestic and Strasbourg 
judiciary of either leaving the fundamental questions of rights interpretation either 
unanswered or without a clearly answer, no rationally coherent approach to interpreting the 
Convention rights is apparent. The pivotal importance of the five questions to the 
interpretation of the Convention rights, however, makes such an approach necessary. Chapter 
                                                 
5
 Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoites” (Council of Europe 1964), vol.1, 67  
6
 HL Deb 5 February 1998, vol.585, col.840 
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six will put forward the PGC as the basis of such an approach, capable of providing coherent 
principled guidance to the interpretation and application of the Convention rights.  
 
As Ronald Dworkin recognised, to be a valid interpretation of a collection of fundamental 
norms, rather than a rewriting of it, a principle such as the PGC must fit their common settled 
core characteristics.
7
 In the context of the Convention rights these features will be identified 
as their universality, their inalienable and inherent possession, and the primary focus of the 
ECHR on rights rather than duties.  
 
The rights will be shown to be fundamentally universal in nature through their possession 
being envisaged as both uninfluenced by subjective individual characteristics and their 
requirements as not relativistic in nature. That they are inalienably possessed is stated clearly 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) which preceded and influenced 
the Convention.
8
 Constant with their universality, they will be argued to inalienably attach to 
a shared inherent characteristic semantically labelled as dignity. At a substantive level, the 
Convention repeatedly speaks in terms of rights which will be argued to have the 
characteristics of ‘claim rights’ under Wesley Hohfeld’s refinement of the term, giving rise to 
consequential duties requiring action by others.
9
 Additionally and more fundamentally, under 
Dworkin’s deontological dichotomy of rights or duties theories,10 it will be submitted that the 
text of the Convention can most persuasively be read as presupposing an underlying 
justification characterised by rights rather than duties. 
 
                                                 
7
 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1997), 105-106 and R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1998), 
66 
8
 UDHR, Preamble, [1] 
9
 W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (D. Campbell and P. Thomas 
eds, Ashgate 2001), 11-12 
10
 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1997), 172 
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Within this methodological framework of the three fundamental characteristics of the ECHR, 
the PGC will be put forward as a justifiable moral theory guiding action and thus capable of 
answering the five fundamental questions of rights interpretation in a principled manner. As a 
moral theory it gives answers to fundamental questions of moral philosophy: the authoritative 
question of why regard should be had to the interests of others, the distributive question of to 
whose interests regard should be had and the substantive question of the nature of those 
interests. The PGC’s answers to these questions will in turn be argued to provide rationally 
compelling guidance to the resolution of the five questions of rights interpretation with which 
the application of the HRA requires judicial engagement. 
 
At the foundation of Gewirth’s argument, and forming the answer to the distributive question, 
is the possession of purposive agency, the capacity of an agent for action, the ability to 
voluntarily act for the attainment of a chosen purpose.
11
 This voluntariness and purposiveness 
thus constitute generic features of agency, possessed by all who are ultimately bound in their 
actions by the PGC. From this premise, both dialectically necessary and dialectically 
contingent arguments can be put forward to demonstrate rationally why agents must act in 
accordance with the PGC in their treatment of others, respecting the possession of purposive 
agency. The dialectical approach has its roots in the Socratic dialogues ‘that begins from 
assumptions, opinions, statements, or claims made by protagonists or interlocutors and then 
proceeds to examine what these logically imply.’12 Throughout this thesis, for literary 
convenience, and due the failure of the English language to steal or develop a satisfactory 
gender neutral alternative, the pronoun ‘he’ is used in describing an agent’s dialectical 
reasoning process. As will be readily apparent, an agent can be a being of either gender or no 
                                                 
11
 Gewirth (n.1), 22, 26-27, 37 & 44-46 
12
 Ibid, 43 
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gender, what is essential is the possession of the generic characteristics of voluntariness and 
purposiveness. 
 
The dialectically necessary argument that Gewirth puts forward, as ultimately justifying and 
requiring the acceptance of the PGC, is necessary in the sense that the premise from which it 
begins, and from which all subsequent statements deductively follow, is one which must 
rationally be accepted by all agents: their possession of the generic features of that agency, 
their purposiveness and voluntariness.
13
  In this first part of this dialectical argument it is 
claimed that such an agent must, in having purposes, necessarily recognise those purposes as 
at least instrumentally good in the sense that he desires to attain them for some reason.
14
 He 
must also, in thinking of his purposes as good, necessarily also think of the generic features 
of the actions necessary to achieve his purposes as instrumentally good.
15
 These generic 
features are ‘freedom’ and ‘well-being’,16 they are necessary for any action and – as action 
characterises agency – can be described as the ‘generic goods’ of agency.17 
 
In the second stage of the dialectically necessary argument to the PGC, it is shown that an 
agent must recognise that they have rights to these generic goods. Although an agent is not 
dialectically required to view their agency as good, if they wish to exercise their agency they 
must necessarily think that their freedom and well-being is instrumentally good to the 
purposiveness and voluntariness that characterises their action and agency.
18
 From this it 
follows that they must therefore dialectically necessarily think that others should not interfere 
                                                 
13
 Ibid, 43-44 
14
 Ibid, 48-52 
15
 Ibid, 52 and D. Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (Chicago University Press 1991), 23-24 
16
 Gewirth (n.1), 62-63 
17
 Ibid, 52 
18
 Beyleveld (n.15), 23-24 
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with their generic goods.
19
 This claim by an agent is the functional equivalent to a claim to 
have rights to the generic goods which should not be infringed by others.
20
 These rights to 
freedom and well-being form the PGC’s answer to the substantive question of morality, the 
nature of the interests of which account should be taken. 
 
However, if the PGC is to be shown to be a moral principle it must establish why account 
should be had to the interests of others, an agent’s claim to the generic rights is not in itself 
sufficient to show why he or other agents should have regard to another’s interests and 
respect their generic rights. Thus in the third stage of Gewirth’s dialectically necessary 
argument he addresses the authoritative question of morality.  
 
The moral status of the generic rights under the PGC is established by demonstrating that an 
agent must claim, accepting that it would be self-contradictory to hold otherwise, that he has 
the generic rights only because of his status as a purposive agent.
21
 From this argument for 
the sufficiency of agency, Gewirth argues the application of the formal principle of 
universalisabiltiy logically follows. This principle states that if a person claims to have rights 
only because they possess a particular characteristic then they logically must accept that any 
other being possessing that characteristic must also possess those rights.
22
 The ultimate 
consequence of these arguments, Gewirth argues, is that all agents must recognise that all 
other agents have the generic rights to freedom and well-being and they have an obligation to 
act in accordance with those rights, this he expresses in the form of the moral Principle of 
                                                 
19
 Gewirth (n.1), 77 
20
 Ibid, 64 & 77 
21
 Ibid, 109-110 
22
 Ibid, 105 & 112 
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Generic Consistency requiring agents ‘act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients 
as well as of yourself.’23 
 
When justified through the dialectically necessary method the PGC must be accepted by all 
agents, for to deny it would be to contradict their own agency or what it necessarily entails. 
The PGC will also be shown to be capable of justification by dialectically contingent means, 
‘from singular or general statements or judgements that reflect the variable beliefs, interests, 
or ideals of some person or group’,24 but which are not necessarily attributable to all agents 
by virtue of their agency.   
 
Thus it will be shown that if the moral point of view – that the interests of others ought to be 
taken account of by a person when acting
25
 – is assumed, as opposed to being dialectically 
necessarily proved in the third stage of Gewirth’s argument of the PGC, the application of 
this to the generic features of agency entails the acceptance of the PGC. Similarly, it will be 
argued that if the specific moral point of view of the ‘golden rule’ of impartiality – requiring 
that we ‘treat others only as we consent to being treated in the same situation’26 – is 
contingently applied to the dialectically necessary conception of agency argued for in stage 
one of Gewirth’s argument, the consequence is again that such agent’s must accept the PGC 
as governing their actions.
27
 
 
In order to practically strengthen the argument this thesis will make for the practical use of 
PGC as an interpretative basis for the Convention rights, it will further be shown that the 
                                                 
23
 Ibid, 134-135 
24
 Ibid, 43 
25
 K. Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Cornell University Press 1958), 118-190 
26
 H. Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge 1998), 104 
27
 D. Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 
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contingent acceptance of the principle of impartially can be seen to be implicit within the 
foundational statements of the post-WWII human rights era in the UDHR. From this it will be 
argued that it is consequentially possible to derive the acceptance of the PGC, by combining 
the commitment to impartiality within tangible international human rights law and the 
dialectically necessary acceptance of the definition of purposive agency.
28
 
 
Based upon these arguments for the PGC as coherent moral principle capable of guiding 
action, it is claimed that both necessary and contingent dialectical reason requires that the 
courts resolve cases in accordance with the requirements of the PGC. In the remainder of 
chapter six, and in the two subsequent chapters of the thesis, it will be argued this is a 
practically and legally possible basis for judicial interpretation of the Convention rights.  
 
To this end it will initially be demonstrated that the interpretive use of the PGC in relation to 
the ECHR is valid under Dworkin’s characterisation of an interpretive enterprise, showing 
that the PGC’s substantive content fits with the three fundamental features of the Convention 
rights. The basic contention that the generic rights are held by all agents gives them a 
universality that accords with the Convention, their deontological nature makes possession of 
the generic rights consistent with the inherent and inalienable characteristics of the 
Convention rights, and basis of the generic rights in the characteristics of purposive agency 
entails that PGC’s requirements are best characterised those of a theory of rights rather than 
one of duties. 
 
In addition to proving the interpretive legitimacy of the application of the PGC to the 
Convention rights, because of the current relationship between the domestic courts and the 
                                                 
28
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ECtHR is characterised at the domestic level by the application of the ‘mirror principle’,29 the 
application of the PGC must not conflict with Strasbourg’s jurisprudence in order to be 
legally acceptable. It will be later argued that the ECtHR’s substantive jurisprudence does not 
require the domestic courts to act other than in accordance with the PGC. However, it will 
also be submitted in chapter six that, whilst as the supreme principle of morality the PGC is 
dialectically binding upon the courts and must logically be complied with by both Strasbourg 
and the domestic courts, at a more legalistic level the no more than
30
 element of the mirror 
principle is an unjustified restriction on the courts interpretive powers and should be 
abandoned. 
 
From this basis, that the interpretive application of the PGC by the British courts is 
practically necessary, theoretically justified and required, in chapter seven the compatibility 
with the requirements of the PGC of courts’ current approach to the five fundamental 
questions of rights interpretation will be critiqued. In light of the open textured nature of the 
Convention rights and the reluctance of the domestic courts and Strasbourg to generally 
engage either clearly or directly with most of the five questions described in chapters four 
and five, it will be submitted that to the extent that the British courts do not already comply 
with the PGC there is the potential for them to do so, and for the PGC to give additional 
clarity to the interpretation of the Convention rights. 
 
In relation to the necessarily foremost question of who has the Convention rights, the 
conception of agency underlying the PGC from which the generic rights derive will be 
carefully defined and its consequences explained, to demonstrate how it can inform the 
judiciary’s answer to this question generally and the specific key case law manifestations of 
                                                 
29
 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] P.L. 720, 720 
30
 Ullah (n.2), [20] 
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it. It will be submitted that the domestic courts’ current conception of who can possess the 
Convention rights generally, can and must be changed to be consistent with the PGC. 
However, more generally, the courts’ approach to recognising the possession of specific 
rights by particular persons appears consistent with the PGC. 
 
On the subsequent question of the substantive nature of the Convention rights, it will be 
argued that a regard to the fundamental underlying rights to freedom and well-being can and, 
because of their dialectical nature and practical utility, should be used by the courts to give 
substantive content to the open textured rights. The negative and positive obligations under 
the PGC to which the generic rights and interests give rise will be explained in detail. The 
relationship between these generic rights the Convention rights will then be critically 
illuminated, and the possibility of their practical application by the judiciary under the HRA 
argued for. Although it will be concluded that there is compatibility between the current 
approaches to the Convention and the approach the application of the PGC would entail, it 
will be argued that the application of the latter can give principled coherence to the former. 
 
In relation to the inherent necessity of human rights adjudication, that conflicting rights be 
weighted and balanced against each other, it will be submitted that the PGC can give 
principled guidance to the courts in their assessment of the factors they consider in applying 
the proportionality test, which will itself be shown to be susceptible to influence by the PGC. 
It will be argued that regard to the generic rights and interests under the PGC, their generic 
weight and the moral status of their holders, can give guidance and transparency to 
judgements which improves upon the opaque reasoning of courts on this question. Although a 
PGC based approach to the balancing of rights will not resolve conflicts in a precise, 
mathematical manner, it will enable more clearly reasoned judgments to be given. 
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The dialectical reasoning by which the existence of the generic rights is claimed necessarily 
entails that they should be recognised to be rights under the will conception. It will be argued 
that the unspecific wording of the Convention, and the undecided nature of the current case 
law allows, such a will conception to be applied by the domestic courts in their 
interpretations. The current domestic judicial approach will be characterised as open to being 
clarified by the application of an understanding of the nature of rights on this question 
entailed by PGC. 
 
Although by the nature of its dialectical derivation, primarily concerned with interactions 
between individuals, the PGC will be shown to also have application to the actions of the 
state which effect individuals. This indirect application of the PGC is facilitated by the 
HRA’s intention of allowing individuals to directly enforce the Convention rights against the 
state. However, the HRA does not proscribe for such direct effect of the rights horizontally 
between individuals. It will be submitted that the direct applicability of the generic rights 
between individuals supports interpretations of the Convention as recognising this 
horizontally, and together they provide a fundamental justification mandating and supporting  
the domestic courts in giving as much horizontal effect as possible under the Act. 
 
In the final chapter of this thesis it will be argued that the dialectically justified PGC, shown 
to be capable of guiding the domestic courts’ answers to the five fundamental questions of 
rights interpretation, can be looked to directly by the courts as giving content to the principle 
of dignity. Explicitly forming the basis of many human rights documents of the 20
th
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Century,
31
 dignity encapsulates the factor which gives individuals the value justifying their 
protection by human rights norms.
32
 However, beyond agreement on the role dignity plays in 
rights documents there is scope for differing views as to its substantive content. It will thus be 
submitted that purposive agency can give content to dignity and that thereby the domestic 
courts can give effect to the PGC, by using dignity characterised in this way to interpret the 
Convention rights. It will be argued that such interpretive regard to dignity and underlying 
moral principles more generally is not alien to domestic law, and is additionally supported by 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Canadian and German courts, as well as its presence in 
international human rights documents. This interpretative attribution of dialectical content to 
dignity, through the lens of the PGC giving dialectical content to it, addressees some of the 
criticism that metamorphic nature of the meaning of dignity.  
 
It will thus be concluded that the PGC should and can be used by the British courts in 
answering the five fundamental questions of human rights interpretation. Its recognition will 
be shown to be both a dialectically necessary consequence of purposive agency and a 
contingent consequence of the acceptance of modern human rights obligations. Its use is 
consistent with domestic and European case law, and the application of the PGC to give 
content to principle of dignity makes its use by the judiciary in interpretation a realistic 
practical possibility. 
 
                                                 
31
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CHAPTER II: THE UNCERTAINTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Introduction 
This thesis argues from the premise that human rights are uncertain norms and that this 
uncertainty renders their meaning susceptible to various and divergent interpretations. It will 
be claimed that this is principally a result of the deliberate utilisation of language’s latent 
potential for uncertainty by the drafters, to achieve pragmatic and political purposes. 
 
This textual openness to different conceptions of human rights will be argued to have both 
positive and negative consequences. It will then be argued that judicial interpretation of rights 
can, in spite of being itself susceptible to the linguistic problems that accompany definitions 
in that judgements themselves require interpretation, ameliorate the negative consequences of 
the uncertain drafting of rights by virtue of their authoritativeness. 
 
The Presence of Uncertainty 
The many different international human rights instruments share a common characteristic in 
setting out the rights they contain in uncertain terms.
1
 This feature of rights treaties generally 
is also shared by the document the HRA incorporates, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), which ‘speaks in abstract terms, and subjects many of the rights it declares to 
equally abstract exceptions.’2 
 
There are two distinct, but related, types of uncertainty present in human rights. The first is 
the textual uncertainty of the ambiguous words used to set out the rights in the rights 
                                                 
1
 C. Wellman, Real Rights (OUP 1995), 179 
2
 R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (OUP 1996), 358 
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documents.
3
 Before they are interpreted and their meaning is agreed, the definition of words 
generally is intrinsically uncertain.
4
 The other form of uncertainty is the more specific 
uncertainty of the semantic conceptions embodied in the rights themselves. This is the 
uncertainty as to the requirements and scope of application of the rights which renders them 
open to different interpretations.
5
 
 
Both of these types of uncertainty are connected, in that the textual openness of language 
used to state the rights facilitates the semantic openness of the requirements and scope of 
those rights to different interpretations.
6
 A corollary of this is that a more linguistically 
detailed definition of a right can reduce the uncertainty of the semantic concept embodied in 
the right.
7
  
 
The semantically uncertain nature of the rights is demonstrated in the many questions of 
interpretation the wording leaves open.
8
 In the ECHR context, this uncertainty is clearly 
apparent in relation to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, the text of both being open to several 
interpretations.
9
 Article 2 immediately raises the question of when should life be deemed to 
begin and end for the purposes of the protection of the Convention,
10
 with Article 8 a key 
semantic question is where is the boundary between private and public life.
11
 That the level of 
textual uncertainty varies between and within human rights documents is also obvious. For 
                                                 
3
 Wellman (n.1), 178 
4
 Below p.19-20 
5
 C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart 2000), 375 and R. Clayton, ‘Developing Principles for Human 
Rights’ [2002] E.H.R.L.R. 175, 194 
6
 Below p.23  
7
 UN General Assembly ‘Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights’ 
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th
 Session, Doc A/2929, 8, see also A. Robertson, ‘The European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights’ (1950) 27 B.Y.B.I.L. 145, 152 and below p.24 
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 L. Sumner, The Moral Foundations of Rights (Carendon 1986), 5 
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instance, the right to life in the ECHR is defined in greater detail than in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
12
 Similarly, Article 6 ECHR sets out detailed 
requirements for a fair trial whereas Article 8 gives little detail on what the protection of 
private and family life requires, thus textual uncertainty increases semantic uncertainty. 
 
Unavoidable Uncertainty in Human Rights 
Uncertainty is not a characteristic unique to human rights norms or to laws generally. In part, 
some uncertainty in the linguistic meaning of words is often inevitable. Herbert Hart noted it 
is a feature of all laws, with the language of a norm at some point having an open texture 
where there is uncertainty as to what the law requires in a particular case.
13
  However, to a 
significant extent, the semantic uncertainty of the norms found in rights treaties, and therefore 
also under the HRA, is particular to them and present as a result of deliberate decisions by the 
drafters. 
 
The Inherent Uncertainty of Language 
Words are representations of ideas or concepts.
14
 They themselves thus have no inherent 
meaning, and must be assigned or associated with an idea or concept which forms their 
meaning.
15
 A person must decide on the idea or concept, the meaning, that is attached to a 
word;
16
 this is as true of the lexicographers who compile dictionaries as anyone else. 
However, the way in which words are assigned their meaning by people can give rise to 
uncertainty as to the meaning of the word. 
 
                                                 
12
 Article 2 ECHR and Article 3 UDHR, see generally H. Golsong, ‘Implementation of International Protection 
of Human Rights’ (1963) 110(3) R.C.A.D.I. 1, 59 
13
 H. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn., OUP 1994), 127-128 
14
 D. Wright, ‘Do Words Have Inherent Meaning?’ (2008) 65(2) ETC: A Review of General Semantics 177, 178 
15
 Ibid, 178 and J. Raz, ‘Why Interpret?’ (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 349, 356 
16
 Raz (n.15), 356 
   
 
20 
 
Under the rules of ‘general semantics: the meaning of a text depends on its being read in 
context.’17 People assign meanings to words based on the context within which they observe 
them being used.
18
 The internal context of a work encompasses the statements within which 
the word is found,
19
 thus the word ‘bear’ can mean to carry a load or refer to an animal of the 
family Ursidae, depending on the content of the sentence within which it is used. The 
external context comprises of the circumstances of the utterance and the relevant knowledge 
possessed by the speaker and the listener;
20
 with a document such as the UDHR this would 
include the historical context which led to its creation. This, however, creates the possibility 
that, because people observe words being used in different contexts, they may assign a 
different meaning to the word.
21
 Similarly, Richard Robinson also noted that words can also 
be ambiguous in a ‘sliding’ sense, in that the word may be seen as covering a collection of 
ideas that are in some way connected,
22
 indeed the concept of ‘rights’ will be argued below to 
be such a term.
23
  
 
It should, however, be noted that it follows from the way in which words obtain their 
meaning that not all words are linguistically or semantically uncertain. On some words there 
is absolute agreement as to the semantic conceptions they convey.
24
 For example, in the 
context of mathematics there is general agreement on the definition of the number ‘two.’ 
Such agreement is due to the artificially constructed nature of numbers which makes their 
numerical value their only feature.
25
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 Z. Bankiwski et al., ‘On Method and Methodology’ in D. MacCormick and R. Summers (eds), Interpreting 
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21
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Thus, when interpreting the meaning of a word in a statement of a human right, the word can 
be linguistically ambiguous in its meaning because interpreters may assign different 
meanings to that word by having regard to different contexts. Even where the right is 
interpreted afresh and an attempt is made to give it a new meaning within its own context, it 
is still possible for its requirements to be semantically uncertain because different interpreters 
may apply different relevant knowledge to the interpretation of the words and see words as 
imposing different requirements. The importance of regard to context in interpretation has 
been explicitly recognised in relation to international laws, of which human rights treaties 
form an important part,
26 
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
27
 which gives an 
open ended definition of ‘context’ as an interpretive tool.28 The problems of interpretation 
through regard to different contexts is, in practice, reduced slightly in relation to judicial 
interpretation of the wording of rights because, as American legal realists have argued, judges 
will share similar training and other characteristics,
29
 which may lead them to assign similar 
meanings shaped by regard to similar contexts. This does not, however, guarantee that their 
interpretation will be the ‘best’ interpretation if judged against an objective standard.30 
 
Attempts to interpret a right afresh face a further inherent problem. A new idea cannot be 
communicated without using old words which are themselves necessarily linguistically 
uncertain.
31
 It is this ambiguity resulting from their linguistic uncertainty which enables them 
                                                 
26
 Golder v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, [29] where the ECtHR held that interpretation of the 
ECHR should be guided by the Vienna Convention, see also C. Ovey and R. White, Jacobs and White: The 
European Convention on Human Rights, (4
th
 edn., OUP 2006), 44 
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to be used to define a new idea.
32
 Laws generally, and human rights specifically, are attempts 
to put ideas into a verbal form,
33
 and thus the potential for semantic uncertainty when 
enumerating a right is inherent in language. 
 
The Uncertainty of Law 
Given the potential linguistic uncertainty of words it is unsurprising that laws generally are 
textually open,
34
 with consequent uncertainty as to their semantic meaning. As far back as the 
Elizabethan era Francis Bacon noted the semantic uncertainty produced by the use of 
linguistically uncertain language in British laws and in laws generally.
35
 More recently Karl 
Llewellyn argued that the linguistic uncertainty of many laws
36
 means that the search for laws 
that are ‘plain to every plain man are a will-o'-the-wisp.’37 Hart similarly argued that, 
although there may be a central core of a law where it will be readily apparent what it 
requires in particular cases, there will always be a ‘penumbra of uncertainty’ where in some 
cases the open textured nature of the language makes it uncertain what the phrasing of a law 
requires.
38
 
 
This uncertainty is clearly shown by the cases coming to court disputing the interpretation of 
statutes; if their meaning were always clear, there would be no need for such cases to be 
brought.
39
 The fact that judges can disagree over the interpretation of laws also demonstrates 
the uncertainty of semantic meaning the linguistic uncertainty of a law can generate,
40
 and 
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shows the availability of different reasons, purposes and values judges can rely upon to reach 
an interpretation.
41
 As laws generally are incapable of being reduced to ‘clear exact and 
certain [rules]’42 and are thus surrounded by uncertainty,43 it is foreseeable that human rights 
in national and international human rights law should share in this linguistic and semantic 
uncertainty.  
 
The Semantic Uncertainty of Human Rights 
In so far as words are an attempt to convey ideas and concepts, the particular nature of human 
rights exacerbates the linguistic uncertainty and consequent room for disagreement that 
applies to an attempt to define the meaning of words and laws generally. In addition to the 
uncertainty of the words used in statements of rights, the practical requirements of those 
rights themselves are also inherently uncertain in scope. The human rights declared in legal 
documents have no immediate definite tangible content,
44
 unlike quantifiable facts,
45
 they are 
‘symbolic constructs... [that] do not refer to things or other material entities’.46 Although all 
ordinary statutes are to some extent textually open, the ‘magniloquent phrases’47 of human 
rights documents have a greater propensity to uncertainty, with a much larger penumbra of 
uncertainty.
48
 Thus, Douzinas claims that ‘[n]o person, thing or relation is in principle closed 
to the logic of rights...[anything] can become the subject or object of rights [and] any right 
can be extended to new areas and persons or conveniently withdrawn from existing ones.’49 
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This description of the semantic uncertainty of the scope of rights statements has its historical 
roots as an important part of Burke’s criticism of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen. He argued that the rights it contained were ‘inventions’ and ‘speculative’50 
concluding that because of their nature ‘[t]he rights of men are...incapable of definition’.51 
Burke considered that the requirements of rights could only be discerned through practice and 
history
52
 and their lack of connection with substance and practice made bold statements of 
rights semantically uncertain.
53
 
 
The use of more detailed language in stating rights provisions will not entirely eradicate the 
semantic uncertainty from human rights provisions. Whatever language is used, it will still 
attempt to describe an abstract concept about which there is disagreement.
54
 Additionally, a 
more detailed definition will also in turn give rise to further questions about the meaning of 
the detail and its implications for the scope and requirements of rights.
55
 Thus, although more 
detailed statements of rights may give more insight into the relevant context which should be 
used to interpret the rights,
56
 trying to create an exhaustive textual definition of a right is 
‘impractical if not impossible.’57  
 
The Deliberate Uncertainty of Human Rights 
Although it is clear that some element of the semantic uncertainty found in statements of 
human rights is an inevitable result of the nature of language and of rights, deliberate 
pragmatic decisions by the drafters which exploit the potential uncertainty of language 
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constitute the main cause of this semantic uncertainty. These decisions, concerning the level 
of linguistic uncertainty and the specificity of the wording of the rights contained within the 
ECHR, can best be discovered by looking at the drafting process by which they were 
formulated, which indicates the intentions of the contracting parties.
58
  
 
Regard to the drafting process behind other international rights documents is also instructive 
in ascertaining the particular practical reasons for the semantic uncertainty of the Convention 
rights. This is so because at a theoretical level the UDHR can be seen as the founding 
document upon which subsequent rights treaties are based,
59
 creating an interconnection 
between them.
60
 The drafters of subsequent treaties have had regard to pre-existing treaties in 
shaping the rights they drafted.
61
 The preamble of the ECHR itself states that its aim is to 
give enforceable effect to the UDHR
62
 and the Consultative Assembly, the body charged with 
looking into the creation of a human rights treaty by the Council of Europe, had explicit 
regard to the provisions of the Declaration,
 63
 and the Committee of Experts was instructed to 
consider the UDHR in drafting the ECHR.
64
 
 
The Need for Agreement 
For international rights treaties to come into being a sufficient number of states must be 
prepared to agree to the articles they contain. Thus, Lauterpacht argues that to draft a rights 
treaty with very detailed provisions would limit the number of states prepared to agree to it 
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because, the greater the detail it contained, the more likely it would be that they would find a 
provision they objected to.
65
 Thus, linguistic uncertainty in the wording of rights treaties 
produces textually open rights, amenable to a number of semantic conceptions, which 
facilitates their acceptance by states with different political systems and traditions.
66
  
 
The Council of Ministers, in considering the draft ECHR, noted that it intentionally did ‘not 
attempt to define with legal precision the human rights it seeks to guarantee.’67 It was felt that 
the pre-existing rights protection of the various signatories would make agreement on 
detailed human rights very difficult to achieve.
68
 The rights that were agreed were thus a 
compromise between those states that wanted very specific rights
69
 and those that favoured 
very general rights identical to those in the UDHR with each signatory state left to define 
their meaning for themselves subsequently.
70
 The final text, although influenced by both 
approaches, more closely favoured a more detailed enumeration of the rights.
71
 French 
foreign minister Robert Schuman, on signing the ECHR, noted that this compromise was 
arrived at because both sides recognised the importance of ensuring the creation of protection 
for human rights.
72
 The uncertainty that was allowed in phrasing of the rights can be seen to 
have been aided in its aim of ensuring the agreement of states to the Convention as a whole 
by the doctrine of the margin of appreciation propounded by the European Court of Human 
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Rights (ECtHR) in order to allow for some difference in views amongst states as to the 
interrelation of some Convention rights’ requirements.73 
 
That the Convention rights, although open to a number of semantic interpretations, are more 
linguistically specific than those found in the UDHR
74
 is possible for practical reasons. One 
reason for this is that, although there was disagreement about the rights to be included in the 
Convention, there were fewer states that had to agree to the content of the rights.
75
 
Additionally the regional nature of the ECHR reduced the potential number of political and 
cultural differences that had to be accommodated within the wording of the rights,
76
 
compared to the UDHR or the UN Covenants.
77
 This meant that the ECHR’s wording had to 
encompass fewer semantic conceptions of rights and thus could be more specific. 
 
Substantive Constraints on Content 
In addition to political reasons for the textual openness of rights, more practical 
considerations have contributed to the linguistic uncertainty of the provisions of rights 
treaties. The drafters of both the ECHR and the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), claimed that they were 
prevented from defining rights in more detail because of the constraints inherent in their 
drafting processes. The Council of Europe noted that a complete definition of the rights 
would require a much more complex and lengthy document.
78
 The drafters of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR argued that it was impossible to create an exhaustive list of all the obligations 
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imposed on states by rights,
79
 because it was not possible to foresee all the acts a state might 
commit which could impinge upon rights.
80
 This recognition contributed to the open textured 
wording of the rights included in the conventions.
81
 
 
The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe acknowledged that ‘years of [study and 
experiments would be necessary]...to attempt with any hope of success, to formulate a 
complete and general definition of all the freedoms and all the rights’.82 Thus, the Assembly 
felt that the time constraints prevented the agreement upon a more precise definition of rights 
to be included in the ECHR. 
 
The open textured nature of the Convention can also be seen to be consistent with a 
recognition of Jürgen Habermas’s subsequent assertion that the truth of a proposition can 
only be known though rational discourse.
83
 This position is based upon the argument that 
what is true can never be said to be conclusively determined,
84
 something the UN has 
recognised in the context of the application of human rights
85
 and the ECtHR has 
acknowledged in practice.
86
 This open-endedness is a consequence of the limits of the 
capacity of humans to possess complete knowledge, given its continually increasing nature 
and diversity analogous to the different contexts which can be available to use in 
interpretation described above,
87
 and the limitations of human discourse and of language.
88
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The open wording and consequent uncertain requirements of the Convention can thus be seen 
to be a necessary and inevitable consequence of the ongoing nature of debate about the 
correct answers to the questions of interpretation of the Convention rights.
89
  
 
Intertwined with the drafters’ debates concerning the level of detail in which to draft the 
Convention rights, from the perspective of achieving agreement and time constraints, was a 
dispute as to the style in which the Convention as a whole should be drafted.
90
 The dispute 
centred on whether to use the civil style of legislation, which favours the statement of broad 
principles which are given detail by subsequent interpretation, or the common law style 
which utilises more precise legislative provisions.
91
 It is submitted that the uncertainty of the 
rights and fact that the drafters’ intention was that the rights to be given detailed application 
by the member states and their courts
92
 together with the ECtHR, suggests that the civil 
approach may in part be responsible for the linguistically uncertain definitions of the rights. 
 
The Avoidance of Legal Obligations 
Unlike the earlier UDHR,
93
 both the UN Covenants of 1966 and the ECHR were intended to 
be legally binding. Additionally, the ECHR provided for the practical enforcement of the 
Convention rights against member states by a supra-national court. This legally binding 
quality also influenced the more detailed drafting of the rights found in these instruments 
compared to those found in the UDHR.
94
 As Heribert Golsong argues, ‘it was necessary to 
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define the rights enumerated [in the ECHR]...with sufficient precision to enable a judge to 
control their application.’95 
 
However, the legally binding nature and the potential for the enforcement of the Convention 
rights by individuals may also have led states to argue for more linguistically uncertain 
definitions of the rights to be included. This would enable them to avoid legal obligations by 
arguing for an interpretation of the semantic conception of the right which favoured allowing 
an impugned state action. This possibility finds support in Dworkin’s observation that the 
textual openness of rights leaves scope for disagreement amongst reasonable people as to 
their proper interpretation and application.
96
 
 
In spite of its non-binding nature, the states still sought to ensure that the UDHR was drafted 
to be semantically uncertain using open textured language to avoid the imposition of 
restrictions upon their actions.
97
 If this was an intention behind the drafting of a non-legally 
binding rights document, it is submitted it is all the more likely that it may have influenced 
the drafters of the ECHR. Even if it was not a deliberate intention behind the drafting of the 
Convention, it is apparent that, in practice, the member states seek to use the open textured 
wording of the rights to protect their actions.
98
 This potential of semantically uncertain rights 
to be used to ‘suppress’ liberty was recognised by the UN Secretary General when he argued 
that ‘[i]n the name of “public order” many a saintly character has been crucified’.99 
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The Consequences of Uncertainty 
It is apparent from the causes of textual openness discussed above that, in relation to human 
rights norms, some uncertainty is attributable to the nature of language, whilst the main cause 
is deliberate choices by the drafters, exploiting the potential of language to be open textured. 
A number of the consequences of the way in which the rights are drafted have already been 
noted. Although some of this semantic uncertainty is undesirable, it is submitted that a certain 
amount is indeed necessary to ensure the success of a rights treaty. 
 
Desirable Consequences 
As noted previously, the drafting of rights in manner which left the Convention rights 
semantically uncertain facilitated the agreement of a wide number of different states to a 
single rights document. The nature of the language enabled the various states to interpret the 
provisions of a particular rights document in a way which reflected their own domestic 
context and thus agree to it.
100
 Without such textually open language it is conceivable that 
disagreement amongst the states as to the specific content may have prevented the creation of 
human rights treaties.  
 
A clear example of this flexibility can be seen in relation to freedom of speech. The extent of 
protection of the protection for speech differs noticeably between the United States, which 
gives very strong protection to freedom of speech, and Germany, which prohibits holocaust 
denial because of its particular historical context.
101
 Yet both have agreed to the freedom of 
expression provision contained in the ICCPR.
 102
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As well as allowing for variations in the requirements of human rights within states, the 
textual openness of human rights allows for the interpretation of rights to change over time. 
This flexibility is important because societal recognition of what is protected by human rights 
changes with time.
103
 Recognition of the shifting content of liberty led Burke to argue that an 
attempt to settle the scope of liberty once and for all was ‘foolish.’104 Such a change is readily 
apparent in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the rights of transsexuals. Here the court changed 
its interpretation of Articles 8 and 12 to find greater protection for their interests.
105
 In this 
context the ECtHR explicitly recognised the need for a ‘dynamic and evolutive’ approach to 
the interpretation of rights which reflected the ‘changing conditions’ in member states.106 
Thus, Jerome Frank argues ‘[m]uch of the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate accident: it 
is of immense social value’,107 with its fluidity being able to cope with the constantly 
changing nature of society.
108
  
 
It is not humanly possible to foresee all the situations and complications which a law may 
have to contend with.
109
 However, just as the textual openness of rights can be used to take 
account of changes in societal recognition of rights, it also enables rights to give protection in 
situations that were not, or could not, have been foreseen by the drafters at the time they 
created the rights document.
110
 This is because, just as the linguistic uncertainty of words 
                                                 
103
 Dworkin (n.96), 134 
104
 Burke (n.50), 151 
105
 Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 163 and Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 
EHRR 447, see generally S. Gilmore ‘Case Commentary Bellinger v Bellinger -- Not Quite Between The Ears 
And Between The Legs -- Transsexualism And Marriage In The Lords’ (2003) 15(3) C.F.L.Q. 295, 302 
106
 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 447, [74] 
107
 Frank (n.35), 7 
108
 Ibid, 6 
109
 Bacon (n.35), Vol. IV, 366 
110
 Dworkin (n.96), 134 and Hart (n.13), 128-129 
   
 
33 
 
which allows them to be used to define new ideas,
111
 it also allows rights to be interpreted to 
meet new and unforeseen situations.
112
  
 
If rights were not defined in a textually open manner it is also possible that, when faced with 
a set of facts not explicitly considered by a detailed right, the court may interpret this as a 
deliberate exclusion from the scope of the right by the drafters.
113
 Given the difficulty in 
predicting the future application of rights described above, such an interpretation may well be 
incorrect. Drafting a right in a textually open manner can avoid this problem by leaving the 
potential semantic scope of a right open. 
 
Potentially Problematic Consequences 
Although the textually open wording of rights, which allows for the expression of the 
semantic uncertainty of rights, has been shown to be necessary for the existence and 
application of human rights treaties, it also gives rise to various theoretical and practical 
problems. In several instances these problems are themselves side effects of the very 
advantages that have been described above. 
 
At a general level the textual openness of rights means that the wording of the rights alone 
gives little guidance as to their semantic scope.
114
 Consequently, a literal or linguistic 
interpretation, which interprets words without regard to their context of their use other than 
their linguistic setting, is of no use in relation to the wording of a rights provision.
115
 Thus, on 
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their face rights have an indeterminate scope,
116
 a problem with which the Convention rights 
are not alone.
117
 As noted above,
118
 this uncertainty has the advantage of enabling rights 
documents to cope with unforeseen applications and to evolve over time. However, this can 
be argued to be problematic in that it means that ‘the boundaries are always contested’119 and 
that their connection with social discourse entails that their meaning is ‘essentially 
unlimited.’120 
 
This indeterminacy of scope also raises a more theoretical difficulty, one perceived as so 
serious that it has the potential to undermine the whole international human rights project. 
Costas Douzinas argues that, as a result of the drafting of human rights in terms intended to 
ensure that as many different states will feel able to agree to them, any state can sign up to 
them and ‘claim to be a human rights state.’121 Combined with a lack of binding legal status 
and the protection given to national sovereignty by many rights treaties,
122
 Douzinas claims 
that there is a danger of rights being used by states as a mere tool to give themselves 
legitimacy.
123
 The fact that, of the 193 members of the UN, 167 are party to the ICCPR, some 
of which have been accused of serious rights violations,
124
 adds support to this argument. The 
deliberately uncertain statement of the semantic conceptions that the rights embody to avoid 
legal obligations, noted above, makes this problem almost inevitable.
125
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In addition to the danger of rights becoming a mere rubber stamp of international legitimacy, 
their open textured nature also creates the risk that rights will be devalued at the national 
level. Their openness to differing interpretations enables many diverse groups to use rights as 
a ‘form of political argumentation’,126 claiming their protection for their activities, some of 
which may be worse, or no better, than those they claim are infringing their rights.
127
 If this 
leads to a general perception that rights can be used to support any argument, the public may 
begin to respond to claims of rights with scepticism and cynicism, viewing them as providing 
neither guidance nor constraint.
128
 
 
The Need for Interpretation 
The forgoing description of the linguistic and semantic uncertainty inherent and implanted in 
human rights, and the positive and negative consequences of this consequent textual 
openness, demonstrates that, as they are written, human rights are poor guides to action. As 
with all laws whose scope is textually open,
 129
 to be practically useful human rights must be 
interpreted to find their meaning.
130
 Under the HRA the interpretation of the Convention 
rights falls to the judiciary.
131
 
 
The drafters intended that the textually open terms of the Convention rights be given detailed 
application by member states and their courts as well as the ECtHR.
132
 This approach is in 
line with the civil style of drafting which influenced the drafters.
133
 It is also in accordance 
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with the correct separation of powers within states which seek to protect liberty.
134
 As 
Montesquieu argued, the power to judge must be separated from the legislature and executive 
powers, this power includes the interpretation of laws necessary to resolve disputes over what 
the law requires.
135
 The independence and impartiality of judges from the parties and the state 
makes them fit to fulfil this role.
136
 
 
Judicial interpretation, however, can never completely eradiate linguistic uncertainty from a 
human rights provision. The judiciary must use language to define rights and these 
definitions, as noted above,
137
 can in turn be ambiguous. Their interpretations of rights will 
themselves have to be interpreted to determine what the courts think the rights mean and the 
judges’ semantic conceptions of the rights may not always be linguistically clear.138 Further 
uncertainty of meaning can result from the fact that there are a number of interpretive 
approaches which can be taken by judges to find the meaning of the open textured rights, and 
thus it may be uncertain as to which judges will take.
139
 
 
In spite of these problems with judicial interpretation of human rights, it does carry with it an 
advantage which counteracts some of the negative consequences of open textured nature of 
rights described above.
140
 The authoritativeness of judicial interpretation of the Convention 
rights at the national and supra-national level mitigates against the indeterminacy of rights.
141
 
Without it human rights are in greater danger of becoming nothing more than the political 
footballs and rubber stamps Douzinas describes. Leonard Sumner argues that if cynicism and 
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nihilism in relation to rights is to be avoided a standard must be found against which to verify 
rights claims.
142
 Judicial interpretations provide such a standard.  
 
Although it is thus clear that the judicial interpretation of rights is essential to ensure their 
effectiveness, the question remains as to which interpretive approach should be taken. Many 
different approaches are available. The aim of this thesis will be to argue for one particular 
principle to guide interpretation. It was observed above that words generally take their 
meaning from their context,
143
 and so this thesis will argue for a particular context which 
should be used by the British courts to interpret the Convention rights and seek an approach 
to interpretation that is compatible with it.  
 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that various causes have created and facilitated the linguistic and semantic 
uncertainty in the meaning of human rights norms. This uncertainty and the connected open 
textured nature has both negative and positive attributes. The uncertainty and its 
consequences, however, make the interpretation of the human rights, including those 
incorporated by the ECHR, essential if the rights and rights movement generally is to have 
meaning. The next chapter will identify in detail disputes of interpretation as to the semantic 
content of the Convention rights that arise as a result of the open textured nature described in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER III: THE PURPOSES UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HOW THESE AND THEIR USE IN THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE CONVENTION RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTE TO THE INDETERMINACY OF 
MEANING OF THE CONVENTION RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will demonstrate how the nature of the principles that underlie the ECHR, whose 
furtherance has been claimed by the courts and the drafters to be the purpose of the rights, 
add to the open textured nature of the Convention to increase the uncertainty as to how the 
rights they underpin should be interpreted and applied. It will be shown that a lack of 
agreement as to the interpretation of these principles creates scope for disagreement upon the 
requirements that the substantive rights based upon them should be interpreted as imposing. 
This underlying lack of agreement, together with the open textured nature of the 
Convention’s language, will be shown to have a practical impact in creating uncertainty as to 
the judgements that the ECtHR and national courts should reach on five central questions of 
interpretation, that underlie disputes over the meaning of the Convention rights, and around 
which the uncertainty of the meaning of the rights coalesces. 
 
The General Purposes behind the Convention’s Creation 
The broad practical reasons which underlie the creation of the ECHR are both reactive and 
prospective. They share much in common with the rationale behind the creation of the other 
international human rights documents following World War II (WWII).  
 
Although similar normative protection for human rights can be traced back to the United 
States’ Declaration of Independence 1776 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
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and the Citizen 1789,
1
 the movement which led to the creation of our modern international 
human rights protections developed during WWII as a response to the Nazi atrocities and 
with a view to the type of society that should be created upon an Allied victory.
2
 In the 
American President Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ state of the union address3 and at the 
meeting of the allied powers at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 an intention to respond to the 
atrocities of the war by ensuring the protection of human rights was clearly stated.
4
  
 
The ECHR was a product of this widespread movement in favour of the protection of human 
rights.
5
 It ‘was a direct response to a global war which had included the horrors of the 
holocaust’,6 with the Consultative Assembly that drafted the Convention explicitly stating the 
need to protect against the injustices and tyrannies of the Nazi regime.
7
 Whereas traditionally 
relations between a state and its citizens were seen as ‘part of the individual state's 
sovereignty and [therefore] governed by national law’,8 in light of the war it was felt 
necessary for there to be international regulation of States’ treatment of their citizens.9 In 
Europe the ECHR was the synthesis of this feeling
10
 which has since put an end to the 
national sovereignty objection to the protection of human rights.
11
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In addition to this reactive purpose, the ECHR was also drafted with the aim of creating post-
war societies of a particular nature. There was a desire to create a new world order that 
protected human rights against oppressive government.
12
 Within Europe it was felt necessary 
to ‘encourage Germany to develop democratic institutions and the rule of law within a more 
integrated Europe’13 in order to prevent the spread of communism.14 This led to an emphasis 
within the ECHR on protecting the values and principles which were thought necessary for 
the creation and maintenance of democratic societies.
15
 This is particularly clear in the 
grounds for determining whether a state’s infringement of a right is justifiable which make 
reference to this aim.
16
 
 
Principled Purposes 
From Purposes to Principles 
These societal consequences that the ECHR was intended to effect are practical 
manifestations of underlying principles which form theoretical bases for the Convention. 
These principles of dignity, autonomy and equality
17
 are statements of the valued 
characteristics of human beings and what is necessary for the existence of a good society.
18
 
Applying any of the definitions of the three underlying principles which will be discussed 
below
19
 it becomes clear that the Nazi policies and actions were abuses of these principles. 
This link was recognised in the preamble of the UDHR which closely and clearly tied the 
principles of dignity and equality to the need to protect against a repetition of the barbarous 
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acts of WWII that violated them.
20
 The bias of the ECHR in these principles is apparent from 
their connection to the practical purposes for which the Convention was created described 
above, the text of the Convention itself, especially the reference to the UDHR in the 
preamble, and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
 
The Convention Text 
The Convention itself makes no explicit statement that the three principles underlie the rights 
it contains.
21
 However, the preamble of the ECHR does make repeated reference to the 
UDHR, and states an intention to give effect to it.
22
 This is significant because the preamble 
of the UDHR recognises respect for both dignity and equality as an important part of the 
general aim of the Declaration of achieving respect for human rights. Louis Henkin argues 
that in this way the UDHR, through its invocation of dignity ‘provided the idea of human 
rights with a universally acceptable foundation.’23 Given that the ECHR was intended to give 
further effect to the UDHR it follows logically that it was also intended to give effect to the 
principles underlying it.
24
 This deduction is strengthened by the invocation of dignity as a 
justification for the protection of rights in the preambles of both the International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights and that on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
25
 This wider 
use supports the recognition of dignity as a basis of the similar rights contained in the ECHR 
and its more general acceptance as a basis of human rights.
26
 
 
                                                 
20
 The protection of dignity and equality were similarly depicted as a response to WWII in the preamble to the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
21
 In relation to dignity see D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 
2001), 12 
22
 UDHR Preamble, [5] 
23
 Henkin (n.2), 11 
24
 D. Feldman, 'Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part I' [1999] P.L. 682, 689, see also Beyleveld and 
Brownsword (n.21), 12 
25
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 See also Feldman (n.17), 130 and Feldman (n.24), 682 
   
 
42 
 
The reasoning that supports dignity as an underlying principle can also be applied in relation 
to equality, due to its similar status within the UDHR preamble. Additionally, by stating 
rights to universal suffrage, representative democracy and equal protection of the law and 
against violation of rights,
27
 the Declaration recognised ‘“equality” and non-discrimination 
[as] a most insistent theme.’28 Although the Convention rights do not duplicate verbatim the 
rights found in the UDHR, they take inspiration from them,
29
 something that can be seen in 
Convention’s similar requirement of free elections and the prohibition of discrimination in 
relation to the enjoyment of the Convention rights.
30
 This substantive overlap gives further 
support to the acceptance of equality as a principle also underling the Convention rights. 
 
No explicit mention of the principle of autonomy is made in any of the rights treaties referred 
to above. However, the concept of ‘freedom’ of action dapples the Convention. Isaiah Berlin, 
in describing his concept of ‘positive liberty’,31 which he depicts as protecting the 
‘autonomous self’,32 uses the words ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ synonymously.33 Thus, it is here 
submitted that the references to freedom in the title and body of the ECHR can be seen as 
encompassing and furthering the protection of the principle of autonomy, establishing it as 
underpinning the Convention.
34
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Article 2, 7 & 21 UDHR 
28
 Henkin (n.2), 12 
29
 Ovey and White (n.1), 2 
30
 Article 14  and Protocol 1, Article 3 ECHR 
31
 I. Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (OUP 2002), 178, See also J. Marshall, ‘A right to 
personal autonomy at the European Court of Human Rights’ [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 337, 340 
32
 Berlin (n.31), 179, see also G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 
1988), 13 
33
 Berlin (n.31), 169 
34
 See in agreement, J. Laws, 'The Constitution: Morals and Rights' [1996] P.L. 622, 623-624 & 626-627 
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The Court’s Jurisprudence  
Under the ECHR the ECtHR is given the authority to rule on the interpretation of the 
Convention rights.
35
 In fulfilling this function it has both explicitly stated, and implicitly 
though use in interpretation
36
 recognised, the principles mentioned above as underlying the 
rights.  
 
The Court has clearly stated dignity as an underlying principle upon which the Convention 
rights are based,
37
 going so far as to hold that ‘[t]he very essence of the Convention is respect 
for human dignity’.38 Just as the cases cited below demonstrate that autonomy is often used as 
an underlying principle in cases concerning Article 8,
39
 the case law shows that dignity is 
very frequently invoked in relation to Article 3.
40
 In addition to the recognition of the 
underlying position of dignity, in Pretty v United Kingdom, the ECtHR also explicitly held 
that ‘the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation 
[of Article 8].’41 This was similarly openly recognised in Goodwin v United Kingdom 42 and 
implicitly underpinned the ECtHR’s decision in Von Hannover.43 
 
Although there is a relative paucity of explicit statements of equality as an underlying 
principle, a finding of unequal treatment has been relied upon as the basis for holding that a 
Convention right has been violated. Thus, in the East African Asians v United Kingdom the 
                                                 
35
 Article 32(1) ECHR 
36
 S. Fredman, ‘From deference to democracy: the role of equality under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2006) 
122 L.Q.R. 53, 53 
37
 Feldman (n.17), 128 
38
 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [65] 
39
 Below p.49 & 146-148 
40
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Commission held that Article 3 had been violated because treating people differently 
rendered them second class citizens.
44
 Additionally it has been argued that a notion of 
equality underlies the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ‘necessary in a democratic society 
requirement’45 provision of the qualified rights where the ECtHR has refused to simply give 
precedence to the view of the majority over the minority on matters of freedom of speech;
46
 
for if the majority could tyrannise the minority they would not be treated as equals.
47
 
 
Uncertainty Surrounding the Interpretation of these Principles  
Although there appears to be good support for perceiving these principles to underlie the 
Convention rights, the nature of the principles creates scope for disagreement as to their 
theoretical contents. Though the different interpretations of the principles are each capable of 
being used to interpret the Convention rights, the diverging views as to their contents creates 
scope for differing claims as to how the rights they underpin should be interpreted, adding to 
the uncertainty as to how the substantive open textured Convention rights will be interpreted 
by the ECtHR. 
 
Dignity 
As a principle of moral philosophy, dignity attaches to the inherent characteristic of humans 
which gives them their value
48
 as a moral agent and entitlement to respect from other 
agents.
49
 Thus, the central question that different theories of dignity seek to address is the 
nature of this characteristic, defining what it is about the human condition that should be 
                                                 
44
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45
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deemed to possess value.
50
 The answer to this question is key, if dignity is to act as a 
justification for deeming individuals to have rights by which states are bound, for it will be 
this characteristic to which the rights attach and thus shapes, the interpretation of those 
rights.
51
 
 
The ‘neo-classical’ conception of dignity,52 so named because of its roots in the idea of 
classical thought that dignity was attached to the rank of an individual,
53
 takes the view that 
humans have dignity, and therefore rights which should be respected,
54
 merely by virtue of 
the fact that they are human,
55
 by ranking as humans. This conception of the uniqueness of 
the human being can be speciesist,
56
 whereby it is the mere fact that humans are humans that 
gives them special value.
57
 Alternately and historically from a religious perspective, the value 
can derive from the belief that humans are made in a God’s image.58  
 
On this view, the content of this definition of dignity, the meaning it gives to the rights based 
upon it, is concerned with protecting the inherent worth of being human and how people see 
themselves as humans (their sense of self worth).
59
 Moon and Allen summarise this definition 
of dignity as requiring the ‘esteem and respect of other people’ and that a person not be 
                                                 
50
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51
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52
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53
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54
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55
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57
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‘humiliated or treated without respect for his value as a person.’60 In this way this conception 
of dignity links to the classical conception of dignity as a person’s social rank and focused 
upon a person’s self-presentation, character and conduct.61  Under the neo-classical 
conception, degrading treatment is that which reduces the value of being a human, not merely 
treats them in a manner inferior to that which is due to their social rank. 
 
Uncertainty arises, however, when the neo-classical conception is called upon to interpret 
rights, for the question must first be asked: what does this value of being a human require? In 
answering this question the interpreter must apply their own view informed by social 
factors
62
 to decide the question and interpret the right.
 63
 On this question there is scope for 
disagreement, leading to uncertainty as to the requirements of a right based upon this 
definition of dignity. An explicit application of this definition can clearly be seen in Pretty v 
United Kingdom where the ECtHR held that Article 3 would be violated if ‘treatment 
humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her 
human dignity’.64 
 
The core feature of the other main conception of dignity is that it focuses, not on the dignity 
of a human as a whole, but instead deems a particular characteristic to be of value and 
therefore giving the agent who possesses it dignity.
65
 ‘[T]he best-known articulation of the 
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65
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idea of intrinsic human dignity’,66 which shows a clear break from the classical and neo-
classical conceptions, is found in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy.67 For Kant the characteristic 
which had intrinsic value and thus dignity was the capacity for rational thought.
68
  
 
He noted that rationality was the factor essential for a being to be able to give universal law 
and recognise that they were bound by a universal law; capable of creating a moral theory 
and acting in accordance with it.
69
 Kant argued that this had intrinsic absolute worth 
(dignity)
70
 because it was pure rationality, not the product of impulses, inclinations or 
feelings which, unlike rationality,
71
 can be subject to comparison and competition and 
therefore are of relative worth.
72
 Based upon this intrinsic value Kant argues that rationality 
should be treated as an end in itself not the means to another end.
73
 A particular interpretation 
of this conception of dignity was applied in relation to Article 3 ECHR by the French Conseil 
d’Etat who held that the throwing of dwarves for sport was to treat the dwarf as an object and 
not an end in itself as required by dignity.
74
 Gewirth similarly takes the capacity for 
rationality, specifically when present in purposive and voluntary action,
75
 to be the 
fundamental characteristic of foremost (all be it contingent) value,
76
 and which therefore 
provide an underlying justification for human rights.
77
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67
 Ibid 
68
 Ibid, 53, see also Feldman (n.24), 685 and Feldman (n.17), 126 
69
 I. Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregor (ed.), C. Korsgaard (intro.) (Cambridge 
University Press 1997), 41 
70
 Ibid, 36-38 & 42 
71
 Ibid, 46 
72
 Ibid, 42-43 
73
 Ibid, 44-46 
74
 Lancer de Nain, Conseil d’Etat, 27 October 1995 – 265340  
75
 A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago University Press 1978), 22 & 26-27 
76
 A. Gewirth, ‘Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights’ in M. Meyer and W. Parent (eds) The Constitution of 
Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (Cornell University Press 1992), 22-23, see also D. Beyleveld and 
R. Brownsword ‘Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics’ (1998) 61(5) M.L.R. 661, 671 and 
Beyleveld and Brownsword (n.21), 64 
77
 Gewirth (n.75), 46, A. Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application (Chicago University 
Press 1982), 15 and Beyleveld and Brownsword (n.21), 115 & 124 
   
 
48 
 
Peter Singer also rejects a neo-classical conception of dignity in favour of a characteristic 
which is not by definition restricted to the human person.
78
 However, in contrast to Kant and 
Gewirth, he argues that the capacity for suffering and enjoyment, rather than reason, is the 
fundamental characteristic making a being worthy of respect and which can give rise to rights 
binding others.
79
  
 
It is, therefore, clear that in addition to there being different general conceptions of individual 
dignity, there are also different interpretations of those conceptions. Thus, the use of dignity 
as an underlying principle to interpret the substantive Convention rights carries with it the 
scope for disagreement as to the interpretation of the rights. Although different interpretations 
of the underlying principle may agree on an interpretation of a particular substantive right,
80
 
the potential for different interpretations to be recommended creates uncertainty as to the 
scope of the open textured rights. The specific areas of potential dispute in interpretation will 
be discussed below. 
 
Autonomy 
The word autonomy derives from the Greek ‘autos’ meaning ‘self’ and ‘nomos’ meaning 
‘rule’ or ‘law’ and referred to the capacity of a city state to make their own laws as opposed 
to being under the control of another power.
81
 In its application to people, autonomy in a 
general sense can be interpreted as upholding the choices people make about how they wish 
to live their lives.
82
 This overall aim has, however, been interpreted in different ways.
83
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Autonomy can be interpreted from both positive and negative perspectives.
84
 In the positive 
sense it involves the ‘freedom to make one’s own choices’85 and set one’s own goals without 
having these predetermined by some other entity or person over which one has no control.
86
 It 
is to act upon one’s own independently determined reasons for acting.87 The use of this 
conception is apparent in the ECtHR’s protection in Von Hannover v Germany of a person’s 
ability to develop their own personality.
88
  In the negative conception autonomy requires 
freedom from interference with ones positively autonomous actions by others.
89
 
 
As with dignity, therefore, there are different conceptions of autonomy as a principle 
underlying rights. Both of these interpretations, however, give rise to a question that 
interpretations of dignity do not: unlike dignity, the principle of autonomy in isolation does 
not answer the question of why autonomy should be respected,
90
 and why it is that a person is 
deemed to have autonomy
91
 and, consequently, to what decisions does autonomy attach. The 
principle of dignity, as shown above, gives answers to these questions and thus it can be seen 
as not only underlying human rights but also the principle of autonomy.
92
 This relation 
between dignity and autonomy is recognised in the UDHR’s preamble, where dignity is said 
to be the ‘foundation of freedom,’93 which was itself argued above to encompass within the 
Convention the idea of autonomy.
94
 However, as has been noted, dignity itself is not without 
uncertainty. The scope for argument as to the identity and requirements of the appropriate 
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meta-principle,
95
 in addition to the existence of differing conceptions of autonomy itself, 
again involves uncertainty as to its scope and requirements when used to interpret rights.  
 
Equality 
Statements of equality were given a prominent place in the early human rights documents
96
 
and it has been argued that equality underlies many of the Convention rights.
97
 In its basic 
formulation, dating back to Aristotle, equality can be defined as requiring that like things 
should be treated alike and dissimilar things be treated dissimilarly.
98
 The application of both 
these aspects is apparent in ECtHR jurisprudence.
99
  
 
However, under this definition it is ‘virtually impossible to conceive of equality in the 
abstract’,100 there must be something in relation to which equality is assessed. Thus, the 
invocation of equality raises the question of what characteristics should be deemed to require 
that there be equal treatment in relation to them, which itself necessitates answering the more 
fundamental question of why ought we to act with equality.
101
 Thus, without underlying 
guiding moral standards equality is meaningless and ‘can have nothing to say as to how we 
should act.’102 Without such content ‘[e]quality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral 
content of its own.’103 
 
                                                 
95
 Above p.44-48, Berlin suggests the philosophies of Kant and Mill as possibilities. (Berlin (n.31), 173) 
96
 The second sentence of the United States Declaration of Independence 1776 and Article 1 of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789, see also Feldman (n.17), 133 
97
 Singh (n.46), 185 
98
 P. Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95(3) Harv.L.Rev. 537, 54 citing Aristotle, The Nicomachean 
Ethics, D. Ross (trans.), L. Brown (intro. and notes) (OUP 2009), 84-85 
99
 East African Asians (n.44) showing the former and Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 15 demonstrating 
the latter. 
100
 Feldman (n.17), 133 
101
 Westen (n.98), 543-544, see also ibid, 134 and K. Greenawalt, ‘How Empty is the Idea of Equality?’ (1983) 
83(5) Colum.Law.Rev. 1167, 1169  
102
 Westen (n.98), 547 and Fredman (n.36), 71 
103
 Westen (n.98), 547 
   
 
51 
 
If we are not to rely on an intuitive notion
104
 of when equality is appropriate, some other 
moral principle must guide the application of this principle.
105
 Peter Westen argues that this 
moral content can be provided by looking at the rights people possess.
106
 This analysis of the 
nature of equality is implicit in the key equality provision of the ECHR ensuring equality, the 
Article 14 prohibition on discrimination,
107
 which the ECtHR has held creates no 
freestanding right but rather ‘relates solely to “rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention”’.108 This, however, raises the question: what is the justification for the scope of 
these rights? Thus, like autonomy, analysis of the application of equality leads us into 
consideration of principles of dignity which, as demonstrated above, provides answers to the 
questions equality raises.
109
 Some recognition of this is apparent in the ECtHR’s reference to 
the rights and dignity possessed by the claimants in the East African Asians case.
110
  
 
In addition to providing a fundamental basis for rights, the use of dignity also avoids the 
philosophical trap of invalidly deriving a moral ‘ought’ from a non-moral ‘is.’111 To be 
logically valid the characteristic which entitles people to be treated equally must be a morally 
significant characteristic as opposed to a merely physical characteristic.
112
 Dignity is such a 
characteristic. However this does not eliminate the potential for uncertainty in the application 
of equality because, as has been noted above, dignity itself is open to different interpretations.  
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The Practical Implications of the Uncertainty of the Underlying Principles for the 
Interpretation of the Convention Rights 
The textual and semantic uncertainty of the Convention rights, combined with the fact that 
the underlying principles described above are open to different interpretations, has the 
practical implication that the interpretation of the substantive Convention rights by the 
ECtHR or national courts is a matter of debate and disagreement. This uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the rights is thus not merely a practical consequence of the language used to 
define the rights; it reflects a deeper theoretical debate as to the nature of the principles which 
underlie the Convention. Within this uncertainty, five fundamental questions of interpretation 
can be identified with which it is necessary to engage in order to adequately determine the 
meaning of the Convention rights. The scope and requirements of each Convention right 
depends on the answers to these questions. The practical importance of these questions can be 
seen from the fact that they arise in the Convention rights cases of the most controversy 
which most tax the highest courts. Thus, the nature of the principle(s) deemed to underlie the 
Convention and used to interpret it, through the answers to the five questions that they entail, 
is pivotal to the practical meaning and scope of the substantive rights.  
 
Who Has Rights 
This question of who can be recognised as capable of possessing human rights is of primary 
and pivotal importance over all other questions of rights interpretation. Its position derives 
from the fact that it is essential to know who can claim the protection of rights before 
determining the protection that a right gives them in a given factual circumstance. Prior, 
therefore, to issues of whether a particular right is relevant on the facts of a case, is the 
question of whether the being in question has the characteristics necessary to be said to be 
capable of holding human rights generally. 
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Although the universality of rights is regarded as a foundational feature of human rights,
113
 
carrying with it the idea that human rights are applicable to all humans, when it comes to the 
practical application of the rights, this broad statement of who can be a beneficiary of rights 
has the boundaries of its scope questioned in hard cases. These cases have involved the 
determination of whether prisoners,
114
 foetuses,
115
 dead humans
116
 or the more intelligent of 
the non-human primates
117
 should be deemed to be capable of being possessors of the 
Convention rights. 
 
Cases such as these pivot on the issue of what the underlying interpretive principles set as the 
characteristic to which rights attach. Thus, under a Kantian perspective on dignity the 
capacity to think rationally is pivotal to whether a person can be deemed to have human 
rights.
118
 However, it is also possible to conceive of a principle of dignity which gives rights 
only to those capable of autonomous action.
119
  Conversely, the speciesist approach described 
above would give rights to those who are genetically human.
120
 Thus, disagreement and 
consequent uncertainty as to the meaning of human rights arise as a product of the different 
interpretations of the underlying principles that can be applied to interpret the rights. The far-
reaching implications of such disagreement are most clearly illustrated by the fact that under 
the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, women and non-
white people were not deemed to have rights they are now recognised as possessing.
121
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The Substantive Nature of the Convention Rights: Positive and Negative Obligations  
After it has been established who can be deemed to possess rights a further question arises as 
to the substantive nature of the obligations that are imposed on others by the rights.
122
 Rights 
can be formulated as imposing positive obligations whereby the party bound by the right is 
required ‘to undertake specific affirmative tasks’123 in order to protect what can be called 
another’s ‘positive’ right from interference or to facilitate and provide for the exercise of 
another’s right.124 Alternatively, they may be interpreted as additionally or alternately 
imposing a negative obligation to refrain from interfering with the ‘negative’ rights of 
another.
125
  
 
The ECtHR is yet to articulate a general theory in this area
126
 and it has been argued that all 
rights are capable of imposing positive or negative obligations.
127
 Guidance as to this element 
of the nature of the rights can be found through the application of the principles argued to 
underlie the rights; however, these can lead to divergent views.  
 
Feldman has argued that a concept of dignity which prohibits interference with a person’s 
self-respect and self-worth will generally only give rise to rights imposing a negative 
obligation.
128
 He, however, concedes that a conception of dignity which attributes value to 
persons who may be incapable of such self-awareness, also coinciding with the neo-classical 
conception described above, can impose positive duties which must be fulfilled to enable a 
                                                 
122
 Eg. X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235, [23], Evans (n.42), [75] and Pretty (n.38), [67] 
123
 A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Hart 2004), 2 
124
 S. Fredman, ‘Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties and Positive Rights [2006] P.L. 498, 500 
125
 Ibid, 498 
126
 Mowbray (n.123), 221 and G. Phillipson and A. Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional 
Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) M.L.R. 878, 883 
127
 Mowbray (n.123), 224 and Fredman (n.124), 500 
128
 Feldman (n.24), 686 and Feldman (n.17), 128 
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person to live in a dignified manner.
129
 Alternately, conceptions of dignity that take a Kantian 
approach can be interpreted as requiring not simply non-interference with the exercise of the 
value-laden characteristic such as rationality,
130
 but also as requiring the provision of the 
circumstances necessary for that dignity to flourish.
131
 
 
As with dignity, so with autonomy. Autonomy can be interpreted as giving rise to not only 
rights to be free from interference by others, but also rights to the positive support necessary 
to exercise that autonomy,
132
 especially in relation to those such as children may need support 
because they are not capable of exercising their autonomy.
133
 Alternatively, a restrictive, but 
possible, interpretation would see autonomy as only requiring the recognition of rights 
imposing negative obligations, ensuring freedom from interference with an individual’s 
actions.
134
 
 
Equality can also be interpreted in both a positive and a negative manner. It can be seen as 
either requiring that people be equally free in, and treated equally by others in relation to, the 
exercise of their rights or dignity to which the principle of equality attaches.
135
 But also it can 
require that positive steps be taken to put a person in a similar position to others in relation to, 
or be assisted so that they are equality able to exercise, the right or value upon which equality 
operates.
136
  
 
 
                                                 
129
 Feldman (n.24), 685-687 & 690 and Feldman (n.17), 128, what Feldman describes as objective dignity. 
130
 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n.21), 16 
131
 Ibid, 11, 18 & 64 
132
 J. Marshall, A Right to Personal Autonomy at the European Court of Human Rights [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 337, 
344 
133
 Feldman (n.17), 10 & 12-13 and Berlin (n.31), 171 
134
 Feldman (n.17), 11 
135
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The Weighing and Balancing of Convention Rights  
As Locke recognised, if all humans have rights then there is potential for one person’s actions 
to infringe the rights of another.
137
 Thus, there must be a means by which disputes as to 
conflicts between rights are resolved.
138
 The inevitably of conflict is recognised in the 
substantive provisions of the Convention described below, however, at the conceptual level 
such conflicts have been seen to be between the competing parties’ interests under the 
underlying principles
139
 behind the substantive rights. Such a conflict was, for example, 
apparent in Pretty where the autonomy of Mrs Pretty was felt to conflict with the autonomy 
interest of vulnerable persons to be free from coercion.
140
 Additionally a conception of 
autonomy or dignity which requires non-interference may well conflict with state actions felt 
necessary in the pursuit of a public interest, such as those listed in the explicitly qualified 
Convention rights such as Article 8(2),
141
 although the extent to which these two types of 
conflict are distinct will be discussed further below.
142
  
 
The way in which such disputes are resolved, between rights and claims that they should be 
limited in favour of specific interests, will be directed by the conception of the underlying 
principle that is adopted. If a teleological underlying principle is applied then the decision 
that ‘would produce the greatest amount’143 of the value protected by that principle is the 
correct one. If a deontological approach is taken then the conflict must be resolved in 
accordance with the relative weight given to the parties’ claims by the extent to which they 
                                                 
137
 Locke (n.58), 118-120 
138
 Ibid, 159 
139
 H. Fenwick, ‘Judicial Reasoning in Clashing Rights Cases’ in H. Fenwick and others (eds) Judicial 
Reasoning Under the Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2007), 260-261 
140
 Pretty (n.38), [67] & [76], see also Evans (n.42) 
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142
 Below p.80-81 & 126 
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further the intrinsic value protected by the deontological principle.
144
 Under this approach the 
quantitative consequences are generally irrelevant; it is the nature of parties’ rights that will 
determine the correct balance.
145
 The quantitative consequences of an action are only relevant 
to the extent that they relate to the calculation of the likelihood of interference with the 
protected rights.
146
 While there is uncertainty as to which approach to balancing the courts 
will and should adopt there will be uncertainty as to the decision they will reach in cases 
where rights conflict. 
 
The Interest and the Will Conceptions of Rights  
In addition to the questions of who has rights, what those rights require of others and their 
precedence over others’ rights, is the question of whether the bearer has the capacity to waive 
the protection that his rights gives him. Waiving the benefit of a right is to suspend the claim 
made by it so as to permit an action prohibited by the right or decline to seek its vindication 
where an action in breach of the duty it imposes has occurred.
147
 The ‘benefit’ of the right is 
referred to deliberately in order to distinguish the idea that the actual possession of a right can 
be surrendered or waived. Under a conception of rights which sees their possession as 
inalienable, in that they are possessed by virtue of some characteristic rather than gifted by 
the external power of the state, the idea that a person might cease to possess a right, on a 
ground other than that they no longer poses the characteristic to which it attaches, is 
fundamentally inconsistent. Thus, the idea that a person could waive their claim to hold a 
right, as opposed to waiving the benefit of their right, is inconsistent with the idea of 
                                                 
144
 D. Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (University of Chicago Press 1991), 48, see generally 
Fenwick (n.139), 256-257 and Berlin (n.31), 173 
145
 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1997), ix, xi & 96 and J. Thompson, ‘The Trolley 
Problem’ (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1395, 1404 & 1408 
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inalienable rights.
148
 It will be argued below that the UDHR and ECHR must be understood 
to state inalienable rights in this sense
149
 and thus, if waiving is possible in relation to these 
rights, it is only the benefit of the rights can be waived. Academic and judicial consideration 
of the exercise of a waiver in relation to the Convention rights will thus be interpreted 
accordingly, unless there is evidence of a clear intention to argue for the waiver of the rights 
rather than their benefit. 
 
On the question of whether the benefit of a right can be waived, there are two competing 
approaches. Under an interpretation of rights which follows the ‘will conception’ it is open in 
principle to an agent to waive the protection of any right,
150
 allowing an act which would 
otherwise infringe upon his right. Under the contrasting ‘interest conception,’ such waiving is 
not necessarily possible.
151
 The two conceptions give different conclusions on the waiving of 
the benefits rights because they have different conceptions of characteristics of a right 
generally.
152
 If principles underlying the Convention rights are used in the interpretation of 
those rights, then whether a will or interest conception of those rights is required by the 
principle can dictate the outcome of a case.
153
 
 
The impact of this question of interpretation is apparent from the Convention right case law. 
In the Dwarf Tossing
154
 decision mentioned above,
155
 the Conseil d’Etat’s adopted an interest 
based approach holding that the dwarf’s consent to being hurled did not prevent the sport 
                                                 
148
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 Below p.169-170 
150
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being an impermissible infringement of his dignity.
156
 The court held that the dwarf could not 
act in a way which denied his own dignity.
157
 This decision is consistent with Kant’s interest 
conception of dignity which entailed that rational beings owed an unavoidable duty to 
themselves to respect their own rationality, their dignity, as well as that of others.
158
 This 
demonstrates the potential for conflicting conclusions to be reached under the two 
approaches: had a will conception been applied by the Conseil d’Etat, it could have been 
possible for M. Wackenheim to permit himself to be tossed. Without certainty as to which the 
courts should and do apply there will be uncertainty as to how the substantive Convention 
rights should be interpreted. 
 
Horizontal and Vertical Application 
A logical corollary of considering the nature of the rights and their consequent obligations is 
the question of upon whom the rights impose obligations, upon only the state (vertically) or 
also upon private individuals and non-state bodies (horizontally)? At a principled level the 
question is one of whether rights are applicable against not only the state but also against 
private individuals and entities.
159
   
 
Whose rights should be interpreted as being legally effective against, directly or indirectly,
160
 
has been argued to be contingent on,
161
 or at least to gain weight from,
162
 the answer to the 
question of who the rights are applicable to in principled or moral terms.
163
 This in turn can 
be seen to depend on the nature of the principles deemed to underlie the Convention rights. 
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This role of the underlying principles is demonstrated by Scanlon’s application of a 
conception of autonomy that is underpinned by the philosophy of Mill.
164
 From this 
theoretical basis his conception of autonomy dictates that a right to freedom of expression 
only has application against the state
165
 – for it is only concerned with determining whether 
an individual should consider themselves bound to obey a law,
166
 not their actions generally – 
and he concedes that a different principle could make freedom of speech rights applicable 
between individuals.
167
 Thus, whilst there is uncertainty and disagreement as to the nature of 
the underlying principles to be applied there will similar uncertainty as to whether the 
substantive rights should have horizontal or vertical applicability. 
 
Conclusion 
It has thus been shown that the underlying principles that it is the purpose of the Convention 
to protect are of uncertain definition. They are open to multiple interpretations, the 
differences in which can have tangible effects on the outcome of the application of the 
Convention rights by entailing different interpretations of the rights. The existence of the 
different principles and different definitions of the principles thus creates uncertainty as to 
how the five pivotal questions of Convention rights interpretation should be answered. There 
is thus a need for a coherent conception of the principled basis of the rights in order to 
provide some certainty as to the principles which should be used to interpret the rights and 
through this, the meaning and application of the Convention rights themselves.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE APPROACH OF THE ORGANS OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE PIVOTAL QUESTIONS OF THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
The five key questions of the interpretation of the Convention rights as a whole are pivotal in 
shaping the ECtHR’s decisions in the cases that come before it. These questions of who can 
possess the rights, the nature of the obligations the rights impose, how should rights be 
balanced against other rights and other interests where they conflict, whether a rights holder 
can waive the benefit of their rights and against whom the rights are held, determine the 
scope and application of all Convention rights to the facts of a particular case. Analysed from 
the perspective of their importance, the ECtHR can be seen to have developed a 
jurisprudence which seeks to answer these questions although it is of varying detail and 
certainty.  
 
This chapter seeks to define those answers to the five questions. To apply a moral principle to 
determine what the requirements of the Convention rights within British law should be, it is 
necessary to know the current approach of the judiciary at the level of the Council of Europe 
to these questions. With such a foundation, the extent to which the interpretative 
requirements of such a principle are consistent with the United Kingdom’s supranational 
rights protection obligations, and the effect such a principle can have within British law 
without a change in Strasbourg jurisprudence, can thus be determined. 
 
Who Can Possess Convention Rights 
The question of who should be deemed capable of possessing rights is a central aspect of the 
scope of the Convention and must, as argued above, precede all other questions of the 
interpretation rights. The Convention cases which have raised this issue directly have 
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concerned the question of whether a foetus can be said to have Convention rights.
1
 However, 
the question also arises where an attempt is made to argue that a person in a permanent 
vegetative state
2
 or a member of another species
3
 should have the Convention’s protection. 
 
Although of pivotal status, it is submitted that this question has not been fully and definitively 
addressed by the organs and documents of the Convention and Council of Europe.
4
 In spite of 
this, it is, however, possible to identify some approaches which have been rejected by them, 
and from these deduce some indication of the interpretations that may be acceptable under the 
Convention. 
 
The Convention Text 
Aside from the titular statement that the 1950 European Convention contains ‘Human 
Rights’, the Convention itself contains no specific description of who can hold the rights it 
contains. The overwhelming majority of the Convention rights
5
 describe those with rights as 
‘everyone’ or else state that ‘no one’ is to be deemed to be unprotected by a right. Neither is 
defined within the Convention.
6
 The term ‘person’ is used in other rights to describe those 
with rights who have been affected by a state action.
7
 The ECtHR uses it as a term 
encompassing those with rights
8
 synonymous with the use of ‘everyone’ and ‘no-one’ in the 
Convention text. This term is open to different interpretations
9
 which the ECtHR has, 
                                                 
1
 Eg. Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12 
2
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 879 
3
 M. Balluch and E. Theuer ‘Personhood Trial for Chimpanzee Matthew Pan’ (Verein Gegen Tierfabriken 
Website 2008) <http://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080118Hiasl.htm> accessed 2
nd
 January 2012  
4
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however, refused to choose between,
10
 whilst recognising that ‘personhood’ is necessary to 
hold rights.
11
 The travaux préparatoires to the Convention give no definition of ‘everyone’ 
for the purposes of the ECHR.
12
  
 
However, although giving no positive description of what attributes a being must have in 
order to possess human rights, it is submitted that by the application of logic to Article 14 it is 
possible to draw inferences as to what characteristics are irrelevant to determining wether a 
being is capable of bearing any of the Convention rights. Article 14 is not a free standing 
right,
13
 rather it states the grounds on which a person cannot be denied the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of the Convention.
14
 The Article’s description of characteristics which 
are irrelevant to the enjoyment of rights can, however, be seen to imply that these 
characteristics are not ones the possession of which is necessary to be a person to whom 
substantive Convention rights attach. Although the possession of one of the characteristics 
listed in Article 14 may make a particular Convention right relevant to the facts of a case, the 
possession of a political opinion may for example make Article 10 relevant where the 
expression that opinion is limited by a law,
15
 the applicability of the protection of the 
Convention scheme generally to the being with such an opinion depends on other less 
contingent characteristics. 
 
The Council of Europe’s subsequent Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 1997 
                                                 
10
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11
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2006), 413 & 415, Haas v The Netherlands (2004) 39 EHRR 897 at [41] 
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(the Biomedicine Convention) built upon the ECHR, elaborating some of the principles 
contained within it,
16
 with the ECtHR given the power to deliver advisory opinions on its 
interpretation.
17
 The Biomedicine Convention’s description of the application of rights 
declares that the parties to the Convention are to ‘guarantee everyone…respect for their 
integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms’.18 This reuse of the term ‘everyone’ is 
again undefined, the explanatory report accompanying it made it clear that this deliberate 
decision was the result of a lack of agreement amongst the members of the Council of 
Europe.
19
 It was felt that in light of this it should be left to the states to define ‘everyone’ 
when giving effect to the Convention.
20
 
 
Although it gives no explicit definition, it is apparent that Article 1 of the Biomedicine 
Convention draws an instructive distinction between the guarantee of rights to ‘everyone’ and 
a separate injunction upon states to ‘protect the dignity and identity of all human beings’.21 
The term ‘human being’ was used because of its ‘general character’22 which was furthered by 
leaving it undefined.
23
 The decision to use two different terms implies that drafters felt that 
there was a distinction which could be drawn between them, with everyone having rights but 
not all human beings falling within the more specific classification of ‘everyone.’ The 
intentionally utilised general character of the term ‘human being’ lends weight to this 
interpretation. It is also apparent from the provisions which exclusively address and protect 
                                                 
16
 Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’ (ETS No. 
164), [9] <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/164.htm> accessed 3
rd
 September 2012 
17
 Article 29 Biomedicine Convention, and see also Vo (n.6), [84] 
18
 Article 1 Biomedicine Convention (my emphasis), see also Article 10 Biomedicine Convention 
19
 Council of Europe (n.16), [18] 
20
 Council of Europe (n.16), [18] and Vo (n.6), [84] 
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concerning Biomedical Research and of the Additional Protocol concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes 
2008. 
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‘human beings’24 that the drafters intended to draw a distinction between human beings and 
humans with rights; these provisions implying that that a being must have attributes 
additional to being a human being in order to have rights under the Biomedicine Convention 
and the ECHR. This shows that the wording of the Biomedicine Convention should thus be 
interpreted as indicating that the drafters of the ECHR did not intend to adopt a speciesist 
approach to who can be deemed to have Convention rights.  
 
It has been noted in the previous chapter that the principle of dignity is used in rights 
discourse to describe those characteristics possessed by a being upon which its possession of 
rights is based. Article 1 of the Biomedicine Convention requires the protection of the dignity 
of human beings; this is not, however, fatal to the above conclusion that the Biomedicine 
Convention requires something more than being a human being to possess the Convention 
rights because, as noted above, there are two main conceptions of dignity that are applied in 
the context of Human Rights. The speciesist neo-classical conception of dignity takes the 
view that humans have dignity, and therefore rights which should be respected, only by virtue 
of the fact that they are human beings and therefore of worth.
25
 The other conception of 
dignity, the ‘Kantian conception’, argues that humans have the value which gives them rights 
as a result of some other characteristic.
26
  
 
If the Biomedicine Convention is interpreted as using dignity in a more general sense of the 
neo-classical conception of ranking as having some worth, but not in the sense of a 
characteristic which gives beings rights, then it is still possible to argue that the Biomedicine 
Convention and the ECHR require something more than being a human being in order to 
possess rights. Support for this interpretive approach can be seen in practice in the ECtHR’s 
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judgement Vo v France that foetuses deserve some protection ‘in the name of human dignity’ 
for their development into a person ‘without making it a “person” with the “right to life” for 
the purposes of Article 2.’27 This interpretation is also consistent with the ECtHR’s decision 
in Pretty where dignity was used to refer to the quality of life in addition to its foundational 
sense.
28
 
 
The Judicial Organs of the Convention 
Given that the Convention text is unspecific as to who qualifies as coming within the 
description of ‘everyone’ for the purposes of possessing its rights, the Convention’s judicial 
organs have been called upon to interpret the text and provide an answer. However, like the 
drafters of the Convention, the Commission and ECtHR have declined to answer the 
question.
29
 The key cases, in which the opportunity to rule on the nature of the beings that are 
protected by the Convention rights has arisen, have concerned the question of whether 
foetuses fall within the scope of ‘everyone’ under Article 2. The judicial organs have, 
however, argued that it is undesirable and unnecessary for them to give an answer to this 
question.  
 
The Commission and the ECtHR have held that ‘it is neither desirable, nor even possible as 
matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person 
…within the scope of Article 2’.30 Both have based this view on the lack of agreement 
amongst the member states as to the legal status of the foetus.
31
 The ECtHR and the 
Commission have justified their approach by holding that the member states differing views 
                                                 
27
 Vo (n.6), [84] 
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29
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requires that they be granted a margin of appreciation on this question.
32
 It is here submitted 
that this use of the margin of appreciation to cover decisions as to who is a being for the 
purposes of the Convention rights is a novel application of the doctrine which departs from 
its traditional application. Previously it has only been applied to the question of whether an 
interference with a right is justified and was held not to be relevant to the determination of 
the scope of a right’s application in terms of what constitutes an interference with a right.33 
 
Although this new use of the margin appreciation is a substantive departure from its previous 
area of application, the courts’ justification for extending it is clearly shared with the 
justifications given for the ordinary application of the margin to questions of balancing 
conflicting rights and interests.
34
 The ECtHR in Vo recognised that cultural differences make 
universal agreement difficult to achieve, and held this justified giving member states the 
capacity to reach different conclusions on the rights status of foetuses. The application of the 
margin of appreciation to this question is also consistent with deliberately open textured 
nature of the terms of the Convention including that of ‘everyone,’ designed to maximise 
agreement amongst states to participation in the Convention project.
35
  This extended 
application of the margin gives effect to this aim by enabling the continued membership of 
states with differing approaches to this question
36
 to the ECHR.  
 
From a practical and pragmatic standpoint the application of the margin of appreciation to 
this element of the question of who has rights is thus justified. However, the fundamental 
nature of the question of who has rights and why, with its implications for the wider 
                                                 
32
 Vo (n.6), [85], Evans v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 34, [56] and H v Norway Application No. 17004/90 
(Commission Decision, 19 May 1992), [1], see also Harris (n.4), 54-55 
33
 Vo (n.6), (Dissent) [O-III 3 & 8] and below p.83-85 
34
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35
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interpretation of all Convention rights, requires an intellectually coherent principled answer. 
Although the ECtHR has concluded that this is not possible at the supra-national level, it has 
left member states and their courts the scope to search for such a basis. 
 
This reluctance to rule upon this question and use of the margin of appreciation is also 
consistent with the earlier approach to the this question applied by the Commission, that laws 
governing this area in the member states entail that it is unnecessary for it to rule upon the 
scope of Article 2 in this context. Thus, in Paton v United Kingdom the Commission held 
that, as the Abortion Act 1967 had implicitly recognised a right to life for the foetus by 
regulating abortions, a ruling on whether Article 2 applied would be redundant because the 
member state had acted as if it did.
37
 Thus, in two ways the Convention organs have 
abdicated their task of interpreting the Convention when asked to determine to whom it 
applies.
38
 
 
Outside of cases directly raising the question as to who has human rights, decisions 
upholding the application of rights to particular classes of person give some indirect 
indication of the view of the judicial organs in this area. Thus, the Commission's decision in 
Herczegfalvy v Austria, with which the ECtHR agreed in principle but disagreed on the 
facts,
39
 demonstrates that persons need not have consciousness of the physical effect of an act 
for them to have the protection of the relevant Convention rights. On the facts of this case the 
Commission held that a person’s Article 3 rights could be infringed by restraining them 
whilst they were unconscious.
40
 Similarly, the Court has made it clear that a person with 
                                                 
37
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reduced mental capacity still retains the benefit of the Convention rights.
41
 The ECtHR has 
even been prepared to hold that the rights may confer protection on the dead, with Article 2 
having been held to impose a duty on states to conduct an ‘effective official investigation’ 
into deaths as a result of state action.
42
 These cases indicate that, outside the indicative 
question of Convention rights for foetuses, Strasbourg is prepared to take quite a broad 
approach as to who should be recognised as capable of possessing Convention rights. 
However, the Court continues to avoid giving a clear principled answer to the central 
question of who can possess the Convention rights and the characteristic to which they attach. 
 
The Substantive Nature of Rights as Imposing Positive and Negative Obligations 
The answer to the question of the substantive nature of the obligations imposed as corollaries 
to the possession of the Convention rights contains a certain amount of uncertainty. It is clear 
from the ECtHR’s case law that the rights can impose positive or negative obligations on 
states
43
 However, just as the language of the Convention rights is open textured, the 
boundaries between two ‘do not lend themselves to precise definition’44 and the ECtHR has 
refused to state a general theory of positive obligations.
45
 Negative obligations are found 
where the Convention rights are interpreted as requiring states ‘to abstain from interference 
with, and thereby respect, human rights.’46 Conversely the nature of positive obligations 
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whose nature has not been authoritatively defined by the ECtHR, require states to ‘take 
action’47 of various sorts to secure to individuals the protection of the Convention rights.48  
 
The Legal Source of the Obligations 
David Harris et al note that civil and political rights generally state negative obligations, the 
protection of the individual from state inflicted harm in these negatively phrased rights was a 
key aim of the Convention,
49
 and consequently they constitute the majority of the obligations 
imposed by the ECHR.
50
 Many of the Convention rights open by explicitly imposing a 
negative obligation on states to treat ‘no one’ in a particular manner51 or in the case of 
Articles 8-11 seek determine the extent to which the state should be prohibited from 
interfering with a person’s right recognised freedom.52 
 
Articles which explicitly impose positive obligations are the exception.
53
 These can be stated 
in clear terms
54
 such as the Article 6(3)(c) requirement of the provision of free legal 
assistance for defendants to criminal charges or the injunction under Article 3 of Protocol 1 to 
hold elections. Alternately, it may be apparent from the text that a positive obligation 
accompanies a negative obligation. This has held to be the case in relation to Article 8, where 
the injunction to States to ‘respect private life’ has been held not only to compel the state to 
abstain from arbitrary interference with private and family life, but to inherently impose a 
positive obligation on the state to provide for it.
55
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In spite of the lack of an explicit statement of the positive dimension to most of the 
Convention rights in the text, the ECtHR has found it necessary and possible to imply, from 
the rights and other articles of the Convention,
56
 an additional,
57
 wider range of positive 
obligations by which the states are bound. Although not the sole reason,
58
 Starmer correctly 
identifies this development as to a large extent driven by ‘the recognition that the acts of 
private individuals can threaten human rights just as much as the acts of state authorities’,59 
with positive obligations being found to arise from rights which are phrased in a negative 
manner to require state protection of the those rights to ensure the freedom of individuals 
from interference by other individuals.
60
 The ECtHR has also been motivated in developing 
this aspect of its jurisprudence by its own practical needs.
61
 In order to spare itself from 
having to engage in difficult fact finding missions the ECtHR has imposed positive duties on 
states to conduct investigations into killings, ill-treatment and disappearances.
62
 Additionally 
the ECtHR has required States to give an effective remedy for delays in the criminal process, 
in part to deal with the huge numbers of such cases under Article 6(1).
63
 Thus the positive 
obligations under the Convention can either require the state to provide something to an 
individual, protecting and deriving from a positive right to some good, or the state can be 
placed under a positive obligation to uphold an individual’s negative right to be free from 
interference, by protecting them from unjustified infringement of their rights by another.  
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Utilising the provisions of the Convention outside the main substantive rights, the ECtHR has 
held that the obligation Article 1 imposes on states to ‘secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ entails that the states can be deemed to have positive 
obligations to secure these rights.
64
 This provision has been a key justification in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence for its imposition of positive obligations under Article 2, as in the 
case of McCann v United Kingdom,
65
 and Article 3, apparent in the case of A v United 
Kingdom.
66
 
 
Similarly, the Article 13 right to an effective remedy has been held to require states to take 
positive actions to protect the Convention rights of the people within their jurisdiction, not 
merely to themselves refrain from action which would violate the Convention rights.
67
 Thus, 
in Aydin v Turkey it was held to impose a positive obligation on states to investigate a breach 
of Convention rights, separate from and beyond any such obligation that might be imposed 
by substantive Convention rights such as Article 2.
68
 
 
The ECtHR has also showed a willingness to find that the States may be subject to positive 
obligations by individuals’ rights under the Article 14 prohibition on discrimination.69 In the 
case of Thlimmenos v Greece Strasbourg recognised that this Article not only required that 
states not treat persons differently without justification in their enjoyment of their Convention 
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rights, but can also require that states take action to treat different persons differently where 
their distinctive characteristics engage their Convention rights.
70
 
 
As well as finding that Articles 1, 13 and 14 entail the imposition of positive obligations, the 
ECtHR has also held that positive obligations are necessitated by the substantive rights 
themselves in order that they may be ‘practical and effective’,71 ‘not theoretical and 
illusionary.’72 This is a more general justification73 because it ‘runs like a thread through 
Convention jurisprudence’74 of positive obligations and has been used in the interpretation of 
a number of different rights. The ECtHR’s logic under this justification is that ‘to secure the 
rights effectively means to provide that rights holders are able to do or have what the right is 
a right to’.75 Thus, in Airey v Ireland it was held that, for the right to private and family life to 
be effectively protected, it was necessary that the state enable people to gain a separation 
from their partner.
76
 Similarly, in the case of Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’77 Article 13 was 
relied upon by the ECtHR to hold not only that the state has a negative duty to permit people 
to exercise their Article 11 rights by holding a peaceful demonstration, but also that it must 
provide for the prohibition and prevention of violent counter demonstrations which would 
inhibit ‘effective [exercise of] freedom of peaceful assembly.’78 This justification for the 
imposition is supported by the text of the preamble which states that an aim of the 
                                                 
70
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Convention is to further that sought by the UDHR: ‘securing the universal and effective 
recognition and observance of the rights’.79 
 
The statement and application of positive obligations not found explicitly within the text of 
the Convention shows a recognition by Strasbourg that the Convention is primarily an 
instrument designed to protect individuals and their human rights, not merely a code which 
restricts members of the Council of Europe from committing certain unacceptable acts. This 
can be clearly seen in the justifications relied upon in the development of its jurisprudence of 
positive obligations. The reliance on Article 1’s injunction to secure individuals’ rights, the 
desire to ensure that the rights possessed by individuals are given effective protection 
applying Article 13 and the Convention’s preamble, and the development of positive 
obligations to ensure that individuals are protected from the actions of other individuals in 
addition to those of the state. 
 
The Particular Nature of the Obligations 
Different substantive positive obligations can be found from these justifications, some of 
which may be combined to support a particular judgement.
80
 The general nature of the above 
justifications,
81
 together with the lack of a statement of a ‘general theory’ of positive 
obligations by the ECtHR,
82
 entails uncertainty as to the specific positive obligations that the 
scope of the Convention rights require for ‘[t]here is no a priori limit to the contexts in which 
a positive obligation may be found’.83 This uncertainty is magnified by the potential for 
judicial disagreements as to what positive obligations are necessary to protect a right.
84
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Within this uncertainty it is, however, possible to discern two broad categories of positive 
obligations which the ECtHR has imposed.
85
   
 
Positive obligations can be seen to be either regulative or facilitative in nature.
86
 The 
regulative obligations require States to create a legal framework which ensures effective 
protection of the Convention rights of those within their jurisdiction.
87
 Thus, Strasbourg has 
held that States are under an obligation to ensure that they enact laws which enable their 
people to complain and obtain redress for violations of their Convention rights.
88
 This 
category of positive obligation has been particularly important in the context of the 
infringement the interests protected by individual’s negative Convention rights by other 
private individuals.
89
 It is one of the most prevalent,
90
 and has been held to require States to 
enact laws which deter people from infringing the rights of others
91
 and ensure that their 
rights are protected by law from infringement by others.
92
 In addition to the enactment of 
laws, states can also be obliged to act to take practical action to prevent one individual from 
infringing another’s rights.93 
 
States have also been held to be required to take positive actions to regulate the actions of 
their emanations to ensure the effective protection of rights.
94
 Thus, especially in the context 
of Articles 2 and 3
95
 because of their fundamental nature within the Convention,
96
 the ECtHR 
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has held that states are under a positive obligation to conduct effective investigations into 
alleged violations of right by state agents.
97
 Such investigations have the aim of determining 
whether a violation has in fact occurred, and ‘the identification and punishment of those 
responsible’98 for a breach of the Convention rights. In order to prevent such violations by 
state agents
99
 the ECtHR has also held that states have obligations to those detained under its 
criminal justice system to provide conditions of detention which do not violate Article 3
100
 
and to take positive steps to protect their health.
101
 
 
The various facilitative positive obligations require States ensure that people can exercise and 
enjoy the rights recognised in the Convention.
102
 Such obligations include a requirement that 
the state enact legal frameworks which give recognition to people’s rights within the law.103 
Thus in Marckx v Belgium Article 8 was held to require that the state recognise at law the 
familial relationship between mother and illegitimate child from the moment of birth, rather 
than via a bureaucratic procedure, to give effect to the rights to a family life.
104
  
 
Even where such a legal framework for the exercise of rights exists, the ECtHR has been 
prepared to impose a further obligation on states. The Court has held that states can owe an 
obligation to ‘provide resources to individuals to prevent breaches of their Convention 
rights.’105 Thus, in Airey discussed above106 the ECtHR applied a general principle that if a 
right cannot be protected effectively without the provision of resources then they must be 
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provided.
107
 In this case it was therefore held that the state must provide legal aid to enable 
the applicant to exercise her rights effectively.
108
 Similarly, it has been held that states may 
have an obligation to provide information to individuals where this is necessary for them to 
protect their Convention rights.
109
 
 
Limits of Positive Obligations 
The ECtHR’s case law recognising positive obligations is still developing and certain positive 
obligations, such as a general duty to provide health care services,
110
 have yet to be 
recognised. Additionally, in determining whether or not a positive obligation should be 
imposed in a particular circumstance which falls within the scope of a right, the ECtHR 
applies both the principle of proportionality and the margin of appreciation discussed below 
in the context of the balancing of Convention rights generally.
111
 
 
When applying the proportionality test to the determination of the existence of a positive 
obligation the ECtHR will pay close attention to striking a ‘fair balance’112 between the rights 
of the individual and the interests of the community generally.
113
 Similarly, in applying the 
margin of appreciation to this area Jean-Paul Costa, the former President of the ECtHR, has 
noted that the Court will generally grant a wider margin of appreciation in relation to positive 
obligations than it does in relation to negative obligations.
114
 This difference in treatment 
recognises that the imposition of a positive obligation may effect the distribution of ‘finite 
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public funds’115 and that ‘national authorities are in a better position to carry out this 
assessment than an international court.’116 Thus it is submitted that, as with the question of 
who has rights, discretion is also given to member States as to the answer to this element of 
the second fundamental question of rights interpretation. 
 
The Balancing of Rights 
The Need to Balance 
All the rights stated by the Convention as held and possessed against others can be restricted 
in their application to the member states in specific circumstances. The rights are either 
limited within the definition of the right,
117
 in relation to the circumstances within which they 
apply,
118
 the persons to whom they apply
119
 or are subject to a general exceptions
120
 in favour 
of certain interests.
121 
Some rights can also be made subject to derogations which exempt 
designated laws from challenge for infringing specified Convention obligations in a time of 
public emergency,
122
 and treaty reservations can be entered in relation to any of the rights 
with which a domestic law is incompatible at the time the Convention is signed.
123
 
 
It is in relation to the rights subject to general exceptions and derogations
124
 the ECtHR is 
called upon to balance the protection of the Convention rights against competing interests in 
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order to decide which to uphold, on the facts of a particular case.
125
  So important is the 
balancing to determining the practical effect of the Convention rights that it has been 
described as key to its practical application.
126
 
 
The ECHR distinguishes between two types of interest against which rights must be 
balanced.
127
 One is the general interests of the community; public interests such as national 
security and public safety.
128
 The specific interests that compose the public interest can be 
conceptualised in several different ways, under the preponderance, unity and common 
interest theories.
129
 In balancing rights against the public interest the ECtHR must be careful 
not to use a conception that leads it into a majoritarian analysis which would risk 
undermining a practical raison d’être of rights and the Convention, the protection of 
individuals from intolerant majorities.
130
 This was recognised by the ECtHR in its rejection of 
the preponderance conception of the public interest.
131
 
 
The second interest is that of individuals. The general qualifying provisions of the 
Convention
132
 make clear that the drafters of the Convention recognised the potential for the 
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rights of different people to come into conflict. Thus, the enforcement of Articles 8-11 can be 
limited in favour of protecting ‘the rights and freedoms of others.’133 In practice, under the 
Convention and HRA, such conflicts occur where a state’s actions or laws protects the rights 
of one party in a way that limits the rights of others.
134
  
 
It is submitted that it is questionable, however, how far these two categories can or should be 
said to be distinct. If the public interest is interpreted as the pursuit of an amalgam of 
individual interests shared by a group of people, which are in turn conceptualised as the 
furtherance of individual rights, then the distinction becomes obscured, and the public or 
general interests should be recognised as in fact summations of individuals’ rights. At a 
principled level, such an approach is more consistent with the deontological rather than 
teleological foundation for the balancing of rights described above.
135
 Steven  Greer fails to 
recognise this in arguing that under Article 8(2) ‘national security’ is a collective good not a 
right or source of rights, and that protection of ‘morals’ and ‘freedom’ do protect rights.136 It 
is submitted that all justifications for the limitation of rights must ultimately be based in 
individual rights to be consistent with a deontological conception of the Convention. Thus, 
Dworkin’s contention that it is acceptable to limit rights because of the disproportionate ‘cost 
to society’ of upholding them,137 can only be deontologically justified by the effect of 
upholding such a right on the rights of others. In practical terms, the ECtHR’s approach to 
balancing, so far as it is discernible,
138
 does not procedurally distinguish between the two 
types of balancing. In cases where rights are explicitly balanced against rights and those 
                                                 
133
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where they are balanced against general interests the principle of proportionality
139
 and the 
margin of appreciation
140
 play key roles.  
 
The Approach of the Convention’s Adjudicative Bodies 
Although the text of the ECHR makes the need to balance rights against other interests 
explicit within the ECHR,
141
 the Convention itself, like other rights treaties, is silent on how 
its adjudicative bodies should conduct this balancing.
142
 The ECtHR (and previously the 
Commission) have also been reluctant to reveal the means by which the balancing should be 
conducted.
143
 Consequently it is unsurprising that there is considerable confusion surrounding 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area.
144
 Amidst this uncertainty as to the substantive 
process of balancing, the principle of proportionality and the margin of appreciation 
respectively perform the functions of tightrope and safety-net in the ECtHR’s approach. Both 
are key to the judicial approach to questions of balancing.
145
 
 
Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality is used by the ECtHR to determine whether a measure 
restricting a right capable of qualification
146
 is necessary,
147
 and thus justified, in order to 
protect some other interest.
148
 In the context of balancing different principles, proportionality 
generally can be defined as requiring that, where the pursuit of a principle by a particular 
means interferes with the realisation of another principle ‘the degree of non-satisfaction of, or 
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detriment to, one principle…[must be justified by the]…greater…importance of satisfying 
the other.’149 It is this approach that the ECtHR has adopted in balancing the Convention 
rights against competing interests.
150
 The Court thus seeks to ensure that there is a 
‘reasonable relationship between the means employed, including their severity and duration, 
and the public objective to be sought.’151 
 
At a substantive level the ECtHR has adopted an ‘evolutive interpretation’ of rights and of 
proportionality.
152
 This involves the recognition that social attitudes within the member states 
can change over time, and thus what may come within the scope of a right
153
 or be a 
proportionate restriction of a right can also change with time.
154
 
 
The practical application of the proportionality principle to a given conflict between rights, 
and between rights and general interests, is attended by some uncertainty which contributes to 
the wider uncertainty surrounding the balancing of Convention rights. The ECtHR’s 
reluctance to set out a detailed proportionality analysis in every case limits the ability of the 
case law to give guidance on how future questions of balancing will be resolved.
155
 Aileen 
McHarg notes also that the variation in the ECtHR’s approach to answering the questions the 
proportionality test raises leads to uncertainty in this area.
156
 She argues
157
 that the ECtHR 
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oscillates ‘between factual inquiries into the necessity of interferences,[158] again with varying 
degrees of rigour,
[159]
 and more substantive evaluation of the relative importance of rights and 
exceptions,
[160]
 sometimes turning on the absence of impairment of the “very essence” of a 
right.’161 It is, however, possible within this uncertainty to ascertain certain trends in cases of 
balancing of rights and interests which will be described below.
162
 
 
The Margin of Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation has been developed by the judicial organs of the Convention 
specifically to be applied in relation to the issue of balancing Convention rights against other 
rights and competing interests. It has thus been utilised in relation to all but the four non-
derogable rights in their negative senses
163
 and it is at the core of the balancing conducted 
under Articles 8-11.
164
 
 
This adjudicative approach originated in the Commission’s decision in Greece v United 
Kingdom
165
 and was first used by the ECtHR in Ireland v United Kingdom.
166
 The key 
codification of the ECtHR’s thinking on the margin of appreciation came in Handyside v 
United Kingdom.
167
 Here it was stated that that, in relation to the issue of determining 
whether an infringement of the scope of a right was covered by one of the protected interests, 
and whether the domestic measure was necessary to protect that interest, the member states 
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have a margin of appreciation within which the ECtHR will show deference to the state’s 
‘initial assessment’168  of these issues.169 The extent of the margin of appreciation given to the 
state varies depending on the facts of a case.
170
 As David Harris and Yutaka Arai-Takahashi 
have noted,
171
 a wider margin of appreciation is given in public emergency cases under 
Article 15,
172
 some cases where national security is claimed as the limiting interest,
173
 cases 
involving the protection of morals
174
 and where there is a lack of consensus amongst the 
member states as to the importance of the interest at stake or the best means of protecting 
it.
175 
The wider the margin of appreciation, the more willing the ECtHR will be to accept the 
state’s view of the necessity of the infringement.176 
 
The margin of appreciation exists in recognition that, because states are in ‘direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries…, [they are] in a better position’177 
than the ECtHR to make judgements on the nature of the general interest and necessity. It 
also recognises that cultural and legal differences between states may make it difficult to 
achieve universal agreement amongst them as to standard of rights protection required in a 
given case.
178
 Its existence also acknowledges that ‘[t]he overall scheme of the Convention is 
that the initial and primary responsibility for the protection of human rights lies with the 
contracting parties.’179 
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However, the ECtHR retains to itself alone the decision as to what amounts to an 
infringement of the scope of a Convention right although, as described above, the ECtHR 
qualified this approach in Vo by applying a margin of appreciation in relation to the question 
of the nature of the person that can fall within their scope.
180
 The margin of appreciation is a 
creation of the ECtHR and thus it ultimately reserves to itself the ability to set aside the 
margin of appreciation and decide for itself the nature of the competing interest and the 
necessity of the interference.
181
 
 
The application of the margin of appreciation by the ECtHR to the question of determining 
whether an infringement of a rights is necessary to further a protected interest
182
 conceptually 
connects it to the proportionality analysis and makes it part of the balancing enquiry.
183
 If a 
margin of appreciation is applied then the Court will accept the member state’s assessment as 
to whether the balance between the right in question and the competing interest at issue 
makes the infringement of a right necessary and justified. Thus, the margin of appreciation 
gives the states a safe area of discretion within which to conduct a proportionality balancing 
act.  
 
Walking the Rope 
Although it is possible to determine the nature of tools that the ECtHR uses when called upon 
to balance Convention rights and competing interests, the question remains as to how these 
are applied in individual cases. The unstructured case by case approach adopted by the 
judicial organs has led to a conclusion amongst commentators that their approach is ‘not 
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underpinned by any clear or coherent rationale.’184 However, it is possible to identify certain 
trends in the jurisprudence of the Commission and Court.
185
 McHarg argues that by studying 
the case law in relation to the balancing of rights against the public interest, it is possible to 
conceptually isolate three coherent approaches. Which approach is applied by the Court is 
determined by the court’s interpretations of the various rights and their exceptions.186 
 
In cases where the public interest invoked by the state is one of national security or the 
prevention of crime and disorder, the ECtHR will focus ‘on the factual necessity of the 
interference’187 to the pursuit of that purpose. The court recognises the importance of these 
interests, and thus if the necessity of a measure is established it will accept the legitimacy of 
balance struck by the member state’s act.188 An example of this approach can be seen in the 
Klass case where the court focused very closely on whether the particular surveillance 
techniques were needed for the purposes in question.
189
 
 
An alternate approach adopted by the court involves a more ‘definitional’190 analysis, 
focusing on the extent of the interference with the right at issue rather than the necessity of 
that interference.
191
 This approach is applied where a state action interferes with the core 
purpose of a right.
192
 Here the Court will seek to determine whether the purpose pursued by 
the measure is sufficiently important to justify the infringement. Thus, in Lingens v Austria, 
in determining whether the infringement of Article 10 was justified, the ECtHR took account 
                                                 
184
 Greer (n.125), 417 & 425 and McHarg (n.121), 673 
185
 McHarg (n.121), 684 and Greer (n.125), 425 
186
 McHarg (n.121), 688 
187
 Ibid (my emphasis) 
188
 Ibid, 
189
 Klass (n.173)  [49], [52] and [59]-[60], see also Golder (n.150), [45] 
190
 McHarg (n.121), 671 
191
 Ibid, 688 
192
 Ibid, 690-691 
   
 
87 
 
of the importance of the protection of political speech under the Convention and held that 
greater protection should be given to such speech.
193
  
 
Thus, whether the necessity or definition focused approach is taken depends on what purpose 
is pursued by the right in question and the extent to which the impugned act infringes that 
purpose.
194
 McHarg recognises that in cases where the state act infringes the core of a right, 
but also pursues a particularly important interest, there will be uncertainty as to which 
approach will be applied.
195
 In such situations, where the right and competing interest are 
evenly matched, the ECtHR will take neither approach and will attempt to strike the balance 
it feels appropriate.
196
 This approach is also taken where the ECtHR is ‘uncertain both about 
the purpose of the right and about its ability to assess what the public interest requires’,197 
such as cases concerning Article 1 of Protocol 1.
198
 However, in this latter form of balancing 
the ECtHR will only find that the right has been infringed where the impugned measure 
imposes ‘an individual and excessive burden’.199 
 
Rights against Rights 
As noted above,
200
 the text of the Convention recognises the potential for the rights belonging 
to different persons to conflict where a state action or law infringes one individual’s rights in 
order to protect those of another. This requires the states and the ECtHR to balance the 
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rights
201
 against each other to determine which it is appropriate to give precedence to on the 
facts of a particular case.
202
  
 
In balancing the rights the ECtHR seeks to determine what weight should be given to the 
exercise of each right on the facts of the case.
203
 The assessment of their weight requires the 
court to consider nature and extent of the interference with rights of both individuals that 
would result from giving effect to the rights of the other party. Thus, in İA v Turky the ECtHR 
considered the gravity of the religious offence caused under Article 9
204
 and then the 
protection of expression that Article 10 was supposed to give and the nature of the speech at 
issue.
205
 Similarly, in Von Hannover, detailed scrutiny of the extent of the intrusion into the 
applicant’s private life and the purpose of the publication of the photographs was conducted 
to determine the relative importance of the exercise of the rights interests at issue.
206
 
 
Once the weight of each right is determined, the ECtHR applies a proportionality analysis to 
assess whether it is justifiable for the applicant’s right to be infringed by the state to protect 
the rights of another individual.
207
 All three elements of the proportionality analysis are 
analysed.
208
 In the context of conflicts between rights, unlike a conflict between a right and a 
public interest, the ECtHR considers the proportionality of the interference with both rights at 
issue, to determine whether the applicant’s right or the competing right of another should be 
upheld.
209
 Consequently, in Éditions Plon the ECtHR considered the justification for 
infringing each of the conflicting rights. It was held that the applicant publisher’s Article 10 
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rights were proportionately infringed in favour of the protection of other’s Article 8 interests 
by the initial injunction, because of the limited impact on the publisher of a short term 
injunction and the severe infringement of the family’s grief.210 However, the ECtHR felt that 
after nine and a half months, there was a greater interest in knowing about the truth about 
President Mitterrand’s health which outweighed the Article 8 rights of the family.211 
Similarly, in Hachette Filipacchi Associés the extent of the interference,
212
 and justification 
for the interference
213
 with both Article 8 and with Article 10, were considered in the course 
of the Court’s proportionality analysis. 
 
Just as when it is called upon to consider the proportionality of the infringement of a right in 
favour of a public interest, the ECtHR has made it clear that it may choose to grant a margin 
of appreciation to state determinations as to the balance that should be struck between 
competing Convention rights.
214
 The ECtHR has held that, in cases of conflicting rights, a 
margin of appreciation is most likely to be granted where there is a lack of consensus 
amongst the States as to what the rights at issue should be interpreted as requiring,
215
 where 
the rights in conflict are of an equal weight
216
 and where the question of the balance to be 
struck raises difficult moral questions.
217
 
 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence, however, demonstrates that it will not always grant states a 
margin of appreciation on the question of which right should have priority in conflicts 
between rights.
218
 When it does balance competing rights the ECtHR determines which 
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should have priority by applying an approach similar to the ‘definitional’ approach described 
by McHarg in the context of the balancing of rights against competing public interests.
219
 
Thus, in Wingrove the ECtHR noted that freedom of expression gave the greatest protection 
to political speech
220
 and, in ultimately deciding in favour of interests protected by Article 
9,
221
 observed that the speech at issue did not fall within this core protection.
222
 This focus on 
the core of the right is consistent with the ECtHR’s statement that there would be less scope 
for the application of the margin of appreciation where the core of a Convention right was 
infringed.
223
  
 
In addition to considering the nature of the rights at issue, the ECtHR also considers the 
factual extent of the interference with the right. Thus, in Editions Plon the Court paid close 
attention to diminishing interference with the President’s family’s Article 8 rights that the 
exercise of the publishers Article 10 rights would cause over time, ultimately finding that the 
party whose right should have priority had switched with time.
224
 As part of this factual 
scrutiny,
225
 as in cases where a public interest interferes with a Convention right, the ECtHR 
will also consider the ‘necessity’ of interfering with one right to further the protection of 
another.
226
 This approach can be seen in Hachette Filipacchi where the ECtHR observed that 
the measure at issue, which protected Article 8 at the expense of Article 10, was as the ‘least 
restrict[ive]’227 means of protecting the Article 8 interest and thus deemed proportionate.228 
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It is submitted that in light of the ECtHR’s case-by-case approach to the balancing of 
conflicting rights and rights conflicting with general interests, and lack of clear general 
principles, the Convention and ECtHR’s current balancing tools can be applied in a manner 
which is consistent with the characterisation of the conflict between rights described above. 
The manner in which this new approach to the assessment of conflicts between rights and 
general interests, as conflicts between competing rights, can be implemented by the domestic 
courts will be described below. 
 
Will and Interest Conceptions of Rights  
The distinction between the will and interest conceptions of rights and their implications for 
the waiving of the benefits of human rights was outlined briefly above. As conceptions of 
rights generally, they seek to describe and classify the fundamental nature of the schemes of 
rights to which they apply and give different conceptions of what characteristics a norm as a 
right.
229
 Due to their more complex nature as theoretical conceptions of rights they need to be 
understood in the appropriate level of detail in order to make engagement with this debate 
coherent. 
 
The Will Conception 
The fundamental feature of theories of rights that fall under the will conception is that all 
rights seek to protect and give pre-eminence to manifestations of an individual’s self-
determination.
230
 The leading proponent of the will conception was Herbert Hart whose 
definition of what constitutes a legal or moral right is premised on the protection of the 
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freedom of choice of individuals.
231
 For this reason the will conception is sometimes also 
described as the choice conception.
232
 
 
Hart argued that there was only one natural right; the right of all men to be free,
233
 possessed 
by any human capable of choice.
234
 This right, Hart argued, formed the basis for moral rights 
by giving a moral justification for limiting the freedom of another person.
235
 It justifies the 
imposition of duties on specific individuals in certain relationships with the rights holder,
236
 
or on persons generally, to refrain from interfering with the rights holder’s freedom of 
choice
237
 because of the equal right to be free the natural right embodies.
238
  
 
Based on his premise of the underlying natural right to freedom, Hart characterises the duty 
relationship it creates as binding only the duty bearer and not the right holder. Thus, he 
argues that the duty relationship ‘is not that of two persons bound by a chain, but of one 
person bound, the other end of the chain lying in the hands of another to use if he chooses.’239 
In this way Hart is able to argue that the rights holder is free to choose to waive the benefit of 
his right and decline to demand the performance of the duty he is owed,
240
 allowing another 
to act in a manner from which the right purports to protect the holder.
241
 
 
Hart’s general legal philosophy is positivist, declaiming any necessary conceptual connection 
between law and morality, the validity of the former being argued not to be dependent on the 
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latter,
242
 a position which this thesis will reject. However, as with his conception of moral 
rights, Hart’s definition of legal rights also has choice as a fundamental element.243 For Hart, 
a person can only be said to have a legal right under a law which imposes some duty on 
another if the one who has a right, ‘or some other person authorised to act on his behalf [has 
the choice]…as to whether the corresponding duty shall be performed or not.’244 This focus 
on the choice of the rights holder as to whether or not to enforce the duty as necessary and 
sufficient for the existence of rights
245
 is the fundamental idea underlying all will conceptions 
of rights.
246
 
 
In so far as moral rights under Hart’s will conception are based on protecting the freedom of 
choice of the individual, he concedes that children and animals cannot be said to have such 
rights.
247
 They do not have the capacity for choice which is a prerequisite for the natural right 
which forms the basis of the moral rights recognised by the will conception.
248
 However, Hart 
nonetheless claims that it is possible for children to have legal rights under the will 
conception which protect some other interest
249
 and do not have a basis in the current 
possession of the capacity for choice. This is possible because, under his definition of a legal 
right, the choice as to whether to require the performance of the duty owed, which is an 
essential element of his definition of rights, need not be exercised by the person to whom the 
duty is owed.
250
 It can be exercised by a person authorised to act on the behalf of a right 
holder, such as a child, who does not have the capacity for choice.
251
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The freedom of choice which underlies Hart’s will conception of rights contains an inherent 
limitation, which in turn constitutes the limit on the exercise of moral and legal rights under 
the will conception. Hart argues that if all men have a natural right to be free
252
 then the 
liberty of the individual must, on occasion, be constrained in order to protect freedom of 
others.
253
 Thus, choice as to how to exercise rights under the will conception put forward by 
Hart can be limited to prevent actions ‘coercing or restraining or designed to injure other 
persons.’254  
 
The Interest Conception 
The interest conception of rights differs from the will conception in that it does not see choice 
as to enforcement as the key means of determining what norms should be classed as rights.
255
 
Instead, the interest theory contends that the essential feature of a legal or moral right is that it 
seeks to protect one or more aspects of the holder’s interests or welfare.256 These may, but 
need not necessarily, ‘include some aspect of the person's freedom.’257 
 
The foundations of the interest theory can be found in the writings of Jeremy Bentham who 
argued that the people who can be said to possess rights are those who benefit from the duty 
or obligation imposed on others by the law.
258
 This benefit takes the form of freedom from 
interference by others with the rights holder’s action259 protected by the law.260 A right exists 
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under Bentham’s theory even if the person who benefits from the obligation would not deem 
themselves to have been advantaged by the possession of the right.
 261
 This is the case 
because under his view that the existence of rights is a matter of law,
262
 although such laws 
can ultimately be critiqued using the overarching utilitarian principle to assess whether the 
harm that it causes is outweighed by good that it does.
263
 
 
Neil MacCormick was a leading exponent of the interest theory and critic of Hart’s will 
conception. In his theory MacCormick argued that the key feature that classifies norms
264
 as 
rights ‘is that they have as a specific aim the protection or advancement of individual 
interests or goods.’265 He argues that the interest protected is of greater significance than the 
duty imposed by the right, thus a right to money under the rules of intestacy can be said to 
exist even though there is no duty to pay the money until an executor is appointed.
266
 
Although the interest theory has its roots in Bentham’s philosophy, MacCormick’s theory 
takes a deontological approach. He argues that for a norm conferring a benefit to be a right, 
the norm must also protect members of a class of persons as ‘individuals separately, not 
simply as members of a collective enjoying a diffuse common benefit’.267  
 
Under this conception the difficulties apparent in relation to the will conception of whether 
children can possess rights so defined does not arise. A child, animal or mentally incompetent 
adult need not possess the capacity for choice to hold a right. They need only have the 
interest which a right seeks to protect. 
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The different definition of rights under the interest conception also has fundamental 
consequences for the capacity of rights holders to waive the benefits of the duties they are 
owed under rights. Under the interest conception rights do not arise solely from the furthering 
the freedom of choice of the holder which prevents norms creating unwaivable duties from 
being classed as rights under the will conception.
268
 Thus, it is possible for a norm to fall 
within the definition of rights given by an interest conception even if the holder of the right 
cannot waive the benefit of the duty they are owed under the right.
269
 However, although not 
required by the interest theory’s conception of rights generally, MacCormick argues that 
‘individuals ought normally to have the power of waiving the duty in particular cases 
affecting only themselves’.270 If it is an individual good that persons ought to be able to 
waive the benefit of a right, it follows that a norm which ensures respect for this capacity can 
be classified as a right.
271
  However, unlike under a will conception such a right of waiver 
would not be part of the definition of rights generally and thus it need not necessarily apply to 
the exercise of all other rights.
272
 Under his conception of the interest theory the question of 
whether the benefit of a right can be waived is conceptually separate from the question of 
what is a right.
273
 MacCormick thus argues that this power of waiver should be seen as a 
remedial power which is ‘consequential on the recognition or conferment of, rights’274 rather 
than a core element of the rights themselves. 
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The Convention and ECtHR’s Approach to Waiving Rights 
The Convention and the ECtHR clearly recognise that there is potential for rights to conflict 
with other rights and other interests. This is explicitly apparent in the reference to the ‘rights 
and freedoms of others’ in qualifications to Articles 8, 9 & 11 as conditions for limiting the 
exercise of these rights. However, the extent to which the Convention recognises the ability 
of rights holders to waive the benefits in cases where an action would otherwise conflict with 
their Convention rights is not nearly so obvious. 
 
The Convention Text 
Like other international human rights treaties, the ECHR ‘has no provision permitting an 
individual to waive [the benefits of] his rights, or to consent to treatment which would 
otherwise be impermissible.’275 Conversely however, the Convention also contains no 
explicit exclusion of the capacity of an individual to waive the benefit of his rights.
276
  
 
John Merrills has argued that this lack of explicit exclusion of waiving allows for the 
possibility that the ECtHR may read its permissibility into the ECHR.
277
 More strongly 
Beyleveld and Brownsword have argued that the fact that rights treaties ‘do not outlaw 
boxing, mountain-climbing, and other dangerous activities, and do not require persons to 
vote, etc., shows that the will conception...is to be applied to at least some of the rights.’278 
They proceed from this to argue that, as the will and interest positions are conceptions of 
rights generally, the identification and recognition of some rights within the Convention as 
will rights entails that all of the Convention rights must be will rights.
279
 Interest theorists 
such as MacCormick’s would, however, explain these activities, and any waiving of rights 
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involved, as allowed in the furtherance of an underlying protected interest, and not as part of 
the conception of a rights. The text of the Convention is thus inconclusive on this question of 
rights interpretation.  
 
The Approach of the Convention Organs 
It is apparent from the Strasbourg jurisprudence that the Court has allowed the waiving the 
benefits of rights in some cases,
280
 although whether this is under a will or interest conception 
has to some extent deliberately
281
 not been made explicit. The main development of the 
waiving jurisprudence has occurred in relation to Articles 6 and 8.
282
  Here the ECtHR has 
explicitly held that the benefit of rights to a public hearing,
283
 access to a judicial 
determination
284
 and to the confidentiality of medical records
285
 may be waived. 
Additionally, although willing in some cases to accept that people can waive rights’ benefits, 
Strasbourg has been reluctant to lightly hold that they have been waived.
286
 To this end, 
substantive and procedural limitations have been imposed on when a waiving of a right’s 
benefit should be deemed to be valid.
287
 
 
In the two cases concerning the disclosure of medical records infringing an Article 8 right to 
confidentiality, the ECtHR has appeared to apply a will conception of the right.
288
 The court 
described the right at issue as one prohibiting the disclosure of the information ‘without the 
consent of the patient’289 and capable of being waived by the holder.290 The characterisation 
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of this element of Article 8’s protection for privacy, as safeguarding an individual’s control 
over information concerning their medical history, accords closely with the fundamental 
feature of will rights as protecting the capacity for individual choice described above.
291
 It is 
submitted that with this interpretation of Article 8, it was logical for the Court to hold that it 
was possible for an individual to waive the protection of the right and allow the disclosure of 
the information. In the Article 6 cases there was no such characterisation of the right in terms 
of choice to justify the permissibility of a rights holder choosing to waive it,
292
 making the 
conception of rights which the court applied more uncertain. 
 
In more general terms, the ECtHR has held that the waiving will not be permitted where to do 
so would ‘run counter to any important public interest.’293 Thus, in Laskey, Jaggard and 
Brown, a case involving consensual sadomasochistic acts, the ECtHR refused to hold that the 
participants had waived the benefit of any Convention rights to protection by the state from 
harm by others.
294
 Instead the Court found that the limitation of the claimants’ autonomy was 
justified on the grounds of the potential danger of the activities, public health considerations 
and that such acts of torture ‘undermine the respect which human beings should confer upon 
each other.’295 Consistent with this approach, in Schuler-Zgraggen the public interest was 
deemed not to prevent a person from waiving the benefit of their right to a public hearing for 
their social security claim because the efficient running of the system favoured not having 
such hearings.
296
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This approach to the limitation of individuals’ capacity to waive their rights can, however, be 
seen to support rather than undermine an interpretation of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
consistent with a will conception. If, as argued above,
297
 the general interests against which 
rights must be balanced are interpreted as indirectly protecting the rights of others, in 
accordance with the ECHR’s anti-majoritarian aim, then where the waiving of a right is 
prohibited by the public interest such prohibition in reality protects the rights of others as 
required by a will conception of rights.
298
  
 
In contrast to the forgoing indications of a will conception approach, in Albert and Le Compte 
the ECtHR stated obiter that ‘the nature of some of the rights safeguarded by the Convention 
is such as to exclude a waiver of the entitlement to exercise them’.299 This statement seems to 
support an interest conception of rights. However, it is submitted that this dicta is anomalous 
and ought not to be interpreted as a general rejection of a will conception by the ECtHR. In 
support of its statement, the ECtHR relied on a case where it had previously found that 
vagrants had not waived the benefit of their Article 5 rights by seeking assistance from the 
police.
300
 However, the refusal to find a waiver in that case was based upon the procedural 
constraints on waiver which were held not to have been satisfied, and not on a general view 
that there could be no waiver of the benefits of the Article 5 rights which would indicate the 
rejection of a will conception of rights.
301
  
 
If a capacity to choose whether to insist on the performance of a duty is not part of the 
characteristics which give rise to Convention rights, then they cannot be rights under the will 
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conception.
302
 The fact that in the case of Glass v United Kingdom
 303
a disabled child, who 
never had and never would have the capacity to decide whether or not to insist on the 
enforcement of a right, was held to have a right under Article 8 would seem to indicate that 
such a basis was not relied upon by the court.
304
 However, both positivist and non-positivist 
will conceptions of rights can account for the recognition of rights for such persons. If a 
positivist approach is taken, with the Convention rights viewed as legal rights, Hart argued 
that legal will rights could be possessed by a person who did not themselves have the 
capacity for choice over actions performed by others to them in relation to the rights, 
provided that choice was exercised on their behalf by another.
305
 In this case, the mother and 
the courts were deemed to have responsibility to consent to medical treatment of the child, 
and thus waive the protection Article 8 gives against interference with a person’s physical 
integrity.
306
 From non-positivist natural law perspectives, which argue that the possession, 
interpretation and application of the Convention rights must conform to a particular moral 
principle to be valid morally, it too can be argued that there are duties under the Convention 
requiring the protection of such persons. Such an approach involves showing that a theory of 
moral will rights based in a characterisation of agency, of which the capacity for choice is a 
central feature, requires that the protection of the Convention also be given to those without 
that capacity as well as those with that capacity. Such an approach will be argued for in detail 
below.
307
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Whether the waiving of rights’ benefits is permissible and what can constitute a waiver are 
two distinct questions.
308
 In addition to the substantive limitations, the ECtHR imposes 
procedural criteria which must be satisfied for waiving to be deemed to have occurred.
309
 
These conditions aim to protect people from too lightly relinquishing the protection of the 
Convention.
310
  
 
The ECtHR has stated that, to be valid, a person’s waiver of the benefits of Convention rights 
‘must be unequivocal and, where procedural rights are concerned, must accord with the 
minimum guarantees commensurate with the importance of such rights.’311 The unequivocal 
requirement goes to the nature of the act or statement by which a person communicates his 
desire to waive the benefit of a Convention right. Such a communication can be explicit 
statement,
312
 or tacit action or inaction,
313
 but must evince a clear intention to waive the 
benefit of the right at issue.
314
  
 
The ‘minimum guarantees’ which must accompany a waiver for it to be valid are procedural 
requirements designed to ensure that the decision to waive is properly informed. Thus in 
Pfeifer and Plankl it was held that the applicant’s waiving of the benefit of the right to an 
impartial tribunal was not valid because he had not had the benefit of legal advice before 
purporting to waive the right’s benefit.315 
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The final procedural limitation on waiving under the ECHR requires that people be protected 
against agreeing to unreasonable restrictions on their Convention rights.
316
 This entails that 
decision to waive the benefit of their rights must be made in the ‘[a]bsence of constraint’.317 
Undue pressure to waive in relation to the right to a trial in favour of paying a fine was thus 
held to negative any waiver,
318
 and the Commission has held that the benefit of Convention 
rights can only be waived through contract terms which are freely entered into and give rise 
to a restriction of rights which is ‘not unreasonable.’319 
 
Ultimately, however, the lack of a clear decision of principle on the question of possibility of 
waiving the benefits of the Convention rights by the ECtHR forces the conclusion that the 
question has not been definitively resolved in either direction. However, as the will and 
interest approaches are conceptions of a scheme of rights as a whole, a fundamental 
conception of rights underlying the interpretation of the Convention must be of either one or 
the other.
320
   
 
Horizontal and Vertical Rights  
It has already been noted in the contexts of positive and negative obligations imposed by 
rights, and of the balancing of competing rights, that it is possible for individuals as well as 
the state to interfere with the rights of persons protected by the ECHR. In the past human 
rights were regarded ‘as interests that required protection only against governmental 
action’321 because it was seen as the state’s prerogative to act to protect its citizens from one 
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another.
322
 However, it is arguable that rights generally, and the Convention rights 
specifically, are applicable to relations between individuals,
323
 for individuals are clearly 
capable of acting in ways that interfere with the interests protected by human rights.
324
  
 
The Application of Rights 
In relation to the ECHR specifically, it can argued that the Convention rights at a conceptual 
level are applicable not only vertically between individuals and the state, but also are held 
horizontally by individuals against other individuals where of relevance to their conduct.
325
 
Although it is possible to infer from the formulation of its various provisions which appear to 
be explicitly addressed to states
326
 that the issue of application of the rights between 
individuals ‘was not taken into account when the Convention was drafted’,327 and some rights 
such as the right to a fair trial
328
 appear only of relevance against a state, a strong argument 
can be made from the text that the Convention does in fact recognise, or at the very least not 
exclude, the applicability of its rights to interactions between individuals.  
 
Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun Pattinson argue that because Articles 8(2), 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2) 
state that the rights or freedoms found in Articles 8(1), 9(1), 10(1) and 11(1) ‘are subject to 
limitation or restriction for (inter alia) the protection of the rights or freedoms of others;…all 
the rights of the Convention are horizontally applicable.’329 These provisions have this effect 
because they recognise that the rights of an individual can apply to restrain the rights of 
another that interfere with them. That other rights, not merely Articles 8-11, apply in such a 
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horizontal manner can be inferred from the fact that recognition of the rights of others in 
these Articles is not limited to those in Articles 8-11.
330
 
 
As Gavin Phillipson and Alex Williams rightly observe in their cogent analysis of the 
incremental nature of domestic law of horizontal effect, at Strasbourg individuals cannot 
directly claim judicial protection for their Convention rights against other individuals and 
must do so indirectly via an action against a state.
331
 However, contrary to their view,
332
  this 
does not amount to a denial of the ‘automatic’ fundamental horizontal applicability of 
Convention rights where relevant to interactions between persons which will be theoretically 
justified below,
333
 rather it implicitly recognises it by vindicating it. By upholding the indirect 
effect of the Convention rights, the ECtHR can be seen to be recognise the necessary 
horizontal applicability of the rights. 
 
Phillipson  and Williams’ contention that the protection of the ‘rights of others’ in Articles 8-
11 does not signify that the Convention rights bind private actors, and only sets out a duty on 
the state to protect their interests, is a plausible reading of the substance of the these 
provisions.
334
 However, such an interpretation fails to defeat the argument that the reason 
such a substantive duty upon the state exists, is to uphold the fundamental rights and duties 
that also exist between individuals and form the protected interests, the horizontal 
applicability of the Convention rights. Further, it is submitted that the general protection for 
individuals against the member countries stated by the Convention and the upheld by the 
Court, would be of little practical relief to individuals if the rights they recognised had no 
application between individuals, a position the Court’s jurisprudence of indirect effect of the 
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Convention has recognised. Article 1 of the UDHR also appears to recognise the importance 
of the horizontality of rights be stating that ‘[a]ll human[s] …should act towards one another 
in a spirit of brotherhood’, supporting the claim that human rights must be respected not only 
by the state but also by other individuals.
335
 
 
The Effect of Rights Against Individuals 
Although it can be said that the Convention rights are horizontally applicable, the distinction 
between the applicability and effect of rights means that as a matter of law this does not entail 
that they can be directly enforced by individuals against individuals before the ECtHR.
336
 The 
ECHR contains no procedure for the enforcement of rights against private individuals; only 
States can be defendants before the ECtHR.
337
 This exclusion of the direct horizontal effect 
of the Convention rights before the ECtHR can be deduced from Articles 19 and 34 and was 
explicitly stated by the Commission.
338
 At a practical level Michael Forde argues that this can 
be justified on the grounds that hearing applications against individuals would increase the 
ECtHR’s already substantial case load.339 Additionally, the States might be reluctant to allow 
the right of petition to the Court for their citizens, if it entailed that ECtHR had jurisdiction 
over ‘numerous aspects of private relations’ within their states,340 for the danger of 
Strasbourg misunderstanding national law as in Osman v United Kingdom
341
 would increased 
under such a regime. 
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As the ECtHR cannot give effect to a Convention right directly against an individual, ‘the 
most that the individual can do at Strasbourg is bring an action against the state for failing to 
protect’342 them from the actions of an individual. As noted previously, the ECtHR has held 
that the Convention can put states under positive obligation to protect individuals from 
having their rights interfered with by other individuals.
343
 Thus, horizontal effect can be 
given to the Convention rights between individuals in an indirect manner.
344
 
 
At a theoretical level, this indirect horizontal effect is justified by the applicability of the 
Convention rights between individuals described above. Although the recognition of positive 
obligations to protect individuals imposes a duty on the state, at a deeper level such 
obligations can be seen to be consistent with a recognition by the Convention rights of the 
existence of duties upon individuals not to interfere with the rights of others.
345
 This 
applicability of the Convention rights between individuals entails that, the possession of a 
right by an individual directly
346
 requires the recognition of at least a negative duty on others 
not to disproportionately interfere with the individual’s exercise of their rights or their 
attainment of the object that the right gives them a right to.
347
 This duty is apparent in the 
statement by Article 10(2) that those with rights under Article 10(1) have duties in exercising 
their right not to infringe the rights of others in a disproportionate manner.
348
 The historical 
reading of this part of Article 10(2) which Phillipson and Williams instead argue for, as 
recognising the duties imposed on speakers by the pre-existing domestic law of the member 
states when the Convention was drafted, is a reasonable construction of it.
349
 However, the 
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provision does not seek exclude an interpretation which takes account of the fundamental 
nature of the human rights which, by virtue of this nature, were claimed in the preamble also 
to exist before the Convention or its predecessor the UDHR recognised them. Although the 
other qualified rights do not explicitly mention such a duty, its general existence can be 
inferred because to assume that there is no such duty would imply that other rights would 
always have precedence over freedom of expression where their exercise conflicted with it.
350
 
That the Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 11(2) make reference to respecting the rights of others (albeit 
without mentioning a ‘duty’) indicates that this cannot be what was intended. 
 
Further implicit support for the ECHR’s recognition of duties between individuals to respect 
each others Convention rights can be found in the combination of Articles 8(2) and 13.
351
 The 
former prohibits the interference with Article 8 by public authorities, the latter similarly 
provides for a remedy for breaches of any of the Convention rights by public authorities. 
Thus, if Article 8 only gave rights against public authorities Article 13 would be redundant in 
relation to it.
352
 Additionally, Article 7(2)’s statement that Article 7(1) shall not prejudice 
other liability implies that, in relation to acts of individuals that involve human rights 
violations (eg. genocide), individuals are culpable for such acts and this implies that they owe 
duties to others not to commit such actions.
353
 Support for the existence of such duties can 
also be found in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Unless the Court’s statement that, 
independent of the question of state responsibility, the stepfather’s treatment of the applicant 
in A v United Kingdom amounted to a ‘violation of Article 3’,354 was ‘simply loose talk’355 
the ECtHR can be seen as recognising that duties under the Convention rights can exist 
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between individuals,
356
 and the domestic courts will thus not be barred in fealty to ECtHR 
jurisprudence from finding that the Convention rights are fundamentally horizontally 
applicable.
357
 
 
Unsurprisingly, other, less area-specific, justifications for the imposition of positive 
obligations on states to protect individual’s rights from interference by others, mirror those 
that are used more generally by the ECtHR when imposing positive obligations under the 
Convention rights. The Article 1 obligation to respect human rights has been held to give rise 
to such positive obligations.
358
 The more general principle of effectiveness
359
 has also been 
invoked to provide a legal basis for decisions giving effect to the horizontal applicability of 
Convention rights via positive obligations.
360
 
 
More specifically to the horizontality of rights context, the ECtHR has developed a 
jurisprudence to prevent states escaping from positive obligations to protect rights by means 
of privatising state activities.
361
 The ECtHR has held States remain responsible for the actions 
of private individuals and bodies where their activities ‘falls within the area of a Convention 
right or is the result of “privatisation”.’362 The case of Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom 
exemplifies this approach. Here the state was held responsible for failing
363
 to protect the 
Article 3 rights of private school students, subjected to corporal punishment, because the state 
was deemed responsible for the education of children under Article 2 of Protocol 1,
364
 and 
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could not ‘absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or 
individuals.’365 
 
The means by which rights are given effect to between individuals by the ECtHR, are 
however, subject to limitations. As with positive obligations generally, the imposition of 
obligations to protect individuals from interference with their rights by others are subject to 
the infringement of the right being found sufficiently disproportionate
366
 and not falling 
within the states’ margin of appreciation. Additionally, although individuals’ rights are 
protected against the actions of other individuals by the positive obligations borne by the 
state, those who infringe the rights of others are not directly impacted by an ECtHR finding 
that there has been a rights violation. In such cases it is for the member state to pay 
compensation or change the law,
367
 and the prohibition on retroactive punishment will limit 
the extent to which they can be held responsible for their actions.
368
 This somewhat limits 
practical enforcement of the duties individuals have at the conceptual level to respect the 
rights of others. 
 
Conclusion 
The ECtHR has recognised, and to varying extents engaged with, the five key basic questions 
of interpretation that arise throughout the Convention. The fundamental nature of these 
questions of the scope of all the Convention rights makes the ECtHR’s answers to them the 
pivots upon which the cases before it fall to be decided. However, the failure of the text of the 
Convention and the Court to provide a clear answer to some of these questions, particularly 
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the key question of who can possess the Convention right, creates uncertainty with 
consequent scope and need for interpretation. 
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CHAPTER V: THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO 
THE PIVOTAL QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION RAISED BY THE CONVENTION 
RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
The pivotal questions of rights interpretation described previously are generally addressed in 
no greater detail by the wording of the HRA than they are by the ECHR, whose substantive 
elements the Act largely incorporates. It has thus fallen to the domestic courts to engage with 
the same issues that have previously faced the ECtHR, the resolution of which must be 
addressed to determine the substantive scope of the Convention’s requirements. 
 
Who Can Possess Convention Rights 
The question of who can possess Convention rights has been argued to be logically prior to 
other questions of the interpretation of the rights. As noted previously, the answers to it 
describe the characteristics which a being must possess in order for the Convention rights to 
be capable of application to them, and which precede other characteristics or factual 
circumstances which must be present for particular Convention rights to be applicable to a 
being capable of holding rights in general.  
 
Who is a Human Being for the Purposes of Convention rights? 
As with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the key domestic decisions on who can possess 
Convention rights are found in cases concerning the status of foetuses as rights holders, with 
cases concerning persons with reduced mental capacity also proving instructive. Whilst the 
case law in this area has had regard to the ECtHR’s approach to this issue of interpretation,1 
domestic judges have sought to base their decisions primarily on pre-HRA domestic judicial 
decisions concerning who is a legal person. 
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The position under British law as to who is a legal person, as distinct from to whom 
Convention rights can apply, can be traced back to the 17
th
 century.
2
 The British courts have 
consistently held that, although a human foetus is a ‘unique organism’3 distinct from the 
mother, it is only said to be a ‘person’ upon being born alive.4 Thus, it has been held that a 
foetus cannot be made a ward of court
5
 and nor can it be a victim of murder
6
 unless an injury 
inflicted upon it causes it to die after it has been born alive.
7
 The legal protection foetuses do 
receive is specially directed to them as foetuses,
8
 they are not treated as having the same legal 
status as humans who have been born. 
 
This focus on having been born and alive is further apparent in the United Kingdom courts’ 
approach to the status of those humans in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) who are 
medically alive, by virtue of a functioning brain stem, but have no consciousness or 
personality.
9
 In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland the House of Lords held that, separate from the 
moral question of what is meant by ‘life’, such an individual is a legal person.10 On this basis 
the court was prepared to hold that the common law principle of the sanctity of life and right 
to life were applicable and required the courts to consider whether they protected the 
continuance of the life of such a person.
11
 On the facts the court held that the right and 
principle were not absolute and un-qualified, and thus did not require that those treating 
                                                 
2
 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England: Part 3 (London, 1648), 50 
3
 A-G's Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245,  256 
4
 Ibid,  254 & 256, Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12, [71] and J. Mason, ‘Case Commentary: What’s in a 
Name?: The Vagaries of Vo v France’ [2005] C.F.L.Q. 97, 101 
5
 Re F (in utero) [1988] Fam 122, 142-3 
6
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Bland continue to do so.
12
 The court held that it did not further Bland’s interests to be given 
treatment which kept him alive, but in a vegetative state from which he could never emerge.
13
  
 
Since the coming into force of the HRA, the case law on who can be deemed to have legal 
rights under British law has been reflected in the courts’ decisions on personhood for the 
purposes of the possession of the Convention rights. Thus, relying on the common law, in 
relation to the status of life before birth, the courts have held human embryos and foetuses to 
be incapable of possessing a right to life under Article 2 because they could not be deemed to 
be ‘persons.’14  
 
Similarly, the position adopted in Bland has been repeated in relation to the Convention 
rights. In that case Lord Goff had noted that the common law principle of the sanctity of life 
applied by the court was recognised by Article 2 of the Convention.
15
 It was thus unsurprising 
when, in a case concerning the continued treatment of a patient in a PVS, the High Court 
applying Bland held that as the patient was still medically alive she was a person for the 
purposes of the possession of rights under Article 2.
16
 Consciously consistent with Bland, 
Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. in NHS Trust A v M also held the non-absolute nature of the 
positive obligations imposed by Article 2 meant that the state was, however, not required by 
her right to keep her alive.
17
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 Evans (n.1), [175], [178] & [181], Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2004] EWCA Civ 727, [106]-
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It is thus clear that, from the British perspective, the nature of the beings that can be deemed 
to fall within the terms ‘everyone’, ‘no-one’ or ‘person’, for the purposes of the possession of 
the Convention rights, is grounded in domestic common law.   
 
Although it is clear from the case law that being born and medically alive is the minimum 
required for a human to be deemed capable of the possession of Convention rights, and that 
for Article 2 being human and alive is all that is required to make it relevant, the relevance of 
other rights to a given case can depend on the presence of other characteristics. Thus Butler-
Sloss P. held that Article 3 was not applicable to the removal of nutrition and hydration from 
a patient in a PVS.
18
 Although recognising that they are persons under the Convention,
19
 
Butler-Sloss P. based this conclusion on the grounds that ‘[A]rticle 3 requires the victim to be 
aware of the inhuman and degrading treatment which he or she is experiencing or at least to 
be in a state of physical or mental suffering.’20 This decision at first appears inconsistent with 
the above described decision in Herczegfalvy, which held that a person’s Article 3 rights 
could be infringed by physical restraint, even though they were not aware of the restraint 
through unconsciousness.
21
  Munby J. (as he was then), in his admittedly over-wide ranging 
judgement
22
 in R (Burke) v GMC also argued that Butler-Sloss was wrong in this conclusion 
because, in the perception of others the patient’s dignity has been infringed, and therefore 
Article 3 should have been deemed applicable to the unconscious patient.
23
  
 
It is, however, submitted that a more coherent reading and justification for these two 
decisions is found by a focus on the reality of the interference. In Herczegfalvy there was 
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actual imposition of physical restraints, in NHS A there was no actual interference because 
the PVS claimant did not have the mental capacity to experience the suffering as a result of 
the withdrawal of treatment, thus her right to live a life free from suffering that would be 
caused by the withdrawal of food and water could not been effected, and Article 3 could not 
apply. Although the ECtHR’s judgement holds that a person need not be aware of the 
interference, such interference must actually occur for the Convention rights to be applicable. 
Thus, a distinction is maintained between the characteristics necessary to be capable of 
possessing the Convention rights at all, and the further factual characteristics necessary to 
make the application of the protection of a right relevant to a particular person and their 
circumstances.  
 
The Substantive Nature of Rights as Imposing Positive and Negative Obligations 
The approach of the United Kingdom courts to the question of the nature of the obligations 
that the possession of the Convention rights can give rise to, although to some extent 
involving regard to domestic considerations, has been heavily shaped by the ECtHR’s case 
law. This is, to some extent, unsurprising given that the incorporated Convention rights were 
a form of norm with which there were few clear analogies in domestic law.
24
 As a 
consequence, it was to be expected that the domestic courts would look to the ECtHR’s case 
law for guidance on the substantive nature of these new rights and their consequent duties, 
and reasonable for the HRA to require that they do so.
25
 
 
The Reception of Positive and Negative Obligations 
Following the incorporation of many of the Convention rights, the British courts have 
accepted that these rights give rise to both positive and negative obligations which control the 
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manner in which a person should be treated.
26
 Baroness Hale has informatively distinguished 
the former as concerning a duty to act
27
 to give protection to a person
28
 and the latter as 
concerning actions which ought not to have been done.
29
 
 
The presence of positive obligations in British law under the HRA is a significant departure 
from the previous position. Prior to the enactment of the Act, the common law distinguished 
between harm caused by actions and harm caused by omissions, with a general rule that there 
was no positive obligation to act where a failure to do so would cause harm.
30
 Similarly, 
British law has seen the proactive provision of welfare benefits as a mater of politics rather 
than legal right.
31
 
 
As noted previously,
32
 many of the Convention rights are expressly stated in negative terms.
33
 
A smaller number explicitly impose positive obligations.
34
 However, in applying the HRA 
the British courts have recognised that it is possible and can be necessary to interpret rights 
phrased in a negative manner, as imposing both negative and positive obligations.
35
 This does 
not undermine the substantive differences in the nature of positive or negative obligations.
36
 
It merely entails that the positive rights and positive obligations under the Convention are not 
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limited to those it explicitly states, and can arise directly or indirectly from the negative 
prohibitions in which most Convention rights are stated.
37
 
 
The Foundations of the Existence of Positive Obligations 
The case law of the British courts on whether a Convention right imposes a positive 
obligation on the state, in addition to the clearly stated negative obligations of non-
interference, ‘is not yet clearly settled or well developed.’38 This lack of a settled approach 
applied in all cases is unsurprising. The British courts have to a large extent relied on ECtHR 
judgements to justify their imposition of positive obligations and the ECtHR itself has not 
developed a ‘general theory’39 of positive obligations.  
 
In Van Colle and another v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police it was held that the 
Article 2 injunction to refrain from depriving people of life could be interpreted as giving rise 
to an accompanying a positive obligation on the state to protect individuals from being 
deprived of their life by the actions of others.
40
 This obligation was deemed to be borne by 
the police because they were a public authority for the purposes of s.6 of the HRA and thus 
must act in accordance with the Convention rights.
41
 However, the Lords accepted the 
existence of this positive obligation under Article 2 by simply applying the ECtHR’s ruling in 
Osman v United Kingdom
42
 that such an obligation existed without seeking to state 
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theoretical reasons for its existence.
43
 A similarly simple approach has been taken in other 
Article 2 cases.
44
 
 
Reliance on ECtHR jurisprudence is unsurprising given that the United Kingdom courts are 
required by the HRA to take account of ECtHR judgements when making decisions under the 
Act,
45
 an obligation the courts have interpreted as requiring them to conform to ECtHR 
judgements except in exceptional cases.
46
 In some other cases, however, the British courts 
have sought to find more substantive justifications for the existence of positive obligations. 
 
Some regard has been had to the principle of effectiveness applied by the ECtHR in the 
context of positive obligations.
47
 Thus, Lord Woolf has noted in the context of Article 8 that, 
in order to ensure effective respect
48
  for family life, the Convention ‘is capable of imposing 
on a state a positive obligation to provide support.’49 Whereas the ECtHR’s use of the 
principle of effectiveness is in part based on the Article 13 right to an effective remedy,
50
 this 
right was not incorporated by the HRA, the creation of the Act and the remedies provided for 
by s.8 having been argued to satisfy the requirements of this Article.
51
 Thus, Lord Woolf had 
regard to the use of the principle of effectiveness in ECtHR case law to justify its domestic 
invocation.
52
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In R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the HD the House of Lords held that Article 3 
imposed no ‘general public duty to house the homeless or provide for the destitute’.53 
However, in spite of this the court held that, by enacting legislation that rendered asylum 
seekers destitute, the state had breached its negative obligation under Article 3 not to subject 
people to degrading treatment,
54
 and consequently had a positive obligation to rectify this 
situation by providing them with welfare assistance.
55
 The Lords justified the imposition of 
this obligation on the reality that the state was responsible, albeit indirectly,
56
 for the situation 
which infringed Article 3’s negative prohibition and therefore the state had a positive 
obligation to remedy the situation.
57
 
 
The decision in Limbuela also gives guidance on the grounds on which the courts find it 
acceptable to refuse to impose a positive obligation. Lord Scott based his decision that there 
is ‘no Convention right to be provided by the state with a minimum standard of living’58 upon 
the view that the question of what constituted a minimum level of social support was a matter 
for the legislature.
59
 A similar approach is also apparent in the ECtHR’s judgement, applied 
in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,
60
 that there was no positive obligation to be provided with a 
home because this was a political rather than a judicial decision.
61
 The courts’ imposition of 
this limitation on positive obligations is consistent with the recognition of the post-WWII 
position that the provision of welfare was a matter of public policy rather than legal right.
62
 
This in turn reflects their interpretation of Montesquieu’s idea of the separation of powers,63 
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drawing a distinction ‘between law and politics, implying…that one is for judges and the 
other for Parliament and the executive.’64 
 
The Article 14 right to equality of enjoyment of Convention rights has been used by the 
ECtHR as a basis for finding positive obligations within the other Convention rights.
65
 It is 
thus unsurprising that it has also been used in this way by the British courts.
66
 In Ghaidan it 
was held that, although it is not a freestanding right,
67
 equality ‘can turn negative duties into 
positive duties.’68 The Lords held that if the state grants a right which falls within the ambit 
of one of the substantive Convention rights to one group,
69
 then it ‘it must not withhold it 
from others in the same or an analogous situation. It must grant that right equally, unless the 
difference in treatment can be objectively justified.’70 Thus, in Ghaidan the court noted that 
Article 8 did not impose a duty on the state to supply everyone with a home nor give 
everyone the right to succeed to a tenancy.
71
 However, the lack of a rational justification
72
 for 
distinguishing between heterosexual and homosexual couples led the Lords to hold that that 
the distinction made by the law on succession to tenancies on the basis of sexual orientation 
violated Article 14 when taken together with Article 8.
73
  
 
The nature of the positive obligation imposed by Article 14 was precisely encapsulated by 
Lord Nicholls as requiring that the state treat like cases alike.
74
 However, although the right 
to equality creates considerable scope for the development of positive obligations, 
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particularly in relation to welfare measures which are normally targeted at one group,
75
 its 
contingent and procedural nature limits its utility as a basis for positive obligations
76
. 
 
Determining the Extent of Positive Obligations 
In deciding whether an infringement of a positive obligation amounts to an unlawful violation 
of the Convention rights the British courts have applied proportionality analysis.
77
 This 
analysis has been frequently phrased by the courts in terms of the reasonableness of the 
state’s attempted compliance with the positive obligation in the circumstances of the case.78 
This was a consequence the courts application
79
 of the ECtHR’s statement in Osman that the 
state must do ‘all that could be reasonably expected’80  of it to fulfil its positive obligation. 
The courts, however, have made clear that it is a proportionality test that must be satisfied to 
determine whether the state has satisfied its positive obligations rather than the less intense 
pre-HRA Wednesbury
81
 reasonableness standard.
82
 This proportionality inquiry involves 
‘consideration of the circumstances of the case, the ease or difficulty of taking precautions 
and the resources available.’83  
 
It is apparent that, in contrast to the determination of whether there has been a violation of 
rights which impose a negative prohibition,
84
 the courts have applied proportionality analysis 
in relation to positive obligations imposed by rights which in their negative manifestation 
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allow no scope for proportionality analysis such as Article 3.
85
 Although the courts have 
engaged in a proportionality analysis to determine whether the scope of an unqualified right 
is engaged by the facts,
86
 outside of the contexts of the review of derogations
87
 and positive 
obligations, proportionality is not applied to determine whether the infringement of an 
unqualified Convention right is justified. This broader application of proportionality is a 
reflection of the separation of powers concerns discussed above. The courts have recognised 
that that they do not have the necessary expertise that the executive or legislature have in 
order to made decisions on positive ‘duties with complex polycentric implications.’88 This is 
apparent in Lord Carswell’s recognition of the resource implications of providing police 
protection
89
 and his preparedness to show deference in the assessment of proportionality 
because of the special expertise of the police in the area in question.
90
 
 
This approach, as well as the application of proportionality by the ECtHR in the context of 
positive obligations described above,
91
 is in line with Lon Fuller’s characterisation of 
polycentric decisions as those which give rise to a web of repercussions for matters and 
parties beyond those that are the immediate subject of a decision.
92
 That the courts consider 
the proportionality of the interference with the positive manifestation of a Convention right, 
is consistent with his argument that decisions imposing positive obligations have more 
polycentric implications than negative obligations, imposed by a right which only concerns a 
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specific duty between two parties.
93
 It is submitted that, in applying the principle of 
proportionality in the determination of whether the failure to take a particular action violates 
a state’s positive obligations, the courts can be seen to be considering whether the right at 
issue is of such a weight, and the interference with it is of such severity, so as to bring the 
requiring of the particular measure within their adjudicative purview by eclipsing the 
polycentric ramifications for other parties within society.
94
 To be justified in making such a 
finding of an infringement and upholding a positive obligation they must find that the nature 
of the particular obligation at issue outweighs the potential polycentric ramifications of such 
a judgement on questions such as the allocation of resources. 
 
It is thus apparent that the separation of powers plays a key role in the recognition and 
enforcement of positive obligations by the British courts under the HRA. Although the courts 
have developed several justifications in which to base positive obligations, influenced by 
ECtHR jurisprudence, the law in this area is still very much influenced by the traditional 
post-WWII conception of the state’s role in making positive provision for its people. The 
domestic approach is thus quite legalistic and does not have regard to a more fundamental 
basis for recognising the existence of positive obligations in the underlying basis of the 
rights. 
 
The Balancing of Rights 
The conflict of rights was noted above to be an inevitable consequence of a conception of 
rights which entails their possession by more than one person.
 95
  Under the HRA the United 
Kingdom courts have begun to state a coherent structure for resolving the conflicts between 
the exercise and protection of the Convention rights.
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Areas of Balancing 
Given that the rights within the HRA are taken from the ECHR,
96
 the balancing exercises 
they require the United Kingdom courts to engage in are very similar to those which the 
ECtHR conducts.
97
 The qualified rights found in Articles 8 – 11, and the right to a public 
hearing under Article 6, require the courts to apply a proportionality analysis
98
 to balance 
conflicting rights and general interests.
99
 Similarly, the courts will apply a proportionality 
analysis to assess the validity of derogations which can be made in relation to certain rights 
under s.14 HRA,
100
 and have the effect in a time of public emergency of exempting a law 
which would otherwise be an interference with a Convention right from having to comply 
with the Convention.
101
 The courts assess the validity of derogations under Article 15 by 
balancing the right infringed against the derogation to ensure the derogation is ‘strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation’.102 
 
The main difference in the balancing that the ECtHR and the United Kingdom courts are 
required to conduct is that the domestic courts are more frequently and explicitly required to 
balance the rights of one individual against those of another individual. Although it has been 
noted above that the ECtHR does indirectly uphold the rights of individuals against 
infringement by other individuals in the context of positive obligations, it will be argued 
below that the fact that the domestic courts are themselves bound to comply with the 
Convention rights in cases between individuals means that, unlike the ECtHR, the United 
                                                 
96
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Kingdom courts must resolve cases concerning explicit allegations that a party’s Convention 
rights have been violated by those of another individual.
103
 The significance of this 
distinction is, however, more procedural than substantive because, as argued by this author in 
the preceding chapter,
104
 the general interests against which the courts must balance rights 
can be seen as being the embodiment of the rights of individuals that they protect, a 
perspective for which, it is submitted, support can be found within the domestic case law. 
Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN
105
 seemed to recognise that the conflicting rights of 
Article 8 and 10 that were at issue between an individual and a private company under the 
common law of confidentiality in this case, would also be relevant where infringement in 
question committed by a public authority.
106
 Similarly, in the case concerning the indefinite 
detention of terrorist suspects, Lord Hope noted that the right to life could underlie a general 
interest of protecting national security.
107
 His Lordship also appeared to go on to 
acknowledge that that the counter majoritarian role of human rights required the court to 
recognise, both the rights of a minority effected by a measure, as well as those of the majority 
on whose behalf the measure was created.
108
 
 
Proportionality 
The tool used by the United Kingdom courts to conduct the balancing required of them, to 
determine whether an interference with a right is justified, is the proportionality test.
109
 This 
test is used for the same purpose in Strasbourg although the United Kingdom courts have 
drawn their conception of it from African and Canadian jurisprudence. The cornerstone
110
 of 
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the test applied by the United Kingdom courts was set out by the Privy Council in de Frietas 
v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing and 
Others.
111
 In this case the court adopted the three part test stated by the Zimbabwean Chief 
Justice which requires the court, in determining whether an infringement of a right is justified 
by the pursuit of a legitimate objective, to consider: 
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective 
are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
112
  
Lord Clyde described the third element of the test as the requirement of proportionality.
113
 
This test was subsequently applied to the context of Convention rights adjudication in R 
(Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
114
 
 
The first element requires the court to consider whether there is a legitimate objective which 
could be called upon to justify the impugned norm or action.
115
 The second considers whether 
the impugned ‘decision, rule or policy…is capable of pursuing the legitimate aim 
identified’.116 However, the first two elements being questions of fact,117 the United Kingdom 
courts focused their adjudication upon the necessity element of the third part
118
 which 
requires the judiciary to engage in a balancing exercise.
119
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The courts have interpreted the test of the ‘necessity’ of an impugned ‘means’ in a number of 
different ways, which impose different conditions of justification.
120
 These differing 
interpretations are apparent in the various judgements in the House of Lords decision of A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.
121
 The majority of the Lords sought to assess 
whether the restriction of rights in question was the most efficient means of achieving the 
legitimate aim pursued;
122
 finding that the restriction was disproportionate because the factual 
circumstances meant that it could not achieve its aim.
123
 Lord Walker who dissented, 
considered the safeguards which prevented the measure interfering more greatly with the 
Convention and found the test to be satisfied.
124
 However, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hope and 
Baroness Hale held that it was necessary to ‘compare’125 the nature of the threat which 
formed the basis of the legitimate aim against the importance of the right at issue to 
determine whether the measure was justified.
126
 The latter two Law Lords were also 
influenced by the efficiency arguments in reaching their decision.
127
 It is submitted that the 
difference of approach within this case can be seen to be a reflection of the varying extents to 
which the Lords were prepared to engage in more substantive review of the actions of the 
other branches of government required under the HRA.
128
 In the non-balancing efficiency 
approach applied by the majority, can be seen the long shadows of the pre-HRA standard of 
review which merely asked whether the measure was reasonable in relation to the public 
policy aims it pursued.
129
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Although in A the court scrutinised closely the necessity of a measure they, as well as courts 
in other cases, have ignored the other element of the third part of the proportionality test, the 
requirement that an interference be ‘no more than’130 the least intrusive means necessary to 
pursue the legitimate aim.
131
 The reason underlying the courts reluctance in this case to 
engage with the question of whether there was a threat which justified the specific measure of 
indefinite detention without trial, separate from the question of its efficiency in achieving its 
aim, can be seen to be a concern for respect for the separation of powers.
132
 With the notable 
exception of Lord Hoffman,
133
 the Lords felt that it was not their constitutional place to 
question the nature of the threat,
134
 and this led them to fail to engage with the question of 
whether it was sufficient to justify such a measure.
135
 Sandra Fredman, however, argues that 
this deference is inconsistent with the courts true role under the separation of powers or 
holding the other branches accountable by requiring adequate justification for their exercise 
of power,
136
 a role that has been enhanced significantly by the HRA.
137
 
 
Similar deference and lack of engagement with the least intrusive means test can be seen in 
the case of R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment where the 
court held that it was a matter for Parliament whether a full or partial ban on corporal 
punishment was the appropriate and thus justified means of achieving its aim.
138
 Here the 
marginalisation of the least intrusive means consideration is clearly apparent in its omission 
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from Baroness Hale’s description of the proportionality test to be satisfied for an 
infringement of freedom of religion to be justified under Article 9(2).
139
  
 
The consequence of this incomplete application is that the courts will not consider the 
substance of whether the impingement upon the rights of those affected, justifies rejecting a 
measure which is efficient in achieving its aim, in favour of one which is less efficient but 
gives greater respect to the rights of the claimant.
140
 R (Williamson), A and other cases
141
 
demonstrate that to apply only the test of necessity is to avoid the balancing of competing 
interests that ‘is crucial to effective protection of human rights’142 from the actions of the 
state. 
 
Although less prevalent in A, the House of Lords has, however, now explicitly adopted a 
balancing analysis as a fourth element
143
 of the proportionality test to be applied when 
deciding whether an action of the other branches of government has violated Convention 
rights.
144
 In Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department the House of Lords can be 
seen to have recognised the deficiency of the de Freitas test as applied by the courts, in not 
involving a requirement to explicitly consider the overall impact of a measure on an 
individual.
145
  In recognising this, Lord Bingham went so far as to describe ‘the need to 
balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups’ as the ‘overriding 
requirement’ to be considered in the proportionality analysis.146  
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Striking a balance was arguably part of the de Freitas approach of considering whether 
particular circumstances require a corresponding infringement of rights. However, this was 
applied as a non-evaluative approach; if a circumstance exists then the state may remedy it 
but go no further.
147
 In contrast the Huang balancing involves an additional
148
 evaluative 
assessment
149
 of whether the nature or weight of the circumstance justifies the infringement 
of the right,
150
 ‘whether overall the measure has struck a “fair balance” between competing 
interests.’151 The distinction between the approaches was clearly recognised in the Canadian 
case of R v Oakes
152
 whose consideration of balancing in proportionality
153
 was influential in 
Huang.
154
 In this case Dickson CJ. held that, even if the impugned measure was tailored to 
the circumstances, it could still be disproportionate if its effect on individual rights is too 
onerous when balanced against the actual importance of the objective it pursues and 
outweighs it.
155
 Thus, the question of overall balance sits above the de Freitas criteria as the 
ultimate test of proportionality.
156
 From a rights protection perspective, this development of 
the fourth element of the domestic courts proportionality analysis is to be welcomed as 
increasing the intensity of review from that previously applied under the three part test. In 
adopting this fourth element the courts can also be seen to be showing an increased 
willingness to accept a stronger role in the scrutiny of the Convention compliance of the other 
branches of government.  
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Practical Proportionality  
In applying the proportionality test to the facts of a case, the weight of justification which 
will determine whether or not the impugned measure violates the Convention rights will vary 
with the context of the case.
157
 At a general level it is apparent that ‘the graver the impact of 
the decision in question upon the individual affected by it, the more substantial the 
justification that will be required’.158 Similarly, it is clear that greater weight will be given to 
rights which the courts deem to be of greater importance amongst the pantheon of rights.
159
 
Thus, in the pre-HRA case of ex p Turgut the court felt ‘most anxious scrutiny’160 must be 
applied to determining the Wednesbury
161
 reasonableness of the infringement of Article 3 
because it was ‘both absolute [as opposed to qualified] and fundamental’.162 Although the 
standards of Wednesbury
163
 and the most anxious scrutiny test have subsequently been held 
not to equate to the intense form of review of whether a decision is justified
164
 required by the 
proportionality test,
165
 and the Universal Declaration upon which the Convention is based 
describes all human rights as fundamental,
166
 this case is an early example of the domestic 
courts considering the weight that should be attributed to Convention rights in assessing the 
acceptability of their infringement. A similar recognition can be seen in the cases following 
the commencement of the HRA including A, where the individual liberty protected by Article 
5 was evaluated as being ‘one of the most fundamental of human rights.’167  
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Balancing Rights Against Rights 
In cases where there is an explicit conflict between the qualified rights of different private 
parties, the proportionality test applies to require that the courts determine which right is of 
the greater weight and should be vindicated. However, although in such cases the same four 
part proportionality exercise is applied, the courts have had to tailor its application to 
recognise that they are balancing the rights of two parties, not a single party’s right against an 
infringing general interest.
168
 
 
The leading judgements on this question are the judgements of the House of Lords in 
Campbell v MGN and Re S.
169
 In Campbell, a case involving the conflict between a model’s 
right to respect for her private life and a newspaper’s freedom of expression, the House of 
Lords upheld the recognition by Hale LJ. (as she was then) in the Court of Appeal in Re S
170
 
that it was necessary to apply a proportionality test to determine the extent to which a parties’ 
right had to be qualified to uphold that of the other.
171
 Baroness Hale’s approach was also 
upheld in the House of Lords on appeal in Re S in its assessment of the balance between a 
child’s Article 8 rights to anonymity and the press’s Article 10 rights to report the details of a 
trial.
172
 In both cases the Lords recognised that, unlike cases where only one right is 
ostensibly at issue,
173
 as both rights could be qualified,
174
 it was necessary to apply the 
proportionality test so as to conduct what has since been labelled a ‘parallel analysis’175 of the 
competing rights.
176
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The Court of Appeal’s approach177 requires the courts to consider independently the 
proportionality of interfering with each of the rights at issue, by considering the weight of 
each right and the competing justifications for infringing each right.
178
 Following this, ‘the 
proportionality of interfering with one [right] has to be balanced against the proportionality of 
restricting the other’,179 to determine which should have priority in an ‘ultimate balancing 
test.’180 In Campbell this involved a very detailed factual analysis of the importance of the 
two rights,
181
 and the gravity of the interference with each right of allowing or prohibiting 
publication.
182
 Based upon its conclusions answers to these questions, the Court determined 
where the balance should be struck between the protection required by both rights and 
decided what information could be disclosed.
183
 In Re S the House of Lords closely 
considered the relative importance of the nature of the Article 8 interest at issue,
184
 the extent 
of and justification for the potential interference with the child’s Article 8 rights,185 the court 
had regard to the underlying principle of democracy in assigning weight to the competing 
Article 10 right.
186
 Ultimately it was consideration of these values that lead Lord Steyn to 
find that the press’s Article 10 rights outweighed the child’s right.187 From this, Helen 
Fenwick argues that a starting point in the parallel analysis ‘is to examine the extent to which 
the values accepted as underlying either article are at stake in any particular instance;’188 if 
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they are comparatively less at stake, being qualitatively less relevant to the facts, then it is 
more likely an interference with that right is to be justified.
189
 
 
Behind the courts’ approach of parallel analysis and ultimate balancing is a recognition that 
neither of the competing rights at issue has presumptive priority over the other.
190
 This 
approach under which the weight of neither right is taken to be predetermined stated by Hale 
LJ. was upheld in Campbell,
191
 and it is because of this position that it is necessary to conduct 
the analysis and balancing described in Re S, to determine which on the facts of a case has 
greater weight.
192
 This approach was held in both cases also to entail that s.12 HRA, which 
requires particular regard to be had to Article 10 in cases where they are considering granting 
injunctions which might restrain that right, did not give pre-eminence to one right over the 
other within the balancing exercise conducted by the court.
193
 
 
In relation to unqualified rights the United Kingdom courts have generally held that a 
proportionality analysis is not applicable because the form of the rights do not allow for it.
194
 
Two exceptions to this rule are applied by the courts. Firstly, positive obligations imposed on 
the state by an unqualified right have been held not to be unqualified and absolute on the 
grounds of the respect for the separation of powers described above.
195
 Secondly, as noted 
above, a proportionality test will be applied in relation to unqualified rights when the courts 
are determining whether a derogation concerning such a right is justified and therefore 
valid.
196
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The key case concerning a potential conflict between unqualified rights was decided ten days 
before the coming into force of the HRA. In Re A the Court of Appeal had to decide whether 
to permit the separation of conjoined twins.
197
 This was necessary to maximise the chance 
that the stronger twin would survive, if left un-separated both would die within months, but 
separating them would inevitably result in the death of the other twin within minutes. Thus 
Ward LJ. held there was a clash between the common law rights to life of both 
children,
198
and recognised the need to balance the rights to life of both children to decide the 
case, but conceded that both must on their face ‘weigh equally.’199 Ward LJ. thus had regard 
to the sanctity of life principle, as underlying the right to life, to resolve the case by guiding 
the balancing of the competing rights and on this basis held that the separation should be 
allowed as the lessor of two evils, for it would ensure the survival of one of the twins rather 
than allowing both to ultimately die.
200
 
 
Although it was argued in Re A that Article 2 would apply to both children and that the same 
conclusion would have been reached under it,
201
 it is uncertain on what basis the United 
Kingdom courts would now decide such a case. They might take Ward LJ.’s approach of 
declining to apply proportionality and conduct a balancing exercise based on an underlying 
principle. Alternately the Limbuela decision would suggest that proportionality could be 
applied if one of the competing rights imposed a positive obligation. However, such an 
approach alone would be a one-sided proportionality analysis and therefore could only ever 
result in a stalemate or the positive obligation being overridden which in Re A would have 
resulted in the death of both twins, the positive obligation being to keep alive the twin who 
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could live independently.
202
 This would be the logical conclusion unless the court, as Ward 
LJ. did in Re A, interpreted the case as within the Article 2(2)(a) exception for self defence on 
the part of the twin who could live independently and thus not a violation of the other twin’s 
Article 2 rights.
203
 Alternately the court could circumvent the problem of balancing
204
 as Lord 
Justices Brooke and Walker did in Re A, by finding the operation did not violate the weaker 
twin’s Article 2 rights because the intention of the doctor conducting the operation could not 
be said to be to be the intentional deprivation of life, rather it was to at least save the life of 
one twin.
205
 It is submitted that Ward LJ.’s approach is to be preferred as engaging most 
closely with the fundamental nature of the rights, which, in the form of the basis on which 
rights are possessed, will be argued below
206
 to provide principled guidance in the resolution 
of such conflicts of rights. 
 
Balancing Rights Against General Interests 
When balancing the weight given to the Convention rights against interests other than 
competing rights under the proportionality test, the key question is the determination of the 
weight to be given to competing interests, and the courts’ determination of this has been 
influenced by institutional and constitutional factors.
207
 These determine the degree of 
deference to be given by the court
208
 to the assessment, by the impugned branch of 
government, of the importance and degree of necessity of the pursuit of the interest at issue 
which forms its weight within the proportionality balancing exercise, and determines whether 
the infringement of a right is justified.
209
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This deference, sometimes called a ‘margin of discretion’,210 is congenitally distinct from the 
margin of appreciation applied by the ECtHR.
211
 The latter has its origins in the nature of the 
relationship between the ECtHR and member states, in the recognition of the differences 
between member states.
212
 The nature of the relationship between the domestic courts and the 
other branches of the state is shaped by different considerations, and thus the courts have 
found the margin of appreciation inapplicable to their application of the proportionality 
test.
213
 In practical terms the margin of appreciation permits member states to make the initial 
judgement on whether an interference with a right is proportionate,
214
 under domestic 
deference the courts do not allow the other branches of state to make that judgement,
215
 
although Baroness Hale has indicated that the courts may find it harder to hold the decision of 
a public authority to be disproportionate where it has given proper consideration to that 
issue.
216
 Domestic deference thus differs from mere submission to the views of the legislature 
or executive, the courts determine what weight to give to the opinion of the other branches of 
state,
217
 they do not simply accept their opinion that a measure is justified,
218
 they reserve the 
ultimate conclusion of Convention compatibility to themselves.
219
 For the courts to abdicate 
this ultimate decision would be to fail to fulfil their role in the protection of rights.
220
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The constitutional deference given by the domestic courts derives from ‘respect for other 
branches of government and in recognition of their democratic decision-making role’.221  
The courts have also acknowledged the authority the distribution of power amongst the three 
branches of government, under the separation of powers within the British constitution, gives 
to their own judgements.
222
 Thus, constitutional deference is a manifestation of the tension 
between the respect for parliamentary sovereignty and the protection of fundamental rights 
which the HRA attempts of negotiate.
223
 Disagreement about where a type of decision falls 
on the spectrum between the courts’ and the other branches’ constitutional responsibilities 
gives rise to disagreement about the amount of deference that should be shown.
224
   
 
In his lengthy consideration of deference, Laws LJ. on a constitutional basis thus argues that 
‘greater deference will be due to the democratic powers where the subject-matter in hand is 
peculiarly within their constitutional responsibility, and less when it lies more particularly 
within the constitutional responsibility of the courts.’225 The examples he gave were decisions 
concerning defence and the rule of law respectively.
226
 Similarly, the courts have taken into 
account general constitutional considerations of democratic legitimacy.
227
 This has led 
members of the judiciary to argue that more weight should be given to impugned measures 
produced by the legislature because of their democratic pedigree,
228
 the courts arguing that 
decisions of Parliament carry with them democratic legitimacy.
229
  
                                                 
221
 Steyn (n.213), 349, Young (n.207), 822, Allan (n.220), 672 and A (Belmarsh) (n.102), [29] 
222
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, [49] and R (Pro-Life Alliance) v 
BBC [2003] UKHL 23, [75]-[76], see also Steyn (n.221), 247-248 and Young (n.207), 822 
223
 F. Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2003) 2 E.H.R.L.R. 125, 129 and Roth 
(n.86),  [81] 
224
 Klug (n.223), 129 and Roth (n.86), [77] 
225
 Roth (n.86), [85] and Klug (n.223), 129, a similar list of grounds for deference was given by Lord Hope in Ex 
p Kebilene (n.213), 381, noted in A (Belmarsh) (n.102), [39]. For a critique of such lists see Allan (n.220), 674-
976 
226
 Roth (n.86), [85]  
227
 Ex p Kebilene (n.213), 381 and Young (n.207), 823 
228
 Roth (n.86), [82-83] and Steyn (n.221), 349 
229
 A (Belmarsh) (n.102), [39], Rehman (n.222), [62] and Beatson (n.38), 267-268  
   
 
140 
 
 
Less closely connected to constitutional considerations
230
 and more practical in nature, the 
courts have also grounded deference in the relative institutional decision making 
competences of the different branches of government.
231
 Laws LJ. considered that ‘greater or 
lesser deference will be due according to whether the subject matter lies more readily within 
the actual or potential expertise of the democratic powers or the courts.’232 This ground of 
deference was also acknowledged in Belfast CC v Miss Behavin’.233 At the basis of it is the 
view, not that another branch of government has the constitutional authority to resolve the 
question, rather that they are more likely to be able to attain ‘the right balance between rights 
and other interests than the courts.’234 The general application of this approach has been that, 
whereas the executive bodies are likely to have special expertise, ‘courts are not suitable 
bodies for resolving “polycentric” questions’235 and deference in the form of extra weight to 
the decision makers’ decision should be given.236 Thus, on the facts of Roth, in the course of 
considering the necessity of the impugned norm, Laws LJ. argued the assessment of the 
social consequences of immigration fell more within the executive’s competence.237 
 
The different factors that determine whether deference is shown by the courts are not 
mutually excusive in their relevance to the facts of a given case. As in the case of R (Animal 
Defenders International) v SoS for Culture, Media and Sport
238
 both institutional and 
constitutional factors may influence a court’s decision. In this judgement, of the three reasons 
Lord Bingham gave for deference, the view that it is ‘reasonable to expect that our 
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democratically-elected politicians will be peculiarly sensitive to measures necessary to 
safeguard the integrity of our democracy’239 is an institutional concern, as is the observance 
that Parliament had closely scrutinised the measure in question.
240
 However the view that it is 
Parliament’s role to decide how to provide protection for freedom of speech when enacting 
general provisions
241
  appears more constitutional in nature. Similarly, Alison Young argues 
that R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney-General
242
 demonstrates an institutional concern for 
the correct balance can shade into fealty to maintaining constitutional balance.
243
 In this 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 case it was recognised that their representative nature mean that ‘[i]t 
is, in the first instance, for Parliament to decide what laws are necessary in accordance with 
what it judges to be in the general interest.’244 However, this apparent institutional 
recognition of competence and consequent need for deference was aided by a constitutional 
reluctance to find against a recently enacted statute because of the democratic legitimacy of 
Parliament.
245
 
 
The final factor the courts will take into account in determining the amount of deference that 
will be shown is whether the right at issue is qualified or unqualified.
246
 Laws LJ. argued that 
‘there is more scope for deference where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, 
much less so where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified’.247 Julian Rivers argues 
that the reason for less deference in relation to unqualified rights is that, except in cases of 
derogations from unqualified rights such as in A and positive conceptions of unqualified 
rights, the courts only consider proportionality in relation to unqualified rights to determine 
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the scope of the right and whether that has been violated,
248
 not whether the violation is 
justified. They have required very strong arguments to be persuaded to consider 
proportionality in this way because the unqualified nature of the rights does not invite the 
attribution of weight to state opinion in the way that qualified rights do.
249
  
 
The functioning of this ground of deference can also it is submitted be seen as influenced by 
the courts’ giving of greater weight to unqualified rights.250 This can be seen to result in a 
reluctance to give weight to competing interests, which would cancel out the greater weight 
given to unqualified rights. Thus, in A the Lords recognised the ‘fundamental’251 and 
‘absolute nature’252 of Article 5 and refused to give the wide margin of deference sought by 
the government.
253
 The approach to deference in A, however, also thus demonstrates the 
overlapping nature of the considerations that go into the calculation of the deference to be 
shown. Here, whilst recognising that the assessment of the nature of the threat to national 
security fall within the executive’s competence and thus should be shown some institutional 
deference,
254
 the Lords found that it was within the constitutional responsibility of the courts 
to assess whether the nature of the national security concern at issue justified the extent of the 
restriction of rights enacted.
255
 
 
From the foregoing it can be seen that the weight that the courts give to rights and interests, 
and to the assessment of necessity within the proportionality analysis, will vary according to 
the rights engaged and the context of the case.
256
 However, it is also clear that the courts have 
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reserved to themselves the final decision on the necessity of the interference and the balance 
that exists, between the weight of the right and competing interests, to determine whether a 
measure is disproportionate and violates Convention rights.
257
 This is the courts’ role under 
the separation of powers, one they refuse to abdicate.
258
 
 
The approach of the British courts when asked to balance rights thus has a number of 
influences. The approach of the ECtHR has only had a limited impact. The main source of 
influence has been domestic constitutional factors which have shaped the structure of the 
balancing process and practical decisions reached by the courts. 
 
The Will and Interest Conceptions of Rights 
The United Kingdom Courts Approach to Waiving Rights 
As with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, there has yet to be a clear authoritative statement from 
the British courts on whether the Convention rights should be interpreted using a will or 
interest conception of rights. Judicial statements in the case law can be found in favour of 
both conceptions, and opaque reasoning can make it unclear which conception has been 
applied in a given case. 
 
The case of R v Brown
259
 demonstrates that prior to the enactment of the HRA the courts had 
not clearly adopted a position on will and interest debate, with elements of the judgement 
being justifiable under both theories. This case raised the question of whether a person could 
consent to serious injuries inflicted in the course of sado-masochistic activity for the purposes 
of relieving the inflictor of liability under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Phrased 
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in terms of rights, the question was whether the victim could waive the benefit of their legal 
right to be free of such harm. 
 
Lord Templeman noted that the common law accepted that consent is a defence to the 
infliction of harm as part of some lawful activities, such as medical surgery and violent sports 
such as boxing.
260
 In holding that this defence was not applicable in this case, the need to 
protect ‘society’ against the un-civilising effects of such activity was held to justify its 
inapplicability.
261
 Lord Lowry and Lord Jauncey similarly saw public interest considerations 
as decisive in determining whether consent could be a defence.
262
 They held that it did not 
favour allowing for consent to the harm in these circumstances because of the potential for 
harm to others.
263
  
 
The recognition by Lord Templeman in the leading judgement, that it was possible to waive 
the benefit of the legal right in question, opens the possibility that he was applying a will 
conception. However, his insistence that there was no general principle that everyone may do 
what they like with their own body
264
 can be interpreted as denying the basic choice premise 
of the will theory. On the other hand, he may have been arguing, consistent with the will 
theory, that individual freedom is subject to the freedom of others under Mill’s general 
libertarian principle.
265
 However, his perception of consent as a remedy rather than part of a 
right is also inconsistent with the adoption of the will theory.
266
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In spite of this, the fact that the Lords held that the protection of the Act could not be waived 
on the facts of the case does not of itself mean that the Court must have been applying an 
interest conception of rights. The Lords focused on the wider harm to society as justifying the 
refusal or recognise waiver by consent and, as noted above, the will conception does allow 
restrictions on the waiving of the benefit of rights in order to protect the freedoms of others. 
Similarly, the fact that the Court held that the duty not to inflict the same level of harm could 
be waived in one situation (eg. medical surgery) but not in another (eg. sado-masochistic 
mutilation) favours a will conception because it focuses not on protecting an individual’s 
interest from a particular harm but instead on the wider consequences of the act in question. 
 
Thus, the Court’s decision in Brown shows a lack of a coherent approach to resolving 
questions of whether the benefits of the duties imposed by rights can be waived with 
elements of the decision pointing to different conceptions. This conceptual ambiguity is 
confirmed by the interpretation of the Lords’ judgements in the post HRA case of Mosely v 
NGN.
267
 Here Eady J. distinguished Brown as a case involving more serious harm to the 
individual and creating the risk of harm to others.
268
 This regard to the extent of the need to 
protect the interest of the individual from freely chosen harm, as well as the need to protect 
society, shows that again the court was influenced by factors from both conceptions.
269
 
 
In other cases the courts appear more to apply only a single conception of rights. In R (Pretty) 
v DPP
270
 the applicant sought a declaration from the DPP that he would not prosecute her 
husband if he assisted her to commit suicide. At the basis of this case was the applicant’s 
                                                 
267
 Mosely v NGN [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) 
268
 Ibid, [116]  
269
 Ibid, [117] 
270
 R (Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 
   
 
146 
 
wish to choose when to die.
271
 Outside of the issue of whether Pretty had a positive right to 
be assisted to die, she wished to waive the protection that Article 2 ECHR gave her under the 
HRA against the taking of her life by another person.
272
 The House of Lords, in contrast to 
the claimant’s argument that Article 2 protected her choice as to whether to live or die,273 
held that Article 2 protected the principle of the sanctity of life.
274
 The Court recognised 
explicitly that this conflicted with the view that the ‘autonomy of individuals is 
predominant’275 in questions of rights, and went on to hold that consent could not override the 
sanctity of life protected by Article 2 in the form of the law of assisted suicide.
276
 This shows 
the Court taking an approach protecting the objectively determined interests of the applicant 
and rejecting a will based conception focusing on choice as a fundamental element of what 
identifies a right. This interest approach is also apparent in the fact that, although considered 
in justifying the refusal to find a positive right to be assisted to commit suicide, questions of 
the public interest which could justify denying a power of waiver in a particular case under 
the will conception were not considered by the court in determining whether Pretty could 
waive her Article 2 right not to be killed. 
 
In this case some of the Lords described Article 8 as protecting the autonomy of the 
individual.
277
 However, the Pretty approach to Article 2 colours the interpretation of the other 
Convention rights in this case. Given their approach to Article 2, the later regard to autonomy 
cannot be seen as an acceptance of it as a general principle providing a foundation for all 
rights in the way that the will conception entails; instead, it appears to be an assertion of the 
particular scope of Article 8. Similar reasoning can be applied to the Lords’ hypothetical 
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statements that, were Article 8 to in fact be engaged by the facts, as has since been held, the 
prohibition on assisted suicide would be justified under Art 8(2) because of the need to 
protect the vulnerable from being coerced into assisted suicide.
278
 It is possible to interpret 
this approach inline with a will conception, as giving protection to an individual’s capacity 
for choice. However, it is submitted that the court’s approach to Article 2 favours interpreting 
it as concerned to protect individual autonomy as an interest protected under Article 8, rather 
than as recognising choice as a fundamental feature underlying all rights. 
 
However, following this decision, in the recent and related case of R (Purdy) v DPP, some 
increased indication of the judicial application of a will conception of the Convention rights 
can be gleaned. In determining whether the DPP’s failure to publish clear guidance on the 
exercise of his discretion to prosecute assisted suicide, the House of Lords held that the 
prohibition at issue engaged the claimant’s Article 8 right because it interfered with her 
ability to choose how to end her life.
279
 This finding is consistent with courts previous 
definition of Article as a right specifically protecting a person’s choice as to how to live their 
life
280
 and several of the Lords in Purdy described this right as one protecting autonomy.
281
 
However, Lord Hope in his interpretation seemed to go further, relying in finding that Article 
8 was engaged and violated upon the ECtHR’s more general statement in Pretty that ‘[t]he 
very essence of the Convention is respect for … human freedom’ which led Strasbourg to 
find that Article 8 was engaged.
282
 This can tentatively be seen as a step towards an 
application of a broader domestic recognition of individual freedom of choice as a 
fundamental feature which all Convention rights protect, consistent with the will conception. 
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In the lower courts, some application of a will conception is also apparent. In a case raising 
the question of where it was possible to consent to the risk of contracting HIV through sex 
with a known carrier, the court held obiter that it was possible to consent to the risk of harm 
to their own health.
283
 Judge LJ. appeared to apply a will based analysis, for he held that to 
prohibit individuals from undertaking risky activities is an ‘interference...with personal 
autonomy [which]…may only be made by Parliament.’284 This focus on autonomy as 
justifying individual risk taking, coupled with an insistence that only Parliament, a body 
representative of the public interests, could restrict such activities, is consistent with the 
protection of choice that is the key element of the will theory. The Court’s attempt to 
distinguish Brown on the grounds that the activity in that case was harmful on public policy 
grounds, shows an attempt by the court post-HRA to interpret that case in accordance with 
the will conception.
285
 
 
It is thus submitted that it is clear that different judges in different cases have applied 
different conceptions of rights which result in a lack of a settled approach to whether it is 
possible to waive the benefits of the Convention rights under the HRA. This has resulted in 
uncertainty as to the approach the courts will apply. 
 
Horizontal and Vertical Effect of Convention Rights  
Practically correlative to the issues of who has rights, and what is their substantive nature, is 
the question of who they hold those rights against? The issues of the enforceability of rights 
between private persons stems from a recognition that the Convention rights are applicable, 
not only to state actions that affect the individual, but also to the actions of individuals that 
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affect other individuals.
286
 As noted in more depth previously, individual actions are equally 
able to infringe the individual interests that are protected by the rights recognised within the 
ECHR, and thus if the rights are to be effectively upheld there must be protection from such 
actions.
287
 However, the extent to which the British courts can give effect to this applicability 
has been held to be subject to limitations contained within the HRA, just as the ECtHR’s 
ability to give effect to it has been held to be subject to its position as an international 
court.
288
 
 
Vertical Effect 
It is apparent from statements made during its passage through Parliament, that there was an 
intention that under the HRA the Convention rights would only be directly enforceable in a 
vertical manner against the state, although the indirect horizontal effect of Convention rights 
was not excluded.
289
 The Lord Chancellor stated that the Act was intended to protect 
individuals against ‘the misuse of power by the state’290 and Jack Straw, who was partially 
responsible for the document which paved the way for the HRA,
291
 claimed that its scope 
would encompass all bodies that the British government could be held answerable for before 
the ECtHR.
292
 This intention can be seen to be manifest in the absence of any provision 
explicitly purporting to bind purely private parties to comply with the Convention rights.
293
 
Thus, s.6 HRA which sets out the conditions under which an action or decision that breaches 
                                                 
286
 Beatson (n.38), 372 
287
 Ibid and above p.104-106 
288
 Above p.106-107 
289
 D. Beyleveld and S. Pattinson, ‘Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect’ (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 623, 645 
and HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol.583, col.783, below p.145  
290
 HL Deb 3 November 1997, vol.582, col.1228 
291
 J. Straw and P. Boateng, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to Incorporate the European Convention on 
Human Rights into UK law’ (1997) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 71 
292
 Hansard HC vol 314 col 406 (17 June 1998), this argument was also referred to in Anton Cantlow at [6], see 
also Beatson (n.38), 343 
293
 G. Phillipson and A. Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) M.L.R. 
878, 890 
   
 
150 
 
a Convention right can be challenged as unlawful, only applies to the actions and omissions 
of public authorities,
294
 the definition of which is thus central to the scope of the Act.
295
  
 
The courts have held that there are two types of public authority caught within s.6.
296
 ‘Core’ 
public authorities are those ‘whose nature is governmental in a broad sense of that 
expression’297 and they must act in accordance with Convention rights in everything that they 
do.
298
 The House of Lords has described the features of such ‘governmental 
organisation[s]’299 as including ‘special powers, democratic accountability, public funding in 
whole or in part, an obligation to act only in the public interest, and a statutory 
constitution’300 and encompassing bodies such as the police, government departments and 
local authorities.
301
 
 
Outside of these core public authorities, it is possible for private bodies to be liable under s.6 
as a public authority for breaching the Convention rights, but only where they are deemed to 
have gone beyond the activities of a private person or entity and are exercising functions of a 
public nature.
302
 The bodies that fall within this scope of the Act as having both public and 
private functions are described by the courts as ‘hybrid public authorities.’303 However, what 
constitutes functions of a public or private nature for the purposes of the s.6(3)(b) and (5) is 
not defined by the Act, it has thus been left to the courts to draw the line which demarcates 
the outer limits of vertical effect.  
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In the leading case of YL v Birmingham CC,
304
 the majority of the House of Lords held that in 
deciding whether a person or body could be said to be performing ‘functions of  public 
nature’, did not depend on the nature of the function in question being performed.305 The 
Lords held that, instead, regard should be had to the nature and character of the body or 
person performing the function and the nature of the obligations under which they performed 
the function.
306
 
 
Lord Neuberger reconciled this approach with the language of s.6(3)(b) by arguing that a 
distinction should be drawn between ‘functions’ and ‘acts’ with the former being less specific 
and more conceptual and composed of various acts.
307
 He argued that, on the facts of this 
case, the question which had to be decided was whether providing care for the elderly as the 
care home did was a public function.
308
 On the facts, the majority of the Lords held that a 
private care home could not be said to be performing a function of a public nature in 
providing care to the elderly. The Lords were influenced by the various characteristics of the 
care home including the fact it was a commercial entity, it did not receive a public subsidy, it 
had private law contracts with its residents and it had no special statutory powers, although 
the presence or absence of these such powers were held not to be decisive.
309
  
 
It is submitted that that the courts have not been activistic in defining the coverage of 
s.6(3)(b). The majority’s explicit rejection of the alternate approach, of focusing on whether 
the character of the particular service provided was of a public nature,
310
 was based upon a 
recognition that such an approach could de facto create the direct horizontal effect the HRA 
                                                 
304
 YL v Birmingham CC [2007] UKHL 27 
305
 Ibid, [29] & [119] 
306
 Ibid, [31], [102]-[103] 
307
 Ibid, [130] 
308
 Ibid 
309
 Ibid, [26]-[28], [101], [148], [150] & [168] 
310
 Ibid, [29] 
   
 
152 
 
was not intended to bring about. The Lords argued that if the courts merely looked at whether 
the particular activity in question was also carried out or contracted out by a public authority 
then what could be a public function for the purposes of s.6(3)(b) would be limitless.
311
 
 
 The Lords were also keen to avoid an arbitrary approach.
312
 The court thus rejected a test of 
whether the private body was performing the function in question under a contract it had with 
a core public body, whereby people receiving services a private body had a contract with a 
core public authority to provide would be able to claim, but a person paying independently 
for such services would have no HRA claim.
313
 However, the consequence of the Lords’ 
approach is that, although the test of what amounts to a public function avoids the problems 
of unlimited scope, it does not avoid uncertainty as each case will have to be considered on 
its individual facts.
314
 
 
This uncertainty is to some extent in line with the deliberate choices made in drafting s.6, as 
Lord Neuberger observed, it is ‘not conspicuous for the clarity of its drafting.’315 The 
provision for liability of hybrid public authorities was created to reflect that as a result of 
privatisation, outsourcing and private finance initiative projects, ‘[t]he public/private 
distinction can no longer be conceptualised in terms of an institutional dichotomy between 
state and non-state entities.’316 The uncertainty of the division requires a test sufficiently 
broad and flexible to reach the appropriate decision on where to draw the line in particular 
cases so that rights can be adequately protected against the state.
 317
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Horizontal Effect 
Beyond the reach of s.6 as it is currently interpreted, private bodies and persons cannot have 
actions brought directly against them under the HRA for acting in contravention of another’s 
Convention rights.
318
 Unlike the position in the Republic of Ireland where the Supreme court 
has held that constitutional rights are enforceable between private individuals and 
corporations,
319
 there was no intention to create a ‘constitutional tort’ for breaches of the 
Convention rights
320
 and the courts have consequently held that there is no direct horizontal 
effect under the Act.
321
  
 
The argument by Beyleveld and Pattinson for the horizontal applicability of the rights within 
the Convention, argued for above in the context of the rights supranational application,
322
 
similarly applies to the rights as incorporated rights within the HRA at the domestic level. 
The domestic judiciary have themselves recognised this reality, that it is possible for private 
persons’ actions to impinge upon the rights of others. In Campbell v Media Group 
Newspapers, Lord Nicholls, although dissenting in his judgement on the facts, recognised the 
general principle that ‘[t]he values embodied in articles 8 and 10 are as much applicable in 
disputes between individuals or between an individual and a non-governmental body…as 
they are in disputes between individuals and a public authority.’323 This horizontal 
applicability of rights forms the theoretical foundation of the indirect horizontal effect the 
courts deem themselves obliged to give to the Convention rights.
324
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This indirect horizontal effect takes the form of the courts striving to act in accordance with 
the Convention rights in applying, interpreting and developing the law in cases between 
private individuals.
325
 That the rights would have effect between individuals in this manner 
was specifically foreseen in the passage of the HRA in the rejection of an amendment which 
would have restricted the rights to vertical effect.
326
 It is submitted that this can also be seen 
as part of the intention, apparent in the passage of the HRA, that the Act should create a 
human rights culture within British society which would encourage all public and private 
bodies to consider whether their actions were compatible with the Convention rights.
327
 The 
legal means by which the courts have been able to give effect to the horizontal applicability 
of the rights are to be found in s.3 and s.6 of the Act.
328
 
 
The Interpretive Obligation 
S.3 imposes a mandatory obligation
329
 upon the courts to interpret and give effect to all 
legislation in a manner which is compatible with the Convention rights as ‘far as it is possible 
to do so’.330 The Act does not restrict this canon of construction to legislation governing 
relations between the individual and the state, it also has a horizontal arc of fire.
331
 The courts 
must interpret legislation which is relevant in a case between private parties in a manner 
which is compatible with the Convention rights, or if a Convention compliant interpretation is 
impossible, make a declaration of incompatibility under s.4(2) HRA in relation to it.
332
 Thus, 
indirectly horizontal effect can be achieved in some cases.
333
 
                                                 
325
 Hunt (n.320), 430-431 
326
 HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol.583, col.783 and Ibid, 440-441 
327
 HL Deb 3 November 1997, vol.582, col. 1228 and HL Deb 27 November 1997, vol.583, col.1163 
328
 Joint Committee on Human Rights (n.320), 30 and Beatson (n.38), 375 
329
 Re S (n.51), [37] 
330
 s.3(1) HRA 
331
 N. Bamforth. ‘The True “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 34, 37 
332
 Beatson (n.38), 375 & 379 and Ibid, 40 
333
 Hunt (n.320), 426 
   
 
155 
 
 
An example of the courts indirectly giving effect to the Convention rights in this manner can 
be seen in the case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.
334
 This case concerned the legal 
relationship between a private landlord and the homosexual partner of the deceased tenant 
under the Rent Act 1977. The issue was whether a provision, which allowed the ‘spouse’ of a 
deceased tenant (defined as encompassing persons living with the original tenant ‘as his or 
her wife or husband’)335 to succeed to the tenancy, violated the Convention rights of those in 
homosexual relationships if it was interpreted as not applying to them. The House of Lords 
held that such an exclusionary interpretation did engage Article 8 and violate Article 14.
336
 
The court, however, held that it was possible to avoid this violation by using s.3 to interpret 
the provision as encompassing both heterosexual and homosexual couples.
337
 Thus, the 
landlord was compelled to respect the Convention rights of another private individual. 
 
However, the ability of the courts to use s.3 to give horizontal effect to the Convention rights 
is limited by the fact that the power of interpretation that it grants ‘is not unlimited.’338 In Re 
S Lord Nicholls recognised that the constraints on the interpretive obligation are 
constitutional in nature and then held that, for an interpretation using s.3 to be legitimate, it 
must respect parliamentary sovereignty by remaining within the sphere of interpretation and 
not usurping Parliament’s power of legislation.339 On the facts of the case Lord Nicholls held 
that, as the approach taken by the Court of Appeal under s.3 created a considerable departure 
from the original legislation, this amounted to illegitimate judicial legislation by amendment, 
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which was not permissible under s.3.
340
 It is apparent that, in assessing whether an 
interpretation in fact amounts to illegitimate judicial legislation, the courts will be influenced 
by considerations of whether it has the capacity and expertise to evaluate the impact of 
adopting a particular interpretation.
341
 The influence of constitutional propriety in 
determining the scope of s.3 can be further seen from the in Lord Nicholls’s refusal to use the 
interpretive power in Bellinger, on the grounds that the government had already made it clear 
that it would bring forth legislation to effect the change required.
342
 
 
The Courts as Public Authorities 
As noted above, core public authorities are required to act in accordance with the Convention 
rights in all their actions. The only bodies to be explicitly named in the Act as falling within 
this category are courts and tribunals.
343
 Special care was also taken to ensure that the 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords was included within this category in s.6(4) HRA, 
although this provision is now irrelevant following the creation of the Supreme Court which 
will be covered by the general provision covering courts and tribunals.
344
 
 
As a consequence of being bound in this way, it is unlawful for the courts to give a 
judgement which infringes the Convention rights.
345
 This entails that the courts must develop 
and apply the common law in a manner that respects the requirements of the Convention, 
where they could ‘be regarded as responsible for the breach…that would result by applying 
the law in an un-modified way.’346 Thus, in Campbell Baroness Hale held that compliance 
with the Convention rights under s.6 required court to develop the common law of 
                                                 
340
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341
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confidentiality in a way that respected the privacy protection contained within Article 8 in a 
case between two private parties.
347
 She was, however, the only member of the House of 
Lords to rely s.6 as the basis for altering the common law,
348
 the other Lords having regard to 
the horizontal applicability of rights,
349
 the shared basis of confidentiality and Article 8 
privacy in the principles of autonomy and dignity,
350
 and the more general influence of the 
relevant Convention rights upon the pre-existing balancing exercise required by the common 
law.
351
 Gavin Phillipson notes that this reluctance to rely openly upon s.6 is unsurprising in 
that it is consistent with the pre-HRA reluctance to allow the Convention to strongly 
permeate the common law, with avoidance of reliance upon Convention rights in favour of 
identical common law principles.
352
 He suggests, however, that the true reason for the 
reluctance to rely upon s.6 in this case was a wish to avoid having to rule explicitly on the 
extent of horizontal effect that it required the courts to give to the Convention rights.
353
 Based 
on this contrast between the use of the Convention to resolve the case by all the Lords, and 
the disagreement as to the basis and scope of its applicability between individuals, Phillipson 
thus argues the general question of existence, basis and extent of horizontal effect under the 
HRA remains unresolved.
354
 This judicial position further makes it unlikely that the courts 
would be prepared to adopt an interpretation of the s.6 judicial obligation as allowing for 
direct horizontal effect, such as that which Beyleveld and Pattinson have argued is 
possible.
355
 Although conceptually justified by the above argued horizontal applicable nature 
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of the Convention rights,
356
 and morally supported by the interpretive approach to the rights 
to be argued for below,
357
 it would be a substantial departure from their current tentative 
approach.  
 
As well as developing the substantive requirements of the common law, the courts are also 
bound by s.6 to act in accordance with the Convention rights when granting remedies.
358
 The 
rights and the positive obligations they can create, may require the courts to refuse or grant 
relief in circumstances in which they would not normally do so in order to avoid violating 
their obligation under s.6. Thus, in the case of South Bucks DC v Porter the House of Lords, 
noting that they had discretion as to whether to create injunctions, held that s.6 required that 
they should only do so if it did not infringe the Convention rights and it was proportionate to 
do so.
359
 It was similarly held in Venables v NGN that s.6 could require the courts to grant an 
injunction where this was necessary to respect the positive obligations imposed by a 
Convention right.
360
 
 
This statutory means of giving horizontal effect to the Convention rights is, however, subject 
to limits which arise from its statutory source and, in common with horizontal effect through 
the application of the interpretive obligation, constitutional constraints. Whilst the application 
of the Convention may show a domestic law to violate an individual’s rights, the breach may 
be beyond the court’s constitutionally constrained statutory powers to directly remedy.361 The 
s.6 requirement that the courts act in accordance with the Convention rights also states a 
constitutional exception to this rule: where a decision which infringes Convention rights is 
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compelled directly or indirectly by primary legislation the courts must obey the legislation.
362
 
This limitation seeks to ensure respect for parliamentary sovereignty as the core tenet of the 
British constitution, and against which the only remedy where a compatible interpretation is 
not possible is a declaration of incompatibility.
363
  
 
Additionally, constitutional concerns control the extent to which the courts can change the 
common law in order to ensure their decisions comply with the Convention rights. The courts 
have held that they cannot use their s.6 obligation to create new common law causes of 
action.
364
 Such a departure from the common law’s incremental method has been held to put 
the courts in danger of usurping the role of the legislature under the separation of powers.
365
 
Phillipson and Williams cogently suggest, however, that although the British constitution 
must be the ultimate arbiter of the courts’ power to protect Convention rights, this prohibition 
on new causes of action is too blunt an application of constitutional concern.  
 
The courts will not always be able to provide a remedy under s.6 for fear of straying into 
legislation, whose constitutional illegitimacy can be seen in the care taken to preserve 
parliamentary sovereignty under the HRA and s.6 in particular.
366
 The core constitutional 
tenets – parliamentary sovereignty’s respect for democratic decision making, the separation 
of power’s recognition of different spheres of institutional competence, the rule of law’s 
concern to ensure that the law is capable of being known by having clarity and lacking 
retroactivity
367
 – entail that it would be illegitimate for the courts to depart from the 
incremental development of the common law and reach a judgement which did not have roots 
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in pre-existing common law principles, creating de novo causes of action.
368
 However, within 
these constraints, the development of new causes of action is possible because the 
incremental development of the common law is consistent with these constitutional 
constraints.
369
 The creation of the modern cause of negligence in Donoghue v Stephenson
370
 
was an incremental development from the previous cause of action on the case,
371
 and post-
HRA application of the law of confidentiality does appear to be developing a new tort of 
misuse of private information in spite of the House of Lords earlier statements.
372
  
 
The courts’ approach to this question of the interpretation of rights, of against whom they can 
be held and enforced, is more developed than in relation to the other four questions discussed 
above. They have directly confronted this issue in recognising the horizontal applicability of 
rights and consequently given horizontal effect to them. They have, however, considered 
themselves restricted to indirect horizontal effect through incremental development of the 
common law and statutory interpretation. 
 
Conclusion 
The courts have recognised and engaged with the five fundamental questions of rights 
interpretation which must be addressed in the process of applying any of the incorporated 
Convention rights. Given that the HRA has only reached its 14
th
 birthday it is unsurprising 
that there is still uncertainty in the courts answers to these questions. However the fact that 
they recognise these issues shows that they are recognising and engaging with the 
fundamental nature of rights. 
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CHAPTER VI: METHODOLOGY: FINDING ANSWERS TO THE OPEN TEXTURE OF 
RIGHTS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
Introduction 
In light of the uncertainty of the requirements of the Convention rights established above, 
given their open textured and semantic nature and the extent to which the courts have left 
fundamental question of rights interpretation unanswered or unclear, this chapter puts 
forward Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) as a moral principle that can give 
guidance in their interpretation. It will be shown not only that the principle is itself justified 
as a guide to action, but also that its interpretative use within the Convention context is 
consistent with fundamental features of the ECHR and legally possible within the current 
relationship between the domestic courts and the ECtHR. 
 
The Question of the Interpretation of Convention Rights 
The ECHR, in common with the UDHR whose protection for rights its preamble claims to 
further, has been argued above to contain rights which are of uncertain meaning. The 
interpretation of these rights has been argued to pivot around the answers to five questions 
which dictate the general scope and practical impact of the rights in individual cases. This 
uncertainty of the rights requirements is facilitated by the wording of the Convention, which 
is deliberately composed in open textured language. However, the congenital root of this 
uncertainty is that the written statements of the Convention rights are a semantic attempt to 
conceptualise the constructed concepts of rights, freedoms and duties.
1
 They are an attempt to 
make tangible the idea that there are some treatments and conditions individuals must not be 
subject to.  
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As a consequence of this open textured language, the scope of the incorporated Convention 
rights, including those explicitly stated to be subject to limitations and exceptions, must 
through interpretation be given a definite content. Under the HRA this task is allotted to the 
judiciary.
2
 The intentionally cultivated open textured nature of the Convention rights through 
the adoption of open language, has successfully achieved its aim in enabling 47 states across 
Europe to the shoreline of the Pacific, with differing ideas of what should be protected by 
rights, to agree to a single Convention.
3
 However, the member states of the Council of 
Europe recognised the need for detailed, authoritative, fact specific clarification of 
requirements of their obligations imposed by their people’s rights by creating a Commission 
and Court.
4
 For until interpreted, the practical requirements of the written rights are 
unknown; the five key questions which fundamentally give meaning to the rights and 
consequent duties are unanswered. 
 
The Need to Find a Rational way of Resolving Disputes about the Interpretation the 
Convention Rights 
Given the different possible approaches, and their consequences, that have been highlighted 
in the preceding chapters’ investigation of the current approaches of the ECtHR and the 
domestic courts, an intellectually coherent construction of the five questions of interpretation 
is required by the pivotal nature of these questions to the meaning of the Convention rights. 
To be a valid interpretation the approach taken must respect the features fundamental to the 
ECHR which it also shares with human rights treaties more generally. Dworkin makes this 
point clearly in his argument that, for a judge to be interpreting a constitution to determine 
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the meaning of a right rather than rewriting it, his interpretive approach must fit the 
constitution’s fundamental settled core characteristics.5  
 
An interpretive approach to the Convention rights must also be one justified by reason rather 
than subjective individual intuition or feeling. As Kant argues, empirical happiness or 
intuitive ‘moral feeling’6 cannot provide a basis for an impartial moral determination of what 
is right or wrong; their subjectivity prevents them from providing a universal ‘uniform 
standard’ against which acts can be measured,7 something international human rights treaties 
claim to be.  
 
Both Kant and Gewirth recognise a principle of morality, determining what acts are right and 
wrong, derived though the use of reason, will not suffer from this inherent subjectivity as its 
logical conclusions will be binding upon all rational beings.
8
 Kant thus derives his 
Categorical Imperatives governing all action from the capacity for reason which he describes 
as the ‘metaphysics of morals’;9 the basis upon which a supreme principle of morality must 
rest.
10
 He claims that it is because pure reason is ‘altogether a priori’, free from empirical 
considerations such as perfection, happiness, moral feeling, fear of god, etc., that it can form 
an impartial basis for deducing morals controlling conduct.
11
 Similarly, Gewirth in his theory 
applies reason in a dialectically necessary manner which asks what statements and claims an 
agent must rationally make because of his position as an agent, and what these logically 
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imply.
12
 This approach leads him to argue that an agent will arrive at the Principle of Generic 
Consistency as the supreme principle of moral action requiring respect for the generic rights 
with ‘a strict rational justification.’13 
 
Consistency with the Fundamental Features of the Convention’s Human Rights Protection 
The specific fundamental features of human rights, and of the Convention in particular, with 
which an interpretive approach addressed to them must fit, can be determined from the text of 
the leading human rights documents with which the ECHR is closely connected and from 
judicial statements attempting to identify the Convention’s underlying principles. These 
fundamental features are the universality, inalienability, and inherent possession of rights, as 
well as a primacy of focus on rights rather than duties.  
 
These three core characteristics arise from the context in which the Convention rights were 
drafted. They are derived from both what was described above as the internal context, the text 
of the Convention itself, particularly its preamble, and also the external context, the factual 
circumstances which influenced the creation of the ECHR, the Second World War and human 
rights movement that found expression in the UDHR.
14
 Given the role of context in the 
interpretation of words generally, by being consistent with this context, even if not 
necessarily being derived directly from it, an approach to the interpretation of the Convention 
can be said to be a legitimate construction of it.
15
 
 
Universality 
The use of an interpretive approach, based in the application of reason, immediately has 
consistency with a fundamental feature of the ECHR and human rights law generally: the 
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universality of human rights. That universalism forms ‘one of the basic assumptions of 
human rights’,16 is textually apparent from its prominent position in the title and preamble of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which subsequent rights treaties, including the 
ECHR, have claimed ancestry.
17
  
 
Substantively, universality requires the recognition that all human rights are possessed by all 
beings who have the fundamental characteristics which give rise to the rights, regardless of 
what other characteristics such as gender, religion, or race they possess.
18
 The call in the first 
paragraph of the UDHR’s preamble for the recognition of the rights, of ‘all members of the 
human family’, states this universal scope of the rights it contains and is emphasised in 
second paragraph of the ECHR’s preamble. Furthermore, the commitment of the states in the 
sixth paragraph to the ‘universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ demonstrates that they are not legal rights deriving from the law of particular states 
but rather attach to the individuals regardless or in spite of their states’ laws. 
 
An interpretative approach to rights based in reason is consistent with the universal nature of 
human rights, for both see the recognition of the possession of rights as uninfluenced by 
subjective factors that are not part of the fundamental characteristics to which human rights 
attach. In this way such an interpretive approach also avoids being relativistic. In the human 
rights context relativism asserts ‘that no human rights are absolutes…, that there is infinite 
cultural variability, and that all cultures are morally equal or valid’,19 and what is moral or 
correct is dictated by the views that prevail within a community.
20
 […] If the universalist 
conception of human rights binding upon all states embraced within the UDHR’s preamble is 
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accepted, even if only in a dialectically contingent manner, as accepted by choice as opposed 
to being logically entailed by an initial position of agency,
21
 such a position is incompatible 
with holding the views which characterise relativism. This must be the case because 
universalism holds that rights are not deemed to be granted or held by the grace of societal 
agreement but rather individuals are entitled to them by virtue of their worth ‘independent of 
the community.’22 
 
It is submitted that support for universality as a fundamental feature of rights can be seen in 
the ECtHR’s recognition of equality as one of the principles underlying the Convention 
described above.
23
 It can also be seen to be manifested in the prohibition on discrimination in 
relation to the enjoyment of other Convention rights,
24
 where the European Court and the 
domestic courts have rejected unjustified attempts to deprive particular groups of the 
protection of rights that are held by others on the grounds of their subjective status rather than 
some objective reason.
25
 The presence of judicial adjudication upon the interpretation of the 
Convention rights more generally can also be seen as a rejection of relativism in the 
protection it grants. By giving an international court the final judgement on their 
requirements,
26
 rather than giving the decision on their applicability to the national 
governments, the rights are insulated from direct influence by interpretations which may be 
grounded only in popular majority opinion within a particular country.
27
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However, although universal of nature in this manner, the recognition of different values 
within societies can be legitimately taken into account in the application of rights 
conceptualised as universal, and can be seen to be already a part of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence, accepted for practical reasons. The Court’s margin of appreciation is a 
recognition that the views of the different societies who are members of the Council of 
Europe as to the priority of rights, can form part of the factual context to be considered in 
determining the weight to be given to the rights.
28
 The ECtHR, in recognition of the 
disagreements between states,
29
 thus in some cases allows member states to determine for 
themselves the correct balance between conflicting Convention rights;
30
 the margin exists in 
recognition that although rights are universally possessed their application can be a matter on 
which reasonable people can disagree. Unlike the relativism such as that of a Communitarian 
moral theory which contains no abstract standard of justice, it is submitted that the 
Convention with the margin of appreciation does provide such a standard for all states, but 
one which does take account of different distributive priorities of the states.
31
  
 
Additionally, this relinquishment of judgment does not, with the isolated exception of the 
question of whether foetuses have rights under the Convention,
32
 relate to the ground on 
which rights are held and thus is consistent with perceiving them to have a universal nature. 
Even the margin of appreciation applied in relation to foetuses does not, however, amount to 
relativism because it does not undermine the Convention’s perception that there are 
identifiable rights held universally by humans. Rather it allows for the disagreements 
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amongst states on the question of whether foetuses are factually a human for the purposes of 
the Convention.
33
 The underlying recognition of universality is reinforced by the fact that the 
court retains to itself the jurisdiction to determine when a margin of appreciation is 
appropriate and so retain ultimate adjudicative power.
34
 Indeed, as noted above, the very 
existence of a supranational court insulates rights from interpretations which are grounded 
only in the popular majority opinion that exists in a particular country.
35
 
 
The Inherent and Inalienability Nature of Rights  
The second fundamental feature with which an interpretive approach to human rights 
documents must fit is connected to the feature of universality. The universal nature of human 
rights exists because those rights are possessed by virtue of an inherent characteristic of 
worth possessed by humans. In the first line of the UDHR preamble this shared characteristic 
is labelled ‘dignity.’36 It is this upon which the rejection of the relativism by human rights is 
founded and upon this that the UDHR goes on to claim that the rights it states are 
inalienable.
37
 
 
The basis in dignity acknowledged in the preamble of the UDHR, performs a ‘founding 
function’38 in conceptualising the recognition that there is a characteristic which unites 
mankind and the existence of which is not dependant on its factual recognition by states.
39
 
Paragraph 5 of the preamble affirms that this value is so fundamental that knowledge of it, 
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and the need for its protection, can be pre-supposed.
40
 Thus, the Declaration makes reference 
to dignity to describe the characteristic embodying the worth of individuals which justifies 
the recognition of and respect for their rights.
41
  
 
The importance of inalienability to the concept of human rights can be found in the early 
rights protection set out in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and 
the American Declaration of Independence, both of which influenced the ECHR.
42
 The 
French Declaration claimed ‘to set forth…a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable and 
sacred rights of man’.43 The combination of the claim to ‘set forth’ together with the actions 
of ‘declaring’, ‘natural’, and ‘unalienable’ norms suggest that a view of the rights as pre-
existing and which the Assembly merely sought to give recognition to, rather than seeing the 
rights as the normative means of an attempt to achieve some other goal. The American 
Declaration similarly acknowledged the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to 
be so fundamental to the nature of man that they were recognised as being ‘unalienable’ and 
‘self-evident.’44 Thus, the twin characteristics of inherence and inalienability can be seen to 
be long established traits of human rights protecting documents. 
 
Within the European Convention itself, in addition to the influence that the above rights 
documents have had upon it, commitment to the inalienability of the Convention rights can 
be inferred from the Article 14 prohibition of discriminatory treatment in relation to the 
enjoyment of the substantive Convention rights. The recognition in this Article, that the 
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possession of rights cannot be effected by the having of various other characteristics and 
statuses, is consistent with the position that rights are connected to the dignity of the 
individual, with their possession incapable of being alienated from that dignity by other 
circumstances or characteristics. 
  
The Emphasis on Rights  
In their titles and in the wording of their substantive articles, the ECHR and other major 
international human rights treaties speak in terms of rights. Section one of the Convention, 
which contains the substantive rights, is entitled ‘Rights and Freedoms’ and many45 of the 
Articles contained within it are classified as such
46
 and expressed in these terms.  
 
The idea of rights is common in laws and morality, although there are different conceptions 
of rights and their requirements. Early in the 20
th
 Century, Wesley Hohfeld recognised that in 
the legal context the terms of both ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ were often used in an overbroad 
manner, to describe using the same labels concepts which had fundamentally different 
natures.
47
 Amongst the various legal concepts often described in legal and judicial writings as 
‘rights’, including powers, immunities, and privileges,48 Hohfeld argued that only those 
norms which involved a ‘claim’ that another should do or not do something in relation to the 
holder (thus known as claim-rights) should properly be described as a right.
49
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Hohfeld’s more precise conception of rights, as correlating to duties owed by others to act in 
relation to them in a particular manner,
50
 finds support in the writings of thinkers who both 
preceded him and those who have subsequently sought to define rights. For example, 
Bentham saw rights and obligations as ‘inseparably connected.’51 He argued that ‘every legal 
command by imposing a duty on one party, if the duty be not of a self regarding kind, confers 
a right to services upon another.’52 Dworkin’s conceptualisation of rights, also recognised 
their interconnectedness with duties arguing that, to say that someone has a right to 
something, in the most common sense of the word, is to say that ‘it would be wrong to 
interfere with his doing it, or at least that some special grounds are needed for justifying any 
interference.’53 Rights are hence norms which prima facie make a claim, requiring or 
prohibiting particular actions in order to ensure some good for or goal of a particular 
individual, rather than to ensure some good or goal for the community as a whole.
54
 It is 
argued that the connection between rights and duties is further reflected by the recognition 
that to have a right to do something a person must also have no duty not to do it, although 
under Hohfeld’s analysis this would be a mere privilege or liberty if it did not also make a 
claim on others in relation to the action.
55
 Rights and duties are thus best conceptualised as 
correlative displacing spheres.  
 
The ECHR recognises rights as norms which impose such corresponding obligations upon 
others (primarily the state) in this way. The Convention rights are not mere civil liberties
56
 
against whose infringement there is no control, this is apparent from the statement in Article 
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1 of the Convention of an obligation upon the signatory states to respect human rights, in the 
Article 13 duty to provide a remedy for their violation, and in the requirement of specific 
justifications for the limitation of the qualified rights which have been argued above to be 
based upon respecting the rights claims of others.
57
 From this nature of the Convention rights, 
it follows that any interpretive approach to be applied to them must be able to account for 
both rights and duties. 
 
Deontological conceptual foundations for normative rights and their interpretation are argued 
by Dworkin to be distinguishable from each other by the way in which they address 
individual’s actions, as being either rights or duty theories. Theories of duty focus on whether 
the actions of individuals comply with a given code of behaviour.
58
 For example, under 
Kant’s theory, lying is always wrong regardless of the consequences.59 Conversely, rights 
bases are ‘concerned with the independence rather than the conformity of individual 
action.’60 They seek to protect what they perceive as the inherent and underlying value of 
individual choice.
61
 Under Dworkin’s theory for instance, all individuals and their choices 
should generally be given equal concern and respect.
62
 Although both rights and duty based 
theories make use of moral rules and codes of conduct, duty theories treat the codes as the 
essence of the theory, whereas under rights based theories the codes are instrumental in the 
protection of rights rather than having intrinsic value in themselves.
63
 Consistent with this, 
whereas duty based theories primary focus is upon restraining actions to conformity with the 
moral rules or code, rights based theories seek to allow freedom of action. 
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Although formal phrasing cannot be conclusive of the substantive conception the treaty is 
most consistent with, the full title of the ECHR as the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should not be disregarded. It can be tentatively 
seen to show a focus on the rights humans have and the importance of freedom to them, 
rather an intention to create a code of conduct for states or individuals which focuses on their 
duties.  
 
The statement in the Convention’s preamble that the UDHR – to which the Convention 
claims to give effect – aimed at ‘securing the universal and effective recognition and 
observance of the rights therein declared’ can, however, be interpreted as consistent with both 
bases. The preamble and the UDHR’s title talk in terms of rights, but the ECHR reference to 
it can also be seen to be presenting the Declaration as a code to which states must conform, 
presenting a more mixed perspective. Guidance as to which interpretation the UDHR is more 
amenable can, however, be found in its more detailed preamble. This foundational statement 
pre-dating the ECHR, talks in terms of the ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘inalienable rights’ of 
human beings noted above. This recognition of dignity and rights of ‘all members of the 
human family’ is then described as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world’. This opening sentence of the Declaration thus places fundamental emphasis upon the 
protection of the freedom of individual action rather than requiring particular actions as a 
duty based norm would be expected to. Further weight is given to this sentiment by its 
reiteration in paragraph 4 of the preamble.   
 
Another factor which favours viewing the Convention as more reflective of a rights theory 
conception in its substantive content, is that the statements of the rights contained within it 
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appear to be addressed to the person who possesses the right, rather than to the person who 
might infringe it. This is particularly clear with those rights that start with the formulation 
‘[e]veryone has the right’.64 There are, however, some articles which are not quite so clearly 
addressed to the rights holder and are not explicitly expressed in terms of rights, instead being 
stated as prohibitions.
65
 Although it is a characteristic of duty theories that they focus on the 
restraint of action, these Articles do not talk in terms of duties upon others to refrain from the 
conduct and do not focus on those who might commit the impugned conduct as would 
reasonably be expected if the rights were clearly duty based. Rather they focus on ensuring 
individuals freedom and protection from the interference in question (eg. Article 3: ‘[n]o one 
shall be subjected to torture’) which is consistent with the focus of rights theory on freedom 
of action. Thus, although less explicitly displaying of a rights theory conception, they are not 
inescapably incompatible with such a basis. 
 
‘Duties’ or ‘duty’ is explicitly mentioned once in the Convention, as justifying restriction of 
an individual’s freedom of expression.66 This mention, even if as argued above the other 
qualified rights implicitly contain a similar duty respect general interests and others’ rights,67 
does not undermine the idea that the ECHR propounds a rights based conception of rights, 
because claim rights necessarily by their nature impose duties.
68
 It is the right rather than the 
duty that is the starting point of this Article
69
 and, if the limitations on the rights are seen as 
protecting the rights of others, this use of duty is consistent with a rights basis for the 
Convention rights. Similarly, the elements of the rights explicitly phrased in terms of the 
states’ duties (eg. Article 8(2) ‘[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority’) are 
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included subsequent to the statement of the right. Therefore, it is submitted that the primary 
focus of these Articles is upon the freedom of the individual from interference, and the 
qualifying provisions merely spell out the extent of the duties that are correlative to them. 
 
Thus, although as noted above the open textured nature does not tie the Convention to a 
particular philosophical basis, in relation to a potential deontological basis, generally the 
substance of the ECHR can be seen to not only be consistent with but to favour the 
recognition of interpretative bases for it which are characterised by a focus on rights rather 
than duties. This focus on individual capacity for choice of rights based theories also accords 
with the recognition of the possession of rights as based in an inherent characteristic as a 
fundamental feature of human rights and those of the Convention in particular.  
 
The Principle of Generic Consistency as a Guide to the Interpretation of the Convention 
Rights 
Moral Answers to Legal Questions 
In the context of the above framework of rights protection within which a moral theory used 
to guide the interpretation of the Convention rights must fit, it is argued that the ‘Principle of 
Generic Consistency’ enumerated by Gewirth can provide a rationally justified and 
practically coherent guide to interpretation. As a moral theory it seeks to answer three 
questions with which it is necessary to engage to address adequately the interactions between 
individuals that are the subject matter of morality.
70
 First, the authoritative question asks, why 
should one be moral and recognise that one is bound to conform one’s actions to a given 
principle purporting to govern action? Second, the distributive question asks, other than his 
own, of whose interests should the agent take account when deciding how to act? Finally, a 
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principle of morality must describe the interests of which ‘favourable account’ must be taken, 
the substantive question. 
 
The concern of the distributive question for the determination of the identity of the beings of 
whose interest account should be taken, is shared with the first of the five key questions that 
must be answered in giving a comprehensive account of the interpretation of the Convention 
rights: who is protected by the Convention? Just as the answers to the other four questions of 
rights interpretation can be traced to the answer to the first, the answer to the substantive 
question is connected to that of the distributive question. Gewirth’s responses to the 
distributive and substantive questions as a theory of rights can thus be used answer the five 
core questions of the interpretation of the Convention system of rights. 
 
The premise of Gewirth’s theory, and his answer to the distributive question, is purposive 
agency. This agency is defined in a non-question begging manner as possessed by beings 
with capacity for action.
71
 The idea of action is neutral, it is the concern of all moral theories 
and it neither reflects nor derives from any particular moral theory, in itself it sets out no 
particular substantive moral claims as to how agents ought to act,
72
 it is merely a factual 
description of a state of being.
73
 The substantive content of action is voluntary and purposive 
behaviour.
74
 An agent is thus a being who has the capacity ‘to control his behaviour [in this 
manner] by his unforced choice with a view to achieving his purposes’.75 Gewirth takes this 
as the defining characteristic of an agent because of action’s fundamental nature as the 
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subject matter of morality, and because it is only possible to address precepts of morality to a 
being who is capable of such action.
76
  
  
Voluntariness entails that the agent has control over his actions in that he has an unforced 
choice as to how to act.
77
 For such choice to be fully real the agent must have knowledge of 
the circumstances relevant to his choice of action,
78
 including the likely effects and outcomes 
of his action.
79
 This voluntariness has both positive and negative elements,
80
 the capacity for 
the possession of which is necessary to be an agent and the respect for which is necessary for 
that agency to have fulfilment. In negative terms agents’ actions must be free from ‘direct 
compulsion...by someone or something external to the person’81 or internal causes ‘such as 
reflexes, ignorance or disease.’82 Similarly, agents must not be subject to indirect compulsion 
whereby the coercion of another forces an agent into a particular choice.
83
 The positive 
element of voluntariness is the requirement that a person should be able to control their 
behaviour by their ‘own unforced and informed choice.’84 
 
Purposiveness is defined as the fact ‘that the agent acts for some end or purpose that 
constitutes his reason for acting, this purpose may consist in the action itself or in something 
to be achieved by the action.’85 These purposes can range from the long term and diffuse to 
the immediate and specific.
86
 As agents are not always successful in achieving their purposes, 
the purposiveness which is a constituent part of what it is to be an agent is conative not 
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achievemental,
87
 it can be said to be achievemental only in the general sense that it is to 
achieve their purposes that an agent acts and undertakes conative action.
88
  
 
The practical connection between voluntariness and purposiveness, the two generic features 
of agency which are constitutive of action, is that the free choice of action that constitutes 
voluntariness is directed by an agent’s purposes, whether it is merely the pursuit of the action 
itself or some other purpose.
89
 As both the generic features of agency are by definition 
necessary parts of what it is to be an agent, if an agent is a being who pursues particular 
purposes, then an agent must therefore also see them both as good in the sense that they are 
essential if the agent has the purpose of maintaining or exercising his agency.
90
 Without 
voluntariness an agent would be incapable of the action necessary to achieve those things he 
regards as good and therefore he must see the possession of voluntariness as instrumentally 
good to that end.
91
 Similarly, by virtue of the fact of seeing some specific purpose as good, 
the generic purposiveness that makes such desire possible must consequently also be seen as 
instrumentally good by an agent.
92
 
 
This premise of agency encompasses the ‘prospective’ purposive agent, a being ‘who has 
desires and purposes even when he is not currently acting’,93 for example one who is asleep.94 
This definition of an agent, by being tied to the factual characteristics of action as ‘the 
voluntary pursuit of purposes’,95 forms the non-question begging cornerstone of Gewirth’s 
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moral theory.
96
 It is from this that the answers to the authoritative and substantive questions 
are derived. To do this, to this conception of agency Gewirth applies the dialectically 
necessary method of reasoning which asks what statements, assumptions and claims an agent 
must – objectively and rationally – logically make from his position as an agent who desires 
to achieve his purposes,
97
 and what judgements and claims they can be shown to 
subsequently imply.
98
 This approach of dialectical enquiry is thus consistent with Habermas’s 
contention that that if a proposition is to be said to be true it must be able to withstand ‘all 
attempts to refute it under the demanding conditions of rational discourse.’99 
 
The first stage under this method is the recognition that, by acting to attempt to achieve a 
purpose, an agent must think that his purpose is good.
100
  This must be the case, for if an 
agent did not value his purpose he would not act in order to achieve it.
101
 It is this valuing by 
the agent ‘according to whatever criteria lead him to try to achieve his purpose’102 which 
makes the purpose at least an instrumental ‘good’ from the agent’s perspective.103 
 
From the dialectical necessity of an agent’s recognition of his purposes as good, such an 
agent must a fortiori also think that the generic features that characterise the actions 
necessary to achieve any of his purposes are good.
104
 These ‘general abilities [of an agent] to 
pursue, retain, and expand’105 their purposes are in this way instrumentally good, but not 
intrinsically good, because they only have value by their relationship to the purposes an agent 
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values.
106
 Thus, these features of action and consequent necessary abilities of an agent         
constitute the ‘generic goods’107 of agency. 
 
These generic goods, which must logically be acknowledged by an agent, are the 
characteristics of ‘freedom’ and ‘well-being.’108 The former is the voluntariness that is 
necessary to act for any purpose;
109
 an agent’s ability to control ‘each of his particular 
behaviours by his unforced choice and…his longer-range ability to exercise such control’110 
with the knowledge of the circumstances relevant to their choices.
111
 This freedom can be 
further defined into two elements. The first is particular freedom or occurrent freedom, which 
is limited where a particular action is prevented; this may not prevent an agent from 
achieving all their purposes but it can prevent an agent from achieving whatever purpose they 
regard as good.
112
 The second element is long-range freedom or dispositional freedom which 
makes all or most purposive action possible, it is affected by interferences such as 
imprisonment and slavery
113
 and ‘is necessary in order to pursue or achieve any purpose at 
all’.114 
 
In addition to the generic need for freedom, as a being who deems their purposes to be good 
an agent must also instrumentally value their ‘generic purposiveness as a necessary good.’115 
Well-being is thus composed of the capacities, abilities, and conditions for action
116
 which 
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enable an agent ‘to act with some hope of fulfilling in general the purposes of their action.’117 
Under the dialectically necessary method, from the agent’s perspective, well-being in the 
form of an agent’s generic purposiveness can be seen to be composed of three kinds of goods: 
basic, non-subtractive, and additive.
118
 
 
The basic goods are those an agent regards as ‘basic aspects of his well-being that are the 
proximate necessary preconditions of his performance of any and all of his actions.’119 These 
are the goods generically necessary for ‘any agent’s purposive actions’.120 In more 
substantive terms they include ‘physical and psychological dispositions ranging from life and 
physical integrity…to mental equilibrium and a feeling of confidence as to the general 
possibility of attaining one's goals.’121 
 
An agent’s non-subtractive goods ‘consist in his retaining and not losing whatever he already 
has that he regards as good’,122 so that his capacity for action and his level of purpose 
fulfilment is maintained.
123
 This necessarily encompasses the retention of the basic goods, but 
extends to whatever the agent had before acting and regards as a necessary good for the 
achievement of his purposes.
124
 Conversely, for an agent, an additive good is the fulfilment of 
their generic purposiveness that results from the attainment of the goal or objective for which 
the agent acts.
125
 Thus, Gewirth observes that ‘[t]he particular contents of non-subtractive and 
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additive goods are relative both to each person’s status quo regarding his possession of goods 
and to what he views as goods.’126 
 
In avoidance of contradiction, and because of the nature of purposive agency from which 
they derive, the three elements of well-being should be viewed ‘generically-dispositionally’, 
and recognised as consisting of ‘the general conditions and abilities required for fulfilling 
any…particular purposes’127 in a successful manner.128 This approach avoids the 
contradictions that might occur if the three elements were viewed as ‘particular-occurrent’ 
goods necessary to perform specific actions rather than for purposive action generally. For 
example, a specific agent’s decision to smoke cigarettes is contrary to their well-being in so 
far as it harms their health, however, it is consistent with their generically dispositional well-
being if by their own purposive action they choose to smoke the cigarette.
129
 
 
Within the three elements of well-being there is a hierarchy which is ‘determined by the 
degree of their indispensability for purposive action.’130 At the pinnacle are the basic 
capabilities for action protected by the basic goods, the most necessary without which an 
agent would be unable to act at all or only in a very restricted way.
131
 Amongst the basic 
goods there is a further hierarchy, ‘headed by life and then including various other physical 
and mental goods, some more indispensable than others for action and purpose fulfilment.’132 
Of the other two forms of well-being non-subtractive goods are higher than additive goods 
‘because to be able to retain the goods one has is usually a necessary condition of being able 
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to increase one’s stock of goods.’133 Although both non-subtractive goods and additive goods 
increase the likelihood of successful purposive action, to lose the capacity for action one 
already has necessarily causes a greater reduction in the capacity for purposive action than a 
failure to increase one’s ability to act. 
 
It is apparent that that well-being is primarily concerned with the protection of the generic 
feature of purposiveness because the abilities and conditions it encompasses are relevant to 
the pursuit of purposes.
134
 Conversely, freedom protects voluntariness because it prohibits 
interference with a person’s control of their behaviour.135 The differences between 
voluntariness and purposiveness thus make the generic needs of freedom and well-being 
conceptually distinct.
136
 The two can, however, be seen in their application to overlap to 
some extent and the distinction between them can be criticised as unnecessary: freedom can 
be seen as part of what is necessary for an agent to have well-being in that it is necessary to 
exercise the purposive feature of agency because it is required to pursue goals.
137
 
Additionally, the same criteria of relative necessity for purposive action applies to the 
determination of the hierarchical weight of the generic goods of well-being as to the 
assessment of the weight to be attributed a particular manifestation of freedom; the greater 
the interference with freedom, the greater the weight the competing generic good must have 
to justify the interference.
138
 However, the two classes of goods are conceptually 
distinguishable by the different features of action they derive from, and it is submitted that 
treating them as such helps to give clarity to the nature of generic needs of an agent and their 
application. 
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It is from purposive agency, and from this first step of the acknowledgement of the 
instrumental necessity of the generic goods for purposive action by agents on pain of 
contradicting that agency, that it is argued in the second stage of the dialectically necessary 
argument to the PGC that agents must rationally recognise that they possess rights to the 
generic goods. Gewirth concedes that the fact that the possession of the generic goods of 
agency is deemed desirable or good by an agent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
to give rise to a right to it.
139
 If this were the case there would be a proliferation of rights,
140
 
to the extent that they would become worthless as they would arise from any individual 
whim. Instead, whether something that appears to an agent to be good entails a right to that 
good depends on whether the fact of goodness or some superior authority determines what 
rights an agent should be deemed to possess.
141
  
 
With freedom and well-being it is not a mere desire or inclination which an agent feels to the 
possession of these that gives rise to a claim of a right to them; it is the vital necessity of 
these two characteristics to being a purposive agent. As a purposive agent who necessarily 
thinks his purposes are good, and therefore recognises that his freedom and well-being are 
good as necessary conditions if he is to act to achieve his purposes, the agent must therefore, 
dialectically necessarily on pain of contradicting his agency, take the view that he has rights 
to the generic goods if he is to be a purposive agent.
142
 An agent must view his need for 
freedom and well-being as a rights claim and see himself as having rights to them because, 
constant with the Hohfeldian definition of a claim right with which an interpretation of the 
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Convention rights must ultimately fit,
143
 the needs of freedom and well-being viewed in this 
way are a claim by the agent that others ought not to interfere with their having the goods in 
question.
144
 That an agent must claim these as rights is the case because, for an agent to 
believe that it is generally permissible for another to interfere with his freedom and well-
being, would be to contradict that these are necessary for their agency. 
 
That the possession of the generic rights by a purposive agent can be shown to the 
dialectically necessary in this way answers the substantive question of moral theory in setting 
out the specific rights claimed by agents. However, for a fully reasoned answer to the 
distributive and authoritative questions, it is necessary to show that the generic rights bind an 
agent in relation to their treatment of others; if a principle is to be a moral one it must be 
other regarding.
145
  
 
If the dialectically necessary argument were to stop at this point, Richard Hare and Edward 
Bond would be fatally correct in their observation that, although it can be dialectically 
necessarily shown that an agent must claim that others ought not to interfere with his generic 
goods and thus claim to have generic rights, the second stage argument does not show why 
other agents must accept that they are bound by these claims and thus to act in accordance 
with another’s freedom and well-being.146 Thus these critics argue that the second stage is 
flawed by not proving why agents should have regard to others’ interests and thus states no 
moral obligations.
147
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However, although what Hare and Bond say is true, Gewirth does not infact claim the second 
stage requires the recognition of such moral duties by other agents.
148
 Rather, the rights and 
duties claimed in the second stage are only prudential in nature, in that they are only 
necessarily claimed by, and must be recognised from, the perspective of the agent to whose 
reasoning the dialectically necessary method is applied.
149
 At this stage, no reasons are 
intended to be given why other agents must recognise another agent’s generic rights, and thus 
the rights and consequent duties claimed are not at this stage argued by Gewirth to be moral. 
The prudential nature of these rights does not prevent their claims and conclusions being 
logically sound, even though at this stage other agents need not recognise their claims. As 
Beyleveld notes, a claim and conclusion can be logically valid even if the claims are not 
accepted by a person they claim to apply to,
150
 for example, the law stating that cars on 
British roads should be driven on the left, and drivers have a consequent duty to do so, 
applies to a car driven by a holidaying continental anarchist who declaims state law and 
chooses to drive on the right. 
 
From this second stage, just as through dialectic reasoning an agent must prudentially 
recognise themselves as possessing the generic rights, or else contradict their agency and its 
requirements, the transition to the statement of a moral principle concerning the recognition 
of the rights of others, and setting out the consequent limits on treatment of others, can be 
achieved though the continued application of the dialectically necessary method. The basis of 
such a principle, because of the merely prudential nature of the second stage, must 
necessarily be sufficient in itself to justify the claim to the norms of action such as rights and 
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their correlative obligations protected by the principle,
151
 and thereby answer the authoritative 
question of morality.
152
 Such a basis will also contain a ‘description or descriptive 
characteristic’ of the person protected by the moral principle153 and to which the protection of 
the moral principle attaches,
154
 thus also providing an answer to the distributive question of 
moral theory. 
 
The piece of dialectical reasoning, which forms the third and final stage in the argument by 
which a moral principle of the PGC is derived from such a characteristic, is the ‘formal 
principle of universalisability’.155 Under this rule of logic, once a person claims to have rights 
only because they possess a particular characteristic, as occurs in stage two with the generic 
rights being prudentially derived from the needs of agency , they must necessarily also 
recognise that any other being who also possesses that characteristic must also have the rights 
that characteristic gives rise to.
156
 It would be contradictory for a person to claim that the 
rights they have are not universalised in this way because, if they were to deny that another 
being with the same characteristics which gives the former person rights has those rights, 
then they would be contradicting their view that the characteristic they have as a rights holder 
is sufficient to possess the rights.
157
  
 
However, the principle of universalisability is only formal; it has no substantive content to 
determine the nature of the rights that are universalised, moral content is given to the moral 
principle by the characteristics which are universalised as the basis of rights.
158
 Thus, the 
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question of what characteristic is both necessary and sufficient to enable a person to claim to 
have rights takes on a crucial character.
159
 In his ‘argument for the sufficiency of agency’ 
(ASA)
 
Gewirth shows that this fundamental characteristic is the purposive agency, which was 
shown in the second stage of the dialectically necessary argument to form the basis of an 
agent’s prudential claim to have rights to the generic features of action.160 
 
As established in the second stage of Gewirth’s argument, an agent must prudentially think 
on pain of self-contradiction that that he has generic rights by virtue of his agency, because of 
the necessity of rights to freedom and well-being to being a purposive agent.
161
 From the 
perspective of an agent, freedom and well-being are ‘the most general and proximate 
necessary conditions’ 162 for the pursuit of his purposes to be possible or stand a chance of 
success.
163
 As a consequence of this necessity, an agent must think that he ought to pursue, 
and have, these generic conditions of agency, to avoid contradicting that he is an agent by 
implicitly denying that he values his purposes for which the generic goods are necessary.
164
 
This belief by an agent that he ought have freedom and well-being was shown logically
165
 to 
entail that an agent must necessarily think that he has a right to freedom and well-being 
which imposes a duty on others to refrain from interfering with his possession of the generic 
goods so that he can pursue his purposes.
166
 However, if an agent were to state that he did not 
have these generic rights, because he lacked some characteristic other than his agency, he 
would in effect be arguing that he does not need freedom and well-being to pursue his 
purposes. But, as freedom and well-being are essential to the pursuit of any purpose, he 
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would also logically be denying that he had purposes and that would be to contradict his 
agency, of which purposiveness is the identifying feature.
167
 
 
The consequence of the ASA is that, because it can be established through it that a purposive 
agent must, on pain of contradiction, prudentially claims in stage two of the argument to have 
the generic rights only because of his agency,
168
 the application of the principle of 
universalisability entails that an agent must accept that all ‘agents who have purposes they 
want to fulfil have the rights of freedom and well-being.’169 An agent cannot deny this logic 
without contradicting that his agency is the necessary and sufficient reason for his possession 
of the generic rights and consequently contradictorily denying his own agency.
170
 
 
The practical application of this logic is that when acting in a way that will affect another 
agent, what Gewirth calls a transactional relationship,
171
 an agent must recognise that the 
agents that are recipients of his actions also have the generic rights to freedom and well-
being.
172
 This in turn entails that ‘every agent logically must acknowledge certain generic 
obligations’173 deriving from the rights of other agents. These obligations Gewirth expresses 
in the form of the precept addressed to all agents which he calls the ‘Principle of Generic 
Consistency’ and which requires agents to ‘act in accord with the generic rights of your 
recipients as well as of yourself.’174 This is the substantive core of Gewirth’s moral theory.175 
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The PGC is a moral principle, not a merely a prudential self-regarding statement,
176
 because 
it requires an agent to have regard to the interests of persons other than himself.
177
 Bond and 
Hare have objected to this conclusion on the grounds that it involves the derivation of a moral 
rule, that agents ought to take account of the generic rights of other agents, from the non-
moral prudential premise of the claiming of generic rights.
178
 They argue that it is only 
logically possible to derive a recognition of moral rights for other agents by universalising the 
claim of rights in the second stage if that claim is itself a moral claim.
179
 Thus Hare claims 
that stage three of the argument can only require a prudential recognition by an agent, that 
other agents must prudentially claim that they ought to pursue their freedom and well-being, 
not a moral recognition of their rights.
180
 Bond similarly concludes that only prudential (ie. 
not moral) general principles can be derived from prudential singular prescriptions.
181
 
 
However, Hare in reaching his conclusion appears to misapply the principle of 
universalisability to an agent’s stage two claim to need freedom and well-being rather than, 
as Gewirth applies it, to the agents prudential claim to have the generic rights with which 
others must not interfere.
182
 However, even if the principle of universalisability is applied to 
the prudential claim of the rights as Bond recognises it as applying, Beyleveld argues that it 
does not entail that only a prudential recognition that other agents will prudentially claim the  
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generic rights or be prudentially recognised as have the generic rights can be the resulting 
conclusion.
183
  
 
This mistaken conclusion is the product of a mistaken application of the principle of 
universalisability, from the external perspective of considering that other agents must 
prudentially claim the generic rights, not from the internal perspective of the agent making 
dialectically necessary claims about his own agency.
184
 When applied in this dialectical 
manner, it is a valid inference that, just as an agent must think that as he has the generic rights 
because he is an agent, he must also from his perspective think that other agents have these 
generic rights because they are also agents.
185
 Thus, a moral conclusion as to the treatment of 
those other agents must be accepted by an agent from his prudential premise. This factual 
premise is non-question begging because the concept of agency and the conclusions drawn 
from it at the second stage are dialectically necessary premises, and in being prudential it 
does not claim to be a moral premise itself requiring an agent to recognise others’ rights.186 
The necessary recognition of moral obligations by an agent follows subsequently from the 
application of the principle of universalisability to this premise.
187
  
 
That the PGC becomes a moral principle at the point ‘where, through the principle of 
universalisability, the agent logically must acknowledge that the generic rights he claims for 
himself are also held by all prospective purposive agents’188 entails that the PGC is thus an 
‘egalitarian universalist moral principle’.189 This is so because it requires an equal 
distribution of the generic rights necessary for action to all agents. This particularly is 
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significant if, as argued below, it is to form a principle which fits with the fundamental 
features of the ECHR, and can therefore be used to interpret it. 
 
Alternate Arguments to the PGC 
As just noted, the step from the possession of purposive agency, to the dialectical necessity of 
such an agent claiming the generic rights, has been criticised for its imposition of duties on 
others as a correlative effect of the claim of rights to freedom and well-being by an agent. 
This recognition that the ‘is’ of agency involves a recognition of a prudential ‘ought’ claim as 
a necessary part of that agency – the recognition of the necessity of freedom and well-being 
entailing the recognition that this need implies a prudential claim of rights which protect their 
possession – is a statement of prudential obligations on others. Within the dialectically 
necessary argument for the PGC it precedes the principle of universality and the ASA which 
seek to justify the imposition of such moral obligations on all agents using dialectically 
necessarily reasoning from that prudential ought which is an implicit part of agency.
190
 
 
An additional criticism that might be brought against this claim of the generic rights from the 
perspective of a singular purposive agent, at the second stage of the argument, is that it 
assumes the moral point of view by assuming, without dialectically necessary justification, 
that agents ought to take account of the interests of others in deciding how to act and not 
merely act in their own self-interest,
191
 and that therefore others agents owe duties to respect 
the generic rights an agent must claim they have. Kant makes this assumption in The 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and his Critique of Practical Reason,
192
 
attempting to determine what the metaphysics of morals is after assuming that rational beings 
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have an inherent ‘[r]espect for the moral law’193 as part of being a person with a capacity for 
reason.
194
 This respect is said to arise from the desire of such persons to be free from the 
influence of their inclinations upon their actions, to have ‘a life independent of animality’195 
and thereby see themselves as possessing value.
196
 Kant thus assumes that because of, and as 
part of, this possession of reason individuals will act so as to take account of the effect of 
their actions on others.
197
  
 
This criticism of Gewirth’s theory is, however, premature. As a whole, the three stage 
argument to the PGC does not involve an assumption of the moral point of view because it 
justifies the generic rights as moral rights by showing – which Kant does not – why regard 
dialectically necessarily must be had to the interests of others.
198
 It does so using the 
arguments of universality and the sufficiency of agency.  
 
Additionally, this criticism is unfounded because, as argued in the previous section, the 
dialectical necessity of the claiming of the generic rights by an agent at this stage of the 
argument to the PGC, prior to the arguments of universality and the sufficiency of agency, 
does not, in fact, seek to state obligations that purposive agents must recognise themselves as 
bearing as agents to other agents. Instead any obligations at this stage are merely the prima 
facie consequences of the prudential rights claimed.
199
 Although these rights claimed are 
‘other-referring or -directed’200 they are not yet dialectically necessarily ‘other-directing.’201 
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Rather, as part of the dialectically necessary argument which proceeds from the perspective 
of a purposive agent, this second stage of the argument for the PGC only involves the 
recognition that such a purposive agent must logically think of himself
202
 as having the 
generic rights – and think of others as having obligations – in a prudential internal manner.203 
This is the case because, as noted above,
204
 from this position it would be incompatible with 
his agency for such an agent not to believe that others should not interfere with his freedom 
and well-being, and should assist him to possess these goods, because of the essential nature 
of these generic goods to his existence as a purposive agent.   
 
However, even if this criticism of this second stage were not premature, it is itself flawed in 
that this criticism itself assumes the moral perspective. By criticising the imposition of duties 
on others, it logically assumes that the status of those others must be taken into account in 
acting, implicitly arguing that others have a status which requires that duties not be imposed 
upon them and itself assuming the moral point of view. If, however, the moral point of view 
is presumed in this way then there is no need for the third stage of the argument for the PGC, 
as the recognition of generic rights flows naturally from the recognition of freedom and well-
being as the necessary characteristics of agency. If it is accepted contingently in this way – as 
opposed to being proved by the dialectically necessary method though the arguments of 
universality and the sufficiency of agency that form the third stage of the argument of the 
PGC – that agents should take account of others’ needs, then all agents must act in 
accordance with the generic rights of all other agents and this together with the agent’s 
recognition of their own generic needs establishes the PGC. 
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Another way in which the PGC can be justified as binding without the need for an acceptance 
of Gewirth’s arguments, beyond the first stage of recognising agency as characterised by 
purposive action, is to apply to this premise the basic morality of the rule of impartiality, 
sometimes known as the golden rule. This specific moral point of view states that we should 
‘treat others only as we consent to being treated in the same situation’.205 It requires an agent 
be impartial between their treatment of their own interests and those of another, treating 
another’s interests although they were his own.206 
 
The golden rule in itself is not a dialectically necessary principle deriving from the possession 
of a particular characteristic, merely being an agent does not require its acceptance.
207
 
Substantively, the difference between the PGC and the rule of impartiality is that, whereas the 
former has a necessary and definite content composed of the generic needs and consequent 
rights, the Golden Rule is completely ‘open and indeterminate’,208 its content is contingently 
derived from the interests to which it is applied and therefore is not dialectically necessarily 
determined. The PGC requires action in accordance with one’s own and others’ generic rights 
and interests, but the golden rule has no such tangible content.  
 
However, because of its contingent content, if the rule of impartiality is applied to the 
conception of a purposive agent whose definition was shown to be dialectically necessary in 
stage one of the argument to the PGC, even though it is not dialectically necessary that to be 
so applied,
209
 it can be given a content by purposive agency which ultimately entails the 
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acceptance of the PGC.
210
 Agents, as defined in stage one of the dialectically necessary 
argument, view their freedom and well-being as instrumental generic goods necessary for 
purposive action. If, to this agency, an assumption of impartiality is applied, then ‘on pain of 
contradicting this impartiality (or denying that he is an agent)’211 an agent must hold that he 
categorically ought to act in accordance with the generic interests of freedom and well-being 
of other agents, unless those other agents are willing to allow damage to those interests.
212
 
Thus, this contingently accepted obligation of impartiality, by requiring an agent treat other 
agents’ interests in this way, amounts to an acceptance of a duty to respect other agents’ 
generic goods in accordance with the other agents’ will, which in turn is an acceptance that 
other agents have the generic rights to have their freedom and well-being respected.
213
 This 
recognition of the generic rights of all agents is a dialectical acceptance of the PGC.
214
 
Crucially however, as the acceptance of the golden rule of impartiality is dialectically 
contingent, unlike the second and third stages of the dialectically necessary argument to the 
PGC, an agent does not contradict his agency by refusing to make this assumption and 
thereby avoid the PGC based upon it.
215
  
 
However, a form of this contingent acceptance of the rule of impartiality can be seen to be 
contained within the foundational statements of the post-WWII human rights era found 
within the UDHR.
216
 The preamble recognises that all humans have ‘inherent dignity 
and…equal and inalienable rights’, the second sentence of Article 1 states that all human 
beings ‘are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood’ and Article 2 proclaims ‘[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and 
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freedoms…[of the UDHR]…without distinction of any kind’. Together, these provisions can 
be read as collectively claiming that ‘all human agents categorically ought to be treated equal 
in dignity and rights’.217 Thus, the declaration shows an acceptance by the creators of the 
UDHR, and thus also by rights documents based upon it such as the ECHR, that regard must 
be equally had to the rights of others. This regard can itself be coherently read to embody a 
commitment to being impartial in the treatment of the rights of all individuals.
218
 
 
However, as the above provisions of the UDHR appear specifically concerned with the rights 
it states, it is arguable that this commitment to impartiality only applies in relation to those 
rights and is not a statement of a general acceptance of the moral rule of impartiality in 
relation to all interests.
219
 Nonetheless, whichever position is taken on the extent of this 
commitment to impartiality, it is possible to dialectically derive from the contingent 
acceptance of the UDHR an acceptance of the PGC.
220
 
 
If the commitment to impartiality is interpreted as only relating to the rights contained within 
the UDHR, the acceptance of the Declaration and its commitment to impartiality contingently 
leads to the acceptance of the PGC by virtue of the nature of human rights. To hold that 
agents who are human have the human rights stated in the Declaration is to implicitly accept 
that ‘human agents have human rights to the generic conditions of agency’.221 Because 
‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and freedom and well-being are needed so that an agent can 
exercise any right to act, no matter what human rights and consequent obligations UDHR 
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declares, the existence and respect for human rights to these generic conditions of agency is 
necessarily implied.
222
  
 
However, under this argument the presupposition by the UDHR of the generic rights does not 
mean that all the substantive rights stated in the UDHR are necessarily generic rights 
consistent with the PGC. For instance, as argued in detail below, because of the nature of 
purposive agency the generic rights are rights under the will conception,
223
 and although 
presupposed by the UDHR and therefore also the ECHR which is based upon it, these 
systems of rights were not drafted to reflect a specific philosophical conception of rights, 
although to be valid under the PGC their interpretation must be consistent with them.
224
  
 
If, instead, the Declaration’s commitment to equality of respect for rights and dignity is 
interpreted as a commitment to a general moral rule of complete impartiality then, if 
contingently applied in conjunction with the dialectically necessary conception of agency, the 
acceptance of the PGC will also be the dialectical consequence.
225
 An attitude of complete 
impartiality towards the generic needs of another agent for generic goods, entails that an 
agent must consider himself to owe a duty to respect the other agent’s generic goods in 
accordance with their will, by doing so he will thus treat them as possessors of rights to 
freedom and well-being. Such impartiality also logically entails that an agent must also see 
himself as possessing the generic rights, to the extent that he too has the same interests in 
freedom and well-being and will have the same attitude as to their treatment.
226
 Thus, it ‘[i]t 
follows, on pain of denying that all human beings are equal in dignity and inalienable rights, 
that it is dialectically necessary for those who [contingently] accept and implement the 
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UDHR to consider that all permissible action must be consistent with the requirements of the 
PGC.’227 
 
Central to these alternate impartiality arguments, from the UDHR to the PGC, is the 
application of the golden rule to the concept of an agent stated in stage one of the 
dialectically necessary argument to the PGC. For impartiality and purposive agency to be so 
linked it must be the case that the conception of persons deemed to be protected under the 
UDHR’s requirement of impartiality does not conflict with the concept of agency under the 
PGC. That this is so was, in part, argued to be the case above if the impartiality stated in the 
UDHR is concerned with the rights specifically contained within the Declaration, in that 
those rights presuppose that those possessing the rights have the capacity for freedom and 
well-being that characterise agency in order to exercise them. 
 
However, on its face the description in Article 1 of ‘human beings…endowed with reason’ 
does appear to conflict with agency from which the PGC derives, because not all humans are 
agents and even humans who are not ostensibly agents can have some protection under the 
PGC.
228
 This conflict can, however, be avoided once it is recognised that subsequent 
international rights documents, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Mentally 
Retarded Persons 1971, have recognised that persons lacking in the capacity for rational 
thought can be said to have human rights.
229
 Beyleveld thus argues that, in order to achieve 
the necessary consistency, Article 1 should be reinterpreted to say that ‘[a]ll human beings 
viewed in terms of the capacities of the human species are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. The Human Species is endowed with reason and conscience, and all human beings so 
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endowed should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’230 Similarly, he 
necessarily argues that Article 2 of the UDHR should be interpreted as recognising the rights 
of individuals ‘to the extent that they are capable of exercising them.’231 Additionally if, as 
argued below,
232
 the characteristic of inherent dignity to which these human rights are 
inalienably attached in rights treaties is interpreted as purposive agency, then the requirement 
of equal respect for this dignity in Article 1 can be seen to similarly allow and entail the 
contingent acceptance of the PGC. 
 
These alternative arguments from the UDHR have an advantage in deriving the PGC from 
more tangible and legal norms. No country in the UN General Assembly dissented from the 
ratification of the UDHR
233
 and the major UN conventions such as the ICCPR, as well as 
regional rights documents including the ECHR and the American Convention on Human 
Rights, explicitly recognise its foundational nature. With such general acceptance, the 
arguments from it to the PGC must also have similarly wide adherence. As noted above, the 
implication of the argument is that those who agree to the Declaration must accept that its 
commitment to impartiality entails that they must act in accordance with the requirements of 
the generic rights, or else disavow their acceptance of the UDHR or incoherently contradict 
the dialectically necessary definition of agency established above.
234
 With this basis, even if 
the criticisms of stage two or three of the dialectically necessary method are accepted, these 
alternate arguments enable the acceptance of the PGC to be argued for from the simple 
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definition of agency, which has been argued to be a factual premise whose acceptance by 
agents has been argued to be a dialectically necessity.
235
 
 
However, the strength of these impartiality bases for the PGC in the Declaration’s wide 
acceptance is also the latent weakness of these alternate arguments. Unlike the three stage 
dialectically necessary argument, the arguments from impartiality and especially the 
assumption of the moral point of view generally make the adoption of the PGC dialectically 
contingent rather than dialectically necessary. Of these, the applications of the impartiality 
rule as a consequence of the contingent arguments from the UDHR are stronger, in that to 
deny them involves either rejecting the UDHR or self-contradiction. The contingent 
arguments from an acceptance moral point of view generally, or simple acceptance of the 
golden rule, are however comparatively weaker because there is no such clear factual basis 
showing their acceptance, other than their abstract general presence in legal systems 
generally, and their use in other moral and theological standards.
236
 
 
In contrast to these, the three stage argument for the PGC provides a logically compelling 
justification of the PGC and which justifies regard to the interests of others. It shows, without 
any leaps of contingent acceptance, that it is dialectically necessary that regard must be had 
by agents to the generic rights others, on pain of an agent contradicting his own agency. 
 
Compatibility with the Convention 
Faced with the three fundamental features of Convention rights with which the PGC must fit 
if it is to be properly said to apply as means for their interpretation, rather than as a critique 
favouring the redrafting of the Convention, it is submitted that the PGC can be validly 
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applied in this way. It is apparent that its substantive tenets are shared with the three 
characteristics the Convention rights which have been described above. 
 
Universality of Rights 
The universality which characterises the PGC and which is possessed by the generic rights 
fits the similarly universal nature that is a fundamental feature of the Convention rights and 
human rights more generally. As noted above, under the PGC the generic rights are held by 
any being with purposive agency regardless of any other characteristic they might have, in 
the way that human rights are held by humans regardless of other personal characteristics. 
This universal possession of the generic rights similarly mirrors the claim by human rights 
treaties to give recognition
237
 to rights that are possessed prior to the enactment of the treaty, 
and their explicit protection or respect by the substantive laws of a state. The Convention 
rights, like the generic rights, must be recognised as held independent of their national legal 
recognition. 
 
The generic rights to freedom and well-being are universal human rights, insofar as they are 
rights ‘all humans have as human agents’.238 Due to their necessity for all purposive action, 
they can be seen to underlie the substantive Convention rights which protect purposive 
agency as more specific manifestations of the generic rights to freedom and well-being.
239
 It 
should, however, be reiterated that under the argument for the PGC it is not the fact of being 
human that gives rise to the generic rights, conversely the Convention and the HRA both 
explicitly talk in terms of humans’ rights. In the next chapter240 it will be explained that this 
apparent inconsistency between the two does not mean that the PGC is unable to provide 
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guidance on the Convention rights of humans who are not also purposive agents; although not 
possessors of the generic rights, they are not without protection under the PGC. 
 
Inherently and Inalienably Deontological   
The foundation and means by which the PGC is derived brings it within the deontological 
genus of the fourfold taxonomy of moral bases for rights, the others being theories of virtue 
ethics, communitarian theories and utilitarian theories. Under this approach rights derive 
from inherent characteristics possessed by some beings, in the case of the generic rights this 
is purposive agency.
241
 This characteristic is inherent in that it is not derived from any 
external calculation, it is rather a factual premise.
242
 As shown by dialectically necessary 
argument,
243
 it is a constituent part of being a purposive agent that such a being must value 
the purposes that they have, and it is from this inherent purposiveness that the generic rights 
derive. 
 
As with Dworkin’s conception of rights, with the generic rights ‘a collective goal is not a 
sufficient justification for denying them [as agents] what they wish…to have or to do, or not 
a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.’244 The possession of 
the generic rights cannot be outweighed and disregarded on the grounds that there is a 
different interest of greater force.
245 
Thus, as a consequence of being a deontological 
conception of rights, the possession of the generic rights is not dependant on calculations of 
general utility such as those found within Bentham’s theory of the moral validity of rights.246 
By virtue of being derived though the dialectical method, the generic rights are inherent to 
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what it is to be a purposive agent; their existence is not dependant on external questions such 
as the amount of good or ill that they cause.
247
 As will be explained in the next chapter, only 
competing rights or interests based in purposive agency can curtail the exercise of a generic 
right and these do not effect the inherent possession of the rights to freedom and wellbeing.  
 
Communitarian moral theories share with deontology some regard to the characteristics 
possessed by individuals in that they claim to give moral recognition to human beings’ social 
nature.
248
 However, the spectrum of conclusions that different Communitarian theorists draw 
from it and their rejection of a basis of rights which does not take into account individual 
membership of communities
249
 distinguishes them from a deontological approach. 
 
At one end of the spectrum of Communitarian rights recognition, theorists, including Daniel 
Bell and Henry Tam, argue that the morals of a community, and therefore the content of the 
rights of its members, should be decided through debate within that community which seeks 
to find accepted and shared morality.
250
 At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that 
membership of a community, together with the capacity for autonomous freedom with which 
the values of the community can be shaped, are the basic needs of individuals which should 
be protected by rights.
251
 This is the approach which can be seen in Amitai Etzioni’s theory 
which rejects the idea that a set of values are good merely because they ‘originate in a 
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community’,252 and argues for community moral values which balance individual needs and 
community needs.
253
  
 
Bell and Tam claim that in practice certain substantive moral values are accepted by a diverse 
range of separate communities. Tam argues that four values
254
 can be shown to be universally 
recognised by different cultures over time and that they ‘provide the moral bonds that that 
bring diverse communities together in the context of a global community.’255 Bell similarly 
argues that ‘[e]very society…has come to accept a bare set of prohibitions…which constitute 
a kind of minimal and universal moral code’256 that can be used to critique a community’s 
morality because it is accepted by all societies.
257
 However, in spite of this claim of a basic 
level of consistency of fundamental laws, at the centre of this form of communitarianism is 
the premise that there are no norms separate from those norms and their related rights 
accepted by a community. Thus, under this moral theory there are no substantive norms 
connected inherently to the person in the manner claimed to exist in the ECHR or found in 
the PGC. 
 
Etzioni’s communitarianism is different in its recognition that, ontologically, individuals have 
the capacity for freedom of action, the ability to choose for themselves their own life goals.
258
 
However, he additionally maintains that we must also recognise that membership of 
communities has the consequence that the values individuals choose for themselves and the 
goals they set are influenced by their community, as well as there being the potential for the 
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individual to influence the values of the community.
 259
  He argues that, through dialogue 
with others in their community, and through the influence of the shared core values their 
community, individuals may be lead to reformulate their goals and values to resemble those 
of their community.
260
 Etzioni thus proposes the recognition of a ‘more complex concept of a 
self, congenitally contextualised within a community,…that accords full status to both 
individuals and their shared union.’261 The product of the values agreed through the dialogue 
form the norms of the society
262
 and the rights and responsibilities of the individual members 
of the society.
 263
 
 
Etzioni, however, maintains that his approach does not allow for majoritarianism.
264
 He, in 
contrast to Bell, argues that the community does not hold to be good a set of group values 
merely because they are held by members of the community generally at the expense of 
minority and individual rights.
265
 Etzioni counters that the basic human needs, possessed by 
all persons and which underlie individual values, are so fundamental that they must be 
respected by all societies for that community to function without the risk of revolution. 
266
 
Etzioni argues that this protection can be seen in practice in rights contained in the United 
States Bill of Rights 1791 such as freedom of speech.
267
 However, although Etzioni 
recognises universal human characteristics in the form of certain human needs in this way, he 
maintains that his theory is communitarian rather than deontological in nature.
268
 He claims 
that theories of universal individual rights under the deontic conception of the individual that 
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‘assume that people are basically benign and rational’269 are inconsistent with the 
communitarian position because such theories do not give account to the social element of 
human nature.
270
 
 
Etzioni’s approach to human rights can be seen as an example of the attempt by the 
communitarian movement to create a theory in opposition to moral theories of liberal 
individualism.
271
 This individualism, called atomism by Charles Taylor, encompasses moral 
theories which have their intellectual history in the concept of the autonomous individual that 
originates in 17
th
 century social contract theory, such as Locke’s,272 which give primacy and 
protection to individuals’ choices without giving moral force to independent conceptions of 
overarching communities, the ‘social dimension of human existence’,273 as distinct from 
concern for the effects such actions may have on other singular individuals.
274
 In this way 
communitarian theory differs from deontology generally, and specifically from the PGC, in 
that it looks beyond what is required by the characteristics of the individual, and takes 
account of the interests of the community defined separately from those of the individual. 
The PGC is derived from a concept of agency whose content of purposiveness and 
voluntariness is dialectically necessary, in a way that the existence of a community and its 
interests are not. Deontological conceptions of rights such as that propounded by Gewirth are 
thus distinct from those of communitarians who reject the possibility of an individual being 
deemed to possess inherent rights external to a conception of community.  
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Although the generic rights are deontological, in that they are derived and enumerated by 
dialectical argument from the inherent characteristics of agency, rather than being recognised 
as product of communitarian societal dialogue or the community dwelling nature of 
individuals, they operate within society and its institutions have a role in their application. 
Agents are necessarily social creatures:
275
 it makes no sense to speak of a right unless there 
are others upon whom duties are imposed, and this is implicit in the claim of rights against 
others to the generic needs of agency in second stage of the argument to the PGC. In light of 
this, it will be argued below that the practical balancing of competing and generic rights and 
interests, and the Convention rights interpreted using them, as distinct from their 
identification and the grounds of their possession, is open to the influence of the debates and 
views within a community. For although the generic rights are derived through dialectical 
reason, their application in society gives a role to societal debate.
276
 Additionally, by virtue of 
the will conception nature of the generic rights to be argued for below,
277
 in only prohibiting 
interference with the generic goods against an agent’s will, the PGC allows for agents to 
come together in a community to agree a set of norms by which they are bound. However, the 
PGC does not allow for agents to be bound by norms to which they do not consent, unless 
they are protecting the generic rights of another and are thus an indirect manifestation of the 
PGC requirements.
278
 In this way the community and its laws can be justified by purposive 
agency and its dialectical requirements, not as constructs independent of it as under the 
communitarian positions. 
 
More broadly, it is clear that if the Convention rights are to effectively pursue the purposes 
for which they were created, their underlying basis cannot be a utilitarian or communitarian 
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moral theory. As noted previously
279
 the ECHR and other post-WWII rights documents were 
intended to protect individuals against the state inhumanities that characterised the Nazi 
regime. If the rights of the Convention are to receive protection against states there must be 
some circumstances when the substantive rights cannot be overridden in favour of a 
perception of the collective or communal good.
280
 
 
Similarly, although the statement in the preamble of the ECHR, which sets out the basis upon 
which the Convention rights were agreed, that the protection of rights and freedoms is the 
foundations the achievement of ‘justice and peace in the world’ could be seen as utilitarian 
goal justifying the Convention rights, other terms mitigate against such an interpretation. The 
preamble of the UDHR,
281
 which paragraph two of the ECHR preamble recognises as the 
basis for the agreement of the Convention, has a consistent focus on the rights of individuals 
and their protection. It emphasises the ‘inherent’ dignity and worth of individuals, the 
importance of freedom to them and the necessity of their protection, all of which indicate a 
basis of the Convention in deontological theory rather than a goal based theory. 
 
Such an interpretation is also supported by the fact that, as noted previously, although 
provisions of the Convention allow the enforcement of most rights to be limited in favour of 
other interests in some cases, this cannot be done to all rights.
282
 This is inconsistent with 
interpreting the Convention rights as having a basis in a goal theory. Additionally, as argued 
previously
283
 and recognised by Dworkin,
284
 the provisions that appear to allow rights to be 
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overridden in the general interests can be convincingly interpreted as in fact weighing the 
rights of different people against each other in a non-goal based manner which looks at the 
importance of a right for each individual. It is thus clear that a basis which fits this feature of 
the Convention rights cannot be found in a communitarian or utilitarian theory. 
 
In contrast, the generic rights are inherently connected to what it is to be a purposive agent, 
just as the possession of Convention rights is stated to be inherent to being human. They are 
likewise inalienable, for no being that claims to be a purposive agent can be such an agent 
without possessing the rights to freedom and wellbeing.
285
 
 
Rights Rather than Duties 
As noted above, deontological theories which support and validate substantive norms, 
including declarations of specific human rights, can be conceptually categorised as either 
theories of rights or duties.
286
 Consistency with the characteristics of the Convention on this 
question, the third fundamental feature of the ECHR, can be seen in the PGC’s position as a 
rights theory. 
 
It is an inherent consequence of the use of the characteristic of purposive agency as the basis 
of a moral theory, that the resulting deontological principle of the PGC is one of rights rather 
than duties. The features of purposive agency and the conclusions it entails conform to the 
characteristics of the rights deontology which the Convention can be interpreted as pre-
supposing. The concept of a purposive agent as one who has purposes they have chosen for 
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themselves as worthy of pursuit
287
 accords with the key concern of rights theories with 
independence and individual choice. As a consequence of this, the norms which form the 
substance of the PGC, the rights freedom and well-being, similarly further the core concern 
of rights theory by seeking to protect the inherent and underlying value of the capacity for 
individual choice.
288
 
 
As described previously, the dialectically necessary argument operates from the perspective 
of the agent and thus necessarily focuses on what they need in order to pursue their chosen 
purposes, rather than upon what duties they owe. Under this perspective ‘[r]ights…are 
demands on the part of agents that the essential prerequisites of their actions at least not be 
interfered with’,289 and these are consequently ‘logically prior to all other[…]’290 entitlements 
because they are necessary for all action.
291
 The dialectically necessary conclusions drawn 
from action thus dictate that only the rights to freedom and well-being are rationally 
necessary, for only these rights are necessarily connected in this way to agency.
292
 Although 
agents may have different personal purposes they wish to act to pursue, only these rights are 
necessary to act for any purpose an agent might have.
293
 Consistent with this perspective of 
the primacy of rights, duties are ‘a logical consequence of the fact that the objects of the 
generic rights are necessary goods’294 and are thus subsequent to the generic rights. In this 
way the argument for the PGC emphasises the protection of individual choice that 
characterises rights theory, and the duties that do arise under it derive from respect for 
purposive agents’ choices rather than deference to a prior, separate, moral code. 
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This role of the fundamental characteristics which form the bias of a deontic theory, in 
shaping the substantive nature of that theory, is clearly apparent when the PGC is contrasted 
with Kant’s argument for the Categorical Imperatives as the constituent substantive 
requirements of morality. Deontological like the PGC, Kant similarly premises his theory on 
the possession of agency defined by the possession of a particular characteristic, a rational 
will. In common with Aristotle, Kant argues that the capacity of mankind for reason is what 
distinguishes him from all other things.
295
 This reason is defined as the capacity of a person 
to determine how he should act, as a result of the understanding it enables, independent of the 
actions that may be suggested by their sensations, what they observe and feel.
296
 However, 
from within this universal basis for morals controlling conduct,
297
 is derived a system of 
duties rather than one of rights.
298
  
 
Kant observes that we must have been given the capacity for reason by nature for a reason 
and he argues that this is the existence of ‘a will that is good, not perhaps as a means to other 
purposes, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary.’299 This capacity for 
reason is argued to be intrinsically good, and that beings with reason thus have absolute 
worth by virtue of their rationality, because it is not an instrumental good designed to enable 
them to achieve some other end
300
 such as happiness.
301
 This inherent freedom of the will is 
the capacity to rationally choose how to act, independent of causes other than our own reason 
which might seek to influence the choice of action, including the capacity to choose whether 
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to act in accordance with laws of behaviour.
302
 This negative sense of freedom from external 
forces and one’s own desires303 is complemented by a positive sense which takes the form of 
the freedom to act in accordance with laws which derive from the very nature of the will 
itself.
304
 In his progressive argument, the transcendental deduction, Kant argues that this 
inherent freedom of the will, from which the Categorical Imperatives derive, must be 
presupposed as ‘a property of the will of all rational beings.’305 This presupposition, he 
argues, follows from the very concept of a rational being as such.
306
 This is the case because 
a rational being, by definition, can act in accordance with reason, and thus has freedom from 
having their actions determined by their impulses.
307
 
 
Although Kant argues that the possession of a rational will gives such a being the capacity to 
choose how to act, this choice is not free in the same way that purposive agents are free to 
choose their purposes under the PGC. It is because the rational will – what he subsequently 
describes as pure reason
308
 – is for Kant the ultimate intrinsic good that he argues in his 
regressive
309
 argument from this premise that it is the ‘metaphysics of morals’,310 the basis 
upon which rests a supreme principle of morality which directs action.
311
 It is because pure 
reason is ‘altogether a priori free from anything empirical’312 that it is able to form an 
impartial basis for deducing morals controlling action.
313
 He adds that, given the pivotal 
position of rationality, if moral laws are to apply to ‘every rational being as such’ they must 
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‘derive…from the universal concept of a rational being as such’.314 Kant argues that without 
such a basis of absolute intrinsic worth, there can be no principle controlling all rational 
action,
315
 for if there is no basis of absolute worth, then all imperatives governing action are 
conditional and contingent on the basis being of sufficient instrumental or relative worth to 
the person choosing how to act.
316
  
 
From this, Kant argues that ‘to have moral worth’317 a motive for action must derive from a 
sense of duty.
318
 If the possession of reason is to be the basis of a morality it must be capable 
of generating a Categorical Imperative which dictates to a person that he ought to act in a 
particular way, regardless of an alternative he may wish to choose by exercise of his will as 
directed by inclinations or other motivations that are not of absolute value, and which thus 
generate merely hypothetical imperatives.
 319
 The need for such a duty arises because the free 
will possessed by rational beings makes it practically possible, although not permissible 
because it would be contrary to reason, for them to choose to act in a way that is inconsistent 
with the requirements of a morality derived from reason.
320
  
 
Kant, in this way, argues that moral action must be governed by duties based in reason for if 
only reason is an absolute good  then only a ‘law’ which determines what reason required of 
us, which states what duties of action reason imposes on us, can be a good we call moral.
321
 
In contrast with the dialectical establishment of the PGC, Kant thus derives a moral code 
from entirely within the reason possessed by rational persons.
322
 Unlike the argument for the 
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PGC, Kant has no regard to the dialectical consequences of being a rational agent that an 
agent must accept by virtue of having such a capacity for choosing how to act,
323
 Gewirthian 
theory in contrast recognises the consequence of agency is the possession of the generic 
needs.
324
  Consequently, Kant’s rational beings perceive their reason alone as circumscribing 
and binding their actions, whereas Gewirthian purposive agents look beyond to what is 
further entailed by the possession of their inherent capacity for purposive action.  
 
In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant makes explicit that his moral theory is one of duties 
rather than rights because of the basis, the fundamental characteristic, from which it is 
drawn.
325
 The ontological basis in reason involves a moral concern for whether an individual 
complies with the dictates of that reason; for Kant, all rational beings have a duty to obey the 
Categorical Imperatives because to deny their force upon them is to contradict that they have 
the capacity for reason which characterises human beings.
326
 The substantive law of morality 
derived by Kant from the basis of reason which is encapsulated within the various 
formulations of the Categorical Imperative
327
 are thus, consistent with their position as the 
requirements of reason, explicitly formed in terms of duties. In contrast, the purposive agency 
that is the basis of the generic rights and ultimately the PGC, leads to a requirement that the 
capacity for purposive choices by agents be protected and furthered.   
 
Kant’s overarching Categorical Imperative of the ‘Universal Law’,328 from which he argues 
‘all imperatives of duty can be derived’,329 requires rational beings with a will accept the duty 
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proposition
330
 that ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my 
maxim should become a universal law.’331 It is, for Kant, respect for the universal law that 
‘constitutes duty’, with its force deriving from the status of reason as good in itself.332 The 
more specific moral laws, the Categorical Imperatives of the Formula of Ends and the 
Kingdom of Ends, which flow from the duty imposed by the universal law, are likewise 
expressed as duties, and likewise flow from reason.
333
 The Formula of Ends seeks to uphold 
reason as the only thing of universal inherent value
334
 by requiring all rational beings
335
 ‘act 
that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at 
the same time as an end, never as a means.’336 This essential precept of Kant’s practical 
morality, rather than being primarily concerned with protecting individual choice and 
independence in the way that a rights theory does, is formally stated to be the ‘supreme 
limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being’337 codifying and 
circumscribing what actions are permissible. The Categorical Imperative of the Kingdom of 
Ends involves the recognition that the duty imposed by the imperative of the Universal Law 
is binding on all rational beings, and thus requires that individuals recognise that as such they 
are subject to the Universal Law and the dictates of reason including the requirement to treat 
themselves and others as ends.
338
 This likewise takes the form of a code binding on all 
rational beings in all their actions which is a characteristic of a duties theory. 
 
The consequence of Kant’s basis for his philosophy is a duty based moral theory which 
involves the creation of a code for action and a focus the determination of whether 
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individuals’ actions comply with that code.339 Under the Categorical Imperatives, beings 
‘experience morality as constraining…mandating what we ought (not) to do’,340 and only 
actions done from duties they state have moral worth.
341
 This has led Roger Sullivan to 
observe that ‘[n]o moral philosopher before Kant had placed so much emphasis on the notion 
of duty, and few concepts have greater prominence in his theory.’342 
 
Although a duties theory, Kant’s theory is capable of forming a basis for rights norms343 such 
as the Convention rights because, as mentioned above, and as recognised by Kant himself,
344
 
duties and rights are correlative connected spheres.
345
 Following from the basis in the duty 
imposed by the Universal Law, a right under this theory is the capacity to put others under an 
obligation in accordance with a Categorical Imperative.
346
 These rights are deontological 
because their basis in the possession of reason entails that they ‘belongs to everyone by 
nature’,347 because reason is the defining characteristic of humanity.348 The rights recognised 
under this approach are ‘the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be 
united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal Law of Freedom.’349 In spite 
of this reference to choice and freedom, they remain rights under a duty conception because 
of the primary position held by duties within the basis in reason to which rights are merely 
correlative. 
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As noted above
350
 the ECHR can be seen to possess elements which support either a rights or 
duties deontological basis. That this is the case is consistent with drafter’s desire to phrase the 
Convention in open textured terms which would maximise the acceptance of its substantive 
norms amongst nations which different political ideologies.
351
 It is, however, submitted that 
whilst at a minimum a rights based deontology is not inconsistent with the substance of the 
ECHR, it is as claimed above
352
 strongly arguable that the Convention itself shares more 
characteristics with a rights deontology than it does with a duty deontology. 
 
The Mirror Principle and the Practical Application of the PGC 
In addition to fitting the fundamental characteristics of human rights protection generally, to 
be legally possible as well as intellectually legitimate, separate from the dialectical force of 
the above arguments, an interpretive approach to the five key questions based in the PGC 
must be consistent with the substantive jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This requirement within 
United Kingdom law is known as the ‘mirror principle’. It is, however, submitted that this 
requirement of consistency does not and should not prevent the domestic courts from basing 
their interpretation of the Convention rights in the PGC. 
 
The Content and Consequences of the Mirror Principle 
The term mirror principle was coined by Jonathon Lewis
353
 to describe the attitude of the 
domestic courts to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in cases where they are called upon to 
interpret and apply the rights incorporated by the HRA. The name of this principle derives 
from the statement by Lord Nicholls that, when the domestic court are adjudicating upon the 
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Convention rights, they must provide a ‘mirror’ within domestic law to requirements of the 
ECHR, as interpreted by relevant ECtHR decisions.
354
  
 
The earliest expressions of the sentiment which has solidified into this principle are to be 
found in the decisions closely following the coming into force of the HRA.
355
 In R 
(Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions Lord Slynn planted the seeds of the principle
356
 by stating that, ‘[i]n the absence of 
some special circumstances,…the court should follow any clear and consistent jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights.’357 This decision was shortly thereafter endorsed by 
Lord Bingham’s claim that the domestic courts would ‘not without good reason depart from 
the principles laid down in a carefully considered judgment of the court sitting as a Grand 
Chamber’.358 
 
These initial foundational statements of position have subsequently been re-enforced and 
developed by several House of Lords decisions. As the decisions in Alconbury and Anderson 
have evolved, the courts have arrived at the current conclusion that, not only must they keep 
in step with ECtHR interpretations of the Convention rights, but also that they must not 
outpace the protection that Strasbourg deems the rights to provide.
359
 Thus, Lord Bingham 
argued two years after Anderson, that ‘[t]he duty of national courts is to keep pace with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.’360 This 
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approach remains the orthodox position
361
 and was reiterated and reinforced subsequently by 
Lord Brown, who suggested that the approach should be one of ‘no less, but certainly no 
more’.362 However, in the recent decision of Sugar v BBC, Lord Walker in his leading 
opinion, recognising recent criticism,
363
 stated obiter that the Supreme Court would welcome 
an opportunity to consider whether to depart from the no more than element of the mirror 
principle.
364
  
 
The immediate consequence of the adoption of the mirror principle has been that the scope, 
the application and the balancing of the Convention rights, when given effect by the domestic 
courts, must match and not exceed that stated by the ECtHR.
365
 In terms of scope, the facts 
and decision in Anderson on the scope of Article 6(1), whether the right to an independent 
tribunal covered the exercise of powers to determine the length of detention for prisoners 
convicted of murder possessed by the Home Secretary,
366
 show the principle being applied in 
the determination of the substantive content of the Convention rights. In Al-Skeini it was held 
that the determination of the territorial applicability of the Convention rights, on the facts 
whether they applied to the actions of British forces in Iraq, was a matter for the ECtHR and 
the domestic courts should follow Strasbourg’s decision.367 Where substantive rights must be 
subject to a proportionality exercise to determine what the Convention requires, as in the case 
of R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School in the context of Article 9, the courts 
have tied themselves to the Strasbourg jurisprudence in assertion and enforcement of 
                                                 
361
 R. Clayton, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: The Human Rights Act and the Impact of Strasbourg Case Law’ [2012] 
P.L. 639, 639 
362
 R (Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [106] 
363
 Lord Irvine, ‘A British Interpretation of the Convention Rights’ (2012) P.L. 237  
364
 BBC v Sugar [2012] UKSC 4, [59] & Lord Mance [113] and R. Clayton, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: The Human 
Rights Act and the Impact of Strasbourg Case Law’ [2012] P.L. 639, 639 
365
 Lewis (n.353), 720 
366
 Anderson (n.358) [13], [15] & [17]-[18] 
367
 Al-Skeini (n.362), [65], [90] & [105]: The ECtHR recently clarified its opinion on the jurisdictional 
applicability of the Convention Rights in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18, [149] 
   
 
221 
 
Convention ‘rights and remedies.’368 In this case, the Lords held that the approach they 
should take to resolving issues of proportionality was that advocated by the ECtHR, not the 
traditional, more procedural, type of scrutiny applied under domestic judicial review.
369
 
However, Lord Bingham has held that the ‘value judgement[s], an[d] evaluation[s]’ which 
are involved in deciding questions of proportionality are for the domestic courts to decide, 
and thus the potential influence of the PGC upon this will be unaffected.
370
  
 
Exceptions to the Mirror Principle 
The breadth of the mirror principle in directing the United Kingdom courts’ decisions on the 
scope of rights, although apparently potentially wide-ranging, can only truly be determined 
by regard to the exceptions to it that the courts have recognised.
371
 These exceptions consist 
of a mixture of practical and constitutional concerns which the courts feel justify them in 
departing from ECtHR jurisprudence.  
 
In practical terms the courts have held that they will only follow ECtHR decisions which are 
‘clear and consistent.’372 Similarly, where an ECtHR decision on the point at issue appears to 
have been made under a misunderstanding of English law,
373
 then the courts feel that it is 
legitimate for them to decline to follow the decision
374
 and suggest to Strasbourg that it think 
again.
375
 In Ghaidan the Court of Appeal argued that such a departure was legitimate because 
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the domestic court were not disagreeing with the ECtHR’s interpretation of the scope of the 
Convention right, merely its application to a particular aspect of British law.
376
 
 
In constitutional terms, the courts have attempted to fit the mirror principle within the various 
facets of the British constitution. Thus, in Ullah it was recognised that it is open to the 
sovereign Parliament to give greater protection via domestic legislation than the ECtHR 
interprets the scope of the Convention rights as requiring.
377
  More broadly, the courts have 
held that if to follow an ECtHR judgement would lead to ‘a conclusion fundamentally at odds 
with the distribution of powers under the British constitution’378 then the courts should not 
follow it.
379
 However, the courts are yet to come across a decision with such an effect.
380
 
 
In recognition of the separation between the legislature enacted rights in the HRA and the 
common law, the courts have also held that it is open to them to develop the common law in a 
way which gives greater protections than that required by the Convention rights as interpreted 
by the ECtHR.
381
 This occurred in Campbell v MGN
382
 where the Law Lords gave protection 
from the journalistic publication of invasive photographs under the common law of 
confidence, prior to the ECtHR finding such protection was required under Article 8.
383
 
Lewis has argued, however, that had there been a contrary ECtHR decision allowing such 
publications, the courts would have been prevented from relying on Article 8 to develop the 
common law in this way.
384
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Although these restrictions are several in number, in practice they do not operate 
frequently.
385
 Of those that explicitly relieve the courts of their self-imposed
386
 duty to mirror 
an ECtHR judgement, the courts have shown reluctance to find that the jurisprudence is not 
clear or that it is at odds with the separation of powers,
387
 and cases where the ECtHR has 
misunderstood United Kingdom law are comparatively few.
388
 The restrictiveness of the 
mirror principle as a result of the limited utility of its exceptions
389
 is compounded by the 
domestic courts’ approach to gaps in the ECtHR’s case law. Where no consideration has been 
given to whether a particular circumstance falls within the scope of a right,
390
 the domestic 
courts are ‘unwilling to step into the vacuum and will await an answer from Strasbourg’391 
unless it is a circumstance in which perceive themselves to be granted a margin of 
appreciation.
392
 
 
Reflecting the PGC 
The applicability of the mirror principle to the determination of the scope or application of 
the Convention rights, to the question of the persons and interests that benefit from the 
protected of the various Articles, presents a prima facie obstacle to an interpretation of the 
rights from the basis of the PGC. As Sir Andrew Morriot V-C implicitly recognised in his 
subsequently reversed Court of Appeal decision,
393
 a ‘blackletter lawyer’394 regard to the 
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judgements of the ECtHR prevents the courts from basing their decisions upon ‘broad 
principles which animate the Convention.’395 
 
In the next chapter it will be seen that, in practice, because of the nature of the ECtHR’s 
current jurisprudence, the mirror principle does not require that the domestic courts act other 
than in accordance with the PGC. The approach of the court to the five key questions of 
rights interpretation apparent in the ECtHR’s decisions is either consistent with the PGC, so 
vague as to fall within the uncertainty exception or else the subject of a margin of 
appreciation. However, the interpretation of specific rights on specific facts or a change in 
ECtHR jurisprudence may take an interpretative approach based on the PGC beyond the 
ECtHR approach and thus be prohibited by the Mirror Principle. Thus, despite substantial 
formal consistency that will be demonstrated below, if the PGC is recognised as the supreme 
principle of morality and used to guide the interpretation of the Convention rights, it is 
submitted that the ‘no-more than’ element of the mirror principle is inconsistent with such an 
approach and an unjustified restriction on the British courts ability to correctly interpret the 
Convention and should therefore be abandoned. 
 
Justification 
At the heart of the creation
396
 and application
397
 of the mirror principle is s.2(1) HRA’s 
requirement that, in ‘determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right[, the courts] must take into account any…judgement, decision, declaration 
or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights’.398 Whilst the courts have 
consistently recognised that this provision does not give ECtHR judgements the status of 
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binding precedent, always to be followed and not exceeded or departed from, they have held 
that only under the exceptions listed above would they do so.
399
 
 
Although it is good legal practice for the domestic courts to treat ECtHR judgements as the 
floor of the protection the Convention rights recognise,
400
 using it to restrain the courts from 
going beyond it has no such clear justification. As Roger Masterman recognises, were the 
courts to adopt an interpretation that recognised a right as giving less protection than in a 
pertinent ECtHR judgement, it would most likely be found to be in breach of the Convention 
on appeal to Strasbourg.
401
 In contrast to this the legislative history of s.2(1) shows a clear 
rejection of the view that ECtHR decisions should be treated as precedents prohibiting the 
courts from recognising a greater scope for Convention rights.
402
 An amendment to s.2(1) to 
make ECtHR judgements binding precedents was rejected,
403
 the then Lord Chancellor Lord 
Irvine arguing in Parliament that ‘our courts must be free to try to give the lead to Europe as 
well as to be led.’404 He has subsequently insisted that S.2(1) was not intended to tie the 
British courts to ECtHR jurisprudence, and instead requires them to take their own decisions 
on whether to follow an ECtHR judgement.
405
  That the mirror principle has been adopted 
and applied in the face of these arguments leads Lewis to draw the reasonable conclusion that 
the courts have in-effect re-written s.2(1) to make ECtHR jurisprudence almost always 
restricting precedent, not merely persuasive guidance.
406
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In response to the apparent inconsistency of the mirror principle with s.2(1), attempts have 
been made to rely on the underlying intention behind the HRA as a whole in order to justify 
its application. Jane Wright argues that the mirror principle interpretation of this section is 
entirely consistent with the HRA’s purpose, which was not to create a freestanding bill of 
rights, but rather to allow for the protection guaranteed by the ECtHR in the domestic courts 
without the need to go to Strasbourg.
407
 The courts in their justifications for the mirror 
principle have also invoked this intention.
408
 Lord Bingham argued that the HRA was not 
meant to enlarge the scope or application of the rights found in the Convention, merely to 
allow their enforcement within the domestic law as they would be before the ECtHR.
409
 Lord 
Nicholls found support for this view in the preamble of the Act’s statement of its purpose to 
be one of giving ‘further effect’ to the rights guaranteed under the ECHR showed that the Act 
was only intended to allow for the enforcement of the rights available under the 
Convention.
410
 
 
However, it is submitted that regard to this particular intent behind the HRA cannot alone 
justify the existence of the mirror principle. The practical desire to reduce the need for appeal 
to Strasbourg was not the sole intention behind the Act’s creation,411 other concerns which 
influenced the bringing into being of the HRA mitigate against the existence of the mirror 
principle.
412
 The Act was intended to have a fundamental impact on the British legal system 
and held against this aim the mirror principle is incongruous. 
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It is apparent from Jack Straw’s statement in introducing the Bill that was to become the 
HRA, that it was designed to achieve ‘a better balance between rights and responsibilities, 
between the powers of the state and the freedom of the individual’,413 that the incorporation 
of Convention rights was meant to be a substantial change in the British constitutional 
structure,
414
 increasing the protection of rights.
415
 It was hoped that that the HRA would 
create a culture of awareness about human rights.
416
 Both these purposes can be seen to be 
consistent with an interpretation of s.2(1) where the courts’ ability to protect fundamental 
human rights is not restrained to those recognised by the ECtHR. Such an approach finds 
further support in the ‘Rights Brought Home’ White Paper created by the Home Office under 
Straw’s leadership.417 Here it was specifically envisioned that incorporation would enable 
British judges to contribute ‘to the development of the jurisprudence of human rights in 
Europe’418 and provide the ECtHR with a ‘useful source of information and reasoning for its 
own decisions’,419 in addition to reducing the delays caused by the former need to go to the 
ECtHR to gain redress for breach of Convention rights.
420
 Although Wright correctly notes 
that no specific reference was made to creating a ‘rights culture’ in the White Paper421 it is 
clear that there were higher hopes and aspirations for what the Act could achieve. The Lord 
Chancellor thus argued in the passage of the Bill that the HRA presented an opportunity for 
the British judges to contribute significantly to ‘the development of human rights in 
Europe.’422 
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It is thus clear that, although the desire to provide a shortcut to the protection of rights which 
bypassed the long road to Strasbourg was an obvious intention behind the HRA, the drafters 
and Parliament meant it to have an effect which transcended this practical need. At the very 
least, it cannot be said that the intention behind the act is so narrow that it necessitates the 
adoption of the mirror principle and, on a more generous understanding of the HRA’s 
legislative history, the courts can find encouragement to go beyond the ECtHR’s case law in 
interpreting the Convention. 
 
The courts have sought to bolster the above arguments for the mirror principle by arguing 
that the ECtHR is the only body capable of authoritatively determining the scope of the 
rights, and therefore it is right that the domestic courts should not depart from its case law. 
From the early case of Anderson the courts have argued that the ECtHR has a ‘deeper 
appreciation of the true ambit and reach of’423 the Convention rights, by virtue of its position 
as a court whose expertise is solely directed at the interpretation of the scope of the 
Convention.
424
 Similarly, in their subsequent entrenchment of the mirror principle, it has also 
been argued that only Strasbourg can authoritatively define the application of the Convention 
rights, for that is its particular function.
425
 In Al-Skeini Lord Brown also felt it necessary to 
uphold the no more than element of the mirror principle because, if the domestic courts were 
to arrive at an incorrect interpretation of the Convention rights which went against the 
government, the government would be unable to appeal the decision to the ECtHR,
426
 and the 
interpretation would not be corrected.
427
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In practical terms, these concerns to ensure the correct interpretation of the Convention’s 
protection are not without foundation. Given the domestic court’s lack of experience of rights 
adjudication prior to the enactment of the HRA,
428
 it is understandable that they would be 
concerned to closely follow an institution with the experience of half a century. However, 
after a decade of the HRA adjudication, with human rights cases approaching one third of the 
House of Lords’ case load by 2007 and unlikely to decline,429 it is submitted that the judiciary 
have sufficient experience to no longer need to hold the hand of Strasbourg so tightly.  
 
At a more principled level if, as argued previously, the PGC should be used by the courts to 
interpret the Convention because of the logical necessity of its position as the supreme 
principle of action and morality, restricting the interpretations of Convention rights to those 
already accepted by the ECtHR on the grounds that only Strasbourg can determine the correct 
interpretation is unjustified. As the Lord Chancellor noted in the passage of the Bill, it is the 
Convention itself, not the ECtHR's jurisprudence, that is the ‘ultimate source of the relevant 
law.’430 This realisation entails that an interpretation of the Convention guided by a basis of 
the rights in the PGC necessarily has a strong claim to be correct at a fundamental level. 
Thus, as the PGC can provide cogent guidance on the correct scope of the Convention rights, 
the courts’ fears of adopting an incorrect interpretation of the Convention if they go beyond 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can be allayed.  
 
In Ullah, whilst claiming that only the ECtHR can authoritatively state the correct 
interpretation of the Convention, Lord Bingham also argued that a no less than and no more 
than approach should be applied because the Convention should have the same meaning in all 
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states.
431
 Similarly, early in the mirror principle’s development, Buxton LJ. stated that, 
because the ECHR applied to lots of different countries, ‘fairness between the citizens of 
those different countries requires that its terms have a uniform and accessible meaning 
throughout the member countries.’432 Subsequently, the courts have continued this argument, 
claiming that the ECHR’s effectiveness would be reduced if different interpretations of the 
Convention rights, other than those stated authoritatively by the ECtHR,
433
 were adopted in 
different states.
434
  
 
As noted previously, it is necessary that the ECtHR’s interpretation of the Convention rights 
be at least treated as a minimum level of protection; failure to follow ECtHR decisions is 
likely to result in a successful application to that court against the judgment.
435
 However, it is 
neither practically nor theoretically problematic for different states to differ in the extent to 
which they interpret the Convention rights in ways which exceeds the universal minimum. 
Indeed, s.11 HRA protect the possibility that domestic law, albeit outside of the Convention 
rights, may provide greater protection for an individual. Although this section is backward 
looking, in that it protects rights existing before the creation of the HRA,
436
 it appears 
inconsistent with such intentional maximisation of rights protection for the courts to restrict 
themselves to the limits of the protection recognised by the ECtHR. 
 
In R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Lord 
Scott, differing from Lord Bingham’s strongly mirror principle approach,437 suggested that 
the way the HRA incorporated the Convention into domestic law made it possible for the 
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United Kingdom courts to adopt a different interpretation of its provisions from the 
ECtHR.
438
 He felt that this was implicit in the fact that, in bringing the Convention rights into 
the HRA, the rights were made part of United Kingdom law separate from the ECHR which 
Strasbourg interprets.
439
 The Convention was not in a strict sense incorporated and given 
direct effect,
440
 rather, what the HRA does is to ‘create domestic rights expressed in the same 
terms as those contained in the Convention. But they are domestic rights, not international 
rights. Their source is the statute, not the Convention.’441 On this basis, Lewis argues that it is 
possible for the domestic courts to adopt a more expansive interpretation of the domestic 
Convention rights without effecting the uniformity of the ECtHR’s interpretation which will 
remain applicable and binding on all states.
442
 Even if, the HRA is seen as incorporating 
certain of the Convention rights directly, their open textured nature, and the presence of 
jurisprudential uncertainty and margins of appreciation on the fundamental question of rights 
interpretation, would still give need for the domestic courts to reach their own interpretations 
of them. Additionally the dialectical force of the PGC is unaffected, as the supreme principle 
of action it has force over the interpretative application of the Convention rights whether in 
Strasbourg, or at the domestic level with which this thesis is primarily concerned. 
 
That Convention rights may be interpreted by different national courts to be of different 
scope is not a position that is alien to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, such differing application is 
a necessary consequence of the margin of appreciation. As noted previously, the ECtHR has 
applied the margin of appreciation doctrine to the question of the scope of Article 2 on the 
question of whether foetuses have rights under the Convention.
443
 This adds to Lewis’s 
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semantic contention that there is no distinction between the ‘application’ of Convention rights 
to which the margin of appreciation has traditionally been applied by the ECtHR and the 
‘interpretation’ of the Convention rights to which the domestic courts have applied the mirror 
principle;
444
 though Strasbourg previously only applied the margin of appreciation to 
questions of where the balance between rights and competing interests should be drawn, it is 
now apparent that it can also apply to the interpretation of the scope of a right. 
 
At a more practical level, it has been argued by several commentators that, as the ECtHR 
itself has not stated a doctrine of precedent,
445
 the domestic courts should not consider 
themselves as tightly bound as they are under the mirror principle. The ECtHR has held that 
in the interests of ‘legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law’446 it will not 
without good reason depart from its previous decisions.
447
 However, Strasbourg’s 
adjudicative approach has been influenced by civil traditions of other states.
448
 In civil law 
systems, judicial decision making operates though the application of general principles by 
judges to specific facts
449
 rather than through close regard to the detailed precedents of 
previous decisions.
450
 This reasoning is one explanation
451
 of why the courts of other 
members of the Council of Europe do not treat Strasbourg judgements as binding in the way 
the United Kingdom courts do.
452
 As with the use of any judgement from another legal 
system, the viability and appropriateness of doing so depends on a proper understanding of 
the context within which the original norm developed,
453
 including the defences between civil 
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and common law traditions.
454
 It is thus unwise for the domestic courts to treat judgements of 
the ECtHR as precedents of a superior domestic court, when in fact they are made within a 
different system
455
 which is influenced by the civil law tradition of adjudication. 
 
Given the differences between the domestic courts and Strasbourg, rather than restricting the 
scope of the Convention rights under domestic law to that already declared by the ECtHR, to 
apply the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in a manner more consistent with Strasbourg’s own 
approach to the Convention, it would be better if the domestic courts had regard to broad 
underlying principles.
456
 Such an approach would facilitate the courts in using the 
fundamental PGC to determine the further scope of the rights.  
 
Similarly, although the judgements of the ECtHR are binding upon the member states that are 
party to a case,
457
 the Convention itself gives little support to the ‘no more than’ element of 
the mirror principle. Its preamble does include the recognition that human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are best maintained their ‘common understanding and observance’. 
However, although this was given as a justification for the creation of the Convention it does 
not show an intention to limit the rights protection that member states could give.  Article 53, 
although concerned to safeguard existing human rights protection within states, shows that 
the signatories to the Convention were aware of the potential for greater rights protection than 
that stated in the Convention. This potential is also explicitly recognised in the preambular 
acknowledgement that only some of the UDHR rights were included in the Convention, and 
is implicitly recognised by the protocols stating further rights that have since been added to 
the Convention. Thus it is submitted that the Convention itself gives little support to the 
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continued application of the mirror principle to restrain the domestic courts from giving 
greater protection than that stated by the ECtHR.   
 
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that, in light of the open textured nature of the Convention rights, the 
Principle of Generic Consistency can be used as a moral basis from which to interpret the 
Convention, and that dialectically it should be so used. The answers that this approach gives 
to the substantive and distributive questions of moral philosophy also give answers to the five 
key general questions of interpretation raised by the Convention. The PGC itself, and thus its 
interpretative use, is rationally justified by a dialectically necessary argument from agency or 
alternately can be justified using common moral assumptions. The interpretive use of this 
theory is supported by its consistent fit with the three fundamental features of the Convention 
as a scheme of rights protection. 
 
The British courts have held, on questions of the interpretation of the scope, applicability and 
the process of the balancing of the Convention rights, their case law must mirror that of the 
ECtHR. However, the mirror principle should not in practice prevent the courts from 
following the guidance of the PGC in most cases. In those cases where it may present an 
obstacle to the greater protection of rights it is submitted that there is a strong case, supported 
by the guidance of the PGC in the interpretation of rights, for the courts to abandon their self-
imposed constraints. Thus, the PGC philosophically and legally can and should be used by 
the courts to resolve the questions of interpretation of the Convention rights. 
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CHAPTER VII: GEWIRTHIAN CONVENTION RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
As argued previously, the case law of both the ECtHR and the United Kingdom courts 
concerning who possess the rights protected by the Convention, suffuses uncertainty. The 
lack of a clearly conceptualised theoretical basis of the Convention permeates the substantive 
rights and consequently the courts’ answers, to the questions of which beings can possess 
them, and which of the rights they possess, are similarly opaque. However, by accepting a 
basis of a conception of rights directed by the PGC, the approach of the United Kingdom 
courts can be given structure and coherence.  
 
Who Has Human Rights 
Introduction  
A conception of moral agency
1
 determines the possession of rights under the PGC, the above 
defined concept of purposive agency.
2
 From this definition it is claimed that moral rights and 
the Convention rights can be derived, and the possessors of those rights can be known.
3
 
 
Agency in Action 
Under the above arguments to the PGC, an agent is being ‘who is able to control his 
behaviour by his unforced choice with a view to achieving his purposes’4 through action and 
can grasp what is entailed by being such a person.
5
 This action of which an agent is capable, 
and which is the concern of morality,
6
 is characterised by the inter-related generic features of 
                                                 
1
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‘voluntary and purposive behaviour’7 described above8 which seeks to achieve a freely 
chosen end.
9
 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, correlative to these generic features of action, and 
therefore of agency, are the generic needs of freedom and well-being which all agents 
necessarily require if they are to successfully exercise their agency through action, and 
which, ultimately, all agents must consequently consider they have rights to, by virtue of their 
agency being characterised by purposive action.
10
 This necessary derivation and connection 
of freedom and well-being from the inherent possession of the capacity for voluntariness and 
purposiveness action, which constitute the generic features of agency, is thus pivotal to a 
Gewirthian explanation of the basis of Convention rights.  
 
Rights in Agency 
Generic Rights in Agency 
It is the basis in agency, combined with the application of reason, that allows for Gewirth’s 
use of the dialectically necessary method to determine what must be accepted as entailed by 
agency.
11
 As discussed in detail previously, as purposive agents, all agents must accept that 
they and all other agents have rights to the generic features of agency or else contradict their 
agency.  
 
With agency characterised by action in the manner described above, it follows logically that, 
‘all rational agents logically must hold or claim, at least implicitly, that they have rights to… 
                                                 
7
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8
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9
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[freedom and well-being].’12 Only the rights to freedom and well-being are rationally 
necessary, because only these rights are necessarily connected with the claimant of the right 
being an agent.
13
 From this, the dialectically necessary argument from agency leads to the 
conclusion that all agents must recognise that rights to freedom and well-being, the generic 
rights, are possessed by themselves and all agents by virtue of the mere fact that they are 
agents,
14
 on pain of contradicting that their own agency is necessary and sufficient for the 
possession of the rights.
15
 This conclusion Gewirth encapsulates within the Principle of 
Generic Consistency.
16
 Thus, within Gewirth’s theory, purposive agency, which is composed 
of the generic features of action, is the pivotal characteristic to which moral rights attach and 
the justification for their existence.
17
 
 
Generic Rights to Human Rights 
Just as agency is the justifying characteristic, the ratio cognoscendi and the ratio essendi, for 
the possession of the generic rights, so too does it provide a justifying basis, a ratio essendi, 
for the rights found in documents stating human rights.
18
 To be more than merely positivist 
norms which are contingent on the whim of society as to what protection for humans is 
agreed to be desirable,
19
 human rights must have a basis which sets out in a non-contingent 
manner why law and society ought to respect and recognise these rights.
20
 Gewirth argues 
that dialectically necessary consequences of the capacity for purposive action ‘provide[s] the 
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basis and content of all human rights’21 by giving such a basis for the recognition of humans 
as having rights.
22
  
 
The generic rights to freedom and well-being derived from agency can themselves be seen to 
be ‘human rights’ insofar as they are rights possessed by all humans who are agents.23 
However, they are not possessed by humans merely by virtue of their humanity; it is agency 
to which the generic rights attach.
24
 The consequence of this is that although all normal 
human adults will possess the generic rights
25
 there will be some members of the human 
species who cannot be said to possess them
26
 because they appear to be incapable of agency. 
 
Beings or humans who are not agents cannot possess the generic rights because, although 
there are degrees of approach to being an agent, there are not degrees of the status of agent 
which is necessary for the possession of the generic rights.
27
 Gewirth attempts, by using the 
principle of proportionality, to argue that such non-agent humans can be said to have the 
rights to freedom and well-being in proportion to the degree to which they approach being an 
agent.
28
 He argues that because it is owing to the value that they give to their purposiveness
29
 
that agents must think that they have the generic rights,
30
 agents must similarly logically 
recognise that other beings or humans who approach having this purposiveness must have a 
degree of rights to freedom and well-being which protect the extent to which they are 
purposive, the extent to which they approach the attainment of agency.
31
 The rights 
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approaching the generic rights possessed by non-agents are argued by Gewirth to be the 
‘fullest degree of the generic rights of which they are capable, so long as this does not result 
in harm to themselves or others’,32 for this would harm the purposiveness upon which their 
recognition is based.
33
 
 
Whilst on its face Gewirth’s development of his dialectically necessary argument for the 
possession of proportionate generic rights by non-agents appears to be logically attractive, it 
is submitted that there is at its base an inconsistency with his original argument for the rights 
of agents which undermines his proportionality argument. As Beyleveld, Brownsword and 
Pattinson note, Gewirth’s proportionality argument relies on the fundamental premise that it 
is possible for generic rights to be possessed by beings that are not agents;
34
 that although 
such beings do not possess all the characteristics of agency they should be recognised as 
having a propionate quantity of the rights that attach to agency.
35
 It is Gewirth’s attempt to 
use the argument from fundamental agency to justify this that logically invalidates his 
argument for proportionate generic rights. At the core of Gewirth’s moral argument is that it 
is from agency that the possession the generic rights dialectically necessarily derive.
36
 This 
being the case, contrary to what Gewirth claims,
37
 it is logically impossible for any generic 
rights to be held by a being that does not possess the generic features of voluntariness and 
purposiveness that characterise an agent, because such a being will not have the features that 
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constitute the perspective from which the generic rights can be derived and claimed in a 
dialectically necessary manner.
38
 
 
Thus, Gewirth’s proportionality reasoning ‘works apart from the very basis that Gewirth 
finds for anything to be a rights-holder.’39 In attempting to justify the possession of some 
generic rights by non-agents Gewirth, in his principle of proportionality, moves from his 
position that under the PGC agents must be recognised as possessing the generic rights, to 
claiming that the generic rights must be granted to all beings in proportion to the extent that 
they approach being agents.
40
 In doing so, he thus departs from his premise that the 
possession of rights derives from, and hence attaches to, the possession of agency.
41
 
 
In addition to the logical inconsistency of his proportionality argument with the basis of the 
generic rights, Beyleveld and Brownsword also note that it is substantively impossible for 
those rights to be held by a being that is not an agent because of their nature as rights under 
the will conception.
42
 As explained previously, and as applied in detail below, agents claim 
the generic rights because they are an instrumental good in the achievement their purposes, 
and consequently they are free to waive the benefit of the generic rights as their purposes 
dictate.
43
 It follows from this that as only agents, not mere partial agents, have the capacities 
of voluntariness and purposiveness necessary to choose to waive the benefits of rights, only 
such agents can possess the generic rights guaranteed by the PGC.
44
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Although beings that are not agents are neither theoretically nor practically capable of 
possessing the generic rights, this does not necessarily leave such beings with no protection 
under the PGC. Beyleveld, Brownsword and Pattinson cogently advocate an approach of 
precautionary reasoning as an alternate response to the question of what protection the PGC 
gives to non-agents. This argument is built around the empirical impossibility of any agent 
knowing for certain whether any being other than himself is or is not an agent, because of the 
impossibility of knowing with certainty the mental capacity of another being and thus 
whether they have the generic features of agency.
45
 
 
As a categorically binding principle, if an agent acts contrary to the PGC he acts in 
contradiction of his own agency.
46
 In recognition of this, these three critics of Gewirth’s 
proportionality approach argue that when this obligation is combined with the impossibility 
of knowing other minds, the PGC must be taken as imposing a duty on agents to take 
precautions against committing actions which would infringe the generic rights of other 
beings if they were agents and whom it is impossible to know are not agents.
47
  
 
Under the precautionary reasoning that the PGC logically requires, agents must treat beings 
who ostensibly appear by their characteristics and behaviour to be agents as agents,
48
 even 
though it is not possible to be certain they are an agent and not, for example, a mindless 
automaton.
49
 An agent has such an obligation because, under the PGC it is better to err in 
treating a being that is not an agent as an agent than fall into logical inconsistency by failing 
                                                 
45
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to treat an agent with respect for their generic rights under the PGC for which there can be no 
justification.
50
 
 
In relation to beings who are not ostensibly agents or who only partially display the 
characteristics associated with being an agent, because they lack these characteristics it is not 
possible and meaningful to treat them as agents with the generic rights.
51
 Although as 
apparently non-ostensible agents precaution does not require that they be treated as agents 
with rights, an agent cannot know for certain that such a being – an ostensible non-agent – is 
in fact not an agent who has the generic features of agency but is incapable of displaying the 
characteristics associated with them.
52
 Consequently, the precautionary reasoning necessary 
to ensure compliance with the PGC requires that agents ‘accept duties to apparent partial 
agents in proportion to the degree of evidence that they might be agents’53 in case they are in 
fact agents.
54
 
 
Thus, this alternate approach does involve an element of proportionality, but unlike Gewirth’s 
approach it is not the proportionate extent to which a being approaches the characteristics of 
agency that is the source of the obligations. Rather, under precautionary reasoning the 
obligations upon agents derive from the duties they owe as agents under the PGC, because of 
the possibility that the non-ostensible agent is in fact an agent, it is not a duty to partial agents 
as partial agents.
55
 Consequently, the proportionate extent to which a being approaches 
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agency is merely relevant to determining the interests, as opposed to rights, which the non-
ostensible agents possess which it is practically possible for agents to have duties to respect.
56
 
 
In terms of assessing whether a being is an ostensible or non-ostensible agent, four types of 
indicative behaviour closely influenced by the generic features of agency provide a coherent 
guide in this assessment. 
1) ‘Patterned behaviour of the kind produced by all living organisms.’ 
2) ‘Behaviour that evinces purposivity (motivation by feeling or desire).’ 
3) ‘Behaviour that displays intelligence (capacity to learn by experience).’ 
4) ‘Behaviour that exhibits rationality (value-guided behaviour, which is characteristic 
of agency).’ 57 
Under this approach, beings which show rationality should be deemed to be ostensible 
agents.
58
 Beyond this, the duties imposed by PGC
59
 require non-ostensible agents should 
have increasing respect shown to their interests commensurate with the extent to which they 
display the various other characteristics.
60
 
 
Although Gewirth’s theory of proportionate partial generic rights for partial agents differs 
fundamentally and logically illegitimately from the precautionary approach in its application 
of the PGC, Beyleveld and Pattinson argue that in practice the implications for the treatment 
of beings should not be markedly different.
61
 Both approaches focus on the extent to which a 
being proportionately approaches agency but give different justifications and explanations for 
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the protection under the PGC of beings who are not clearly agents.
62
 The overlap in outcomes 
can be seen in relation to the protection required for foetuses under the PGC discussed below 
in relation to the decision in Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others.
63
 
 
In spite of the practical overlap, one important implication of the difference in approach 
between Gewirth’s theory and the precautionary argument is upon the extent to which the 
generic rights can be said to be ‘human rights.’ Under Gewirth’s approach to the possession 
of the generic rights, the rights can be said to be human rights in that all humans either have 
the generic rights or have rights which approach the generic rights in proportion to the extent 
to which the approach being a purposive agent.
64
 Under his proportionally theory, rights to 
freedom and well-being are possessed universally by all humans; the degree to which they are 
possessed, however, is relative and proportionate to the type of human that they are. Thus, he 
claims his conception of generic rights is consistent with the universality and inalienability of 
rights,
65
 prominently stated by human rights treaties as a key characteristic of the rights they 
contain.  
 
However, owing to the rejection of the idea that non-ostensible agents can be said to have any 
‘generic rights’ Gewirth’s argument that the generic rights are ‘human rights’ cannot work in 
the form he makes it if the precautionary approach is accepted. In spite of this, although 
human non-ostensible agents cannot be said to have generic rights and therefore they are not 
universal human rights in this sense, the precautionary approach to the PGC nonetheless can 
still be seen to support the possession of legal human rights by all humans. By protecting the 
generic rights of human ostensible agents and the interests of human non-ostensible agents, 
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the PGC does provide universal and inalienable protection to all members of the human 
species relative to their agency status, although this focus on agency means that the 
protection given by the PGC is not specific and isolated to humans as a species. 
 
Convention Rights through Generic Rights 
Gewirth argues that it is from the position of the generic rights to freedom and well-being as 
the ‘necessary goods of action that the ascription and contents of human rights follow.’66 The 
dialectical derivation of these rights – and also of the precautionary generic interests – 
enables them to provide a basis for the Convention rights by showing why all humans must 
accept that they and other humans as humans are owed the duties which must be respected.
67
 
 
As the generic rights deriving from the concept of action must be accepted as imposing 
logically compelled obligations on agents which guide their actions, it follows that in order 
for other rights which seek to guide action to be morally valid they must conform to the 
requirements of the generic rights.
68
 The dialectical necessity of Gewirth’s argument from 
agency to the generic rights, and the alternate dialectically contingent arguments, provide an 
answer to distributive question of moral rights
69
 to which other rights claims must conform. 
A justification for rights necessarily contains within it a ‘description or descriptive 
characteristic of the person for whom the right is claimed’70 and thus, if the Convention rights 
are to be valid under the PGC, then they must be held by those recognised by that theory as 
having the generic rights or generic interests.
71
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It follows from the foregoing argument that Convention rights which further the generic 
features of agency, purposiveness or voluntariness, protected by the generic rights and 
interests of freedom and well-being, must be recognised as being possessed by each human 
being in accordance with the extent to which they have the characteristics of purposive 
agency,
72
 as ostensible or non-ostensible agents, with which to benefit from them.
73
 Under 
this approach it is apparent that the fundamental minimum characteristic to which the United 
Kingdom courts attach the possibility of being a Convention rights holder under the HRA is 
currently inconsistent with a basis of rights in the generic features of action. However, 
beyond this, the approach of the courts to the questions of which particular rights can be 
possessed by which persons is consistent with a Gewirthian approach. The adoption by the 
courts of an approach based in the PGC, with its focus upon purposive agency, would give to 
the judgements a clear and coherent theoretical basis. If applied by the courts, this would 
create a consistency in their substantive approach to the question of who can possess the 
Convection rights and which rights they possess. 
 
Under the decision in Bland,
74
 subsequently approved post-HRA in NHS Trust A v M,
75
 and 
in the context of case law on the rights of foetuses,
76
 the possibility of the possession of 
Convention rights is held to hinge upon being a born living human. However, Bland, who 
was in a permanent vegetative state, could not be said to approach behaviour displaying the 
characteristics of an agent, or even of a prospective purposive agency.
77
 Consequently, the 
birth-centric approach of the British courts in countenancing the possession of rights merely 
                                                 
72
 Ibid, 124 and Beyleveld and Brownsword (n.34), 123  
73
 Gewirth (n.1), 122 and Beyleveld and Pattinson (n.45), 264 
74
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 858-859, 864, 881 & 889 
75
 NHS Trust A v M [2001] Fam 348, 356 
76
 Evans (n.63), [106]-[107] 
77
 See above p.178 
   
 
247 
 
by beings who are living humans, even with no capacity for voluntariness or purposiveness, 
is on its face unsupportable by a basis of the generic rights of ostensible agents.
78
 
 
However, under the precautionary approach, the finding that Bland was a being whose 
(‘best’)79 interests had to be considered, through the application principle of the sanctity of 
life and Article 2 ECHR,
80
 is justified and required by the PGC. Although in a PVS, it is 
empirically impossible to be certain that he is not an agent. However, based on the agency 
interests that he displayed, the Court was justified under the PGC in its decision to remove 
life-sustaining treatment. There was no indication that Bland’s body supported his continued 
agency, if indeed he remained an agent, and thus the end of Bland’s life could not have 
reduced his level of voluntariness and purposiveness to which his life was an instrumental 
good.
81
 Therefore, the continued provision of treatment should not be deemed to be required 
by a positive obligation under the right to life based upon the protection of the generic 
features and goods.
82
  
 
Although the ascription of rights in Bland can be justified under a precautionary application 
of the PGC, the court’s refusal in Evans to countenance foetuses as the possessors of any 
Convention rights is inconsistent with a basis in purposive agency as understood under the 
precautionary approach. The domestic court’s decision that foetuses have no Convention 
rights
83
 as they are not persons
84
 appears arbitrary once the basis of human rights is taken to 
be purposive action viewed in a precautionary manner. Although apparently lacking in 
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purposiveness and therefore not ostensible agents with the generic rights,
85
 Gewirth argues 
that foetuses do have some rights as a result of the application on the principle of 
proportionality. According to Gewirth, a foetus can have no right to freedom because they 
have no capacity for voluntary action due to their connectedness to their mother.
86
 However, 
Gewirth argues they can have rights to ‘well-being as [it] is required for developing 
potentialities for growth towards purpose fulfilment’87 because, although not actually 
purposive agents, they unlike Bland proportionately approach being a purposive agent
88
 as 
they grow.  
 
This context is one in which the theoretically different proportionality and precautionary 
approaches to the rights of non-ostensible agents yield the same substantive results.
89
 The 
latter approach similarly regards foetuses as non-ostensible agents.
90
 However, unlike 
Gewirth’s approach, under the precautionary thesis the potentiality of a foetus to become an 
agent does not entail recognition of the foetus as possessing rights
91
 approaching the generic 
rights. Instead, the foetuses’ potential to have the generic rights  is given precautionary 
weight as evidence that the human foetus may already be an agent, and thus in order to avoid 
the risk of violating the PGC agents have duties to show greater respect for its interests than 
foetuses of species that do not normally develop into agents.
92
 
 
The substantive implication of the application of this precautionary reasoning to the 
Convention rights is that as a member of the human species with the potential to be an 
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ostensible agent, foetuses should receive a commensurable measure of recognition and 
protection under the appropriate Convention rights. At a minimum, to guard against the 
danger of contradicting the PGC if the foetus is an agent, foetuses should be said to have an 
interest in life as part of an interest in continued development towards displaying the full 
characteristics of an agent which they may or may not already be.
93
 Thus, the interests a 
foetus should be recognised as having should be accorded increased moral weight as it 
develops and the proportionate likelihood of it being an agent increases,
94
 this is of particular 
relevance in the balancing of its interests against the generic rights and interests of other 
beings which will be discussed below.
95
 
 
The birth centric approach of the British courts has the advantages of clarity and simplicity, 
but without a dialectically valid basis it lacks the philosophical and intellectual coherence of 
an approach based in the PGC. The current position which Evans continues, first described by 
Coke in the 17
th
 Century, has its roots in pre-enlightenment thinking preceding the idea of 
inherent and inalienable human rights.
96
 However, an approach based in the PGC, which fits 
with the modern concept of universal human rights, protects in a non-speciesist manner the 
rights and interests of all humans, not just those who are born, and its interpretive use gives a 
more principled, consistent and coherent basis to the ascription of Convention rights under 
the Act.  
 
In Evans the question was whether human embryos, created for the purposes of IVF 
treatment and kept in storage, had a qualified right to life contingent on the wishes of the 
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mother.
97
 Arden LJ. rejected this application of Article 2, finding that there was a large 
margin of appreciation on this question and upholding the domestic legislation which denied 
the possession of rights by embryos or foetuses.
98
 It is submitted that were the PGC to have 
been applied to this question, the court would in fact have been required to recognise a 
qualified right to life for the embryo, similar to the extent that Anthony Bland was recognised 
as having such a right, although as in that case,
99
 this right would not have required the 
continued preservation or possibility for development of the embryo, but for different 
reasons. 
 
As an entity which is known to develop into an agent, under the precautionary approach to 
agency, like a foetus, an embryo should be seen to have an interest in continuing to exist and 
in its continued development.
100
 Correlative to this is a duty upon agents not to impede that 
development of the characteristics of ostensible agency, and also to facilitate it.
101
 Under this 
approach a comparison can be drawn with Bland in that both are genetically human and, 
although Bland physically resembles an agent, both only showed the minimal ‘patterned 
behaviour’ of the fourfold criteria for assessing agency.102 There is little to choose between 
them under the precautionary assessment of whether they are currently agents, one naturally 
develops into an ostensible agent, whereas the other once was an ostensible agent but shows 
no other sign of continuing to be one. Thus, it is submitted that under the precautionary 
approach to agency, as Bland can be said to be at least covered by Article 2,
103
 so too should 
embryos and foetuses. 
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The embryo can be said to have an interest in continuing to exist, however this interest is only 
of minimal force because, in showing no signs of purposiveness and voluntariness, there is 
very little indication that it is actually an agent deserving of protection under the 
precautionary approach, and so their moral status is lower.
104
 Their consequentially 
minimally weighted generic interest in life under the PGC must also be balanced against the 
competing rights of others. This will be discussed in detail below,
105
 however the embryo’s 
low moral status entails that any generic interests it has protected by Article 2, a positive 
obligation to protect the life and development of the embryo, would be easily be outweighed 
by the generic rights of other agents; the parents’ right to control their own reproduction or 
rights of members of wider society to the resources that would be necessary to preserve the 
embryos. This lower moral status of an embryo, and the consequent implications for the 
balancing of interests, was noted by Arden LJ. in her judgement,  where she held that 
‘embryo has no right to life which trumps the right to choose of a person whose ongoing 
consent to its use or storage is required under the 1990 Act.’106 Thus, although the PGC and 
purposive agency requires that the scope of the protection of the HRA and the Convention 
rights be extended to encompass foetuses and embryos, this would not require a different 
substantive outcome on the facts of Evans. However, although the final decision would 
remain the same, the application of the PGC by the courts would create principled 
consistency and coherence between the judgements Bland and Evans, rather than the more 
arbitrary distinction based on birth. 
 
Contrary to the claims of Soren Holm and John Coggon, this precautionary application of the 
PGC is not speciesist in nature.
107
 It is not a foetus’s or PVS patient’s genetically human 
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nature that gives rise to a precautionary duty of increased respect for their interests, it is the 
increased possibility that they are agents that their humanity carries with it an increased 
likelihood that does not apply to the foetuses of species that do not normally develop into 
ostensible agents.
108
 That the precautionary approach is not speciesist, will also be 
demonstrated below by arguing that, as Holm and Coggon themselves contend should be the 
case,
109
 the PGC entails that respect should be given to the generic interests of animals to the 
extent that they approach the capacities of agency, although it will be shown that this does 
not mean that they can be given protection under the Convention.
110
 
 
The ability of the precautionary approach, to generate theoretical consistency and coherence 
in the judicial determination of the application of Convention rights generally and of 
particular rights, as well as its non-speciesist nature, can be seen in its application to the 
varying capacities of the members of the human species. It is particularly apparent in the case 
law flowing from the decision in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA.
111
 Here the court 
held that the decision making capacity of a child should be assessed on a case by case basis, 
and with increased capacity there was therefore a correspondingly increased duty upon others 
to respect an individual’s choices as to the treatment they are given.112 This decision 
recognises that although a child under 16 is not generally deemed to have the capacity for 
autonomy of an adult, the voluntariness and purposiveness of an ostensible-agent, respect 
should given to a child’s interests, insofar as they show characteristics of such agency, to 
guard against the possibility that the have already in fact attained early the capacity that 
characterises the status of adult. The fact that children are not allowed to refuse treatment 
                                                 
108
 Beyleveld and Pattinson (n.45), 264-265 Cf. ibid, 302-303 
109
 Holm and Coggon (n.38), 303 
110
 Below p.255-257 
111
 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 
112
 Ibid, 169-170 & 189 
   
 
253 
 
under the Gillick rule
113
 can also be justified under the precautionary approach. It would be to 
act inconsistently with the PGC to give unwarranted respect to an individuals perceived 
voluntariness, where to do so runs the risk of in fact undermining their ability to ultimately 
attain the generic goods which characterise agency, whose possession the PGC protects. Lord 
Donaldson seemed to recognise this in holding that ‘…good parenting involves giving minors 
as much rope as they can handle without an unacceptable risk that they will hang 
themselves.’114  
 
At the other end of life’s brief candle,115 just as we cannot know whether a potential agent is 
already an agent we cannot know with certainty that a deceased agent is no longer an 
agent.
116
 Thus, under the precautionary thesis there is a basis for the domestic courts to give 
protection to the interests of dead persons as ex-ostensible agents under the Convention 
where an interference with their interests can be identified. The ECtHR’s decision in McCann 
v United Kingdom
117
 that Article 2 gives a deceased person a right to have their death 
investigated can be justified from the precautionary perspective of redressing any violation of 
their generic rights that may have played a part in their death.
118
 It can, however, also be 
justified as protecting living agents rather than dead agents, as protecting the well-being of 
agents generally against deprivation of their lives.  
 
The fact that ‘ought’ logically implies ‘can’ – that stating that a person has a duty to act in a 
particular manner implies that they have the capacity to do so – entails that it must be 
possible to identify the interests of another in order to be able to act in accordance with them 
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under the PGC.
119
 The practically limited means for interaction with the dead, given that they 
display none of the four types of behaviour described above as relevant to the assessment of 
the extent to which a being displays the features of agency,
120
 means that as with other 
inanimate entities it impossible to know what actions would be consistent with their interests 
in their current state.
121
 Consequently, only nominal duties can generally be owed to them 
under the PGC,
122
 a recognition that they might be agents but also that there is no more that 
this possibility can entail by way of required actions. Thus, similarly, as it is impossible to 
conceptualise what interests of purposiveness and voluntariness a rock may have, it is 
impossible to determine what action would respect its interests. Therefore, contrary to Holm 
and Coggon’s critical interpretation of the precautionary thesis, that is so broad that it futilely 
‘requires us to treat anything as if it were an agent so long as it is logically possible that it 
might be an agent’ and is therefore meaningless,123 an agent need not treat a rock as an agent 
under the PGC,
124
 for cannot implies no ought and the possibility that it might be an agent 
cannot be acted upon. 
 
However, the fact that the dead were once ostensible agents is a precautionary reason for 
considering that they may still be agents which is not present with rocks. It follows that if 
agents can, they ought to consider that they have precautionary duties to respect the exercise 
of the deceased’s generic rights made whilst he was a living ostensible agent. For although 
we can discover or conjecture little as to any new generic interests of a dead person, it is an 
practicable precaution to presume that if they maintain their agency after death, one thing that 
they would voluntarily and purposively wish is that the excesses of their generic features of 
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agency made whilst alive, such as wills, continue to be honoured after their death. In light of 
this, the court in R (Rudewicz) v Secretary of State for Justice arguably failed to act 
constantly with the PGC in not giving weight to the views of the deceased, in deciding 
whether to allow his remains to be moved from a chapel he explicitly wished to be buried 
in.
125
 
 
As noted previously, in a case submitted to the ECtHR the question is one of whether a 
Chimpanzee called Matthew is a person for the purposes of the Convention rights.
126
 Under 
the PGC such animals are recognised as having generic interests – for as long as evidence 
shows them only to possess the characteristics of non-ostensible agents
127
 they cannot have 
generic rights
128
 – as a precaution against the possibility that they are in fact agents.129 
Without, as yet, an ECtHR ruling on the matter, the main obstacle to the recognition of the 
possession of Convention rights by such beings is the specific description of the Convention 
and the Act which incorporates it into British law as documents of ‘Human Rights.’ This is 
not an insuperable obstacle, however. If it is recognised that what makes humans worthy of 
protection under the Convention is the possession of the generic features of agency, and 
‘human’ is thus defined in these terms rather than in speciesist terms, then the extension of 
the Convention rights to beings who are not of the human species can have a basis in moral 
philosophy.
130
 
 
                                                 
125
 R (Rudewicz) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 499 
126
  M. Balluch and E. Theuer ‘Personhood Trial for Chimpanzee Matthew Pan’ (Verein Gegen Tierfabriken 
Website 2008) <http://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080118Hiasl.htm> accessed 2
nd
 January 2012 
127
 Beyleveld and Pattinson (n.45), 271 and Gewirth (n.1), 120 
128
 Cf. Gewirth (n.1), 144 
129
 Above p.242-243 
130
 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n.34), 126 
   
 
256 
 
The United States District Court of the 9
th
 Circuit was confronted with a similar question in a 
case concerning Orcas.
131
 An animal rights organisation argued on behalf of the whales that 
keeping them in sea life centres violated the 13
th
 Amendment to the US constitution, the 
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude. Although attempts were made by the 
claimants to argue that the constitutional prohibition should apply to the whales because they 
displayed characteristics and capacities approaching those of humans,
132
 Judge Miller gave 
no consideration to this. The judge applied a speciesist interpretation of the scope of the 13
th
 
Amendment, holding that the provision ‘only applies to “humans” and therefore affords no 
redress for Plaintiffs’ grievances.’133  
 
Having regard to the historical context surrounding the creation of the prohibition on slavery 
and its wording, the judge found that it was clear that it was intended only to apply to human 
persons,
134
 and gave no possibility of enlarging its scope to cover whales.
135
 It is likely that a 
similar approach will be taken by the European Court in relation to Matthew the chimpanzee; 
the creation of the Convention arose out of an intention to address and prevent the wrongs 
committed against humans that had occurred in the Second World War and the Convention 
title talks clearly of ‘human rights.’  
 
However, if an interpretive approach based in the fundamental characteristics to which rights 
attach were applied in the manner suggested above, the American case could have been 
decided differently by broadening the meaning of ‘persons’136 to all encompass moral agents, 
not only humans. Whether such an approach is taken is likely to be influenced by political 
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concerns of over-broadening the applicability of the Convention, given that separate legal 
protection for animals does exist, something noted to be the case for the whales.
137
 The 
existence of other protections, however, raises its own questions of whether such protection 
gives sufficient respect to the possibility that other animals are in fact agents, given that the 
PGC and the precautionary argument requires agents recognise their interests, more 
protection may be required.  
 
The conception of dignity as the basis of rights which currently predominates in the UK 
courts, and which is also present in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, described above and engaged 
with in detail below,
138
 suggests that at present the domestic courts and the ECtHR would be 
resistant to such a broadening of the scope of the Convention rights. The neo-classical 
conception of dignity they have applied, which views dignity as something humans possess 
because of the special value of being a human,
139
 if taken as the basis of rights, limits those 
rights to humans in a speciesist manner. Although it will be argued that such a conception of 
dignity is nether satisfactory nor required by the Convention, and that therefore the rights 
need not be limited in this way, the above practical and political issues raised by extending 
the Convention to animals mean that such an interpretation of the Convention is unlikely to 
be adopted.   
 
Thus, generally, it is apparent that the case law of the United Kingdom courts on the nature of 
beings who can possess Convention rights is in need of some modification. Such change in 
the law to reflect a basis of Convention rights in the purposive agency is within the courts’ 
powers and is not barred by ECtHR jurisprudence by virtue of the mirror principle.
140
 As 
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noted previously, the ECHR contains no specific description of who can hold the rights it 
contains other than the use of the term ‘human’ in its title, and ‘men and women’ in Article 
12. The use of open textured terms such as ‘no one’ and ‘everyone’ in describing who has 
rights has been shown to have been a deliberate decision by the drafters. The lack of 
specificity of the text has been continued in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which has 
declined to definitively answer the question of the nature of the beings who can poses the 
Convention rights, and instead given a margin of appreciation to member states on this 
issue.
141
 The use of the concept of dignity by the ECtHR in its discussion of this issue in Vo, 
as the label for characteristics of humans worthy of protection,
142
 even if not by substantive 
Convention rights, will later be shown to be significant as a means by which the United 
Kingdom courts can legitimately bring consideration of Gewirthian theory into their 
determinations upon this issue left to their determination by the ECtHR. 
 
Reassuringly, however, in terms of the ascription of particular Convention rights to persons, 
the domestic approach is consistent with an approach based in the generic features of agency. 
As mentioned earlier, Gewirth argues that the generic rights or rights approaching the generic 
rights are possessed in proportion to the extent to which a person has the ability to utilise 
them in order to engage in purposive action without endangering the purposiveness of 
themselves or others.
143
 A similar approach operates under the more logically valid 
precautionary approach in relation to the generic interests. The greater the characteristics of 
agency a being has and thus the closer to ostensible agency a being is, the proportionately 
greater the duties agents owe them under the PGC to respect its generic interests.
144
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The consistency of the United Kingdom courts approach with this theory can be seen as 
implicit in Bland decision. Here Lord Mustill recognised that if a Bland had possessed more 
of the awareness which forms human personality he would have received more rights 
protection.
145
 This logic was followed though in NHS Trust A v M where the court relied on 
the limited agency of a person in a permanent vegetative state to hold that as they were 
incapable of possessing the capacity for sensation which can be seen to be part of the well-
being necessary for purposive action
146
 they could have no rights under Article 3.
147
 
Conversely, in W v M, a person in a minimally contagious state was held to have Article 3’s 
protection because she had higher levels of consciousness.
148
 A mirroring of a PGC approach 
is also clear in the courts’ decision that a tetraplegic, although like Bland unable to move or 
act, nonetheless, because of her mental capacity for choice, had a right to choose how she 
was treated.
149
 She possessed the purposiveness and voluntariness that Bland did not, and 
thus more rights. 
 
Conclusion 
It can be seen that the domestic courts’ approach is in need of change in respect of who has 
Convention rights to be consistent with a basis of rights in the defining characteristics of what 
it is to be an agent subject to moral obligations. However, on the question of the extent of the 
rights a person can possess, the case law of the United Kingdom courts is consistent with a 
Gewirthian approach and its intellectual coherence and clarity can only be aided by being 
informed by Gewirth’s ideas of the basis of rights. The recognition of the dialectical 
implications of a basis of human rights in agency would give guidance to the courts on 
questions of the rights possessed by children and the mentally disabled, as well as giving an 
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insight on question of the extension of human rights to the higher primates currently before 
the ECtHR. 
 
The Substantive Nature of Convention Rights 
Foundations of Interpretation 
Fundamentally, under the PGC agents must on pain of contradiction recognise that they and 
other agents have the generic rights to freedom and well-being. Within the features of these 
generic rights a coherent guide can be found for the judicial interpretation of the nature of the 
open textured Convention rights, particularly the extent of their positive and negative 
obligations. The dialectical derivation of the PGC means that it provides a fundamental 
normative criteria against which the validity of other moral rights can be measured. A 
consequence of this is that the generic rights as primary goods can be seen to provide a 
foundation for other rights,
150
 and those which accord with the generic rights can be deemed 
more specific manifestations and enumerations of the two rights.
151
 In the light of this 
recognition, and the fit between the generic rights and the Convection rights described 
above,
152
 it is morally appropriate to use the generic rights as a tool with which to read the 
Convention, so as to achieve a substantive interpretation of those rights which is valid under 
the PGC.
153
 
 
Convention Rights in the Light of Generic Rights 
As generic needs of agency, agents necessarily claim rights to freedom and well-being.
154
 
The corollary of this claim is that agents must recognise that they have negative duties not to 
coerce or harm the freedom and well-being of the recipients of their action, and positively 
                                                 
150
 Gewirth (n.12), 1154 and Gewirth (n.1), 73, 102 & 150 
151
 Gewirth (n.1), 64 & 150 
152
 Above p.201-208 
153
 Gewirth (n.1), 64 
154
 Gewirth (n.12), 1152 
   
 
261 
 
ought to give other agents assistance to have freedom and well-being where they would 
otherwise lack these necessary goods.
155
 
 
Negative Obligations 
In its negative sense the generic need for freedom constitutes a right to non-interference
 
with 
an agent’s particular chosen actions and with their capacity for choice generally.156 In 
practical terms, the generic right to freedom requires that an agent’s ability to make unforced 
choices to act or be acted upon be respected and free from interference, so that their actions 
are within their voluntary control.
157
 This thus protects the capacity for action which 
characterises agency.
158
  
 
As a theoretical basis for the Convention, the negative aspect of the right to freedom can be 
seen to underlie, and therefore be able to inform the interpretation of, several of the 
Convention rights. With its primary focus on protecting an agent’s choices as to action ‘a 
person's right to freedom is violated if he is subjected to violence, coercion, deception, or any 
other procedures which attack or remove his informed control of his behaviour by his own 
unforced choice.’159 Given that the Convention’s full title proclaims protection for 
‘fundamental freedoms’ it is unsurprising that Gewirth claims that this generic right protects 
the expression, assembly and religious practice that are protected as freedoms by the 
Convention.
160
 Similarly, the broad protection under the right of freedom for an individual’s 
choice as to the conduct of his life, what Gewirth terms autonomy and privacy,
161
 can be seen 
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to be mirrored in the breadth of Article 8.
162
 Indeed, the ECtHR has recognised that that the 
principle of autonomy is an important underlying principle to be used in the interpretation of 
Article 8  and, in a manner very similar to the content of the generic right to freedom, argued 
that this right protects ‘the ability to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own choosing’.163 
Thus, there appears a ready possibility for the generic right to freedom to be used to interpret 
the extent of the protection these rights give. 
 
Given their shared basis in purposive action, a practical overlap in what is protected by the 
two generic rights to freedom and well-being is unsurprising as both protect the same 
ultimate state of being.
164
 As a result actions that freedom protects against, such as killing and 
physically maiming, will often coincide with what is protected against by well-being.
165
 
Gewirth thus goes so far as to argue that freedom can be seen as a part of what it is for an 
agent to have well-being.
166
 
 
However, in spite of their overlapping spectrum, freedom’s procedural protection of agents’ 
capacity to choose is, as noted above,
167
 conceptually different from the substantive demands 
of the right to well-being.
168
 This distinction is due to the underlying difference between the 
generic features of purposiveness and voluntariness, from which the rights derive.
169
 To 
interfere with freedom is to restrict a being’s ability to voluntarily control their behaviour,170 
however, to interfere with a being’s well-being is to impede his attainment of what he regards 
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as good, to restrict his purposiveness.
171
 Thus, although the infliction of harm upon an agent 
to which they do not consent will interfere with both generic rights, a restriction of choice 
between alternatives by coercion or deception
172
 will infringe freedom, without in itself 
depriving an agent of the practical abilities and attributes necessary to pursue his purposes 
that constitute their well-being. The consequences of such an interference with voluntariness, 
for example the coercion of a highwayman’s limiting of options to ‘your money or your life’, 
may be a loss of generic goods, objects or purposes of voluntary action,
173
 but the coercive 
act itself constitutes a conceptually prior interference with voluntariness. 
 
As noted above,
174
 at its most basic the well-being necessary for purposive action is 
composed of life, and physical and mental integrity.
175
 These basic goods, and the correlative 
basic rights,
176
 guaranteeing safety from interference with them,
177
 are the necessary 
preconditions for any and all actions by an agent.
178
  
 
The second category of generically necessary goods for well-being are the non-subtractive 
goods, ‘the abilities and conditions’179 an agent generically needs to maintain his capabilities 
for any actions in pursuit of his particular purposes, and his level of purpose fulfilment 
generally.
180
 There is some overlap between these and the basic goods because agents, in 
necessarily claiming negative rights not to be deprived of the basic goods, perceive them as 
non-subtractive goods. However, there are some non-subtractive goods that are not basic 
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goods because the former more broadly encompasses ‘whatever else, before acting, the agent 
has and regards as good.’181 As examples of interferences with negative rights to the non-
subtractive goods required for action, Gewirth lists ‘being lied to, cheated, stolen from, 
defamed, insulted, suffering broken promises, and having one's privacy violated.’182 
 
The non-subtractive generic goods share with the additive goods the characteristic that the 
nature of the specific goods they protect in a given set of circumstances, is determined in 
relation to the quantum of goods necessary for the action in question that an agent possesses, 
together with the particular nature of the purposes he seeks to achieve.
183
 However, whereas 
the content of non-subtractive goods is the maintenance of an agent’s capacities for action, 
additive goods are the abilities and conditions an agent requires in order to increase the 
likelihood of achieving his particular purposes by increasing his capacity for action.
184
 
Although the term ‘additive’ describes the positive accrual to an agent of further goods, the 
PGC can give rise to negative as well as positive duties on the part of agents in relation to 
these goods,
185
 requiring non-interference with another’s attainment of these goods necessary 
for their purposive action, just as it will be shown below that the vindication of ‘non-
subtractive goods’ can involve the imposition of positive obligations.186 
 
Thus, the negative conception of the right to the additive goods is a right to develop these 
abilities and capacities for purpose fulfilment.
187
 On this basis, this right is infringed where an 
agent is ‘denied education to the limits of his capacities,…discriminated against on grounds 
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of race, religion, or nationality’188 or otherwise obstructed from developing his capacity to 
pursue purposes.
189
 Central amongst the additive goods is ‘self-esteem.’190 Following from 
the fact that all the generic rights are a dialectical consequence of the necessity that an agent 
regards his purposes as good, and his generic rights as instrumental to those goods, an agent 
sees his purposes as good because of his own sense of self-worth which leads him to pursue 
them.
191
 On this basis an agent’s self-worth must be seen as an instrumental good to the 
pursuit of any purpose and purposiveness generally as a generic feature of agency.
192
 In 
practical terms, the protection of this particular additive good requires that an agent not be 
treated as an inferior being or subject to discrimination in comparison with other agents,
193
 
because this would be to unjustifiably treat the agent as of less worth. 
 
This hierarchical stratification of the elements of well-being, which was described above,
194
 
can be seen to be mirrored in the positioning of the rights recognised within the Convention. 
At a basic textual level, it is submitted that the prominent protection of the rights to life and 
freedom from torture
195
 is consistent with the pivotal position of life, and physical and mental 
integrity as basic goods necessary for action pursuing any purposes.
196
 This prominence 
accords with the distinction between the basic harms which deny basic goods, and which will 
prevent the pursuit of any purpose, and specific harms against non-subtractive and additive 
goods which will instead reduce an agent’s capacity to pursue their purposes.197 
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Of the non-subtractive rights, not all the conduct that Gewirth explicitly states as being 
protected against has a clear partner in the text of the Convention, however, the ECHR can be 
seen to show a general concern for those goods that fall within the protection of these generic 
rights. Privacy, when a non-subtractive good required by an agent for the pursuit of his 
particular purposes,
198
 is explicitly stated amongst the rights protected under Article 8. 
Although not defined in detail by Gewirth, the content of the privacy protection under the 
PGC can be deduced from its purpose of the protection of the purposiveness from which it is 
drawn. As an element of the generic good of freedom, it requires respect for a person’s 
capacity to choose how to live their life with freedom from coercion and other duress,
199
 as a 
non-subtractive right, privacy can therefore be seen to require respect for an agent’s 
substantive choices as to the form of life they wish to live. The fact that Article 8 states a 
protection for ‘private and family life’ (emphasis added) suggests a similar focus which is 
consistent with an aim of the protection of a person’s chosen form of life. In concordance 
with this interpretation of a right to privacy as the protection of the form of life that follows 
agents’ personal purposes, the courts have interpreted the Convention’s protection for privacy 
to require respect for a person’s choice as to the way they live their life.200 
 
Similarly, the non-subtractive good of not being a victim of theft
201
 can be seen to support the 
protection given to property rights within the Convention,
202
 and the maintenance of the 
underlying ability to pursue purposes generally is protected in a negative sense by the 
Convention’s prohibitions on the deprivation of liberty in Articles 4 and 5. However, these 
liberty rights also clearly protect the generic interest in freedom and the underlying generic 
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feature of voluntariness described above, illustrating the overlap between the generic rights 
described previously.
203
 Although not explicitly protected in the Convention, a specific non-
subtractive right or interest in the public perception of one’s character, including not being 
subject to defamation or insult, mentioned by Gewirth
204
 can be seen to be protected in the 
Convention by the way in which the courts have interpreted Article 10(2); applying it to 
define the scope of the speech rights of others under Article 10(1) in order to protect the good 
of the reputation of another.
205
 
 
In relation to the additive rights, some of those explicitly argued for by Gewirth are similarly 
explicitly found within the Convention. The prohibition on interference with a person’s 
education in Article 2 of Protocol 1 clearly protects a person’s capacity to develop their 
abilities and so increase their ability to achieve their purposes.  The Convention’s prohibition 
on discrimination, although explicit, is not a generally applicable free standing right; it 
prohibits discrimination only in the extent to which a person can exercise the other 
Convention rights.
206
 This contingency is, however, shared with the requirement of non-
discrimination which is conceptually entwined with the PGC. By ‘requiring every agent …act 
in accord with the generic rights of his recipients as well as of himself, the PGC 
proscribes…an equality of generic rights.’207 This manifestation of the PGC in practical terms 
requires individuals respect the generic rights of the recipients of his actions,
208
 and that the 
rules of society which govern interactions between individuals and the actions of individuals 
working for state institutions ensure that the equality of the generic rights to freedom and 
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well-being is ‘provided, restored, or reinforced’.209 Thus, in the same way as Article 14 
requires non-discrimination in relation to the respect for others enjoyment of their generic 
rights, the PGC through the equality of generic rights (EGR) can be seen to require non-
discrimination in respect
 
for the generic rights of others. 
 
The protection of self-esteem as an additive good under the Convention can be seen in the 
protection from discrimination just described. For, as noted by Gewirth, non-discrimination 
prevents an agent from being treated as less worthy of respect for his purposiveness than 
other agents.
210
 Article 3’s prohibition on degrading treatment gives similar protection, the 
ECtHR in Ireland v United Kingdom holding that it prohibited conduct which caused persons 
to feel ‘inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their 
physical or moral resistance.’211  
 
From the forgoing illumination of the Convention and the judgements of the ECtHR, and the 
domestic courts using the primary colours of the generic rights, it is clear that the law can be 
seen to further these underlying moral norms and so capable of being interpreted in a way 
which gives effect to them. The protection given by the negative obligations contained in the 
Convention can be seen to be necessary to protect the fundamental generic features of those 
identified previously as demanding or precautionary deserving of concern. 
 
Positive Obligations 
In addition to the negative duties that the PGC imposes upon agents to govern their actions 
affecting other beings, it imposes positive obligations because the general duty act in 
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accordance with the generic rights of others
212
 also involves a ‘positive concern for their 
having the objects of’213 the generic rights. Agents have this positive duty to further other 
agents’ generic features of action because, under the above described arguments to the 
PGC,
214
 in claiming for themselves positive rights to the generic goods necessary for their 
agency, they must recognise the possession of these rights by other agents and their own 
corresponding duties in relation to them.
215
 The vindication of these rights can be achieved 
between individuals directly, or indirectly by the creation of appropriate institutional 
arrangements.
216
 
 
The EGR manifestation of the PGC requires that agents must actively seek to ensure that all 
other agents achieve fulfilment of their generic needs for freedom and well-being to which 
they have rights.
217
 The obligations flowing from this element of the PGC entail that, where 
an agent does not have the full generic goods of freedom and well-being necessary for 
purposive action, agents cannot claim to have discharged their duties simply by the fact that 
they did not cause the agent’s predicament.218 The equality of respect for the generic rights of 
all agents, the EGR, is not achieved if other agents are deficient in the attainment of the 
freedom and well-being to which they have rights and agents thus have corresponding duties 
to vindicate.
219
 
 
Whereas the negative obligations imposed by many of the Convention rights are clearly 
stated in the text, the ECtHR has used three different justifications in its decisions on whether 
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a Convention right stated in negative terms also implicitly imposes a positive obligation. 
However, the court has not yet stated a general theory of positive obligations. The need for 
the rights to give effective protection is the common factor amongst the three justifications 
the ECtHR invokes to give a legal basis to its recognition of positive obligations. However, 
the court decides on the specific content of the obligations imposed by Convention articles on 
a right-by-right basis without regard to a deeper shared underlying theoretical basis.  
 
In finding positive obligations under the rights incorporated by the HRA the domestic courts 
have, understandably, been heavily influenced by the judgements of the ECtHR. As a 
consequence of their close regard to Strasbourg jurisprudence on this matter they have often 
similarly given effectiveness centred justifications for their finding of positive obligations, or 
have simply invoked the Court’s judgements as precedents. Similarly, the domestic courts 
have also failed to provide any deeper theoretical justification to systematise the recognition 
of positive obligations. 
 
A justification for the recognition of positive obligations, based ultimately on ensuring the 
protection of the capacity to act in a voluntary purposive manner, can be seen to be similar in 
approach to the ECtHR’s effectiveness argument under Article 13220 also applied by the 
United Kingdom courts in some cases.
221
 Both the perspectives of the PGC and the courts 
regard positive obligations as necessary to ensure the effectives of an underlying norm, in 
Strasbourg’s case the specific Convention rights, in the Principle’s case the more 
fundamental concept of agency.  
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When compared to the argument for positive obligations as necessarily entailed by the EGR 
manifestation of the PGC, the domestic and Strasbourg courts’ use of the similarly contingent 
Article 14 right to non-discrimination to recognise particular positive obligations
222
 can be 
seen to follow a logic similar to that applied by Gewirth. Thus, rights which under the PGC 
or the Convention are equally held by all agents but by accident of fate may be practically 
possessed only by some, must actively be sought to be provided to all by agents.
223
 Gewirth, 
however, goes further than this by arguing that this equality entails positive obligations in 
relation to all the rights, not only when rights of one particular group are protected. Thus, in 
the example case of Ghaidan
224
 the PGC via the EGR might be interpreted as entailing an 
obligation to recognise a positive right to succeed to a tenancy for all relevant persons 
because of their fundamental agency, not merely because the state had unjustifiably protected 
it for one group but not others.
225
 However, for Article 14 to be applied in such a way the 
court would have to change its long held interpretation of this right from a focus on whether a 
state action ‘engages’ a right in a discriminatory matter,226 to the view that its requirement 
that ‘[the] Convention rights shall be secured’227 requires all the rights to be positively 
‘secured’ without discrimination; shifting the emphasis of the Article from protecting against 
discrimination to the protecting of Convention rights generally.
228
 
 
When the substantive Gewirthian positive obligations with a foundation in the PGC are 
contrasted with those that have been recognised by the domestic and Strasbourg courts, it is 
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apparent that the Convention does give protection to ensuring these positive needs for action 
are met. However it is apparent that it could go further in doing so. 
 
Although, etymologically, freedom is understood as being concerned with being free from the 
control of another in choice of action, particularly in the context of slavery,
 229
 under the PGC 
the generic right to freedom can impose positive obligations on agents to act to ensure that 
others have this generic necessary good.
230
 Thus, the capacity of an agent to exercise the 
choice which is protected in a negative form by the PGC also requires that an agent ‘must 
have knowledge of relevant circumstances’,231 in order to decide whether to choose to be 
subject to the action of another. This right and correlative positive obligation of imparting 
information was recognised under the Convention in Guerra v Italy as protected by Article 
8,
232
 a right which has already been shown to be capable of giving strong protection to the 
generic right to freedom in choice.
233
  Here, the court held that information should have been 
provided because it was necessary for the claimants to properly decide whether they wanted 
to live near a polluting factory.
234
 
 
More substantively, the capacity for voluntary choice supporting many Convention rights 
which explicitly state negative obligations of non-interference, can also be seen to impose 
positive obligations on the state to ensure that the negative requirements are respected and 
that the capacity for choice is maintained and protected against the actions of others.
235
 This 
obligation supports the previously discussed decisions in Van Colle and Osman v United 
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Kingdom which required the state to protect individuals from threats to their life – protected 
by their negatively stated right to freedom from interference – posed by others.236 Similarly, 
this theoretical basis would support the positive obligation states have been held to have to 
protect, from interference by others, individuals’ choice of how they exercise their freedom 
of expression.
237
 
 
The generic right to well-being, like that of freedom, entails that agents may have to 
recognise that they owe positive obligations to act in order to protect and maintain the basic 
well-being of other agents.
238
 When the PGC is applied indirectly to the state, as opposed to 
directly between individuals, to assess the compliance of the actions of state actors with the 
PGC the basic rights can be seen to impose positive obligations to provide particular 
protections for the basic rights.
239
 In positive terms, the state must provide a basic criminal 
law which protects well-being
240
 and also that ‘only persons who have violated the rights 
should be punished, there must be equality before the law, trials must be fair [and] habeas 
corpus must be guaranteed’.241 The Convention text can be seen to require these basic goods 
be provided by states. Article 2’s requirement that the law protect life imposes a positive 
obligation to legislate against interference with the most basic good
242
 and Article 5 and 6’s 
procedural requirement make positive demands of legal systems. 
 
Beyond these more procedurally natured – what Gewirth calls ‘static’243 – positive 
obligations, the PGC can also be interpreted as requiring more proactive, dynamic
244
 action 
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which impose duties upon agents and the state to take positive steps to ensure that beings 
possess all three elements of well-being.
245
 As people are unequal in their possession of, or 
ability to attain, the generic goods that form the three elements of well-being,
246
 the EGR 
entails that agents and indirectly the state can have duties to provide for basic needs such as 
housing and food, additive goods such as employment possibilities, access to education and a 
safe environment, as well as non-subtractive goods such as privacy by support for family 
life.
247
  
 
The Limits of Positive Obligations 
Gewirth recognises that these positive obligations cannot be unlimited in nature. Similarly, 
the domestic courts and the ECtHR have in some cases refused to find that the Article at issue 
gives rise to this type of obligation. However, whereas the courts’ reticence is formally based 
in constitutional concerns, Gewirth’s is primarily based in the PGC’s protection of freedom 
and well-being.
248
 An approach proceeding from the generic goods and rights can thus 
provide a more clearly morally principled basis which could inform domestic courts’ 
decisions. However, similarities in the questions asked by the courts in deciding this issue 
means that often they may reach similar results.  
 
Consistent with the recognition of the practicalities of life, the positive obligations imposed 
by the PGC do not require agents act to prevent every diminution of other’s generic needs; 
they need only act where they are in a position to do so.
249
 Where action to maintain 
another’s generic rights is impossible for an agent, or where he has no knowledge of the harm 
to another and it is not reasonable to expect him to have that knowledge, he does not have a 
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duty to attempt the impossible. The general principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, presupposes 
that for a person to be placed under a duty to act they must be capable of fulfilling that duty. 
Thus, where an agent has not the knowledge or ability to aid another’s generic rights or 
interests, he has no positive obligation under the PGC to so act and thus does not contradict 
the dialectical consequences of his agency by failing to so act.
250
  
 
However, even where these practical considerations do not prevent the bearing of a positive 
obligation, the PGC in stating that an agent must act in accordance with his own and other’s 
generic rights, will not impose an obligation upon an agent to maintain the freedom or well-
being of another where this would unjustifiably impinge upon the agent’s own generic 
needs.
251
 To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with EGR, contradicting the PGC, for it 
would be to require an agent to give insufficient regard to his own generic rights.
252
  Thus, for 
the PGC to impose a positive obligation, the generic interest or right of the being in favour of 
whom the obligation exists must be sufficiently important in order to justify the limitation of 
the freedom of choice of action of the agent subject to the duty.
253
 This requirement that the 
limitation of an agent’s freedom be justified also entails that, for the PGC to impose a 
positive duty upon an agent, the one to whom the duty is owed must be unable to realise their 
generic goods without the assistance of another. If this were not the case, the limitation of the 
duty bearer’s freedom could not be justified. 
 
In a related manner, the final condition required for a positive obligation to arise under the 
PGC is directly concerned with the balancing of all the relevant generic rights and interests of 
both parties. The concern for a potential duty bearer’s rights entails that the PGC only 
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requires that an agent to act positively to maintain another’s generic rights or interests where 
the agent can do so without being subject to an excessive interference with his own generic 
rights, judged in relation to the relative importance for action of the rights or interests of the 
one to whom the duty is owed.
254
 An agent might, therefore, not be required to risk his own 
basic goods to preserve another’s, depending on their weight,255 although, it would not 
necessarily be contrary to the PGC for them to choose freely to do so as an exercise of their 
own purposive agency.
256
 
 
To some extent the domestic courts and ECtHR can be seen to apply a similar, though more 
pragmatic, approach.
257
 In their decisions on whether a positive obligation is imposed by a 
Convention right, they balance the interests of the individual in need of proactive protection 
against the wider interests of society in a manner consistent with the approach required by the 
PGC, balancing the competing rights of the claimant and of those who will bear the burden of 
the positive obligation embodied within the general interest to determine what is an 
unacceptable comparable cost. The ECtHR’s balancing of the interests of the community and 
the individual in deciding whether to interpret an Article as imposing a positive obligation,
258
 
and the domestic courts proportionality test of whether a positive obligation has been 
fulfilled,
259
 both follow this reasoning without regard to Gewirth’s principled fundamental 
basis for rights. Additionally, in the deference shown both by the ECtHR to the states in its 
margin of appreciation
260
 and in the domestic courts to the other branches of government 
under the separation of powers,
261
 the courts can still be seen to be focusing on achieving at 
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the appropriate balance, however in these cases the courts feel that it is the member states or 
legislature that is best placed to determine what the balance is.
262
 As argued above,
263
  this 
deference can itself  be interpreted as involving consideration of whether the right at issue is 
of sufficient weight to justify the their overriding potential polycentric implications for 
others’ rights and interests. 
 
In light of this it is arguable that not only cases where the ECtHR and domestic courts have 
recognised implicit positive obligations, such as the requirement of legal aid
264
 and the 
protection of family life in Marckx v Belgium,
265
 are consistent with the PGC. Cases such as 
Anufrijeva v Southwark LBC
266
 where the courts refused to recognise a positive obligation 
because of the cost to society, or Ghaidan
267
 where they deferred the decision on the 
provision of assistance to another branch of government, can also be seen to respect the PGC 
in so far as the reluctance to recognise the right was at its basis because of the competing 
rights and interests of others.  
 
The implications of interpretation based in the PGC for the British courts’ approach to this 
question of rights interpretation, in increasing the clarity of the law and providing a coherent 
principled basis for their judgments, can be seen when the judicial response to S.55(1) of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is analysed in light of it. The leading decision 
of Limbuela, as noted above, rejected the existence of a general positive obligation under 
Article 3 on the state to provide assistance for the destitute.
 268
 It is however submitted that, 
had the House of Lords interpreted the Convention using the PGC they would have been 
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compelled to uphold this positive obligation, and that such an approach would have produced 
a clearer and more coherent decision than the circuitous analysis the court adopted. 
 
In contrast to the domestic and Strasburg jurisprudence, the PGC through the EGR has been 
shown to state a general principle of positive obligations.
269
 From this can be derived a duty 
to act to ensure that others are not in a state of destitution. Food and a place of shelter, after 
life, can be seen to be the basic of goods needed for humans to exercise purposive agency, 
and without them the most basic good, life, is itself in danger.
270
 Roosevelt recognised this in 
stating ‘freedom from want’ amongst the four most basic freedoms necessary for a world 
where human rights were protected.
271
  
 
As noted above, the positive obligations under the PGC are not unlimited; the duty to ensure 
that others have the generic goods necessary for their purposive agency only exists to the 
extent that agents, or indirectly the state on their behalf, can fulfil it without an unjustifiable 
impingement upon the generic rights of agents.
272
 In a similar way, under the domestic and 
European approach to positive obligations under the Convention, including those found under 
unqualified rights, a proportionality analysis is applied to determining whether such an 
obligation should be implied into the right.
273
  
 
In declining to find a freestanding positive obligation in Limbuela, the Lords however 
recognised that Britan was a comparatively rich country and that, except for late applicants 
covered by s.55, s.95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 combined with our system of 
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social security showed a commitment and ability to ensure that no-one within this society was 
reduced to destitution.
274
 In light of this, when combined with the obligation under the PGC 
in the form of the EGR used as a basis to interpret the Convention rights, and the importance 
of the basic goods in question, it is submitted that it was unjustified for the court to decline to 
hold that there was a general positive obligation under the incorporated Convention rights to 
prevent destitution as it is within the power of British society, through the state, to prevent it. 
This could have been practically achieved, either by reinterpreting ‘treatment’ under Article 3 
more broadly as covering the consequences of an omission to provide basic necessities,
 275
 or 
implied into Article 8 right respect for private life.
276
 As Lord Brown argued, ‘[t]he real issue 
…is whether the state is properly to be regarded as responsible for the harm inflicted (or 
threatened) upon the victim;’277 under the PGC it is responsible for destitution it can remedy. 
 
The courts deferential concerns were understandable; upholding this positive obligation 
would have immediate resource implications.
278
 However, the vital importance of the generic 
need in question and the fact that such support would have been available but for S.55 
empowers the court to find the positive obligation, in spite of the polycentric implications of 
the decision and because of the moral principled nature of the obligation. When analysed 
from the perspective of the EGR and the factors that the courts currently consider in 
determining whether to show deference in finding a positive obligation, it is submitted that, 
under the proportionality test applied by the courts to determine the extent of positive 
obligations under the Convention, the importance of the right and the extent of the 
interference requires and allows the courts to uphold the freestanding positive obligation in 
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spite of the resource allocation implications.
279
 The approach argued for here does go beyond 
the ECtHR’s position that the provision of a minimum standard of social support is not 
required by the Convention, but is instead left to each member state’s legislature.280 However, 
this margin of appreciation and the Supreme Court’s recent sounding of the retreat from the 
‘no more than’ element of the Mirror Principle, when combined with the force of the 
obligation under the PGC, places such an approach within the domestic courts’ power.  
 
In this way, by using the PGC as a basis for the interpretation of the Convention, a principled 
approach to whether the courts should interpret rights as imposing positive obligations can be 
found, and coherence can be brought to an area of interpretation which has thus far lacked 
any broad principled approach in either ECtHR or domestic jurisprudence.
281
 Had the courts 
been prepared to find such an obligation, the long and complicated case law surrounding 
S.55,
282
 which had resulted in a backlog of 100 cases at the time Limbuela,
283
 could have 
been avoided. This would have brought clarity to the law, and also increased coherence. 
Rather than having to find a positive obligation as a remedy to an infringement of a negative 
right in order to show an unjustified deference to parliament, the courts should have directly 
found the positive obligation to protect persons from a position of destitution, a conclusion 
which is clearer and the reasoning behind which coheres with the importance of the 
Convention right (and the underlying generic need) at issue.  
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Conclusion 
The substantive positive and negative requirements of the generic rights to freedom and well-
being can thus be seen to find protection in the various Convention rights. That the ECHR 
gives this textual protection to the generic rights shows it to be practical for them to be used 
to interpret the scope of the Convention rights on this question. That the recognition and 
respect for the generic rights is dialectically necessary gives the theoretical impetus to do so. 
 
The Balancing and Weighing of the Convention Rights 
Conflicts Between Rights 
The potential for rights to conflict with other rights is explicitly recognised and provided for 
within the Convention.
284
 Gewirth, too, recognises this as a necessary consequence of the 
possession by all agents of rights to freedom and well-being under the principle of 
universalisability.
285
 Consistent with this the PGC, in stating that agents must act in 
accordance with their own and other’s genetic rights, can be seen to implicitly recognise that 
an agent’s pursuit of his purposes can interfere with the protected purposive action of other 
agents.  
 
Most directly, the choice of one agent as to how to act under his generic right to freedom may 
conflict with the rights of another agent to the goods protected by his right to well-being.
286
 
Similarly, an agent can also infringe another’s generic right to freedom by actions which 
control or limit their capacity for choice in a way to which they do not consent.
287
 Outside of 
these direct transactional relationships between agents and those they intend to be affected by 
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their choices,
288
 there is also the potential that an action may indirectly affect the generic 
rights or interests of others. For instance, in the case of the conjoined twins Mary and Jodie, 
not only were they and their parents’ generic rights or interests directly affected by the 
court’s decision, but it could also have implications for other agents in society generally, by 
for example conveying a message about the reduced value of life which may be the start of a 
slippery slope of less respect for the value of agency.
289
 Similarly, in Pretty Lord Bingham 
stated obiter that even if refusal of assistance in suicide were a breach of Pretty’s Convention 
rights it would be justified by the need to protect the vulnerable from being persuaded to 
commit suicide.
290
 
 
The inevitability that the rights of agents will conflict, and also therefore that the interests of 
non-ostensible agents will do so too, entails that generic rights are not and cannot be 
absolute.
291
 This must be the case in order to avoid creating an inherent contradiction within 
the PGC by both requiring that an agent act in pursuance both of his own generic needs, 
whilst at the same time not infringing upon those of other agents. However, consistent with 
the categorical necessity of the supreme principle of action, agents must also accept that the 
balancing of rights where they come into conflict is itself set by the elements of the PGC.
292
 
With this basis for balancing of the generic rights in the PGC, agents must on pain of 
contradiction rationally accept the balance the principle dictates.
293
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Weight and Balance 
As noted previously, the approach of ECtHR and the United Kingdom courts to the issue of 
balancing the Convention rights in cases where they come into conflict with other rights and 
general interests involves several elements. These are questions that the courts ask, when 
applying a proportionality analysis, to determine the weight of competing rights by seeking to 
gauge the relative position of the rights at issue along different spectrums. The courts 
consider the relative weight or importance of the rights in the circumstances of the case
294
 
and the extent to which that would be interfered with,
295
 the strata within a hierarchy of 
Convention rights on which respective rights reside
296
 and the extent to which an action 
impinges upon the core or essence of a right.
297
 
 
However, within these interpretive approaches there is no consistent principled guidance to 
assist the courts in arriving at decisions under these considerations. As noted above,
298
 the 
courts vary in the amount of detail they give in justifying their decisions, advancing very 
much on a case by case basis, tailoring their decisions closely to the facts of the case before 
them. Consequently, the judicial adjudicative licence that exists under the factors the courts 
do consider contains scope for the use of the guidance which can be derived from the PGC. 
As a justification for why humans should be recognised as having rights or interests protected 
by the Convention, it follows that the generic features of agency should also be used in 
determining the scope of that protection in cases of conflict between the rights and interests 
of different persons. The regard in the Court of Appeal to the principle of the sanctity of life 
in Re A to attempt to resolve the conflict of the rights of the twins
299
 demonstrates some 
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acceptance by the judiciary of the role underlying principles can play in determining the 
relative weight of rights.  
 
Gewirthian Weight 
From the perspective of a basis for the Convention rights in the agency protected by the PGC, 
two factors are relevant to the resolution of conflicts of rights; the weight of the generic rights 
or interests, and the weight of the moral status of the individual.
300
 As noted above, that the 
generic rights or interests can be of different weight is a consequence of the recognition that 
some attributes are more crucial than others to the ability to act for purposes that 
characterises agency.
301
 Regard to the moral status of beings in cases of conflicting rights or 
interests, follows logically from the basis of the generic rights in agency and the above 
described impossibility of knowing with certainty whether any being other than oneself is an 
agent.
302
 In straightforward situations where both parties are ostensibly agents, the relative 
weight of their generic rights will determine whose rights should be vindicated. However, 
where there is a conflict with the generic interests of a non-ostensible agent then the relative 
moral status of parties to the conflict, as well as the relative weight of their rights or interests, 
must be taken into account to determine whose rights or interests should be upheld. 
 
The varying needfulness of the different generic needs for the purposive action attributes 
relative value to the generic rights.
303
 As noted above, amongst the three sub-classifications 
of the generic good of well-being there is an inherent hierarchy
304
 under which an 
interference with an agent’s well-being is more morally wrongful the more it interferes with 
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an agent’s abilities to achieve its purposes.305 It is thus the case that the basic goods are of the 
greatest weight, and of these some are more indispensible for purposive action than others.
306
  
Life must necessarily be foremost
307
 given that, although we cannot be certain,
308
 death 
appears to stop all purposive action. This is then followed by the need for physical and 
mental integrity.
309
 The rights to subtractive and non-subtractive goods are of lesser relative 
moral weight,
310
 and of these it has been argued that the non-subtractive rights and interests 
should be deemed to have the greater weight.
311
 
 
Of the two, ‘non-subtractive rights rank higher than the additive because to be able to retain 
the goods one has is usually a necessary condition of being able to increase one's stock of 
goods.’312 Although both non-subtractive goods and additive goods increase the likelihood of 
successful purposive action, to lose the capacity for action one already has necessarily causes 
a greater reduction in the capacity for purposive action than a failure to increase one’s ability 
to act. 
 
The right or interest of freedom, to voluntarily choose whether to act or be acted upon, as a 
generic right, cannot be curtailed, unless the restriction is justified under the PGC by the need 
to protect another’s generic rights or interests in well-being.313 The substantive content of the 
generic features of a being’s purposive pursuit of particular purposes, protected through the 
various elements of well-being, thus set the limits of another agent’s procedural right to – or 
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non-ostensible agent’s interest in – freedom, protecting his capacity for voluntary choice.314 
Additionally, where the rights or interests in freedom of two beings conflict and appear 
equally matched, balancing the freedom of one against the well-being of the other, which, as 
noted above, can sometimes overlap with the protection given by their right to freedom,
315
 
can determine whose freedom should be upheld.
316
 
 
Against the well-being of another, the manner and extent of interference and also ‘the degree 
of importance of the objects or purposes to which the behaviours interfered with are directed’ 
is also relevant to determining whether a constraint of freedom is justified by the generic 
needs.
317
 This degree of importance is judged in terms of the generic good that purpose 
furthers, Gewirth gives the example of the position that being prevented from eating one’s 
favourite cake is less serious an interference with one’s generic needs than being prevented 
from eating anything at all.
318
 Where an agent’s actions do not involve another in a 
transaction to which they do not consent or inflicts harm to their well-being by reducing their 
capacity for action, a form of general liberty is recognised under the PGC and their exercise 
of their generic freedom of action should not be restricted.
319
  
 
This manner of attributing weight to the generic rights and interests, of assessing their 
relative weight within a hierarchy, is by its nature not generally able to give precise cardinal 
value to them.
320
 An exception to this is the basic right or interest in life, as the most 
apparently fundamental characteristic necessary for the achievement of any purpose, it must 
be assigned the highest value, although this does not entail that it must always be vindicated 
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over a competing right or interest. The relative weight of the generic rights and interests is 
not the sole determinant of their balancing, to enumerate their content the PGC first specifies 
what beings have the necessary status to be deemed to have these moral rights and interests. 
With beings of identical status, such as two ostensible agents, their moral status will give no 
guidance to this one variable conflict. However, in situations where the rights of an agent 
conflict with the interests of a non-ostensible agent, or those of two non-ostensible clash, the 
relative moral status of the beings must also be considered in determining the weight to be 
attributed to their respective claims to generic rights and interests.
321
 
 
As shown previously, the impossibility of knowing with absolute certainty whether any being 
other than oneself is an agent requires precautions be taken against the possibility that other 
beings are agents so that the PGC is not violated, in proportion to the likelihood that the other 
being may be an agent.
322
 It follows from this that, in balancing the generic rights and 
interests of different beings, greater moral status should be attributed to beings that are more 
probably agents, and consequently greater weight given to their generic rights or interest than 
to beings that are less probably agents and their interests.
323
 The probability that a being is an 
agent is thus ascribed on precautionary grounds in proportion to the extent to which a being 
displays the characteristics of agency.
324
 Four forms of behaviour were argued above to 
indicate the capabilities of purposiveness and voluntariness a being possess, and their 
consequent moral status.
325
  
 
                                                 
321
 Beyleveld and Pattinson (n.45), 268 
322
 Above p.241-242 
323
 Beyleveld and Pattinson (n.35), 44-45 and see generally Beyleveld and Pattinson (n.45), 268-269 
324
 Above p.242-243 
325
 Above p.243 
   
 
288 
 
The PGC, as a non-speciesist theory, accords moral status with generic rights or interests to 
non-humans who display characteristics of agency.
 326
 However, even if the courts decline to 
adopt the PGC’s non-speciesist approach and thereby depart from their birth-centric 
interpretation of the Convention on the question of who can possess the rights it protects,
327
 
the moral status consideration remains relevant to the balancing of Convention rights of 
humans, as members of the human species vary in the extent to which they display the 
characteristics of agency.  
 
As the basis for the generic rights, the status of agent is the highest moral status possible.
328
 
However, the moral statuses of non-ostensible agents, although necessarily of lesser values, 
cannot be assigned such a cardinal pre-determined value, because their relativity to agency is 
not capable of similarly precise quantification in terms of value.
329
 In lieu of a precise 
mathematical formula, judgements of relative weight must instead be made in each case, 
based on the extent to which a being displays characteristics of ostensible agency.
330
 The 
greater those characteristics, the more it is possible to treat the being in accordance with the 
interests of agency and thus the greater moral status it is possible to attribute to it.
331
  
 
The lower moral status of non-ostensible agents, contrary to the claim of Holm and 
Coggon,
332
 does not necessarily entail that their generic interests are necessarily always of 
lesser weight than a conflicting generic right of an ostensible agent. Although this will be the 
case where the same generic right and interest is at issue, where the rights and interests 
claimed, as well as the moral status of the parties, is different, the nature of the rights and 
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interests at issue, as well as the moral status of the bearers, must be considered and the 
interests of non-ostensible agents will not always be defeated by those of an ostensible 
agent.
333
 
 
The guidance which the PGC and the precautionary approach to agency can give to the 
resolution of these multi-variable conflicts, between the different generic rights or interests of 
beings who have differing moral status, is, however, not mathematical in its precision.
334
 As 
argued above, upon a scale of importance for action of the characteristics of agency and 
generic rights and interests, only the status of agent and the right or interest in life can be 
attributed a cardinal value as of the highest status. The proximity to the moral status of 
ostensible agency is capable of being ranked at one of three levels by looking at the 
characteristics of agency they display.
335
 Similarly, the categories of basic, non-subtractive 
and additive give a hierarchy of generic goods, and the extent of an interference with generic 
freedom can be measured in relative terms. By the summation of these two factors, relative 
weight can be attributed to the rights and interest claimed by the parties and precedence given 
to the greater over the lesser.
336
 
 
The categories of non-ostensible agency are sufficiently broad that there will sometimes be 
room for arguments on the facts of a particular case as to which party’s rights or interests 
should be vindicated; owing to factual uncertainty as to the moral status of the beings or the 
particular nature, and the consequent relative precedence, of the generic goods at issue. 
However, compared to one variable conflicts of either generic goods or moral status, the 
scope for argument is greater where differing generic rights or interests belonging to beings 
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of different moral status are in conflict.
337
 The general lack of cardinal values, and scope for 
factual disagreement, means that in the balancing of the multiple variables no precise 
mathematical formula is readily applicable, and the resolution of these conflicts must be left 
to the judiciary to resolve on a case-by-case basis.
338
 
 
As alluded to previously,
339
 the resolution of these questions of balance through judicial 
debate and the societal dialogue that accompanies it does not undermine the dialectical 
necessity of the recognition of generic rights and interests. As Kenneth Westphal observes, 
not all questions can be neatly classified and determined by deductive reasoning, some are a 
matter of judgement.
340
 The application of moral principles and thus the practical 
implementation of the PGC involves detailed consideration of factual questions.
341
 What is 
important is that these decisions are properly reasoned. This will include the consideration of 
the views on the question that exist within the community, although the ultimate decision 
may not necessarily be one with which the majority of the community agree.
 342
 The domestic 
adversarial judicial system, with the opportunity for interested parties to make representations 
to the court, ably facilitates this debate. 
 
The Generic Weighting of Convention Rights 
From the fundamental status of the generic rights under the PGC as capable of justifying the 
existence, possession and respect of human rights, it follows that they can also provide 
philosophically cogent guidance to determine when one party’s Convention right should take 
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precedence over those of others.
343
 Although largely without mathematically definable 
cardinal values, the consideration of the moral status of beings and the generic rights to 
freedom and well-being can nevertheless help to guide the resolution of conflicts between 
Convention rights. Already, the domestic courts and Strasbourg attempt to allocate relative 
weight to Convention rights where they are called upon to make decisions on the 
proportionality of the infringement of a right in favour of competing rights or general 
interests.
344
 By virtue of the PGC’s dialectical necessity and intellectual coherence the 
generic rights, and their basis in the generic features of action, can provide principled 
justification and guidance to the courts in this practical application of the Convention.  
 
The hierarchy of rights that the courts have recognised in the context of the Convention can 
be seen in several respects to already mirror that of the generic rights. The basic goods of life 
and physical integrity are most strongly protected under Article’s 2 and 3. The courts credit 
these rights with fundamental status or sanctity, recognising their unqualified status under the 
Convention, with their protection generally incapable of being outweighed by other rights.
345
 
This primacy is a consequence of the argued severity of the consequences of the infringement 
of either for an individual’s physical and mental integrity,346 the equivalent of the ability to 
live a voluntary and purposive life as an agent protected by PGC.  
 
Alongside the rights to which the courts give the highest protection, the courts’ use of 
proportionality to resolve conflicts between these rights is open to principled direction by the 
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generic rights of freedom and well-being. In Campbell
347
 the court sought to balance 
Convention rights which concerned interferences with non-subtractive rights
348
 of privacy 
and the maintenance of the self-esteem
349
 against the right of the public not to be deceived 
and the right to freedom of the newspaper to communicate information.
350
 In attempting to 
balance these, the courts could have taken a coherently principled approach – in their 
consideration under the proportionality test of the question of interference with which right 
would be the greater – by consideration of the extent of the interference with the generic 
characteristic of purposive voluntary action. In its judgement, the House of Lords did, in fact, 
approach the case from a perspective that fits well with the rights protected by the PGC. The 
Lords’ focused upon the extent to which publication would detract from Miss Campbell’s 
freedom to pursue her purpose of receiving treatment,
351
 and the degree of importance of 
protection of the freedom of the paper to publish the type of information in question
352
 in 
light of the need to prevent the deception of the public, whose generic rights can also be seen 
to be relevant.
353
 The proportionality test can thus be seen to be susceptible to the influence 
of a basis in the PGC, and the courts already appear to consider elements that are consistent 
with the substantive rights for which it requires respect. 
 
In relation to additive rights, that their Convention equivalent are given lower weight is 
apparent from the fact that rights which the courts deem to outweigh other rights, when given 
content analogues to that of the basic goods, are treated with lesser weight when the positive 
obligations they impose are considered, open to being outweighed under a proportionality 
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analysis.
354
 In Limbuela Article 3 was held not to impose a positive duty for the provision 
food and accommodation,
355
 however, the court did not explain the limited scope of this 
positive obligation by explicitly balancing it against other rights Lord Scott, rather, argued 
that such provision was a matter for social legislation and a failure to provide it could never 
breach Article 3.
356
 Whether under the PGC this limitation of a positive obligation was 
correct depends on whether to create such an obligation would impose too great a comparable 
cost on the generic rights of others.
357
 Such an approach can, however, be seen in Lord 
Bingham’s argument in Pretty that the scope of a positive obligation depended on the balance 
that should be struck between the interests of the individual and the interests of the 
community.
358
 The acceptability under the PGC of the court in Limbuela deferring this 
decision to the state was discussed above,
359
 and the substantive decision appears susceptible 
to explanation under the PGC. 
 
As noted previously, for the limitation of rights in favour of some general interests, such as 
national security, under the proportionality tests of the qualified Convention rights,
360
 to be 
consistent with the anti-majoritarian aim and a deontological consequentialist rights basis for 
the Convention,
361
  such limitations in the general interest should be read as categories 
implicitly protecting individual rights and requiring the correct balance to be achieved 
between them.
362
 When the domestic decision on the indefinite detention of un-deportable 
foreign terrorist suspects
363
 is viewed in this way, the court can be seen to be required to 
balance the individual’s right to liberty against the positive duty of a state to protect against 
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threats to the right to life which underlies the general interest of a threat to the life of the 
nation.
364
 In the case, several of the Lords did explicitly view the balance they were required 
to strike in this way.
 365
  For this decision to be in accordance with the PGC, the courts would 
have to conclude that the threat to generic rights to freedom and the relevant basic and non-
subtractive goods of well-being of detained individuals outweighed the risks to the basic 
rights of others. That the court considered the importance of the competing interests or 
rights,
366
 whose weight can be determined by underlying generic rights, in assessing the 
necessity element of the proportionality
367
 analysis, shows a concern consistent with the 
PGC. That the courts require greater justification for a state action which interferes with a 
more important Convention right
368
 is also supported, and could be guided by, more explicit 
use of the reasoning and principles of PGC and its hierarchisisation of the generic rights. 
 
In a similar manner, the approach sometimes utilised by the ECtHR, of giving greater weight 
to actions that are at the core of what a right protects, can be guided by the PGC.
369
 To 
determine what actions should be deemed to covered by the core of a right, and hence be of 
greatest weight in balancing against other rights, the court could be directed by the extent to 
which one action is more important for freedom or well-being than another. For example, 
political speech, deemed in Lingens to be at the core of what Article 10 was intended to 
protect,
370
 could be argued to be of more importance to an agent’s voluntary purposiveness 
by enabling him to influence the way he is governed than commercial advertising which may 
increase his additive goods, but have less impact on the a person’s general capacity to act. 
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Such guidance would give a more cogent and fundamental basis to the assessment of what 
deserves most protection under the Convention rights than regard to principles such as ‘the 
concept of a democratic society’ 371 relied on in Lingens and which is used in the Convention 
in justifying qualifying the scope of some of the rights.
372
  
 
The current approach of the courts, to who and what can be deemed to be capable of 
possessing the Convention rights, limits the scope for regard to the moral status of beings in 
assigning weight in conflicts between the rights. Were it extended to cover foetuses and non-
human animals, it would be of much greater importance in balancing Convention rights.
373
 If 
a foetus were covered by the Convention it would necessarily be of less moral status than its 
mother because it would be a non-ostensible agent,
374
 albeit one whose probability of being 
an agent and moral status increased in proportion to its development.
375
 However, the 
mother’s rights would not necessarily prevail because the weight of the rights in conflict is 
effected not only by the higher moral status but also by the nature of the generic rights that 
are at issue.
 376
 Thus, a foetus’s basic rights may outweigh the non-subtractive rights of the 
mother. 
 
The consequences of the current basis for rights in the context of balancing conflicting rights 
can be seen in the judgements of Ward and Walker LLJ. in the conjoined twins case. In line 
with the basis for position of legal rights in being born and alive, the judges saw the sanctity 
of life as an absolute fundamental principle
377
 which could therefore not be subject to a 
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balancing exercise, for all human lives were held to be valued and weighted equally, and thus 
both twins had an equal right to life.
378
 The judges were thus required to consider the other 
factors described previously to determine whether the operation would be lawful, Ward LJ. 
relied on an analysis of the best interests of the twins and self-defence backed up by the 
principle of the sanctity of life,
379
 Brooke LJ. applied the principle of necessity to find the 
separation justified as a lesser evil
380
 and Walker LJ. applying the principle of necessity 
guided by the aim of maximising the bodily integrity of both twins.
381
  
 
Were the possession of rights to be held to be based on agency under the PGC, a different, 
clearer and more coherent approach would have been open to the courts to address the 
conflicting rights in this case. Under stage one of the argument to the PGC, life is the most 
important of basic goods, and thus also the most important generic right or interest.
382
 
However, as argued above, the basis in agency entails that moral status of the agent or non-
ostensible agent, in addition to the pantheonic position of the generic right or interest, must 
be considered in determining the balance to be struck between competing rights.
383
 
 
This approach would similarly have led the court to find in favour of separating the twins, 
however it would have done so through a clear and direct balancing of rights claims, which 
the Court of Appeal’s approach circumvented. Although the Court of Appeal was correct to 
attribute the highest weight to life, it was wrong to hold this prevented the twin’s rights from 
being balanced against each other.
384
 The PGC requires that they should have balanced the 
rights and determined whose should be given priority; Jodie’s potential to become an 
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ostensible agent, and that fact that Mary could live at most a few months un-separated, 
together with her impaired brain function, lead to the conclusion that under the precautionary 
approach to agency she had less moral status.
385
 ‘[T]he probability that Jodie is an agent is 
greater than the probability that Mary is an agent.’386  
 
At the fundamental level of generic rights and interests under the PGC, in this case Mary is 
claiming a positive right against Jodie that she be kept alive, and Jodie has a negative claim 
against Mary not to be killed by her attachment. At the legal level of rights claims under the 
Convention, when viewed from the PGC perspective of the protection of their generic needs, 
both can be viewed as indirect claims of positive obligations upon the state to live as long as 
possible; Jodie by being separated from Mary, Mary by remaining attached to or by being 
provided with some other form of life support. Contrary to the view of the Ward LJ,
387
 the 
primary duty to Mary must be to keep her alive, at present her life is not under threat and her 
interest is in continuing it, as Brooke LJ. argued, ‘[t]he doctor's purpose in performing the 
operation was to save life, even if the extinction of another life was a virtual certainty,’388 as 
Walker LJ. argued ‘the doctors do have duties to their two patients.’389 The significance of 
this is that as positive obligations, under the case law described previously, they are not 
absolute.
390
 Consequentially, in this way it would have been open to the court, whilst 
recognising the competing Article 2 claims, to uphold the balance between the rights required 
by the consideration of the children’s moral status and allow the operation. 
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Under this PGC based approach the courts would engage directly in the balancing of rights 
claims at issue, which their monolithic attribution of rights on the simple speciesist basis 
being born and alive prevented. This would have provided a clear means for resolving this 
conflict of rights rather than the various means by which the members of the court of appeal 
struggled to resolve what they refused to admit, was fundamentally a question of the 
balancing of rights. As an incredibly difficult moral decision, it is understandable that the 
judges wanted to send a clear message that all life is valuable. It is submitted that the PGC 
based approach provides a coherent means by which to recognise the cardinal importance of 
the basic good of life, whilst at the same time recognising, through its basis of the value of 
agency, that in this ‘unique’391 case of the conflict of these most important interests, it is 
clearly morally justified to take the only possible step that will preserve the child with the 
potential for ostensible agency at the expense of the life of the one that does not. 
 
It was noted above that the weight of the different levels of the various generic rights or 
interests, except life, and the various levels of moral status, except that of ostensible agency, 
cannot be given a mathematical pre-determined cardinal value. Rather, their weight, where 
rights and interests conflict, is relative between the various beings involved. This was also 
recognised in the description of the balancing process in the Convention context required in 
Re E as ‘not mechanistic but intuitive.’392 In spite of this, the dialectical necessity of the PGC 
as a moral principle and the coherence and consistency of basis that it can provide for the 
balancing of the Convention rights supports its use by the courts to help create thoroughly 
reasoned, transparent and accountable judgements.
393
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That the weight rights or interests should be recognised to have on the facts of a given 
situation is not inherently clear,
394
 can be seen to be reflected in the ECtHR’s margin of 
appreciation and the deference shown by domestic courts. Their recognition that bodies other 
than the courts may be better positioned to determine the weight of rights
395
 does not 
undermine the argument that the assessment of that weight is best done through the lens of 
the generic features and needs embodied within the PGC. Rather, deference and the margin of 
appreciation can be seen as recognition of the fact that the generic rights and interests do not 
generally have a clear cardinal value, and an attempt to ensure that the correct weight is 
given.  
 
The courts’ reservation to themselves of the ultimate power to decide when to defer or give a 
margin of appreciation on the balancing of rights,
396
 if combined with a regard by the courts 
to the generic rights and interest, could provide a standard against which the courts could 
hold differing allocations of weighting and withdraw the margin or deference if the other 
bodies’ weighting was clearly inconsistent with the PGC. That the courts are less willing to 
give a defence or a margin of appreciation where an unqualified right or the core of a right is 
at issue
397
  could be further informed by the weight given to generic rights and interests under 
the PGC. 
  
Conclusion  
It is apparent that the Gewirthian approach to the balancing of rights and interests can provide 
the courts with a coherent principled basis for their decision. That this is possible can be seen 
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for the approaches the courts already take and the factors they consider in assigning weight to 
rights. With the addition of the application of the PGC the courts can be provided with a 
dialectically justified moral framework within which to do this. 
 
Will Conception of Generic Rights 
The Nature of Gewirth’s Rights 
Under the dichotomy between will and interest conceptions of rights, concerning whether the 
recognition of the capacity of an agent to waive the benefit that his rights protect is essential 
to the identity of a norm as a right, Gewirth argues for a conception of the generic rights that 
falls within the interest conception. He claims that because, as noted previously,
398
 the rights 
to freedom and well-being ‘necessary to all action, no agent could waive them or be deprived 
of them and still remain an agent.’399 As a consequence of this necessity for action,400 
Gewirth argues that an agent could not alienate these rights by allowing others to interfere 
with them without contradicting or diluting his view of this necessity.
401
 From this, Gewirth 
claims that it is dialectically necessary that, consequentially, a purposive agent must 
necessarily be ‘opposed to whatever interferes’402 with his having the freedom and well-being 
that is necessary for any purposive action.
403
 
 
In contrast to the interference with his generic rights by others, Gewirth concedes that it is not 
inconsistent with his own purposive agency for an agent to commit an action which reduces 
his own generic goods. Although the PGC requires agents act in accordance with their own 
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rights to freedom and well-being as necessary to achieve their purposes,
404
 this duty is 
specific to the purposes that agents pursue.
405
 Gewirth thus argues that the PGC does not 
generally prohibit suicide or other self-harming actions such as drug taking,
406
 provided that 
these are the agent’s freely chosen purposes.407 Similarly, as noted above, although the PGC 
does not impose a positive obligation on an agent to sacrifice his own freedom or well-
being,
408
 it does not generally prohibit an agent from freely choosing to do so.
409
 
 
That under the PGC an agent can engage in action that would be objectively seen to interfere 
with his freedom and well-being, is justified by Gewirth on the grounds that the generic needs 
are contingent and instrumental to an agent’s achievement of his purposes.410 The 
instrumental nature of these goods entails that even in committing an action, such as suicide, 
which extinguishes at least ostensible agency, is an exercise of the agent’s generic rights and 
thus cannot be inconsistent with them.
411
 Rather, it would be an interference with the generic 
right to freedom to obstruct an agent’s voluntary decision to inflict harm upon himself.412 
 
Gewirth distinguishes the permissibility of an agent reducing his own ability to engage in 
voluntary purposive action from the self-contradiction of allowing such actions by others, on 
the grounds that the former is an exercise of his generic rights,
413
 whereas the latter is an 
interference with them which deprives him of the capacity to act.
414
 That an agent must 
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dialectically necessarily hold that the generic rights are good for him,
415
 means that the agent 
must see them as worth protecting, and Gewirth argues it is inconsistent with this 
fundamental position for an agent to allow interference with them.
416
  
 
Similarly, although Gewirth argues that agents can consent to rights transactions whereby 
another’s actions are allowed to affect their capacity for action,417 he argues that this is an 
exercise of the agent’s generic right to freedom which is distinct from requiring or allowing 
another to disregard their generic rights.
418
 Gewirth again argues that the former is an 
exercise of the generic right to freedom,
419
 whereas the latter is logically inconsistent with 
agency because an agent seeks to deny his own agency by declaiming the protection of his 
generic rights,
420
 and the fact that an agent wishes another to act towards them in a particular 
way is, as noted previously,
421
 insufficient to impose an obligation on another to act in that 
way.
422
 
 
The Necessary Nature of the Generic Rights 
Although, as with the substance of the generic rights, Gewirth claims the means of their 
operation can be derived by the dialectically necessary method, in reaching an interest based 
conception of the generic rights Gewirth can be seen to have incorrectly departed from the 
proper application of his own method. If the premise of the PGC in purposive agency is 
followed to its logical extent, then Gewirth’s insistence that the benefit of the generic rights 
cannot be waived by agents, whilst at the same time claiming these rights are based in and 
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protect the capacity for purposive action, can be seen to be contradictory. Additionally, that 
for Gewirth the PGC allows an agent to commit suicide and engage in other activities which 
appear objectively harmful to the freedom and well-being that make up the capacity for 
action, and permit others to do actions which effect the scope of their freedom of action, and 
yet not allow the waiving of the protection the rights give, is similarly incoherent.  
 
Instead, as Beyleveld and Brownsword argue, the basis of the generic rights in fact 
necessitates that they be recognised to be rights which are, by nature, of the will 
conception.
423
 As noted previously, the will conception is sometimes known as the choice 
conception of rights because it argues that at the basis of moral rights is the protection of the 
freedom of individual choice as to how to act and whether to be acted upon.
424
 The derivation 
of generic rights from purposive agency, the capacity to choose to act to achieve one’s chosen 
purposes,
425
 thus entails that the generic needs to which an agent has rights are only 
instrumental goods which enable agents to pursue their choices.
426
 Therefore, the rights are 
only of value to an agent insofar as they enable him to pursue his purposes.
427
 
 
The consequence of this nature of the rights is that, logically, if an agent’s purpose is that 
another treat him in a way that would otherwise be in disregard of his generic rights, then an 
agent is at liberty under the PGC to allow such treatment. By allowing such action, the agent 
does not contradict his own agency or generic rights because the agent’s choice pursues his 
purposes. Similarly if an agent no longer wishes the protection of his generic goods, they are 
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no longer of value to him and he does not contradict his agency by allowing others to deprive 
him of freedom or well-being.
428
 
 
From this reading and the logical application of Gewirth’s own theory, it is clear that it is 
contradictory for him to maintain that an agent can give up his own agency through 
suicide,
429
 and yet not recognise that the instrumental goodness of the generic needs and 
rights of agency means the benefits of these must also be capable of being waived. Similarly, 
if it is possible for an agent to choose to consent to the limitation of the scope of his rights in 
a transaction instigated by another, then it is inconsistent to hold that he cannot equally 
choose to waive the benefit of his rights and allow others to act in ways that would otherwise 
infringe his generic rights. The fact that an agent cannot always, under the PGC, compel 
another to act positively in a particular way in relation to him, does not logically entail that an 
agent cannot himself choose to give up the benefits of his rights. 
 
In addition to the Gewirth’s inconsistent conclusion that the generic rights follow the interest 
conception, his view that allowing for the waiving of the benefits of the generic rights would 
contradict the inalienable nature of these rights is inconsistent with the concept of 
inalienability as used within international human rights documents, described above.
430
 Under 
the UDHR, the ECHR, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and the 
American Declaration of Independence, the inalienability of rights entails that rights are 
incapable of separation from the inherent characteristic of the individual which is of value, 
their dignity.
431
 The recognition that an agent can choose to allow actions which from an 
objective standpoint infringe his generic needs protected by his generic rights to freedom and 
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well-being, waiving the benefit of the protection of those rights does not alter the fact that 
those rights derive from, and are thus inalienably connected to, the value of his purposive 
agency.  
 
Will Conception Convention Rights  
If the generic rights are used as a basis from which to interpret the rights of the Convention, 
which make no explicit statement as to the nature of the conception of rights it contains, it is 
apparent that the uncertainty of the domestic case law must be clarified in favour of applying 
a will conception and that support for this can be found in the ECtHR’s case law. The 
Strasbourg court already appears in some cases to apply a will conception,
432
 and at the very 
least there is no ‘clear and consistent’433 jurisprudence in favour of either conception. This 
entails that under the self-imposed mirror principle
434
 ECtHR case law supports, or at least 
does not prohibit, the application of a will conception of the Convention rights by the United 
Kingdom courts. 
 
To be consistent with the will conception the courts must depart from the elements of the 
interest approach in Brown,
435
 and recognise a general capacity to control what is done to 
one’s own body. Although the nature of the acts, which would otherwise interfere with rights 
based on freedom and well-being, to which persons can consent to cannot be unlimited,
436
 the 
courts must recognise a different starting premise from which to approach such questions, 
one that reflects a generic capacity for choice. Such a shift in the courts’ general thinking 
finds support in R v Dica (Mohammed), a case which raised the question of whether it was 
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possible to consent to the risk of contracting HIV though sex, where the court put emphasis 
upon the recognition of the individual as having autonomy which justifies the capacity to 
consent to the possibility of the infliction of some harm by others.
437
 This need only be made 
the rule rather than the exception. 
 
Altering the domestic approach to apply a will conception of Convention rights will not 
necessarily mean that previous cases, in which an interest conception of rights influenced the 
judgement, will now fall to be decided differently. Under the will conception, an agent does 
not have unlimited freedom to waive the benefits of his generic rights for, even if he wishes 
to waive the benefit of his own rights, he is bound by the PGC to respect the generic rights 
and interests of others,
438
 something Gewirth himself recognised as the case in relation to 
agent’s self-harming actions.439 The ECtHR’s statement that the waiving of rights will not be 
permitted where to do so would ‘run counter to any important public interest’,440 and the 
regard in Brown and Mosely to the danger to society of allowing the protection for personal 
integrity at issue to be waived,
441
 can be interpreted as considering the rights of others in this 
way.
 442
 Thus, the balancing conducted by the courts under this approach enables the capacity 
and freedom of agents’ to waive the benefits of their rights to be balanced against the generic 
rights and interests of others in a manner consistent with a will conception of rights.
443
 The 
substantive consequence of this is that, even if an agent is not prevented by that same agency 
from waiving the benefits of his rights, the refusal to allow waiving might still be upheld 
depending on the balance the PGC requires to be found
444
 between the conflicting rights. 
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In light of this were, the above discussed case of R v Brown
445
 to fall to be decided today, 
with Convention claims interpreted and resolved in accordance with the requirements of the 
PGC it is submitted that the substantive judgement, that consent to the actual bodily harm at 
issue is not possible in law, would remain the same. However, an approach which openly 
recognised a will conception basis for the Convention rights would have the advantage of 
engaging clearly with the question and implications of the nature of the rights, creating clear 
coherence with the basis upon which the rights are held.  
 
As noted above, the justifications for the decisions in this case were ambiguous, capable of 
being interpreted as propounding either will or interest conceptions.
446
 If the British courts 
instead base their approach in the underlying aim of furthering purposive agency when 
interpreting Article 8’s requirements,447 directly addressing the underlying question of 
whether an agent can waive the benefit of the indirect generic duty upon the state to protect 
them from harm and the horizontal generic right not to be harmed by others,
448
 this ambiguity 
of rights conception would be resolved by giving a single coherent basis for the decision. 
 
If the concern for the impact on ‘society’ and the ‘public interest’ of allowing consent to such 
harm
449
 is, as has previously been argued to be possible,
450
 interpreted as concern for the 
rights of others within society, including the generic rights of other agents, not just the 
immediate effect on the subjects of the masochistic acts in this case, or an amorphous impact 
on an abstract conception of society generally, then the decision is justified from the 
                                                 
445
 Above, p.143-145 
446
 Above, p.99-100 & 143-145 
447
 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39, [35]-[36] 
448
 Above, p.269-270 and below p.319-321 
449
 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown (n.447), [40] & [44] and Brown (n.435), 237, 245-246, 253 & 255 
450
 Above p. 80-81 & 100 
   
 
308 
 
perspective of the will conception PGC. With masochistic acts, the most direct danger of 
infringing the generic rights is from the risk that the parties to them do not freely consent to 
the harm. Where serious harm is inflicted, as opposed to the ‘spanking’ in Mosely,451 then the 
gravity of the potential infringement of the generic rights is more serious and the precaution 
of prohibiting the action, which cannot be regulated to ensure consent, is justified to protect 
those who do not truly consent. The limitation of the freedom of some, who do truly consent 
is justified by the weight of the danger of the freedom and well being of others. Although the 
PGC is a deontological principle, it is necessary in applying it to look at the qualitative 
likelihood of the potentially consequences of an action would be contrary to the PGC,
452
 to 
determine whether, when it is balanced against the infringement of rights not to allowing the 
action would entail, the action should be prohibited to protect the rights of others. Such an 
approach has theoretical consistency with the precautionary approach to the possession of 
rights,
453
 and has substantive legal coherence with the prohibition on allowing persons to 
waive the protection of the right to life to allow another to assist them to commit suicide, in 
case a vulnerable person should have their freedom and well-being infringed by coercion to 
consent.
454
  
 
Another clear and coherent will based justification which is available to court in upholding 
Brown, is the cost to society of the treatment of people who had validly consented to the 
harm. This can be seen to be a factor in the domestic and Strasbourg courts’ thinking.455 As 
noted above, under the PGC the indirect implications of actions on the generic rights of 
others can give rise to duties constraining action.
456
 It would therefore be justifiable under the 
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will conception of the PGC to prevent valid consent to such actions because of the indirect 
implications for others, rather than to protect the participant themselves from the freely 
chosen harm. Such an approach would also be consistent with existing laws limiting the 
potential for persons to choose to risk harm to themselves, because of the wider implications 
to society, such as the requirement of helmets for motorcyclists.
457
 
 
As a capacity for choice is fundamental to the possession of rights under the will conception, 
only beings capable of such choice can hold these rights.
458
 Consistent with this, under the 
approach to the possession of the generic rights argued for previously, as the capacities of 
voluntariness and purposiveness are necessary to hold the generic rights, only agents can 
possess those rights.
459
 Thus, animals and children cannot be said to hold the waivable 
generic rights, however, they must be deemed to have generic interests which should be 
respected under the precautionary thesis.
460
 It follows from this that, in determining whether a 
particular person can waive the benefit of a Convention right, regard must be had to whether 
they have sufficient capacity to choose to abdicate its protection. Those without this capacity 
but with sufficient characteristics of agency to be protected by PGC based Convention rights, 
including some children, thus should not be deemed capable of waiving
461
 the protection of 
the Convention rights which apply to protect their generic interests.  
 
As noted above,
462
 the will and interest theories are however conceptions of rights as a whole, 
and the rights stated by a moral theory such as the PGC can therefore only be of one of these 
sub-species. However, by distinguishing between substantive Convention rights of the ECHR 
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as a system of rights for the protection of those who fall within its scope
463
 and the generic 
rights of agents under the PGC when used as a justifying basis for the ECHR in this way, it is 
possible for the Convention rights to be coherently applied as either will or interest rights. 
Depending on the capacities of the holder of those rights, as either having the agency which 
gives rise to generic rights, the benefit of which is by nature necessarily waivable, or as non-
ostensible agents with generic interests, whose benefit is not necessarily so, the nature of their 
substantive Convention rights should be interpreted accordingly. Decisions consistent with 
this approach can be seen in both the domestic and the Strasbourg case law. The ECtHR’s 
concern to ensure that a person displays an unequivocal intention to waive the benefit of a 
Convention right,
464
 and asking whether a person has had sufficient information to make such 
a choice,
465
 can be seen to ensure that only those capable of waiving the benefit of rights are 
deemed to have done so. A similar knowledge of the risks was said to be required in the 
obiter statements in the domestic case of Dica.
466
  
 
Although some domestic decisions appear to apply an interest conception of rights, the law 
concerning a person’s ability to consent to or refuse medical treatment shows that 
consideration of capacity to consent to or refuse actions done towards them, is not a concept 
alien to domestic law. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out a statutory framework for 
making such decisions
467
 and the courts have held that mentally competent persons can refuse 
treatment even if necessary to save their life.
468
 Although such a decision is an instance of the 
exercise of a right to be free from interference to which one does not consent, that the respect 
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for an individual’s capacity for choice given by the courts in these cases469 is not replicated in 
the context of waiving the benefit of rights to non-interference is an inconsistency in the 
courts’ approach. This existing law thus demonstrates that there is scope and support within 
domestic law for a move towards a will conception of the Convention rights. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the approach of United Kingdom courts is unclear, with elements of both will and 
interest conceptions arguably apparent, it would not require a seismic shift in the tectonics of 
the case law to recognise a will conception. Substantively, many of the elements of a will 
conception have played a part in the courts’ decisions, all that is required is a change in the 
underlying theoretical conception of rights – to one which recognises their foundation in 
respecting the choices of purposive action.  
 
Horizontal and Vertical Gewirthian Rights 
An immediate formal difference between the PGC’s conception of rights and the statement of 
rights in the Convention is the parties who are the primary concern of the rights. The generic 
rights, by virtue of being derived dialectically from agency, primarily state rights and duties 
that exist between individual persons as agents.
470
 The Convention rights, however, as a 
result of the historical context from which the ECHR arose,
471
 can be seen from Article 1 of 
the Convention to concern themselves primarily with the rights of persons which impose 
obligations upon the state. In spite of these differences, however, the PGC is capable of 
supporting the existence of vertical rights against the state, and the Convention rights are 
capable of practical application between individuals. 
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Vertically Challenged  
Although the very nature of the dialectical means by which the PGC is derived and its 
substantive content
472
 focuses its application upon the actions of individuals, it also has 
application to social rules and institutions.
473
 These social institutions are the ‘relatively 
stable, standardized arrangement[s] for pursuing or participating in some purposive function 
or activity that is socially approved on the ground…of its value for a society.’474 Whether 
structured groups such as a governing state or a standard activity such as truth telling, these 
institutions have rules which must be followed to participate in the activity of the group.
475
 
 
Thus, not only does the PGC apply directly between individuals, but also indirectly between 
individuals and the state and its laws.
476
 The application to the state is indirect because the 
question of whether state rules or institutions comply with an agent’s generic rights arises 
because the determination of whether the action of an agent acting under state rules or 
institutions, which directly effect another agent,
477
 can only coherently be assessed by 
applying the PGC to the state power which controls their action.
478
 These actions compelled 
by social rules are not the direct transactions between individuals with which the PGC is 
concerned; individuals are fulfilling social roles rather than acting in their individual 
capacities.
479
 As the social rule dictates the transaction between individuals it is the rule that 
should be evaluated under the PGC.
480
 The consequence of this indirect application is that, 
even if an individual’s actions in isolation appear to conflict with the generic rights of another 
agent, if the social rule which directs that action is justified under the PGC as furthering the 
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generic rights or interests of others, and these outweigh those of the individual in question, 
then it will be justified under the PGC.
481
 
 
The PGC’s requirement of an equality of generic rights482 is of particular relevance when the 
generic rights of individuals are applied to social institutions. The EGR, like the PGC, is not 
only concerned with agents’ actions directly effecting other agents, but also with ‘the ways 
institutions affect the persons subject to them.’483 Gewirth indeed recognises that the 
provision, restoration and reinforcement of the generic rights to all agents, which the EGR 
may require, will usually operate through social institutions
484
 because these will best be able 
to assist most agent’s to attain and maintain their freedom and wellbeing. 
 
If the PGC is the supreme principle of morality, it follows that it is the standard against which 
the state’s laws and actions should be held and their moral validity assessed.485 Practically, 
this will be the case if the Convention rights are interpreted and applied in accordance with 
the generic rights. If the interpretations argued for above are adopted in recognition of the 
necessity of the compliance of the HRA and ECHR with the PGC, the vertical application of 
Convention rights provided for in the Convention and the HRA against the state will serve to 
protect the generic rights and interests of individuals from violation by state laws and actions 
under them. The obligations imposed under s.6(1) and (3) HRA, requiring that bodies 
exercising state functions  either acting under the control of
486
 or applying the laws of the 
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state
487
 comply with the Convention, thus can be seen expression to the need to ensure that 
some structured social institutions are subject to the constraints of individual rights.  
 
Horizontally Challenging 
Whereas the application of the generic rights to the state is an indirect application of the 
PGC, that individuals as agents are bound to act in accordance with the generic rights and 
interests of others is the immediate and direct
488
 obligation imposed by PGC. However, just 
as the pre-eminence given to the vertical application against the state under the ECHR and 
HRA is in contrast to the indirectness of the application of generic rights to states, the logical 
primacy of rights and duties betwixt individuals is not explicitly given similar direct 
protection by these rights documents. 
 
The direct applicability of the generic rights provides a theoretical basis to support the 
previously described arguments
489
 for the horizontal applicability of the Convention rights; 
although human rights are traditionally seen as protecting against acts of the state, the actions 
of individuals are just as capable of violating the generic rights or interests.
490
 That the 
claiming of the protection of a right by one person for their action may impinge upon the 
right of another is recognised theoretically by the PGC,
491
 and also tacitly in the qualified 
rights of the Convention. These recognise the need to balance the exercise of rights against 
‘the rights or freedoms of others’492 and other general interests which have been argued to be 
general categories protecting more specific rights.
493
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The direct horizontal applicability of generic rights, also supports the acceptance of the 
interpretation of other provisions of the Convention which are open to readings that support 
giving some horizontal effect to the rights. The interpretation of Article 13’s particular focus 
upon breaches of the Convention rights by a public authority, in requiring that remedies be 
available for breaches of the substantive Convention rights, as implicitly recognising that the 
rights may also be interfered with by persons not acting on behalf of the state,
494
 is buttressed 
theoretically by the PGC. Similarly, the implicit recognition that persons in their individual 
capacity, rather than as a state representative, may breach the rights of others, apparent in 
Article 7(2)’s recognition of the applicability of the jus cogens norms,495 finds support in the 
direct applicability of generic rights.
496
 Thus, the ECHR, when combined with a basis for its 
rights in the PGC, justifies the domestic courts in giving as much horizontal effect as 
possible
497
 within the constraints of the provisions of the HRA and principles of the British 
constitution. 
 
It is philosophically fitting that the term indirect horizontal effect is applied to the protection 
of the Convention rights of individuals from infringement by other individuals under s.6 
HRA, for it is supported by the indirect applicability of the generic rights to the state. The 
courts’ decisions, compelled under s.6(3)(a)’s requirement that they act in accordance with 
the Convention rights of the parties, gives effect to the direct applicability of the generic 
rights between individuals.  
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As noted previously,
498
 several different justifications were, however, invoked by the Law 
Lords in Campbell v MGN to justify their application of the Convention rights to freedom of 
speech and privacy in the development of the common law of confidentiality. Baroness Hale 
alone had explicit regard to the court’s obligations under s.6 in considering the balance 
between the parties’ claims in terms of the conflict between Articles 8 and 10.499 The other 
Lords did not rely upon this section, instead they took approaches which recognised that the 
underlying applicability of rights between individuals justified them in giving indirect effect 
to the parties’ rights within the common law. 
 
The application of the PGC by the court would not necessarily have altered the substantive 
outcome of Campbell, however its explicit recognition that the fundamental source of the 
possession of Convention rights in the agency of persons, not as the self-restraining gifts of 
the state, could have given a clarifying fundamental weight to the Lords justification for their 
decision. Lord Nicholls went some way towards recognising this in holding that the, ‘values 
embodied in [the rights in question were] as much applicable in disputes between 
individuals’500 without making the deeper argument as to why this is the case. Lord Hoffman 
went further in arguing that there was ‘no logical ground for saying that a person should have 
less protection against a private individual than he would have against the state,’501 grounding 
this recognition in ‘human autonomy and dignity.’502 A wider explicit recognition of the 
horizontally applicable nature of the Convention rights, by virtue of rights and duties 
primarily and necessarily existing between human agents, would provide the clear theoretical 
bedrock for the indirect horizontal effect of rights for which some of the Lords in Campbell 
were grasping, but not clutching. Were this approach to be adopted by the judiciary, it would 
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also assist in the clarification of the nature of rights within British society, which will be 
argued in the next chapter to be one of the wider effects that a grounding of rights in a PGC 
based concept of dignity can have;
503
 a recognition that everyone has the Convention rights 
by being human agents, and that they are distinct from other forms of legal protection. 
 
From the perspective of theoretical coherence, a basis in the recognition of the possession of 
rights in this fundamental characteristic of agency, is also required for the answer to the 
question of the horizontal effect of rights to be consistent with grounds for possession of 
Convention rights, and the deontological approach to the balancing of conflicting rights, 
argued for previously.
504
 If the balancing required under the qualified Convention rights is 
not a utilitarian calculation, but instead the general interests considered are actually 
manifestations of, and serve to protect, individual rights, the horizontality of the rights is a 
necessary consistent corollary. 
 
Gavin Phillipson argues that the court was reluctant to engage with s.6 due to a desire to 
leave the question of the extent of horizontal effect under the Act unresolved.
505
 The 
observation of Lords Nicholls and Hoffman that the common law in this area has developed 
over the years under the influence of the Convention rights,
506
 can similarly be seen to be part 
of the judicial concern to stay within the balance of powers within British Constitution in 
protecting the Convention rights. However, the protections of the Convention rights, as 
human rights, arise directly from a fundamentally different basis to those of the common law 
generally, and a judicial recognition of this will be necessary if the courts are to make a 
strong argument for giving as much as indirect effect as possible to the horizontal 
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applicability of PGC based Convention rights. This recognition by the courts is, however, 
subject to the limitations of the HRA imposed by parliamentary sovereignty and the 
separation of powers.
507
 Thus, although the courts appear willing to recognise the horizontal 
applicability of Convention rights as the PGC requires, constitutional concerns restrain their 
ability to give effect to it.  
 
The courts have been shown to be capable of giving effect to positive obligations the PGC 
imposes to ensure that others attain the generic goods in applying Convention rights.
508
 One 
way in which the courts can be seen to have done so is in their decisions under s.6(3)(a). In 
cases such as Venables v NGN, where the court granted an injunction preventing press 
publication of information which could have resulted in harm being caused to the clamant,
509
 
the courts can be seen to be acting on behalf of the members of society as the indirect means 
of the fulfilment of the direct positive obligations under the PGC, to ensure that persons can 
attain their generic goods and are not prevented from doing so by the actions of others.
510
 
 
As with the interpretation and application of the common law under s.6, the HRA also 
enables the courts to give indirect horizontal effect to the direct applicability of the generic 
rights in its interpretation of statues under s.3(1).
511
 However, this indirect effect of the 
Convention and generic rights is limited by the same constitutional concerns that apply to the 
use of s.6(3)(a), the courts must not upset the separation of powers by using interpretation to 
effect de facto legislation and usurp the power of Parliament. This would be the case if the 
courts were to adopt an interpretation that departed ‘substantially from a fundamental feature 
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of [an Act]’512 which the text of the Act could not support.513 Faced with these constitutional 
constraints, a basis for Convention rights in the direct applicability of the generic rights 
provides the courts with a sound theoretical moral basis which supports giving as much 
horizontal effect to the Convention rights protecting the generic rights ‘as it is possible to 
do’.514 It supports pushing the bounds of the possible515 to their furthest legitimate extent, for 
to fail to do so would contradict the necessary recognition of the direct horizontal 
applicability of rights.  
 
The lack of direct horizontal effect under the HRA and its consequence for judicial protection 
of the Convention rights, from a moral angle, unjustifiably prevents full protection being 
given to the generic rights by the courts. If parliamentary sovereignty, the British 
Constitution’s main tenet, is to be supported by the PGC as protecting the voluntary 
purposiveness of individuals to which democratic decision making gives effect,
516
 it is 
contradictory for this sovereignty to prevent the protection of the generic rights by limiting 
horizontal effect being given to the Convention rights. However, as this constitutional 
principle appears immovably established,
517
 the practical constitutional reality is that the 
courts are prevented from giving full protection to the horizontal applicability of the generic 
rights. 
 
If the HRA is to give adequate effect to the direct applicability of the Convention rights 
between individual persons, then the horizontal means of indirectly challenging the actions of 
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individuals must compensate for the House of Lords’ restrictive approach to the actions that 
can be challenged vertically under s.6(3)(b).
518
 This will not be possible where there is no 
legislation which can be interpreted as giving protection or common law that can be 
developed to do so. If this is the case, then the direct applicability of the generic rights would 
support a reconsideration of the court’s rejection of Baroness Hale’s dissenting approach in 
YL, that the courts should look at the nature of the particular action,
519
 rather than the nature 
of the body performing the function and the duty under which it is performed,
520
 in order to 
maximise the horizontal protection of the generic rights. Alternately, the decision made in the 
drafting of the HRA that the Convention rights should not be directly enforceable between 
individuals
521
 should be revisited in any reform of the Human Rights Act. In the absence of a 
horizontal remedy, the vindication and protection of individuals’ generic rights are left to the 
will of the majority represented through the legislature, the very thing the Convention was 
designed to prevent,
522
 subject only to the possibility of claiming that the state has failed in its 
positive obligations of protection. 
 
Although there are constitutional constraints upon the extent to which the domestic courts can 
give effect to the direct applicability of generic rights and Convention rights interpreted in 
light of them, ECtHR case law does not prohibit horizontal effect. It has been argued above in 
the context of the mirror principle that the courts should not be constrained from giving 
greater protection to the Convention rights than the ECtHR
523
 and the fact that Ireland, also a 
                                                 
518
 Above p.151-152 
519
 YL (n.486), [65]-[68] 
520
 Ibid, [28], [31], [102]-[103] & [119] 
521
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act’ 7th 
Report HC (2003-04) 382 / HL  (2003-04) 39, 30 
522
 G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2007), 74 and S. 
Greer, ‘“Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights: a Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ 
(2004) 63(2) C.L.J. 412, 431 
523
 Above p.224-233 
   
 
321 
 
signatory to the ECHR, gives horizontal effect to fundamental rights under its national 
constitution proves this to be permissible and possible.
524
 
 
Conclusion 
The HRA thus gives clearest effect to the indirect applicability of the generic rights. The 
direct applicability of the generic rights between individuals which is at the heart of 
Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument for the PGC is only protected in an indirect 
manner. If the PGC is applied as a moral guiding basis for the interpretation and application 
of the Convention rights the courts must, so far as is constitutionally possible, ensure that the 
direct as well as the indirect applicability of individuals’ rights are upheld. Such an approach 
would be coherent with the basis on which rights are held under the PGC, and provide a 
strong and clear basis for the courts maximisation of the horizontality of Convention rights 
enforcement. 
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CHAPTER VIII: THE PRINCIPLE OF DIGNITY AS A MEANS FOR THE JUDICIARY 
TO HAVE REGARD TO GEWIRTHIAN IDEAS IN INTERPRETING THE 
CONVENTION RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
That the PGC can guide the courts in the interpretation of the Convention rights, by providing 
principled and justified answers to the five fundamental questions of rights interpretation, 
was established in the preceding two chapters. This final chapter seeks to show how the 
domestic judiciary can in practice bring regard to the PGC and its requirements into their 
judgements, by using it to give content to the principle of dignity. It will be shown that 
although this will require a modified understanding of, and greater engagement with, the 
concept of dignity generally applied by the courts, such an approach is possible and desirable, 
and finds support in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the decisions of the German and 
Canadian courts, and international human rights documents. 
 
The Role of Dignity in Context of Human Rights 
At the most general level, to ascribe dignity to a person is to recognise that they have a value
1
 
or characteristic which is of worth
2
 and they are thus deserving of respect,
3
 this is consistent 
with the roots of the word in Latin, dignitas meaning ‘worth.’4 In the human rights context 
specifically, respect for the dignity of the individual has been argued above to be the most 
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fundamental of general principles, including respect for equality and autonomy, which can be 
seen to underlie human rights.
5
  
 
This dignity of the individual has been explicitly used by many of the human rights 
documents of the latter half 20
th
 century as the basis upon which the rights they contain are 
founded.
6
 Similarly, to varying extents the judiciary of different legal systems have 
recognised dignity ‘as providing the basis for human rights in general’.7 The first sentence of 
the preamble to the UDHR, closely replicated in the preambles of the ICCPR and ICESCR, 
recognises the foundational role of dignity within the landscape of human rights, stating it 
prior to the recognition of the rights of individuals, as ‘a formal, transcendental norm to 
legitimatise [the subsequent] human rights claims.’8 Eleanor Roosevelt, chairman of the 
Commission that drafted the UDHR, stated that dignity was included as a description of the 
worth of individuals which justified the recognition of them as possessors of rights.
9
 The 
Helsinki Declaration contained a similar explicit recognition that all human rights ‘derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person’.10 Such is the prevalence of the use of dignity 
in the context of legal human rights protection that it can now be seen to be central to human 
rights discourse generally.
11
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Although the Convention and other rights documents have been stated to also protect the 
principles of equality, and autonomy or freedom, dignity necessarily underlies these other 
principles.
12
 The content of dignity, as the essential nature and characteristics of the person to 
which rights attach, entails that the statements in rights documents and judgements, that 
human rights also further and protect the principles autonomy and equality, reinforce rather 
than contradict the most fundamental basis of rights in dignity. As argued above, dignity 
provides the ultimate justification for the requirement of the protection of both autonomy and 
equality in the rights context, because the protection of these principles in the form of 
substantive human rights is ultimately required by the dignity of the individual.
13
 Thus, where 
equality or freedom or autonomy are invoked in the preambles of rights documents such as 
the UDHR and used to support interpretations of the substantive rights,
14
 behind them, 
justifying their protection, is the dignity of the individual. 
 
Whilst there is generally agreement that dignity is ‘the foundation and the ultimate aim of 
human rights systems’,15 there is disagreement as to its exact nature.16 The key question 
accompanying a basis of rights and respect in the possession of dignity is to what does the 
dignity attach?
17
 Opinion on the value or characteristic to which dignity is ascribed in the 
human rights context has been described as falling within two camps. The Neo-Classical 
conceptions asserts that by being of the human species individuals have a worth which 
requires that they not be subject to treatment which would humiliate them or otherwise fail to 
respect the value of being human.
18
 Conversely, the Kantian conception of dignity deems a 
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particular characteristic to be of value and worthy of respect.
19
 For Kant whose theory can be 
seen as the genesis of this approach,
20
 it was the capacity for rational thought which deserved 
this respect.
21
 
 
However, just as the textual and semantic uncertainty of the substantive Convention rights 
has been argued to be to a certain extent a deliberate means of ensuring maximum agreement 
amongst states to add their signatures to international human rights documents,
22
 the 
openness of the concept of dignity to different interpretations has performed a similar 
function. In order to fulfil a role of being the theoretical basis upon which the different 
substantive rights of different rights documents are based and their requirements given 
legitimacy,
23
 such a founding principle must attract a consensus of agreement amongst states 
with different ideologies.
24
 Consistent with this aim, in domestic and international rights 
documents dignity, has been left undefined and thus capable of having different content 
attributed to it
25
 by parties who might otherwise disagree as to the basis of human rights.
26
 
 
That the concept dignity is capable of fulfilling this role as a ‘linguistic-symbol’27 for 
potentially differing underlying ideas is apparent from discrepancies that can be seen in the 
ratifications of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Both contain an identical reference to dignity in 
their preambles, however the USA has ratified the ICCPR but not the ICESCR and China the 
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ICESCR but not the ICCPR.
28
 From this it is apparent that states may agree on a commitment 
to the open textured idea of dignity; the disagreements as to the content of substantive rights 
can be seen to be a symptom of a different underlying principled ideology which they see 
rights as founded upon.
29
 
 
Although there is clearly scope for disagreement as to the content of dignity, the position 
given to dignity within rights documents shows an international acknowledgement of the 
need for the some theoretical basis to justify the recognition of human rights.
30
 Such a deeper 
justification is necessary for without it the rights human rights documents state would appear 
to exist merely as the gift of states that recognise them to be enjoyed at their whim.
31
 Such a 
position would be contrary to one of the aims of the drafters of the rights documents of the 
post-WWII era of preventing a repetition of the state actions which characterised the Nazi 
regime
32
 and had shown the rule of law alone provided inadequate protection to individuals.
33
 
 
The role that dignity plays in rights documents as an underlying theoretical justification of the 
rights they state has led to it being used by judicial bodies attempting to interpret those 
rights.
34
 Its use by the ECtHR in this way has already been noted, and its use by the courts of 
Canada and Germany will be described below.
35
 Various theorists have recognised the 
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applicability of conceptions of dignity in answering the five key questions of rights 
interpretation that have been highlighted as key in determining the application and content of 
any human rights document.
36
 However for dignity to be used in this way content must be 
given to it
37
 by deciding what it is that is of value and constitutes dignity and is thus worthy 
of protection.
38
 
 
Dignity as a Means of Regard to Morality 
In this thesis several arguments have been made to support Gewirth’s moral philosophy as 
providing a cogently justifying basis from which to interpret open textured human rights.
39
 It 
is submitted that the means by which the British judiciary can best apply the PGC in practice 
to guide their interpretive judgements is by having regard to the principle of dignity underling 
the rights which in turn is informed by Gewirthian theory. In this way the PGC provides the 
‘deeper principles’40 which give content to dignity. 
 
The less fundamental principles of autonomy and equality can also be used and given content 
as means through which to invoke particular requirements of the PGC, the generic right to 
freedom and the requirement of the Equality of Generic Rights (EGR), and their ability to do 
so will be described in detail below.
41
 However, whereas dignity is the principle which 
encapsulates the very basis on which rights are held, the purposive agency from which the 
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PGC dialectically derives, autonomy and equality are only secondary manifestations of some 
of its requirements.
42
 
 
There have been few attempts to apply legal and political philosophy to the interpretation of 
the ECHR;
43
 the use of dignity in such interpretation involves engaging with moral 
questions
44
 because of the aim of attempting to determine the ethics of which actions are right 
or wrong under the Convention rights. However, even prior to the enactment of the HRA the 
domestic courts recognised that some of the cases they were required to decide raised moral 
questions. In the previously discussed case of Bland Hoffman LJ. (as he was then) recognised 
that the case involved ethical questions upon which no ‘difference can be allowed to exist 
between what is legal and what is morally right.’45 Although in this case he also stated that it 
was ‘not the function of judges to lay down systems of morals’, Hoffman LJ. thought that 
reaching a judgement in this case required regard to ‘underlying moral principles’.46 The 
ECtHR has similarly recognised that it is generally required to engage with moral issues in 
interpreting the requirements of the Convention. In the case of Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 
in trying to determine the substantive requirements of Article 8, the ECtHR held that there 
now a ‘better’ tolerance of homosexuality amongst member states.47 From this George Letsas 
argues that it is apparent that the ECtHR ‘was primarily interested in evolution towards the 
moral truth of the ECHR rights, not in evolution towards some commonly accepted standard, 
regardless of content’.48 He thus argued that the ECtHR engages in a ‘first order moral 
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reading of the ECHR rights’49 which it phrases in terms of interpretations commonly 
accepted by the member states so as to make its approach acceptable to them.
50
 
 
Thus, the mere fact that engagement with dignity in interpreting the Convention rights makes 
the engagement with morals by the courts more explicit should not be seen as a radical 
departure from the current or pre-HRA position. Indeed such open acknowledgement of the 
moral dimension of the questions raised by Convention rights will engage the criticism that 
judges can have regard to their own morality in interpreting rights by ensuring perceptive 
scrutiny of such reasoning.
51
 Acknowledging that such decisions have previously been, and 
are now more so, part of the allotted judicial function, subject of course to the final decision 
making power of Parliament,
52
 will bolster the legitimacy of those decisions. 
 
Gewirthian Dignity 
The content of dignity which must be recognised under Gewirthian theory is closest to the 
Kantian conception in that it attaches to an aspect of the human condition which is inherently 
all be it contingently of value to all who poses it
53
 and which, having such worth, must be 
respected.
54
 This characteristic is the purposive agency
55
 which is at the foundation of the 
dialectically necessary and contingent arguments to the PGC.
56
 With this agency as the 
characteristic to which dignity attaches, it follows that the interpretation of the human rights 
which flow from dignity should be interpreted in accordance with the PGC, which 
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dialectically describes the generic rights and interests which must be respected in order to act 
in accordance with purposive agency. 
 
Under the dialectically necessary method, and as the necessary premise of the contingent 
arguments,
57
 all agents see themselves as distinct from other creatures because of their 
capacity for freely chosen purposive action, and ‘[b]y virtue of these characteristics…the 
agent regards himself as having worth or dignity.’58 This dignity provides a basis for a 
conception of human rights as possessed inherently by all humans.
59
 Due to the arguments of 
universalisability and sufficiency of agency, or the contingent application of the moral point 
of view or the principle of impartiality, in the argument for the PGC, agents must therefore 
also recognise the dignity of other human agents and therefore must respect the human rights 
that flow from it.
60
 The argument above concerning the status and treatment of possible 
agents also applies to extend the precautionary protection of human rights to them.
61
 
 
The susceptibility of the concept of dignity in the human rights context to being given content 
by the conception of purposive agency, and its requirements by the PGC that derives from it, 
receives supported from judicial engagement with dignity in other countries. The German 
courts have been particularly proactive in their engagement with the concept of dignity 
protected with the first article of their constitution. Conversely the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
interpretive use of dignity within their common law system is enlightening because, like the 
HRA, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 contains no mention of dignity. 
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The clear statement by Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law 1949 (BL) of the inviolability 
of human dignity was held by the Federal Constitutional Court to be the underlying principle 
of all other rights within the Basic Law.
62
 The reference to the concept of inalienable rights in 
Article 1(2) BL was influenced by the 18
th
 Century revolutions and supports interpreting the 
conception of dignity in Article 1(1) as proceeding ‘from the assumption that individuals are 
reasonable beings, autonomous and capable to decide for themselves their own paths to 
happiness.’63  Such an interpretation of the characteristic to which dignity attaches is 
consistent both with the Kantian conception applied by the German constitution court
64
 but 
also with the characteristics of the purposive agent who has dignity under Gewirthian 
conception. Similarly, the potential for the capacity for purposive action to underlie the 
conception of dignity can be seen from McIntyre J.’s judgement in the Canadian case of R v 
Morgentaler where he argued it required respect for the choices made by individuals.
65
 
 
The Susceptibility of British Law to a Dignity Basis for Rights Interpretation 
Prior to the coming into force of the HRA there was very little explicit mention of dignity in 
statute or case law in the sense that it is used in treaties such as the UDHR.
66
 Gay Moon and 
Robin Allan’s review of the law reveals that of the 800 statutes that mentioned dignity, most 
references are concerned with the dignities of offices such as Bishoprics.
67
 However, since 
the enactment of the HRA references have increased, with ‘judges, advocates and 
legislators…increasing confidant in referring to dignity.’68  
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The greater judicial use of dignity has been accompanied by arguments that the dignity of the 
individual was in fact protected as an important value by the common law prior to the HRA.
69
 
Concern for dignity has been argued by Munby LJ., a leading advocate for and practitioner of 
the judicial use of dignity, to underlie the pre-HRA case law on the treatment of those in a 
permanent vegetative such as Bland.
70
 Similarly, David Feldman argues that the well 
established pre-2000 case law requiring respect for patient control over their medical 
treatment protected dignity by preventing people from being treated without regard for their 
opinions as if they were of no worth.
71
 Consistent with this he also argues that the decision in 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p JCWI gave protection to dignity by 
seeking to uphold to the fundamental value of the individual
72
 which underlies the protection 
given by the ECHR.
73
 Thus, it is apparent that even prior to the enactment of the HRA, the 
worth and value of the person protected by the references to dignity in treaties mentioned 
above, can be seen to have already been a concern underlying the judge made common law 
and now to support more explicit protection and recognition for this worth and value by 
explicit judicial regard to dignity. 
 
Since the coming into force of the HRA, in the course of interpreting the Convention rights 
regard has been had to dignity in several cases. The foremost judicial exponents of dignity 
have been Baroness Hale and Munby LJ. who together have demonstrated its potential utility 
as an interpretive tool.
 74
 Both have recognised dignity as the basis of the Convention rights, 
Baroness Hale quoted the ECtHR’s statement in Pretty75 to that effect76 and Munby LJ. 
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argued that although dignity was not mentioned explicitly in the ECHR it is implicit ‘in 
almost every one of the Convention's provisions.’77  
 
Consistent with the use of dignity in the human rights context described above, the domestic 
courts have held it to be concerned with the value or worth of the individual. Prior to the 
HRA in Bland it was recognised that dignity is the intrinsic value possess by the individual.
78
 
Subsequently in Godin-Mendoza it was held that to treat someone as of lesser value than 
another person, in this case by discriminating against them, was to fail to respect their 
dignity.
79
 Baroness Hale recognised that the human rights are held by all persons because 
they are all of equal value, they all possess dignity, and thus she argued discrimination in the 
respect accorded to them is an unacceptable violation of the very basis on which the rights are 
held.
80
 Recognition of this definitional link between the worth of the individual and their 
possession of dignity can similarly be seen in the statutory instruction to the Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights to foster a society which respects ‘the dignity and worth of each 
individual.’81 Munby J. summed up the position well by arguing that respect for dignity 
requires the recognition that a human being is more than a machine, their greater intangible 
humanity must be respected.
82
 
 
The substantive conception of dignity that has thus far been used by the courts, the specific 
value that the courts have argued dignity protects, closely resembles the neo-classical 
conception that has been described previously. However, the current case law on dignity will 
be argued not to be preclusive of a movement towards the adoption of a conception of dignity 
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based on purposive agency and the PGC, and to acknowledge the possibility of a conception 
of dignity that goes beyond the neo-classical.  
 
In Bland dignity was held to be concerned with the prevention of demeaning or embarrassing 
treatment of another.
83
 Subsequently in Campbell Lord Hoffman reaffirmed his position by 
stating that dignity is concerned with the ‘right to the esteem and respect of other people.’84 
In his explorations of the concept of dignity Munby J. has similarly applied a neo-classical 
conception of dignity by talking in terms of the protection of the human person against 
humiliation and debasement as the concern of ‘human dignity’85 explicitly following the 
approach of Hoffman LJ. in Bland.
86
 In all these cases the mere fact of being a human being 
has been regarded as the value or worth underlying the dignity of individuals, with even the 
permanently unconscious being held to possess a dignity worthy of respect.
87
 
 
However, although Munby J. acknowledged the neo-classical conception of dignity stated in 
previous judgements, he recognised that the concept of dignity was not confined to this 
narrow speciesist conception of what is of value and had the potential to be a much wider 
concept embracing ‘such elusive concepts as, for example, (feelings of) independence and 
access to the world and to others.’88  These latter elements can be tentatively seen to be closer 
to the attributes that form purposive agency under a PGC based conception of dignity, the 
capacity of freely choosing purposes to pursue through action. This suggests that it would not 
be impossible for the domestic courts to broaden their conception of what dignity 
encompasses. 
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The reason why the British courts have unnecessarily restricted themselves to the neo-
classical conception of dignity, in contrast to countries such as Germany who have applied a 
more Kantian conception,
89
  is the sharp line they have drawn between the principle of 
dignity and that of autonomy. Back in Bland dignity and autonomy were distinguished as 
‘separate though interrelated principles’,90 distinct but both concerned with the ethics of how 
we should live, with the former capable of overriding the latter.
91
 This distinction was 
maintained by Munby J. in his review of the area
92
 describing autonomy as protecting ‘self-
determination and…bodily integrity’.93  
 
This dichotomy has thus resulted in the courts adopting a conception of dignity which does 
not recognise the capacity for purposive action which, under the arguments to the PGC, 
dialectically must be what gives humans value.
94
 That the concept of dignity should be 
extended by the domestic courts, to encompass the capacity for purposive action, follows 
from the fact that such a capacity underlies the principle of autonomy and forms the 
characteristic of value which the principle of autonomy seeks to protect. The courts 
protection of autonomy raises the above noted
95
 question of why is it that autonomy is worthy 
of respect and worthy of protection by human rights?
96
 The answer to this question can be 
found, though the dialectical approaches outlined above, to be in purposive agency. As this 
must be accepted as of fundamental value by such agents, it constitutes their dignity in the 
sense in which the term is used in human rights documents and concerns the capacities that 
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are currently protected under the heading of autonomy. Thus, if the arguments to the PGC’s 
dialectical conclusions are valid, the British courts should alter their conception of dignity to 
encompass the purposive agency elements of the capacity for autonomy they have 
distinguished it from, as a properly justified basis for the Convention rights and from which 
they should interpret them. 
 
Practical support for the adoption of such an approach can be seen in the substance of Munby 
J.’s decision in R (Burke) v GMC. The case involved an argument by a patient with spino-
cerebellar ataxia, that he should be able to require that artificial nutrition and hydration 
(ANH) should not be removed from him when his condition irreversibly deteriorated to the 
extent that he would be dependent on such treatment whilst remaining mentally competent.
97
  
The applicant argued that removal of ANH against his wishes would violate, amongst others, 
his Article 3 and 8 Convention rights. Munby J. held that the interest in autonomy which 
underlay Article 8 encompassed choosing how to pass one’s final days, whereas the Article 3 
embraced the right to die with dignity.
98
 What is significant is that Munby J. recognised that 
the patient’s autonomy interest entailed that it is for patient to determine what would be 
distressing for him (ie. whether to continue to be treated or to not be treated) and a violation 
of his dignity, and therefore the competent patient’s decision whether ANH should be 
withdrawn was determinative.
99
 This approach is prima-facie consistent with the recognition 
of the basis of the Convention rights in a concept of dignity (encompassing what the courts 
label as the autonomy interest) characterised by purposive agency.
100
 Additionally in Burke a 
neo-classical conception of dignity was stated obiter as determining the treatment of 
incompetent patients, it was held that ANH could be removed from a person who had not 
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demanded that it be continued if ‘right-thinking bystanders’101 would view its continued 
provision as humiliating or debasing the victim and thus violating their dignity.
102
 This 
approach could also be brought within a purposive agency and PGC based approach to the 
interpretation of Convention rights and dignity if it were used as a means of applying 
precautionary reasoning
103
 to determine what treatment should be given to such a patient. 
Although, the Court of Appeal subsequently criticised Munby J.’s attempt in Burke to set out 
a ‘textbook or practice manual…on the right to treatment generally’104 with advice on 
questions which were not pertinent to the case potentially creating confusion,
105
 his 
judgement nonetheless demonstrates the way the principle of dignity can be judicially applied 
to resolve cases. 
 
Under the approach advocated here, the principle of autonomy is therefore to be characterised 
more narrowly as protecting a specific element of what the basis of rights in dignity and 
purposive agency require be respected, rather than being itself a fundamental basis of all 
rights. Autonomy should instead be invoked as a principle encompassing the protection of the 
generic rights to freedom.
106
 Similarly, the principle of equality is not to be invoked as the 
basis of rights, but rather as a manifestation of requirements of the Equality of the Generic 
Rights (EGR)
107
  which flows from the basis of rights in purposive agency. In relying on 
purposive agency as the fundamental basis for the Convention rights and the PGC deriving 
from it for their interpretation, it is more appropriate for the judiciary to use the principle of 
dignity to encapsulate and convey the fundamental nature of purposive agency, as interpreted 
by the PGC, as the basis for the interpretation of the Convention rights, with the principles of 
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autonomy and equality invoked as specific manifestations of it. This is more than a mere 
semantic distinction, it goes directly to the heart of ensuring the judicial and public 
recognition of the fundamental basis of the Convention rights. The foremost use of dignity 
over the other principles also links our domestic judicial application of human rights to the 
wide body of international rights protection, whose preambles frequently cite dignity as their 
foundation.
108
  
 
This basing of rights judgments in dignity will be argued below to also have the advantage of 
increasing the acceptability of human rights more generally within the UK, by highlighting 
their fundamental nature.
109
 However, the open use of a concept of dignity specifically 
characterised by purposive agency has advantages over the mere invocation of dignity as 
loose and general justification, or as defined by the neo-classical perspective. The PGC, 
which derives from purposive agency, has been shown above to be capable of giving specific 
and dialectically grounded guidance on the five fundamental questions of rights 
interpretation.
110
 With a more defined content than the neo-classical conception, the answers 
to the five questions can be logically derived, rather than having to be divined from what the 
nebulous status of being a human entails. In contrast to the Kantian conception of dignity, the 
approach of purposive agency again provides a more detailed conception of what 
interpretations follow from this basis, due to the PGC’s more detailed content and its nature  
as a rights based theory fitting the core features of the Convention rights. 
 
At present it is apparent that currently domestic judicial regard to the underlying value of 
dignity in human rights cases is not widespread. Where it is used, the neo-classical 
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conception applied is limited and does not reflect the characteristics that has been argued to 
be dialectically of worth. However, the current case law has the potential to develop to into 
one which openly recognises purposive agency as the attribute which characterises dignity 
and the basis to which rights attach. 
 
Extra-national Support for the Increased Domestic Regard to Dignity  
Support for the recognition and adoption of a concept of dignity grounded in purposive 
agency and its wider interpretive use by the British courts can also be found in the 
jurisprudence of other countries and in the protection of human rights above the national 
level. 
 
Dignity in other States 
It has already been noted that the German and Canadian courts have developed conceptions 
of dignity which they have regard to in some of their human rights judgements. Although 
these legal systems and systems of rights protection vary in their similarity to the British 
common law and the HRA, influencing the consequent strength of the analogies that can be 
drawn from them,
111
 these jurisdictions demonstrate the practicality of the judicial 
interpretive use of dignity. 
 
The Canadian use of dignity is of particular significance in supporting the interpretive 
application of dignity in the United Kingdom. The courts of Canada have recognised dignity 
as underlying the rights
112
 in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCFR)
113
  and 
have been prepared to use it to interpret the Charter Rights even though, as with the HRA, 
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there is no explicit mention of the dignity in that rights document.
114
 The Canadian Supreme 
Court has nevertheless recognised that dignity is one of the ‘values and principles essential to 
a free and democratic society’115  and as such should guide the Court in its interpretation of 
the Charter rights.
116
 
 
The Canadian courts have to a certain extent used the reference to dignity in the preamble of 
the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights to support their use of it in the interpretation of the Charter 
rights.
117
 It is conceded that the HRA contains no provision comparable to the Bill’s 
recognition that the ‘dignity and worth’ of the human person are founding principles of the 
nation however, in spite of this comparative difference, the Canadian experience can still be 
seen to support the interpretive use of dignity by the British judiciary. The Canadian legal 
system is a child of our common law system and in several cases the Canadian judges have 
found a basis for the interpretative use of dignity in the common law as well as their Bill of 
Rights.
118
 In R v Stillman Cory J. based his interpretive use of dignity upon the recognition 
that ‘[t]raditionally, the common law and Canadian society have recognised the fundamental 
importance of the innate dignity of the individual.’119 Similarly, in R v S (R.J.) it was 
recognised that the dignity was a fundamental value which underlay not only the CCFR but 
also the common law.
120
 The experience in Canada thus indicates that, although unlike 
Germany the principle of dignify is not explicitly stated within our core human rights 
document, this is not an absolute bar to its use in judicial interpretation of those rights. 
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Dignity above the National Level 
The characteristics of the conception of dignity widely found within international human 
rights documents,
121
 as encapsulating the basis of the rights in human value,
122
 has been 
described in detail previously. Its prominent position
123
 in their preambles has given dignity a 
central position in human rights discourse
124
  
 
Such widespread recognition can be called upon to support the domestic courts use of the 
concept of dignity to interpret the Convention rights, many of which closely resemble those 
found in the rights treaties. More specifically, prior to the creation of the HRA and in the 
absence of clear domestic protection for fundamental rights, over the course of 25 years the 
courts had developed a cannon of statutory interpretation under which it was permissible to 
have regard to international human rights treaties to interpret the provisions of domestic 
statutes.
125
 In the earliest case of Waddington v Miah
126
 Lord Reid cited the prohibitions on 
retroactive criminal legislation in the UDHR and ECHR as supporting the conclusion that 
Parliament could not have intended to pass such legislation and therefore held the provision 
in question should not be construed as having that effect.
127
 In this decision Lord Reid can be 
seen to argue for a presumption in favour of a construction of legislation that was consistent 
with assuming an intention on the part of Parliament to legislate in accordance with the 
countries’ international obligations.128  
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The open textured nature of the Convention rights stated within the Human Rights Act makes 
the use of this pre-HRA case law particularly apt, for it was in particular used to address 
ambiguities in statutory meaning.
129
 Although the incorporation of the Convention rights has 
significantly reduced the need for the courts to have regard to this cannon of interpretation as 
a circuitous means of protecting human rights, it has the potential to support the courts in the 
use of the frequent mentions of dignity in international rights treaties to which the United 
Kingdom is a party, to interpret the Convention rights. Practical support for such an approach 
can be found in the case law of Canadian Supreme Court where the protection of dignity in 
rights treaties has been recognised as a source of interpretation of the CCFR.
130
 Some 
encouraging steps towards such a regard to use of dignity in other rights documents can be 
seen in Lord Steyn’s judgement in R (European Roma Rights Center) v Immigration Officer, 
Prague Airport.
131
 Here, in the course of construing the non-discrimination requirements of 
customary international law, the noble Lord cited the Article 1 UDHR statement of equal 
dignity of all human beings and noted that the ECHR and other rights treaties were ‘direct 
descendants of the Universal Declaration.’132 Similarly, Munby LJ. in the course of his 
judgement in R (A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex CC (No.2), which made considerable 
interpretive use of concept dignity, noted the prominent place given to it within the UDHR.
133
  
 
Munby LJ. in E. Sussex CC (No2) also relied upon the references to dignity in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU to support his interpretive use of it.
134
 Prior to the creation of 
the EU Charter A-G Stix-Hackl argued that ‘[a]s an emanation and as specific expressions of 
human dignity…all (particular) human rights ultimately serve to achieve and safeguard 
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human dignity’,135 this sentiment has been reflected in the Charter whose first chapter is 
dedicated to dignity and includes the rights to life, personal integrity and freedom from 
slavery or torture, and whose drafters recognised dignity as the basis of rights.
136
 
 
Although there is no explicit mention of dignity in the ECHR, its preamble makes several 
references to the UDHR and states that the Convention is aimed at furthering certain of the 
rights the UDHR recognises as universal. This is significant because the UDHR’s preamble 
makes reference to dignity as the basis of the need for universal respect for the rights which 
the ECHR in turn claims to further. Thus, it can be argued that in this way the ECHR can 
itself be seen to be implicitly claiming a basis in human dignity
137
 and Munby LJ. can be seen 
to be vindicated in his argument that the protection of dignity is implicit within the 
Convention rights.
138
 
 
In spite of the absence of explicit mention of dignity which Jochen Frowein attributes to the 
view on the part of the drafters that it was too wide a concept to include,
139
 the ECtHR held in 
Pretty v United Kingdom that respect for dignity was ‘the essence of the Convention’,140 
recognising it as underpinning the substantive rights.
141
 Such recognition has formed the 
basis for the various judgements in which the judicial organ of the Convention have made use 
of it in giving cogent meaning to the Convention rights
142
 beginning with the Commission’s 
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judgement in the East African Asians Case
143
 and the Court’s judgement in Tyrer v United 
Kingdom.
144
 The ECtHR has considered dignity in interpreting a verity of Convention 
rights,
145
 in particular Articles 3,
146
 but also Articles 2,
147
 7,
148
 8
149
 and 10.
150
 As the HRA 
actively encourages that account be taken of ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the interpretation of 
the Convention rights
151
 these judgements provide strong support for the use of dignity in 
interpretation by the British courts.  
 
The relationship between domestic judgements on the interpretation of the Convention rights 
and relevant ECtHR jurisprudence has been described as characterised by the mirror 
principle.
152
 However, even if this questionable self-limiting position continues to be 
maintained by the courts, and is applied to the tools of interpretation as well as the 
substantive decisions of the ECtHR as has been the case with the principle of 
proportionality,
153
 it is submitted that this need not prevent the British judiciary from 
applying a conception of dignity characterised by purposive agency.  
 
As noted previously, the ECtHR in Pretty stated a neo-classical approach to dignity
154
 which 
is conceptually different from that entailed by Gewirthian theory. However, in the early case 
of Tyrer the ECtHR, as well as applying the neo-classical conception,
155
 did appear to 
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recognise that the principle of dignity could be violated by treating a person as an object,
156
 
echoing the conception of dignity applied by the German constitutional court which goes 
beyond the neo-classical.
157
 Similarly, just as the conception of autonomy used by the British 
courts should be seen to be founded in and required by a conception of dignity, so too can the 
principle of autonomy used in interpretation by the ECtHR. In Pretty the ECtHR argued that 
the principle of the autonomy of the individual involves respect for the choices of individuals 
as to how they live their lives
158
 which is consistent with the purposive agency that is at the 
heart of the Gewirthian conception of dignity. Thus, although the conception of dignity 
adopted by the ECtHR appears to be different from one characterised by purposive agency, 
the divergence is not sharply cut. 
 
The mirror principle itself requires that in determining the scope and applicability
 
of the 
Convention rights the domestic courts give no more or no less protection than is given in 
ECtHR judgements.
159
 However, in this principle the domestic courts have tightly bound 
themselves to Strasbourg’s substantive judgements, through fear of being out of step and to 
allow Strasbourg the final determination of the requirements of the Convention,
160
 not the 
means of interpretation by which they are arrived. Although it has been noted that the courts 
have held that they should apply the proportionality standard of review used by Strasbourg, 
rather than the domestic judicial review standards, they have held that the value judgements 
and evaluations made in the course of such review are for themselves to decide subject to the 
supervision of the ECtHR.
161
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Thus, it can be seen that, although the courts continue to bind themselves to follow 
Strasbourg’s final determinations, it is open to the domestic courts to apply a different 
conception of dignity when interpreting the rights for themselves where the conclusion in a 
case is not clearly indicated by ECtHR jurisprudence or is left to the court under a margin of 
appreciation. The mirror principle does not present a general obstacle to the courts applying a 
conception of dignity characterised by purposive agency and using it and the generic rights 
which follow from it to interpret the Convention rights. 
 
The Practicality of Dignity 
It has been shown to be legally and theoretically desirable for judicial regard to be had to a 
conception of dignity based in purposive agency and the PGC that gives content to it in 
deciding questions of the interpretation of Convention rights. That dignity can practically be 
used in resolving the five key questions of rights interpretation, is apparent from the case law 
of other countries and the tentative steps have already been made to use it in this way in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Both the Canadian Supreme Court (CSC) and the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC) have explicitly recognised that dignity, by virtue of its fundamental nature underlying 
other rights, can be used to interpret those rights.
162
 Although the CSC has not yet made clear 
where a person begins to be a human with dignity,
163
 the FCC has had regard to dignity in 
holding that a foetus’s life is of value164 and demonstrated the role of dignity in determining 
who has rights. In both systems the courts have made use of dignity in balancing competing 
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rights, characterising the rights of both parties in terms of the concern for dignity which 
underlies them
165
 and seeking to avert the more grievous interference with dignity.
166
  
 
Munby J., in E. Sussex (No2), recognised that basing the Convention rights in dignity entailed 
that dignity had to be considered in balancing the rights of the claimants to manual handling 
against those of their carers to a safe working environment, the rights of both being 
underpriced by their dignity.
167
 He also recognised in the same case that the protection of 
dignity could also lead to positive obligations upon the state ‘to secure…essential human 
dignity’.168  
 
In relation to the debate concerning whether a will or interest conception of rights should be 
adopted, the French Conseil d'Etat in Lancer de Nain applied an interest conception of 
dignity to find that the M. Wackenheim, a dwarf sized person, could not waive the benefit of 
his right not to be treated as a projectile which was protected under Article 3 ECHR.
169
 This 
case also shows a recognition that the dignity of individuals can be infringed in a horizontal 
manner by other individuals, in addition to the engagement of dignity in the context an 
individuals vertical relationship with the state that is found in other cases. 
 
It is also apparent in the case law addressing most of these core questions of rights 
interpretation, that principles of autonomy and equality have been invoked by the courts in 
justifying their interpretations. Under the approach advocated here, these could provide 
helpful clarification of the specific aspect of the requirements of purposive agency and the 
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PGC that is being applied by the courts. However, in order for the fundamental basis for the 
interpretation of the rights in purposive agency to be made clear, it is, as argued above, 
essential that these other secondary principles be acknowledged to be ultimately protecting 
the dignity of the individual from which they derive their content.
170
 Were autonomy and 
equality to be used in isolation, without a stated basis in dignity, the dialectical basis of their 
requirements in purposive agency and the PGC would not be apparent, and their moral force 
would be less explicit. 
 
As the question of who can possess rights is directly concerned with the question of the basis 
on which they are held, dignity as the most fundamental principle of human rights 
discourse,
171
 rather than autonomy or equality, is the most appropriate principle for the courts 
to invoke. However, in determining the extent and assistance of the negative and positive 
obligations under the Convention, the case law shows that autonomy and equality could 
usefully be invoked to explain the more specific substantive requirements of the basis of the 
rights in dignity characterised by purposive agency. In the law on privacy, autonomy and 
individual freedom have been regularly invoked to justify interpretations of the scope of 
negative obligations imposed under Article 8,
172
 giving effect to the generic right to freedom 
which underlies several Convention rights.
173
 Similarly, the principle of equality could 
continue to be invoked in the context of positive rights imposed by Article 14,
174
 to more 
clearly explain how the dignity basis of purposive agency requires that the generic rights of 
all agents be protected under the EGR. 
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In the context of the balancing of conflicting rights, the principle of autonomy, sometimes in 
the form of freedom,
175
 is invoked by the courts to justify their decisions. In Campbell the 
Lords considered the claimant’s autonomy, weighing the interference with her ability to 
pursue her purposes against the importance of the press’s freedom to report her drug 
treatment.
176
 However, the generic right of freedom of action, which autonomy most easily 
embodies,
177
 is only one factor that the PGC requires be considered when balancing generic 
rights. Questions of moral status, being connected directly to the basis on which the rights are 
held, are better encapsulated within the concept of dignity, and the multifaceted needs of 
well-being are broader than autonomy and all fall within the requirements of dignity defined 
by purposive agency.
178
 Additionally, when the courts must balance competing autonomy 
claims, as in Pretty where the Article 8 claim to choose to end one’s life conflicted with the 
danger to the Article 2 rights of the vulnerable who might be pressured into choosing to die, 
another standard is required.
179
 The protection of dignity can encompass this standard under 
the PGC, focusing upon the needfulness of the generic good or Convention right in question 
to a person’s purposive agency.180 Thus, although autonomy is a useful principle in 
encapsulating one aspect of the PGC’s application to the interpretation of Convention rights, 
it is not by itself sufficient. 
 
Autonomy is similarly relevant as a principle which could be invoked in applying the will 
conception nature of the Convention rights. When characterised in terms of freedom of 
action, autonomy explains in a practical sense the ability being given effect to when the 
waiving of the benefits of rights is upheld, thus in Brown the claimants argued autonomy 
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required their choices be respected.
181
 However, whether rights conform to the will or interest 
conception has been noted above to be determined by the very basis on which the rights are 
held, the characteristic to which the rights attach, the content of the principle of dignity 
within human rights discourse.
182
 Thus, here as on other questions, to determine and explain 
what autonomy requires on this question, to which conception it is giving effect, regard must 
be had to dignity. To attempt to answer this question merely in terms of autonomy does not 
give a full reasoned justification for the conception of rights arrived at.  
 
The final question, of the vertical and horizontal applicability of rights, is similarly 
determined by the basis on which rights are held. Thus dignity should be invoked to 
encapsulate the ultimate foundational characteristic on which a fundamental argument for the 
applicability of the Convention rights must be made. As argued previously, the EGR entails 
that positive obligations to ensure the fulfilment of other agent’s generic rights can be 
interpreted as requiring horizontal effect be given to the Convention rights between 
individuals.
183
 If claims of dignity and equality are combined, a strong argument can be made 
for increasing the horizontal effect of the Convention rights. However, although 
philosophically justified, it would require a significant departure from the current 
interpretation of the HRA and Article 14, whose contingent nature prevents equality being 
applied to create horizontal effect outside of the area positive obligations.
184
 
 
It has thus been shown that dignity by itself, or together with the elaboration provided by 
autonomy and equality, can be used by the judiciary to give effect to the requirements of the 
PGC in answering the five questions of rights interpretation. This indirect means of using the 
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dialectical requirements of purposive agency to interpret the Convention rights, compared to 
an unmediated open judicial application of the PGC, is necessitated by the practical and legal 
environment within which the judiciary operates. 
 
Although regard to the PGC is dialectically required and answers the five questions of rights 
interpretation, direct appeal to it alone would be a significant departure for the British legal 
system. Human rights have only recently been adopted domestically as substantive norms 
governing legislation and judicial decisions. There has also been past rejections by the 
judiciary of open moral decision making and the creation of ‘systems of morality.’185 This 
has moderated to some extent under the HRA, with the increased use of principles such as 
dignity,
186
  but a judiciary which is still hesitant to use such general principles would be even 
more wary of explicit ‘systems of morals187 such as the PGC.  
 
Judicial willingness to rely upon dignity as a principle of interpretation, although not yet 
widespread, is slowly increasing,
 188
 with politicians and others also making use the language 
of dignity in the rights context.
189
 As a consequence of this, to invoke dignity as a means 
through which to apply the PGC, is to present it as a development of the current law rather 
than a radical departure from it. This would be more politically, publically and judicially 
acceptable than simple invocation of the PGC, thereby lessening resistance to decisions based 
upon it.  
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The widespread use of dignity within international human rights law and discourse
190
 
similarly makes this a more acceptable principle than a boldly stated PGC. The general 
acceptance of dignity as shorthand for the basis of rights, has the advantage of familiarity, 
which the concept of purposive agency does not. Thus, just as purposive agency and the 
dialectical PGC give content to dignity and its requirements, so dignity explains the nature of 
purposive agency and the PGC as deriving from it. These advantages of dignity as a vector 
through which to give effect to moral principles is not unique to this argument, they were, as 
noted previously, the reasons for use of the concept of dignity in the first rights treaties, and it 
can perform a similar function in our domestic legal system. 
 
Potential Problems with the use of Dignity 
The core problem with the practical judicial use of dignity that Feldman identifies is that it is 
capable of being imbued with different meanings, to greater extent than even the specific 
substantive human rights that it is argued to underlie.
191
 It has already been noted that it was 
this characteristic that lead to its use in the preambles of rights documents as a basis for the 
rights they contained.
192
  Whilst this metamorphic quality is politically desirable in achieving 
agreement amongst states upon dignity as the basis of rights, when called upon to as an aid to 
the interpretation of specific rights, without substantive form it cannot provide specific 
guidance
193
 and can merely direct judges to consideration of the basis of rights in broad 
terms.
194
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Given the open textured nature of dignity, Feldman argues that if used by the judiciary to 
interpret substantive rights it creates the potential that judges will apply their own morality to 
give it content.
195
 Additionally as it is apparent that there are multiple possible and 
conflicting conceptions of dignity and of the constituent human worth
196
 this creates the 
potential for inconstancy when principle is applied and in the conclusions reached using it,
197
 
which in turn may render judgements reached using the principle of dignify of questionable 
legitimacy
198
 given that certainty is an important element of the rule of law.
199
 Feldman thus 
warns that judicial regard to dignity may ‘simply shift the terminology in which disputes are 
conducted rather than resolv[e] them,’200 limiting its utility as a judicial interpretive tool.201 
 
However, these particular arguments against the interpretive use of dignity are largely 
addressed when the principle is given content by the concept of purposive agency and the 
generic rights that derive from it within the PGC.
202
 Derived by dialectical reasoning, 
whether directly necessary or via the contingent assumption of the moral point of view or the 
golden rule, imbues dignity with a content which must be accepted on pain of logical 
inconsistency or the abandonment of a commitment of the current human rights regime.
203
 
The form of this argument for this consent to be given to dignity, the avoidance of self 
contradiction, is itself not alien to the domestic courts. It was apparent in the Torture 
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Evidence case of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2)
204
 where Lord 
Hoffman argued that the courts could not accept evidence obtained by torture without 
contradicting the fundamental tenets of the British legal system.
205
 If this approach is 
accepted then the problem of the uncertainty and competing conceptions of dignity is 
resolved in favour of purposive agency and the PGC. 
 
It is acknowledged that, even guided by the PGC, there is still room for judicial disagreement 
about what respect for purposive agency and the generic rights or interests that follow from it 
require on the facts of particular cases.
206
 However, such disagreement currently exists in 
judicial attitudes as to how the Convention rights should be interpreted, and all interpretative 
approaches carry with them the potential for disagreement as to how they should be applied 
and the need for them themselves to be interpreted.
207
 The advantage of regard to a PGC 
inspired conception of dignity is that their judgements will be guided by a fundamental 
justificatory basis of human rights.
208
 The role of deciding such disputes within a society has 
been allocated by society to the judiciary, and although this cannot ensure consensus or 
guarantee correctness of interpretation of the requirements of purposive agency and the PGC, 
it has been decided to give them the adjudicative jurisdiction over the interpretation of human 
rights.
209
  
 
This adjudication is not undemocratic, rather it strengthens ‘accountability by exposing 
decisions to public scrutiny.’210 In protecting minorities from intolerant majorities, the courts 
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act democratically by upholding the value of each individual upon which democracy is 
based,
211
 enabling minorities to have means by which to participate in process of which 
legitimates the norms effecting them.
212
 As Fredman argues, this can be seen in practice from 
the nature of the claimants who have been ‘prisoners, detainees, the homeless and the 
excluded.’213  
 
From the Acceptance of Dignity to the Acceptance of Rights 
The success of a transplantation of a norm has long been argued by constitutional theorists to 
be heavily dependent on it compatibility with the contextual characteristics of the recipient 
legal system,
214
 including its ‘maxims of government’,215 political context216 and the ‘social, 
cultural and legal circumstances that have shaped’217 its constitution, when contrasted with 
those of the donor system. Unlike the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen, the German Basic law or indeed the ECHR, the HRA did not arise from any clear 
widespread movement to depart from a system government which involved sustained 
systematic infringement for the fundamental value of man. In light of this difference of 
context, it is less surprising that its introduction and enforcement has been met with some 
resistance.
218
 It is submitted that this domestic context can be seen to be an underlying cause 
of the perception amongst some sections of the British public and press that the HRA’s 
incorporation of the Convention rights is an alien and unnecessary piece of legislation 
imposed by our European neighbours. 
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In the absence of such a nationwide popular movement recognising the need for the greater 
protection of rights, it is submitted that one means by which the acceptance of the Convention 
rights as part of domestic law might be increased is by clearly showing them to be based in 
the fundamental value individuals share by being a human. The HRA like the ECHR 
contained no such explicit recognition of the basis of human rights in the value shared by all 
humans
219
 which constitutes their dignity. However, by clearly rooting the interpretation of 
the Convention rights in a philosophically cogent concept of the dignity of the individual, it is 
submitted that the judiciary might help counter the perception of human rights protection as 
something alien and unnecessary. By basing rights in dignity they can be clearly seen to 
derive from an element of what it is to be human, and thus be possessed by all humans, rather 
than being a foreign imposition. 
 
Were the British Bill of Rights currently under consideration
220
 actually created, a 
preambular commitment to dignity would be desirable. It would signal a clear metaphysical 
grounding for the rights which is not explicit in the HRA. It would also give the strongest 
legal support to judicial regard to dignity in the interpretation of human rights and hence also 
facilitate judicial regard to purposive agency and the generic rights as the basis for rights 
interpretation. The Bill of Rights Commission was tasked with promoting ‘a better 
understanding of the true scope’221 of the Convention rights and existing British liberties, the 
recognition of philosophically cogent conception of dignity as the basis of these may go some 
way to achieving this aim.     
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Conclusion 
It is thus, through the use of the concept of dignity, legitimate and practically possible for the 
courts to have regard to purposive agency and the PGC deriving from it as a justified basis 
from which to interpret the Convention rights. By doing so the courts gain guidance in the 
interpretation of the deliberately open textured Convention rights and increate the moral 
legitimacy of their judgements. This will practically enable them to give coherent and logical 
justified answers to the five key questions of rights interpretation which underlie all questions 
of the interpretation of the substantive rights included within the HRA.   
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to add to existing scholarship by establishing that the use of the moral 
Principle of Generic Consistency by the British judiciary, in the interpretation of the 
Convention rights, is both necessary and possible, in light of the current approaches to rights 
interpretation of the domestic and Strasbourg judiciary. Such an interpretative approach was 
argued to be necessitated in a general sense by the open textured wording of the substantive 
rights, an inevitable feature of language, which was deliberately exploited in the drafting 
process to create semantically ambiguous statements of rights. More specifically, the task of 
determining the practical content and application of the rights in cases brought under the 
HRA has been allocated to the courts, and if arbitrariness of interpretation is to be avoided, a 
principled judicial approach to construction is required, one the PGC can provide.  
 
It has been claimed that questions of the scope and application of the Convention rights that 
arise before the courts, are specific manifestations of five fundamental questions of 
interpretation with which it is necessary to engage to determine the Convention’s 
requirements. These questions of who has rights, the substantive nature of the obligations 
they impose, how conflicting rights are to be weighted and balanced to determine priority, as 
well as whether it is possible for a person to waive the benefits of their rights, and finally of 
against whom the rights can be held, in turn have been shown to mirror the substantive, 
distributive and authoritative questions of moral philosophy. Analysis of the approaches to 
these five questions applied in the domestic courts and Strasbourg was used as the foundation 
against which potential receptivity of domestic law to an interpretive approach based in the 
PGC was ultimately analysed. These questions also formed a framework through which the 
substantive requirements of PGC in the Convention rights context was demonstrated. 
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Regard to the PGC, and the respect for the generic rights or interests of freedom and well-
being it requires, in determining the interpretation of the Convention, was shown to be 
supported by the dialectically necessary argument that the PGC must be recognised by all 
agents, on pain of contradicting their agency, as the supreme principle of action. 
Additionally, it has been shown that the acceptance of a fundamental tenet of international 
human rights treaties, impartiality between the treatment of persons’ rights, entails the 
recognition and acceptance of the PGC as the supreme principle of morality in a dialectically 
contingent manner. Similarly it has been argued that a contingent coupling of the dialectically 
necessary recognition of the nature of purposive agency to the acceptance of the moral point 
of view also dialectically entails the acceptance of the PGC. 
 
The legal coherence of the interpretive use of the PGC by the courts, was demonstrated 
through its fit with the settled core features of the Convention rights under Dworkin’s criteria 
of interpretive validity: their universality, their inherent and inalienable nature and their rights 
rather than duties focus.  
 
The practical consequences and utility of regard to the PGC by the judiciary in addressing the 
five questions of Convention rights interpretation under the HRA was demonstrated in 
chapter seven. Here it was also shown that jurisprudence of the ECtHR does not prevent the 
domestic courts from adopting the integrations of the Convention rights which the PGC 
dialectically requires, even if they continue to apply the mirror principle and its no more than 
element which this thesis has argued is unjustified and conflicts with the aim of the HRA to 
create a culture of domestic rights protection. 
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The means through which the interpretive use of the PGC can be accomplished in the most 
judicially acceptable manner was argued in the penultimate chapter to be by its use to give to 
give content to the principle of dignity. The possession of dignity, as a justificatory basis in 
the human rights documents of the 20
th
 Century, is semantically open to being defined as 
constituted by purposive agency thus enabling the judiciary to through it interpretively apply 
the requirements of the PGC to the Convention rights. This argument has been shown to be 
supported by the jurisprudence of domestic and foreign courts, which demonstrate that such 
an interpretive use of dignity is within the ability of the British judiciary.  
 
Although it has been shown that the interpretative use of the PGC is both necessary and 
possible, it has also been conceded that the approach advocated cannot completely eradicate 
uncertainty from the interpretation of the Convention rights. What the generic rights to 
freedom and well-being themselves require on the facts of a particular case can be open to 
dispute. Similarly, the weight of the moral status of beings and their generic rights or interests 
in cases where they conflict is a matter of judgement. However, as established at the very 
beginning of the thesis and in the survey of the domestic and Convention case law, 
uncertainty as to the requirement of rights is already present both within the wording of the 
Convention and in the current judicial approaches to their interpretation. Regard to PGC in 
interpretation, however, improves upon the present situation by providing a coherent and 
justified principled basis for the resolution of the five questions of interpretation where one is 
currently lacking. The dialectical justifications for the PGC give it force, and its content 
forces the judiciary to engage directly with the fundamental questions of rights interpretation 
from a principle perspective in a way that has been absent from their judgements, particularly 
on the questions of the nature of the obligations imposed by the Convention rights, and 
whether they are rights under the will or interest conception. 
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Ultimately, it is this engagement with the fundamental basis of rights that it is hoped this 
thesis will encourage. It has been shown that such an approach can provide principled 
guidance on all questions of substantive Convention rights interpretation. It is conceded that, 
although regard to the PGC has been shown to be both dialectically necessarily required and 
contingently entailed by the acceptance of the most basic moral principles or the acceptance 
of the authority of the international human rights regime, and practically possible though the 
principle of dignity, the courts may be unwilling to engage explicitly with the generic needs 
of freedom and well-being, declining to recognise that such moral reasoning is within their 
powers, as it has been argued to be. If this proves to be the case it is hoped that they will at 
least feel encouraged by the arguments of this thesis to engage directly and openly with the 
five fundamental questions of rights interpretation and in a principled manner. This is 
approach will be one that the author will argue for in the research which will follow on from 
this thesis, as a means of analysing the fundamental issues at stake in cases of rights 
interpretation. 
 
It is also hoped that the judicial approach which has been advocated will also lead to a wider 
public recognition and understanding of the fundamental nature of the open textured 
Convention rights, within society generally. As submitted at the end of the eighth chapter, the 
lack of an explicit statement of the Convention rights within the HRA, as something more 
than positivist norms, can be seen to have contributed to the misunderstanding and hostility 
that has sometimes surrounded them. It is submitted that, were the rights seen clearly as the 
product of answers to the authoritative, substantive and distributive questions of morality, 
there might be a re-characterisation of the debate about their interpretation and application 
and a reduction in hostility to them. The public debates on the rights of immigrants and 
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prisoners can only be helped by a recognition that the possibility of the possession of rights 
derives from agency, not nationality or personal liberty. Similarly the continuing debate of a 
right to die would benefit from a contribution to the clearer understanding that fundamentally 
at issue are questions of the outer limits of positive obligations and the capacity to waive the 
benefits of rights. 
 
It is in this way that the arguments made in this thesis will be continued, through arguing for 
an increased recognition of the fundamental moral dimension of human rights which in turn 
supports legitimacy of rights claims generally and the HRA in particular. Alongside, and 
drawing support from this general argument, the judicial approaches to the interpretation of 
the Convention rights will be critiqued from the perspective of the PGC’s answers to the five 
fundamental questions of interpretation, with the aim of informing the debate with the light of 
fundamental principles, in the greater hope that through the such debate the right rights 
judgements will be reached. 
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